Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi in an Interview with Ijtihad Network: Both Philosophy Influenced the Principles, and the Principles Influenced Philosophy!

“The work carried out in the field of the philosophy of language had its origin in the science of principles (ilm al-usul) and subsequently entered philosophy. In philosophy and philosophical thinking, besides recognition and cognition, we have a discussion called the value, criterion, standards, and sources of cognition. In the past, since the subject of philosophy was defined as ‘existence as existence’ (wujud bi-ma huwa wujud), cognitive discussions were generally raised under the discussion of existence and the stages of being—such as the issue of mental existence (al-wujud al-dhihni), the issue of the soul (nafs), and the like. However, today, epistemology has transformed into an independent subject distinct from ontology. This is undoubtedly among the influences of the science of principles on philosophical discussions.”

Exclusive to Ijtihad Network: The anniversary of the passing of the late Sheikh Muhammad Hossein Isfahani (Kampani) is an appropriate opportunity to examine the relationship between philosophy and the science of principles (ilm al-usul)—two disciplines in which that magnificent researcher was preeminent, so much so that his principles book Nihayat al-Dirayah is replete with philosophical notes and the synthesis of principles and philosophical rules.

However, Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi, like his master, the late Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified), believes that confusing principles rules with philosophical rules and introducing philosophy into the science of principles is a major error; because the principles of jurisprudence is a common (urfi) science and has no relation to the rational precision of philosophers.

The lecturer of advanced (Kharij) jurisprudence and principles at the Islamic Seminary of Qom, while acknowledging the mutual influence of these two sciences on one another, strives in this interview to also list the errors of philosopher-principles scholars in introducing philosophical rules into the science of principles. The details of this interview are as follows:

Ijtihad: Is the precise philosophical perspective in the principles of jurisprudence not in conflict with the inherent conventional nature (urfiyyah) of jurisprudence?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: These two questions must be separated from one another. At one time, we speak of the role of philosophy in the science of principles of jurisprudence, and at another time, we speak of its role in the science of jurisprudence. In the first part, which is the debate on the interaction and connection between the science of philosophy and the principles of jurisprudence, it is not only acceptable but necessary to a certain extent, while in another aspect it is unacceptable.

In the history of the science of principles, perhaps in the distant past and in the era close to the era of the Imams (peace be upon them), there was no great need for philosophical thinking; however, gradually, portions of theological (kalami) discussions also entered the principles of jurisprudence. Yet it was perhaps since the time of Al-Muhaqqiq al-Khwansari in the eleventh century AH that the grounds for the entry of philosophical thinking into the domain of the principles of jurisprudence were prepared. Gradually, in subsequent years, this prepared the ground for Vahid Behbahani, relying on this very premise, to form a movement against the Akhbaris.

As some prominent figures, such as the late Martyr Sadr, have also stated, philosophy and the principles of jurisprudence have exerted a mutual influence on one another; meaning, one of the influential factors in the triumph of the independent reasoning (ijtihad) school over the Akhbaris was the entry of philosophical thinking into the science of principles.

When we speak of the influence of philosophy on the principles of jurisprudence, it has a specific scope. Philosophical thinking, particularly when positioned in comparison with the principles of jurisprudence, strengthened portions of the principles of jurisprudence and, particularly in the discussions of verbal evidences (mabahith al-alfaz), caused it to exert influences beyond the science of principles itself.

Therefore, within a certain scope, we can say that the entry of philosophical thinking enriched the principles of jurisprudence; but concurrently, it must be noted that the foundation of the science of principles is established upon conventional constructs (i’tibariyyat), and we must be careful that a confusion between realities (haqiqiyyat) and conventional constructs does not occur.

That is, while a precise philosophical perspective is necessary in the domain of the principles of jurisprudence and has had highly positive effects after the period of the destruction of Akhbarism, we must concurrently be careful that this confusion does not occur and boundaries are preserved.

For example, the late Imam Khomeini points to this note in the chapter of cause and consequence (sabab wa musabbab). When the discussion of cause and consequence is raised, they usually apply it on the scale of ontological causes, and the interpretations and analyses are carried out within that very framework. However, the late Imam, regarding causality and consequence in the science of principles, is of the opinion that causality here is not of the nature of ontological causalities; meaning, just as in the real world something is a real cause and real agent in something else, here causes in reality construct the subject for rational conventions (al-i’tibarat al-uqala’iyyah).

For example, when we say that a contract of sale (aqd al-bay’) is the cause of ownership (milkiyyah), he believes that this causality is not ontological, like the causality of fire for heat; rather, this causality means that when the contract of sale occurs, a subject is prepared for the convention of the rational people (uqa’la) on ownership, rather than there being a real physical action and reaction.

Or, for example, in the chapter of the presumption of continuity (istishab), they emphasize that rational and philosophical precisions must be cast aside. Likewise, in the issue of the preservation of the subject in istishab, and also in the unity of the certain proposition (al-qadiyyah al-maytiqanah) and the doubted proposition (al-qadiyyah al-mashkukah), that very unity from the perspective of common understanding (urf) is the criterion, not what intellect and rational and philosophical precisions require. This concerns the principles of jurisprudence.

