Ayatollah Sayyid Mojtaba Nourmofidi in an Interview with Ijtihad Magazine: The Benefit of Art Is That It Transforms the Commanding Self into the Tranquil Self

The Head of the Contemporary Jurisprudence Research Institute in an Interview with the Ijtihad Network:

The benefit of art is that it transforms the commanding self into the tranquil self / The role of time and place in texts related to the jurisprudence of art is highly significant / Some reduce today’s issues in the jurisprudence of art to matters such as looking at a non-mahram

Today, profound questions arise in the field of film and cinema as one manifestation of art, and they require special examination. Questions today are not limited to whether a woman’s face or clothing may be shown in a manner inconsistent with religious standards. For example, may a man apply makeup to a woman and vice versa? The questions extend beyond these matters. These challenges must be examined within the jurisprudence of art and the philosophy of the jurisprudence of art.

Exclusive to the Ijtihad Network: Emerging branches of jurisprudence appear to have experienced increasing growth over the past two decades. Scholars of jurisprudence have reached what is almost an unwritten consensus that contemporary human issues must be answered from the perspective of jurisprudential knowledge. One of the most important requirements for establishing a new branch of jurisprudence and making it possible to resolve its issues is the formulation of jurisprudential rules specific to that field. We spoke with Professor Sayyid Mojtaba Nourmofidi, Head of the Contemporary Jurisprudence Research Institute, regarding rules specific to the jurisprudence of art. The teacher of advanced jurisprudence and principles of jurisprudence at the Qom Seminary, however, focused primarily on explaining art and precisely defining the jurisprudence of art. At the end, he also offered several points concerning the specific rules of the jurisprudence of art and the general approach to applying these rules in resolving its issues. The full text of the Ijtihad Network’s exclusive interview with Professor Nourmofidi follows:

Ijtihad: What is the jurisprudence of art, and in what respects does it differ from similar branches of jurisprudence, such as media jurisprudence, communications jurisprudence, and cyberspace jurisprudence?

Ayatollah Nourmofidi: To define the jurisprudence of art, we must first understand art itself. The definition of jurisprudence is clear, but art is a concept over which there is extensive disagreement and is perhaps one of those concepts that is both easy and impossible to define. Some define art as an inner state or attribute, some as a form of knowledge or science, and others as a work created by a human being. There are also those who regard the disagreement as concerning whether art is purposeful or purposeless. In other words, there is disagreement concerning art from several perspectives. Some regard art as a form of knowledge. Some consider it a psychological state. Others regard it as an act or deed performed by a human being. Therefore, defining the jurisprudence of art on the basis of different definitions of art will produce different results. If we say that art belongs to the category of knowledge and understanding, the question arises whether the jurisprudence of art—as a jurisprudence that explains the rulings governing the conduct of legally accountable persons in various spheres—can seek to state the ruling concerning an aspect of human life that falls within the realm of knowledge and understanding. We must therefore determine whether a position can be adopted regarding knowledge itself.

Or, for example, if we regard art as an inner state, can jurisprudence fundamentally adopt a position regarding inward acts, or does it relate only to outward actions? Given the disagreement over the definition of art, precisely defining the jurisprudence of art is therefore difficult unless we extract a common element from these definitions or focus and agree upon one of art’s implications and effects and then define the jurisprudence of art. Furthermore, modern art has fundamentally become entirely distinct from traditional and authentic art. The basic fact that art is as old as humanity cannot be denied. Human beings innately love beauty, and Almighty God has also affirmed this: “Indeed, God is beautiful and loves beauty.” Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that art is as old as humanity and that human beings have always attempted to leave behind works representing the most beautiful things, whether in the form of poetry, music, certain forms of prose, paintings, or sculptures. This has a very long history and is therefore as old as humanity itself. Even today, when archaeologists speak of explorations relating to distant periods, there is perhaps no instance in which they discover something connected with human beings and human life in the past without also finding an artistic work, such as artistic dimensions in the clothing, vessels, and ornaments they used.

It may be said that, in the modern world, modern art has become different, developed distinct branches, and acquired a particular character. For example, during one period, some Western scholars emphasized that art is fundamentally something that must be entirely devoid of religious and ethical purposes. This is the theory of art for art’s sake, which some advocate. When this view is placed alongside Ibn Sina’s statement in al-Isharat that the benefit of art is that it transforms the commanding self into the tranquil self, and that art is something that directs human imagination toward sacred imaginings and leads it out of carnal illusions, the considerable distance between these two perspectives becomes apparent.

Among some Islamic thinkers, we find views that go even further—that is, particular orientations that may indicate a characteristic or attribute of art. My purpose in referring to this point was to demonstrate that, in defining art, we encounter a broad spectrum of views and ideas. If we wish to define the jurisprudence of art on the basis of these differing opinions and views, we must define it in parallel with the various definitions offered for art. Setting aside the point I mentioned, however, and regardless of whether art should be understood by stating its conceptual components, through its implications and effects, or by combining the two, in order to determine the position of jurisprudence in this regard, we will proceed on the assumption that art is a manifestation of human inner states that emerges in the form of an act.

In light of these preliminaries and existing disagreements, if we wish to offer a general nominal definition that distinguishes this jurisprudence from other specialized branches of jurisprudence, we must say that the jurisprudence of art consists of rulings concerning every act and form of conduct by legally accountable persons that is in some way related to a relatively extraordinary, beautiful, and perhaps unusual work. This is because art inherently possesses this aspect of beauty, at least according to its claim. It is undeniable that an artistic work is something created by a legally accountable person in the form of speech or action, with or without an instrument. It is in some way distinct from the ordinary speech, conduct, and actions of people. If someone composes a poem, it naturally possesses beauty, even though beauty has different degrees. The creation of music, the making of sculptures, and the other branches of art that have emerged in the modern world all possess a kind of beauty.

