Session Forty-One, The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being

Session Forty-One

The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being — The Second Proof: Traditions (Riwayāt) — The Eighth Group — The First and Second Traditions — The Ninth Group — The First, Second, and Third Subgroups — The Tenth Group

May 11, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

We noted that several proofs have been invoked to prove the inherent dignity of the human being. The first proof consisted of some of the verses, which were examined, and the objection of the conflict of certain other verses was answered.

The Second Proof: Traditions (Riwayāt)

The second proof is the traditions (riwayat); we have numerous traditions indicating the inherent dignity of the human being. These traditions are divided into several groups. I shall quote one or two traditions from each of these groups because they are very numerous. In my view, the groups of traditions that indicate these matters by implication (bi-l-mulazamah) or by correspondence (bi-l-mutabaqah) are abundant. Furthermore, some of the traditions indicate not only this dimension of inherent dignity, but also certain rights arising from the inherent dignity of the human being.

The Eighth Group

The eighth group of traditions that can, in some manner, indicate inherent dignity—and that the human being qua human being enjoys a minimum of respect, nobility, and dignity, on the basis of which certain rights are also established for him—consists of traditions that generally prohibit any kind of torture, intimidation, and surprise killing (fatk). Regarding confession, traditions have been transmitted stating that if a person’s confession is obtained under pressure, torture, imprisonment, threat, or intimidation, it does not entail a legal punishment (hadd). To be sure, some exceptions have been mentioned regarding torture, but those exceptions are not proof of the absence of this standing, respect, and dignity in the human being; they have a justification that has been presented in its proper place.

The First Tradition

The first tradition: “From Abu al-Bakhtari, from Ja’far, from his father, that Ali (peace be upon him) said: ‘Whoever confesses under stripping, imprisonment, intimidation, or threat, there is no legal punishment (hadd) upon him'” (عَنْ أَبِي الْبَخْتَرِيِّ عَنْ جَعْفَرٍ عَنْ أَبِيهِ أَنَّ عَلِيّاً قَالَ مَنْ أَقَرَّ عِنْدَ تَجْرِيدٍ أَوْ حَبْسٍ أَوْ تَخْوِيفٍ أَوْ تَهْدِيدٍ فَلَا حَدَّ عَلَيْهِ). It states that if someone confesses under specific conditions such as imprisonment, intimidation, and threat, a legal punishment is not established for him by virtue of this confession. This indicates a kind of humane behavior, treatment, and confrontation even with criminals, because, after all, confession is one of the ways to establish a legal punishment.

Question:

Professor: For whatever reason, that He removes punishment from someone who confesses under torture is higher than a legislative prohibition (nahy taklifi) in the manner you describe. That the punishment of an accused is negated by confession under extraordinary conditions, torture, and pressure—nothing can be conceptualized for this matter other than observing the boundary and a minimum of respect for the human being. That the human being has this choice to confess by himself indicates the special position of the human being. Of course, if evidence (bayyinah), testimony, and other matters lead to a ruling by the judge, that is another discussion; however, that no one under conventional conditions can torture another to extract a confession and then punish him indicates a specific standing for the human being.

The second tradition concerns surprise killing (fatk), meaning surprise killing and assassination; even concerning those who are sentenced to death, surprise killing is prohibited. We witnessed an example of this in the story of Muslim ibn Aqil in the house of Hani ibn Urwah. This is supported by traditions such as: “And the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him and his family) prohibited surprise killing” (وَ قَدْ نَهَى رَسُولُ اللَّهِ عَنِ الْفَتْكِ). Islam does not approve of this. Consequently, even if this prohibition is not a binding prohibition (tahrimi) but a discouraging one (tanzihi), it is still sufficient to prove our claim. We wish to prove the uncommendable nature of certain treatments and confrontations with human beings qua human being, and that this is based on a set of characteristics and advantages the human being possesses.

