Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles
Session Nineteen
Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Criterion for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, Continued Analysis of the First View, Commentary on the Treatise on Rights, The Importance of Performing Prayer at Its Earliest Time and Its Effects, 1. Prevention of Heedlessness, 2. Comfort at the Moment of Death, 3. The Removal of Sorrow, 4. Salvation from Hellfire
October 8, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion concerned the various views regarding the criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). We noted that the first view is that of conflict (ta’arud) and exception (takhsis); meaning that the presumptive proofs and the practical principles conflict, but the proofs of the practical principles are excepted by the proofs of the presumptive proofs. We outlined the rationale for this conflict and exception, alongside the objections raised against this view.
Thus far, after several developments, objections, and responses, the conclusion is that conflict between presumptive proofs and practical principles is conceivable in brief. This is because efforts were made to formulate and justify the mutual contradiction (tanafi) and mutual denial (takadhub) of the proofs of the practical principles and the proofs of the presumptive proofs. The primary objection was that the subjects of the proofs of the presumptive proofs and those of the practical principles are not identical, and therefore conflict is negated.
This objection was answered. A counter-objection was raised, which was again answered, and ultimately it was claimed that the subject in presumptive proofs and practical principles is identical, as both run under the assumption of ignorance of the actual ruling (al-hukm al-waqi’i), and both have been validated under this assumption.
As for the claim that doubt in one is taken as a condition in its subject and in the other is merely its occasion of application, this ultimately cannot establish any significant difference. This is because both the presumptive proofs and the practical principles run in some manner within the context of doubt. To assert that doubt is a condition in the subject of one and merely the occasion of application of the other is a difference in phrasing and verbal style, nothing more. Therefore, the apparent meaning of the proof of a principle like istishab is: if you were previously certain and subsequently doubted, act upon your prior certainty and presume its continuity. Thus, this has been legislated to run under the assumption of doubt and ignorance of the actual ruling. If istishab runs, then in the context of the presumptive proof, doubt and ignorance are eliminated, leaving no room for the presumptive proof.
On the other hand, the proof of the presumptive proof also requires the establishing of the ruling derived from the presumptive proof, regardless of whether istishab or another practical principle runs or not. When the presumptive proof runs, the doubt and ignorance that existed in the domain of istishab or the principle of exemption are eliminated. Therefore, in this manner, conflict between these two categories of proofs is conceivable in some manner.
Continued Analysis of the First View
Is conflict acceptable? If we accept conflict, then as the author of al-Riyad asserted, its result is exception (takhsis). Indeed, the first view, which is known as conflict, has as its outcome exception—conflict and exception. He states that the proofs of the practical principles and those of the presumptive proofs conflict, and the relationship between them is general and specific in some aspects (‘umum wa-l-khusus min wajh), but we are nevertheless compelled to treat them as general and specific absolutely (‘umum wa-l-khusus mutlaq). We have also explained why, despite their relationship being general and specific in some aspects, we treat them as general and specific absolutely.
This is because they asserted that if we prioritize the proof of the principle, it would render the authority of the presumptive proofs entirely futile (laghw); conversely, if we prioritize the proof of the presumptive proof, it does not render the authority of the principle futile. We explained this in detail: why futility arises under the former assumption, but not under the latter. This is because if the presumptive proof is to run and be authoritative whether a principle contrary to it exists or not, it means that we possess no instance for presumptive proofs where a principle would not run. However, the same is not true for the practical principles; we can find instances for the practical principles where no presumptive proof contrary to them exists.
Therefore, the entailment of the author of al-Riyad’s view is that we are compelled to assert that the proofs of the practical principles are excepted by the proofs of the presumptive proofs. That is, the presumptive proof is prior to the principle. Excepting the proofs of the practical principles by the proofs of the presumptive proofs means the precedence of the presumptive proof over the principle, because every specific (khass) is prior to the general (‘amm). Thus, the presumptive proof is prior to the principle on the criterion of exception. This means that the proofs of the practical principles state: the practical principle is authoritative, except when a presumptive proof is established contrary to it.
Is this view correct? Ultimately, must we accept conflict and exception, or must we, like some, argue for entry (wurud), or argue for government (hukumah), or detail the distinction? The objection found in the statements of certain prominent scholars, such as the late Sheikh and others, has been answered. This was the objection concerning the lack of unity of the subject, and that the subject of the proofs of the principles differs from the subject of the proofs of the presumptive proofs, and thus conflict is not realized; because conflict is the mutual contradiction of the two proofs within a single subject. The justification for the unity of the subject in both proofs was mentioned.
