Imam Khomeini’s (RA) Theory of Legal Addresses: Beyond Mirza Naini’s Real Propositions

Certain interpretations of Imam Khomeini’s (RA) intellectual foundations, including the theory of “legal addresses” and “the role of time and place in ijtihad,” have been misunderstood and misguided. Some explanations, whether from direct or indirect students, lack the depth of his perspective and are alien to it. The claim that the theory of legal addresses is merely a refined or elevated version of Mirza Naini’s “real propositions” theory is “entirely unacceptable” and reflects a misunderstanding of this significant principle.

According to Ejtehad reporter, the first academic session of the series “The Intellectual Geometry of Imam Khomeini’s (RA) Jurisprudential and Legal Principles” was held under the auspices of the research group of the Imam Ali (AS) Institute of Higher Education. The session, themed “Examining the Components of the Theory of Legal Addresses,” featured Professor Seyyed Mojtaba Nourmofidi, author of the book An Examination of the Theory of Legal Addresses.

The head of the Contemporary Jurisprudence Research Institute emphasized the importance of clarifying and elucidating Imam Khomeini’s jurisprudential and legal principles at the outset of the discussion. He stated: “The theory of legal addresses is not merely a completion or enhancement of the late Mirza Naini’s ‘real propositions’ theory but represents an independent approach to the issue of how religious rulings are established and legislated. The primary aim of this theory is to explain how divine addresses are directed toward the ‘general public’ and ‘society’ in a manner consistent with rational legislative methods, eliminating the need for superfluous constructs such as deeming non-existent entities as existent.”

Three Fundamental Premises in Understanding the Theory of Legislation

The professor from Qom’s Islamic Seminary categorized discussions related to religious rulings into four main areas: the nature of religious rulings, their types, their scope, and the manner of their establishment and legislation. He emphasized that understanding the process of legislation profoundly impacts the science of jurisprudence and its related branches.

According to Professor Nourmofidi, within the framework of legislation, three prominent and fundamental topics address the quality of establishing rulings from distinct perspectives: the object of commands and prohibitions (whether they pertain to essences or otherwise), real propositions (what it means to establish rulings as real propositions), and the establishment of rulings through legal addresses.

He stressed that these three topics are interconnected, yet each addresses a specific aspect of legislation, and they should not be conflated.

Distinction Between Imam Khomeini’s and Mirza Naini’s Approaches to Real Propositions

The author of An Examination of the Theory of Legal Addresses noted that, unfortunately, some of Imam Khomeini’s (RA) principles—such as the role of time and place in ijtihad—have been subject to incorrect interpretations far removed from the depth of his views. He cautioned that the theory of legal addresses faces a similar risk. Some have attempted to portray the theory of legal addresses as a refined or elevated version of Mirza Naini’s real propositions, an inference he deems unacceptable.

The professor of advanced jurisprudence and principles at Qom’s Islamic Seminary distinguished between Mirza Naini’s and Imam Khomeini’s (RA) definitions of real propositions, highlighting differences derived from Naini’s terminology regarding real and external propositions, including:

• Subject: In external propositions, the subject is individuals, whereas in real propositions, it is the essence as a reflection of individuals.
• Dissolution: Real propositions dissolve into the number of individuals.
• Transformation into Conditional: A real proposition dissolves into a conditional proposition (e.g., “If something exists externally and is deemed wine, it is forbidden”).

Professor Nourmofidi then elaborated on Imam Khomeini’s (RA) perspective, identifying three key differences from Mirza Naini’s view:

1. Subject as Essence: Unlike Mirza Naini, who considers the subject in real propositions as the essence as a reflection of individuals, Imam Khomeini (RA) regards the subject in both real and external propositions as the essence itself. However, in external propositions, it is qualified by the existence of individuals in the external world. He deems it impossible for a ruling to apply to mental or external individuals and rejects the notion of essence as a reflection of the external due to the incompatibility between essence and external individuals (as he explained in discussions on generality and specificity). According to him, essence is united with individuals, not a reflection or indicator of them.
2. Rejection of Dissolution: Imam Khomeini (RA) completely opposes the dissolution of addresses into the number of individuals, and this rejection is a cornerstone of his theory of legal addresses.
3. Rejection of Transformation into Conditional Propositions: Imam Khomeini (RA) does not accept the transformation or dissolution of real propositions into conditional propositions.

Legal Addresses: Focused on the “Addressee,” Not the “Subject”

Professor Nourmofidi emphasized that, despite these differences, Imam Khomeini (RA) accepts the establishment of rulings as real propositions. He clarified that the theory of legal addresses is neither an enhanced version nor a replacement for real propositions but addresses a different aspect of legislation.

He explained that the primary purpose of discussing real propositions is to resolve the issue of extending rulings to absent or non-existent entities. However, the theory of legal addresses fundamentally concerns whether the addressees of divine addresses are individuals or the general public/society. Addressing each individual and assuming dissolution entails unnecessary and futile effort, as the Lawgiver can cover all states, individuals, and obligations with a single address (akin to rational legislative practices), eliminating the need for superfluous constructs like deeming non-existent entities as existent.

In other words, the theory of legal addresses is grounded in the principle that the Lawgiver’s method of legislation mirrors the rational approach, directing laws toward the general public and the collective. This approach simply resolves the issue of extending rulings to non-existent entities by relying on rational methods, without requiring complex justifications. Notably, the theory of legal addresses is not confined to a specific form; it can manifest in both real and external propositions (e.g., a command for a specific jihad), demonstrating its independence and non-exclusivity from types of propositions.

Professor Nourmofidi concluded by asserting that the theory of legal addresses focuses on the “addressee” aspect of jurisprudential propositions. It seeks to view the relationship between the Lawgiver and the law-receiver beyond mere sovereignty and servitude (in the realm of legislation) and align it with rational legislative practices. This approach does not negate other inherent divine rights but solely aims to clarify the method of articulating rulings.