“From Abu al-Sabbah al-Kinani, who said: ‘I said to Abu Abdillah (peace be upon him): Indeed, we have a neighbor from Hamdan called al-Ja’d ibn Abdillah, who sits with us; and when we mention Ali, the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), and his virtue, he slanders him… Do you permit me concerning him?’—meaning to kill him. ‘He said: O Abu al-Sabbah! Would you actually do it? I said: Yes, by Allah, if you permit me, I shall lie in wait for him, and when he is there, I shall rush upon him with my sword and strike him until I kill him. He said: O Abu al-Sabbah! This is surprise killing (fatk), and the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him and his family) prohibited surprise killing. O Abu al-Sabbah! Indeed, Islam has fettered surprise killing'” (عَنْ أَبِي الصَّبَّاحِ الْكِنَانِيِّ قَالَ قُلْتُ لِأَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ إِنَّ لَنَا جَاراً مِنْ هَمْدَانَ يُقَالُ لَهُ الْجَعْدُ بْنُ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ وَ هُوَ يَجْلِسُ إِلَيْنَا فَنَذْكُرُ عَلِيّاً أَمِيرَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَ فَضْلَهُ فَيَقَعُ فِيهِ … قَالَ فَقَالَ يَا أَبَا الصَّبَّاحِ أَ وَ كُنْتَ فَاعِلًا فَقُلْتُ إِي وَ اللَّهِ لَئِنْ أَذِنْتَ لِي فِيهِ لَأَرْصُدَنَّهُ فَإِذَا صَارَ فِيهَا اقْتَقَمْتُ عَلَيْهِ بِسَيْفِي فَخَبَطْتُهُ حَتَّى أَقْتُلَهُ قَالَ فَقَالَ يَا أَبَا الصَّبَّاحِ هَذَا الْفَتْكُ وَ قَدْ نَهَى رَسُولُ اللَّهِ عَنِ الْفَتْكِ يَا أَبَا الصَّبَّاحِ إِنَّ الْإِسْلَامَ قَيَّدَ الْفَتْكَ). Here, too, the Imam prohibited surprise killing.

What is the reason that the Imam prohibited surprise killing? Why has surprise killing been prohibited? At the very least, it indicates a degree and standing for the human being that does not permit surprise killing. I shall state later in the discussion of punishments that even in punishments, the rights of criminals and those who must be punished must be observed. These, in part, indicate that very dignity established for the human being qua human being.

Question:

Professor: We are not currently in a position to express limits and boundaries;… therefore, we said “in part.” But even with these limits, the argument from this tradition is not compromised. This tradition is recorded in al-Kafi and is authentic.

Question:

Professor: A point is raised as an objection to the traditions, which primarily relates to the weakness of the chain of transmission of some of these traditions, which I shall answer later.

The Ninth Group

The ninth group consists of traditions pointing to the existence of one of the three factors we previously addressed in the discussion of the foundations of inherent dignity. Of course, we can mention each of the traditions related to these three factors independently; we have some traditions indicating the existence of intellect in the human being, traditions indicating the existence of will and choice in the human being, and traditions indicating the liberty and freedom of the human being. The traditions proving these matters are numerous, and we do not wish to read those traditions here.

In our discussion of the foundations of inherent dignity, when mentioning the first category of advantages, we mainly pointed to these few elements: intellect, will, choice, the right to select, and human emotions and feelings present within the human being’s existence. When we mentioned the evidence for each of these, we briefly pointed to some of these traditions. Here, however, we mention the collection of those traditions under a single group, although it includes a large number of traditions. Traditions indicating the existence of a specific blessing in the human being—where the necessity of the existence of such blessings in the human being and their exclusivity to him indicate a specific position and standing for the human being—I shall quote one tradition from each of these categories.

The First Subgroup

In a tradition narrated from the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) and recorded by the late Kulayni in al-Kafi, it is stated: “O people! Indeed, Adam did not beget a slave nor a handmaid, and indeed, all the people are free” (أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنَّ آدَمَ لَمْ يَلِدْ عَبْداً وَ لَا أَمَةً وَ إِنَّ النَّاسَ كُلَّهُمْ أَحْرَارٌ)—all human beings are created free. We have similar statements in Nahj al-Balaghah where the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him), in letters or testaments to his children, referred to this matter.

The Second Subgroup

Traditions indicating the existence of intellect in the human being, such as the very tradition narrated from the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) in which the Imam stated: God created the angels from intellect without desire, the animals from desire without intellect, and the human being compounded of both. That there exists within the human being’s existence a substance and gem called the intellect is an advantage.