However, in truth (al-insaf), the final point that can be stated in this regard is that the subjects of the proofs of the principles and those of the presumptive proofs are not identical. Why are they not identical? Because:
First: Ignorance and doubt are sometimes related to the actual ruling in the sense that we lack direct access to the actual ruling. For example, our access to the Infallible Imam is cut off, and we cannot hear the religious ruling from his own lips. Here, we say that the actual ruling is not known to us. Since the actual ruling is not known to us—meaning that we cannot acquire the religious ruling through certain paths—we discover the religious ruling through rational paths. A rational path is, for example, acting upon the report of a trustworthy narrator (khabar al-thiqah). Indeed, the solitary report (khabar al-wahid) has been validated because rational people consider it a reliable path to reach reality. We noted that the path-indicativeness of the presumptive proof and the solitary report to reality cannot be denied. Rational people act upon this path because if they were to rely only upon certain paths, their system of life would be disrupted. Although this path may err in conforming to reality, rational people possess no other way. Therefore, acting upon the presumptive proof and the solitary report is, in the view of rational people, for the sake of reaching reality.
However, the practical principles are not like this. The practical principles have not been established or validated for the sake of grasping reality or reaching reality. They merely define our practical duties when we cannot utilize these rational paths.
Therefore, the subject of the presumptive proofs differs from the subject of the practical principles. The subject of the presumptive proofs is the absence of certainty regarding reality or the ignorance of reality, under the assumption that the presumptive proof is a rational path to reach reality. However, the subject of the practical principles is not reaching reality. That is, although we possess, in both, a form of ignorance or doubt regarding the actual ruling, in one, ignorance of the actual ruling establishes a path for us to reach reality, whereas in the other, ignorance of the actual ruling establishes a practical duty. The principle does not claim to show you reality, but the presumptive proof claims to show you reality. Therefore, ignorance of the actual ruling and doubt in it differ between these two, and this prevents the unity of the subject. Consequently, conflict is unacceptable.
Second: The practice of treating two proofs whose relationship is general and specific in some aspects as general and specific absolutely is also ambiguous. If we maintain that the relationship between presumptive proofs and practical principles is general and specific in some aspects, why must this relationship be converted to general and specific absolutely? The reason they proposed is that if we do not do so, the authority of the presumptive proofs is rendered futile. However, this is not the case. The proofs of the practical principles state that the practical principle is authoritative, whether a presumptive proof contrary to it is established or not. The proof of the presumptive proof’s authority also states that the solitary report is authoritative, whether a principle contrary to it is established or not. These two conflict in their point of intersection (maddat al-ijtima’).
Now, the most that can result from this conflict is that both lose their validity; for ultimately, there is either a reason to prioritize one over the other, or there is not. If we say that the principle is prioritized, this conflicts with the precedence of the presumptive proof in that same point of intersection, because the assumption is that these two possess points of divergence on both sides. If we conceive of a point of divergence, then the issue of futility does not arise.
Question: …
Professor: No, the point of divergence is where we possess a presumptive proof… no, the divergence must be assumed such that in a certain instance, there is no domain for the principle, but a presumptive proof exists… for example, but the ignorance of the actual ruling is resolved by the presumptive proof… there is no certainty. The assumption is that there is no certainty. No, that same presumptive proof which has been established… meaning we do not possess a point of divergence… no, certainty must be put aside… then you must say their relationship is not general and specific in some aspects… the assumption is that certainty is absent. We have a presumptive proof which is authoritative based on the proofs, whether a principle contrary to it exists or not. On the other hand, the principle is authoritative based on the proofs, whether a presumptive proof contrary to it exists or not.
Question: The problem arose because we state regarding the practical principle that it is absolute, whereas it is not absolute regardless of whether a presumptive proof contrary to it exists or not, but rather is only where no presumptive proof exists.
Professor: This is begging the question (musadarah)… what you are stating returns to that first objection—namely, the objection of the lack of identity of the subject. What you are stating returns to that objection, the lack of identity of the subject… the discussion is precisely regarding this. You are returning to the same objection; this statement of yours returns to the first objection. … Do you accept the first objection or not? … Consider this carefully.
On the whole, in our view, the first view—which is conflict and exception—is unacceptable.