Ijtihad: In what manner did the science of principles influence the discipline of philosophy?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: As an example, the work carried out in the field of the philosophy of language had its origin in the science of principles and subsequently entered philosophy.

In philosophy and philosophical thinking, besides recognition and cognition, we have a discussion called the value, criterion, standards, and sources of cognition. In the past, since the subject of philosophy was defined as “existence as existence” (wujud bi-ma huwa wujud), cognitive discussions were generally raised under the discussion of existence and the stages of being—such as the issue of mental existence (al-wujud al-dhihni), the issue of the soul (nafs), and the like. However, today, epistemology has transformed into an independent subject distinct from ontology. This is undoubtedly among the influences of the science of principles on philosophical discussions.

The examples for this discussion are not few. Therefore, principles and philosophy have had mutual influences on one another. Philosophy, in a sense, has strengthened principles and consolidated its foundations against the destructive current of Akhbarism; concurrently, it has also brought about new issues in the science of principles. Conversely, the science of principles has introduced discussions into philosophy, such as discussions related to epistemology and issues related to the analysis of language and the like.

It can be stated with certainty that philosophical thinking was influential in the science of principles and truly enriched it; but from the other side, when innovations took shape in the science of principles, they also exerted influences on philosophy. For example, the work carried out in the field of the philosophy of language had its origin in the science of principles and subsequently entered philosophy.

Regarding jurisprudence, naturally the entry of philosophical thinking into the science of jurisprudence ultimately affects deduction, which is the primary work of jurisprudence. However, concurrently within jurisprudence itself, the question arises as to whether we can proceed to deduction with philosophical thinking and such rational precisions or not?

I rely on a statement by the late Imam Khomeini in this regard, where he lists among the conditions of ijtihad that the jurist must be familiar with common, conversational conventions (muhawarat-e urfi) and the understanding of conventional subjects; because the conversations of the Book and the Sunnah have been carried out in accordance with conversational conventions. Furthermore, the condition for ijtihad is that we do not confuse rational precisions with conventional foundations. He states that in this field, much confusion has occurred, causing preoccupation for a number of scholars and resulting in numerous difficulties.

That we consider the condition of ijtihad to be the understanding of common conventions and being familiar with conversational conventions is a critical point; therefore, care must be exercised so that these confusions do not arise. Concurrently, the intellect (aql) also has its specific utility in jurisprudence; therefore, care must be exercised so that both confusion is avoided and the intellect preserves its standing.

Ijtihad: Reason (aql) is proposed as one of the sources for deducing Sharia rulings. Is reason different from rational precisions? Furthermore, how must we be careful to avoid these confusions?

Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: It has been explained in its proper place which comprehensions of which intellect—and within what domain—serve as sources of deduction. It is not the case that the intellect, absolutely, is a source of deduction.

On the other hand, the urf (common understanding) does not intervene in deducing or establishing Sharia rulings, but we primarily attribute influence to the urf within the domain of subjects. To identify subjects, we refer to the urf. Grand scholars such as Sahib al-Jawahir and the late Sheikh al-Ansari in Al-Makasib have referred the identification of subjects to the urf and specified its scope.

For example, Sahib al-Jawahir stated that the urf is the reference in any word for which the Lawgiver has not considered a specific meaning. If a subject is among the deduced subjects (al-mawdu’at al-mustanbatah) whose boundaries and limits have been declared by the Lawgiver, we have no debate; but if the Lawgiver has not specified boundaries for a subject and has not presented a specific meaning, here the reference is the urf.

Some commentators explicitly state that the ontological system (takwin) is designed in a certain way, and the legislative system (tashri’) is on the scale of the ontological system, subsequently deriving certain applications, whereas this subject itself is a subject of discussion—whether we can examine the legislative system on the scale of the ontological system, or whether the legislative system is an independent system.

In Al-Makasib, the late Sheikh al-Ansari, in numerous instances—particularly in the discussion of transactions involving ritually impure objects (a’yan-e najisah)—explicitly states that this subject has been referred to the urf. Or the criterion for the correctness of a transaction is that it must possess a halal (lawful) benefit (manfa’at-e muhallalah). This criterion was proposed by the Lawgiver, but it is the urf that determines whether a certain thing possesses a halal benefit or not. Or, for example, the late Al-Shahid al-Thani, in the discussion of singing (ghina), after much discussion, says that it is preferable to refer to the urf.

In any case, in deducing Sharia rulings, the urf has no intervention; however, within the domain of subjects and identifying subjects, the urf does intervene. Of course, here too a disagreement exists as to whether identifying the instances (masadiq) of concepts is entirely with the urf or not, but what is definite is that verifying the instances is with the urf; meaning, to verify whether a certain liquid is an instance of wine (khamr) or not, or whether a certain melody is ghina or not, one must refer to the urf.