In any event, we wish to know what rulings apply to these works and actions in their various dimensions from the perspective of jurisprudence and the position of the Sharia, which explains the rulings governing the conduct of legally accountable persons. With this definition, the jurisprudence of art becomes entirely distinct from the other specialized branches of jurisprudence mentioned in the question. If we consider art in its general sense, it may manifest itself in the way someone dresses. In other words, if someone displays particular taste and refinement in choosing clothes, we do not say that he has created a work of art. One may display particular taste and refinement and use this means within media jurisprudence, communications, or cyberspace. That is art in its general sense.

For example, someone working in the media may employ particular taste and refinement to achieve greater impact, whether in advertising, reporting news, introducing a book, or similar activities, and this will naturally attract a larger audience. A teacher conducting a class may have an appealing teaching method, or a speaker’s manner of delivering a speech may hold the audience spellbound. Art can therefore permeate every dimension of human life. However, when we speak of art, we mean art in its particular and technical sense, which causes the person who has created a work to be recognized as the creator of that artistic work and to be described as an artist. Thus, a teacher who conducts a class in an appealing manner is not called an artist. Although it may be said that he communicates the material artistically, he is not called an artist. The jurisprudence of art is therefore entirely distinct from some of the specialized branches of jurisprudence mentioned in the question, although art itself may naturally be present within all these human activities and actions.

Art in its general sense can, of course, also be the subject of jurisprudential examinations, but the question here concerns art in its particular sense. Although the general meaning mentioned may also be used in other fields, it cannot be what is intended by the question.

It is necessary to note that although I attempted to provide a general definition of the jurisprudence of art, it contains many ambiguities in terms of identifying its subject matter. In order to pay proper attention to art as the object to which jurisprudence is applied, we must first attempt to resolve many of the ambiguities surrounding this issue.

When the jurisprudence of art is discussed, the first thing that comes to the mind of a researcher in jurisprudence is to search jurisprudential books for its background in terms of subjects, questions, and issues. The researcher examines the evidence and considers subjects such as painting and depictions of animate or inanimate beings, singing, music, and musical instruments. We then come to performance, which was discussed in a simple form in the past through matters such as men imitating women and vice versa, or the issue of gender mixing. Yet the subject of art, even concerning these matters that have a history and precedent, has become entirely different from the past. Music and singing, for example, have truly undergone transformation. The questions raised about them today have become entirely different. It is not particularly fruitful to organize the network of issues in the various dimensions of the jurisprudence of art by confining ourselves to the same simple questions raised in the past and attempting to answer new issues through them. The writings and issues concerning art generally approach it through those same simple questions from the past. However, if serious work is to be undertaken in the jurisprudence of art, it first appears necessary to remove ambiguities concerning art and its various branches, understand its subjects, and enumerate its questions.

Ijtihad: Please mention a few examples of the new questions and challenges confronting the jurisprudence of art.

Ayatollah Nourmofidi: The art of cinema is highly important, and the requirements of this art mean that when the life of a husband and wife inside their home is portrayed, the woman naturally should not wear hijab in front of her husband, or there should be particular emotional relations between them. Alternatively, in order for the outcome of a play, film, or story to be properly effective, we may have to portray certain aspects of a negative character, some of which may be religiously or ethically impermissible. Is such an act permissible from a jurisprudential perspective?

This question extends beyond the simple questions of the past. I offered this example to show that the issues confronting artists go far beyond those of the past and require greater dialogue, mutual understanding, and a shared comprehension of the subjects in order to produce useful results. I do not mean that we should passively move in whatever direction human life takes, because, in that event, after some time nothing would remain of jurisprudence and religious rulings. Rather, I mean that there must be mutual communication and understanding, specialized subjects must be understood fully, and these matters must not be approached simplistically.

These subjects must be considered within the jurisprudence of art.

Ijtihad: What are the rules specific to the jurisprudence of art? Please name several.

Ayatollah Nourmofidi: In the field of jurisprudential rules, we are not particularly empty-handed when it comes to applying rules in the jurisprudence of art. My point is that our evidence—the verses and narrations—can greatly assist us if it is reread and reviewed. I sometimes feel that some people insist in their speeches and writings that we must look only to jurisprudential rules. Yes, rules can be applied in many instances. Rules such as the prohibition against assisting in sin, the rule of negating domination, the rule of obligation, and similar rules have significant applicability in all specialized branches of jurisprudence. However, we must not overlook the generalities, unrestricted statements, and specific evidence cited to establish the prohibition of certain aspects of art.

For example, in discussing singing, music, sculpture, and painting, the late Shaykh addresses certain views, such as that of Muhaqqiq Sabzevari, who says regarding certain narrations dealing with singing and similar matters that it is not unlikely that they should be interpreted as applying to a particular subject that existed at that time. Thus, this evidence was directed primarily toward the forms in which these things were used during that period. Similarly, the late Imam Khomeini himself said in his discussion of sculpture that its prohibition was due to the fact that sculptures were worshipped at that time. Paying attention to the fact that the evidence was issued within that context and concerned those circumstances can be highly instructive for us.

I do not mean to say that every piece of evidence prohibiting an artistic activity necessarily related only to that period. However, we must review and reread the evidence from this perspective and reconsider the subjects under contemporary conditions. Although these subjects may not have changed outwardly, they have become situated within complex relationships. The role of time and place in ijtihad is therefore a highly important matter that some approach only superficially, whereas the matter is more profound than this. In my view, however, the evidence we possess is genuinely open to examination and, alongside jurisprudential rules, can greatly assist us.