Commentary on the Treatise on Rights
Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) stated that prayer has two rights upon you. Subsequently, he declared: “So when you know that, you should stand in it…” It is worthy of you to possess heartfelt and physical humility. Subsequently, he outlined the nature of heartfelt and physical humility, and finally stated that the person standing in prayer must be entirely beseeching and requesting. We have explained these in detail over several sessions.
The Importance of Performing Prayer at Its Earliest Time and Its Effects
Prayer, with all of its majesty, acquires a specific value when it is performed at its earliest time (awwal al-waqt). Perhaps all the matters we have outlined—such as what the reality of prayer is, how the worshipper must be—are on one side, and performing prayer at its earliest time is on the other. In a narration from Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him), it is stated that the preference of performing prayer at its earliest time over other times is “like the preference of the Hereafter over this world” (ka-fadli al-akhirati ‘ala al-dunya). You see how much the Hereafter is preferred over this world; they are fundamentally incomparable. He states: performing prayer at its earliest time compared to other times is like the preference of the Hereafter over this world.
Regarding the importance of performing prayer at its earliest time, it is stated that when someone delays prayer without an excuse—note, without an excuse (making excuses and fabrications)—the prayer curses that person. The prayer addresses the person, saying: “You have wasted me, may God waste you.” Prayer has a reality that is realized through our action; prayer has a celestial reality beyond these outward actions and recitations. According to the narrations, if the prayer was performed well, the angels of God carry this reality in the best state to the heavens. If, God forbid, it was performed poorly, they carry it to the heavens in a state where the prayer addresses the worshipper, saying: “You have wasted me, may God waste you.” If that reality makes such a request of God, undoubtedly this request is granted.
The Effects of Performing Prayer at Its Earliest Time
Performing prayer at its earliest time has numerous effects and blessings. That is, if we compile the collection of narrations transmitted regarding performing prayer at its earliest time and outline their effects, perhaps seven, eight, or ten highly significant effects can be attributed to performing prayer at its earliest time.
I will refer to a few of these effects. If I were to list them all, it would take too much time, and we lack the time.
In a narration, Imam Baqir (peace be upon him) states: one effect of performing prayer at its earliest time is that the person is not considered heedless. That is, this indicates the absence of heedlessness: “Whichever believer is vigilant over the obligatory prayers and performs them at their earliest times, he is not of the heedless” (ayyu-ma mu’minin hafazat ‘ala al-salawat al-mafrudah fa-sallaha li-waqtiha fa-laysa hadha min al-ghafilin); at its earliest time—meaning not in its extended time but in its time of virtue and preference.
In another narration from the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him and his family), three effects are outlined for performing prayer at its earliest time: “There is no servant who attends to the prescribed times of prayer and the positions of the sun except that I guarantee for him comfort at the moment of death, the removal of anxiety and sorrow, and salvation from Hellfire” (ma min ‘abdin ihtamma bi-mawaqiti al-salati wa-mawadi’i al-shamsi illa damintu lahu al-rawha ‘inda al-mawti wa-nqiti’a al-humumi wa-l-ahzani wa-l-najata min al-nar).
He states: there is no servant who is attentive to the prescribed times of prayer and the positions of the sun for his prayer times, except that I guarantee three things for him. The Prophet states: I guarantee for someone who performs prayer at its earliest time:
“comfort at the moment of death” (al-rawh ‘inda al-mawt). The moment of death is the most difficult moment; it is a highly difficult moment. Comfort at the moment of death is what I guarantee for someone who performs prayer at its earliest time.
“the removal of anxiety and sorrow” (inqiti’ al-humum wa-l-ahzan). The second thing the Prophet guarantees: grief, worry, and sorrow are removed from such a person. Sorrow, grief, and worry are lifted from someone who performs prayer at its earliest time.
“salvation from Hellfire” (al-najah min al-nar); salvation from the fire of Hell. The Prophet states: I guarantee these three things for someone who performs prayer at its earliest time…
Other worldly and otherworldly, material and spiritual effects have been outlined for performing prayer at its earliest time.
Regarding spiritual perfections, you have undoubtedly heard this account from the late Ayatollah Shah-Abadi [Imam Khomeini’s mystical teacher] that those who were intimate with him transmit: he emphasized that you must be constant in performing prayer at its earliest time, and if, through this constancy, you do not reach spiritual heights and things are not made clear and revealed to you, spit in my face and curse me. He was so certain that performing prayer at its earliest time opens doors to realities and other realms for a person.
As I noted, prayer itself is on one side with all of its majesty, and performing prayer at its earliest time is another matter entirely.