Or, saying 413 of Nahj al-Balaghah: “Sufficient for you of your intellect is what clarifies for you the paths of your deviation from your guidance” (كَافِكَ مِنْ عَقْلِكَ مَا أَوْضَحَ لَكَ سُبُلَ غَيِّكَ مِنْ رُشْدِكَ).

The Third Subgroup

Traditions indicating the existence of will in the human being—traditions indicating that the human being is the possessor of will, choice, and has the right to select. These traditions also indicate the existence of this advantage in the human being, and naturally, with this advantage, the human being comes to possess certain rights, and care must be shown toward him.

Or this very tradition: “The people are equal like the teeth of a comb” (النَّاسُ سَوَاءٌ كَأَسْنَانِ الْمُشْطِ). Here, too, the discussion is about the human being, and is not about the believer and the non-believer. It is clear that this equality is not total, but is rather partial; partial equality is inevitably related to some privileges and rights. That is, they are equal in benefiting from blessings, and the divinely bestowed gifts are partially identical for human beings; human beings, setting aside certain accidental states, are equal with one another in essential matters and essential human elements. Is this other than that God has thereby magnified and ennobled the human being?

Therefore, these traditions, which we placed under a single group, indicate the existence of these advantages in the human being, and the existence of these advantages itself indicates the ennoblement of the human being. God has thereby ennobled the human being; God, by granting these blessings to the human being and making him benefit from these specific advantages, has honored him. These advantages are also actually present in all human beings. God does not state that if you become believers, you have the right to select; if you become Muslims and pious, you are free; if you are pious, you are equal; if you become servants of God and believe, you have the right to select—none of these exist. God has never stated that the intellect is only for the believers.

Yes, we previously noted that the intellect is used in two senses: one is a specific meaning, which is: “the intellect is that by which the All-Merciful is worshipped and Paradise is acquired”; but the intellect in the sense that the human being can contemplate, discover the unknown by the conjunction of known facts, and acquire it, exists in all human beings and is actually present. The very fact that these natural potentials and these natural capabilities exist in the human being is, in the words of Martyr Mutahhari, the document of a series of natural rights—meaning the human being cannot be coerced, cannot be tortured; he has the right to choose and pursue the path he wishes. This is that very minimum of rights established for the human being.

The Tenth Group

The tenth group of traditions we shall not enter into further, because we referred to it previously; this group consists of some of the chapters of Kitab al-Ishrah (The Book of Companionship). To be sure, some of the groups we mentioned in previous discussions are, in some manner and with some differences, recorded in Kitab al-Ishrah. However, I wish to argue that the entirety of this section or this book, as recorded in our traditional compendiums—in al-Kafi and Wasail al-Shiah—indicates in part the inherent dignity of the human being. Of course, what relates to companionship, interaction, and socializing with the people is categorized in this book; in some cases, the recommendation of certain actions is expressed, and in others, the dislike of certain actions or even the prohibition of some actions is stated. Among the traditions, some relate to the manner of treating disbelievers.

Question:

Professor: What is in your mind is Kitab al-Maruf, under enjoining right and forbidding wrong, which has mentioned a series of cases; but the title Kitab al-Ishrah appears in volume 12 of Wasail al-Shiah… the chapters on the rulings of companionship in travel… I request you to look at the table of contents of these two books—namely, Kitab al-Ishrah in al-Kafi and Kitab al-Ishrah in Wasail al-Shiah—so that it becomes clear which section can indicate inherent dignity. Thus, the tenth group is in reality some traditions of Kitab al-Ishrah.

In my view, these ten groups are sufficient to prove the claim.

Discussion of the Next Session

In opposition to this proof, two major objections exist that we must answer:
The first objection concerns the weakness of these traditions—that these traditions are weak in their chain of transmission. Of course, we do not examine the traditions one by one, but among these traditions, those with a weak chain of transmission are not few. The recognized rules accepted in biography (ilm al-rijal) do not govern these traditions.
The second and more important objection is the existence of conflicting traditions, just as this objection was raised regarding the verses.
We shall answer these two objections in the next session, God willing.