The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Eighty-Seven

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Sixth Topic: Examination of the Inclusion of the Hadith of Lifting with respect to the Cases of General Knowledge (Schematic Knowledge), Seventh Topic: Examination of the Inclusion of the Hadith of Lifting with respect to the Implicit Legislative Ruling, Two Foundations on the Issue, The Truth in the Issue

February 8, 2026

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion was on the scope of the Hadith of Lifting. Up to this point, we referred to several aspects related to the scope of the Hadith of Lifting, and some angles of the meaning of this hadith were clarified.

Sixth Topic: Examination of the Inclusion of the Hadith of Lifting with respect to the Cases of General Knowledge (Schematic Knowledge)

Another topic related to the scope of the Hadith of Lifting is whether the Hadith of Lifting also encompasses cases of general knowledge (‘ilm ijmali / schematic knowledge) or not? For example, does “ma la ya’lamun” (that which they do not know)—which has been lifted by virtue of this hadith—mean “that which they do not know” detailedly (tafsilan), or is it broader, encompassing both that which they do not know generally (ijmalan) and detailedly?

At any rate, in cases of general knowledge (‘ilm ijmali), there are aspects of the lack of knowledge, and for this very reason, it is called general knowledge in contrast to detailed knowledge (‘ilm tafsili), in which all matters are known, whereas in general knowledge, ultimately some aspect remains unknown. For example, when at Friday noon you do not know whether the Friday prayer is obligatory or the noon prayer, this very hesitation is recognized as an unknown; although the root of the duty of a prayer on Friday is certain, yet whether this prayer is the Friday prayer or the noon prayer is unknown.

Now the question is: Does the Hadith of Lifting also apply in cases where a person has general knowledge? Does the Hadith of Lifting have utility with respect to that duty and ruling established within the scope of general knowledge or not?

For example, where a person has general knowledge regarding the hesitation of the matter between the less and more related (al-aqall wa al-akthar al-irtibati), or between performing the Friday prayer or the noon prayer; can he, by relying on the Hadith of Lifting, say that because our duty on Friday is not detailedly known, the ruling of the case of general knowledge is also removed? In cases of general knowledge, based on the ruling of reason, precaution (ihtiyat) is obligatory. If we have general knowledge of the root of the duty, but the duty-bound object (al-mukallaf bih) is unknown, reason rules on the obligatoriness of precaution. Can the Hadith of Lifting remove this ruling? Similar to our doubt in the root of the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer: if the root of the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer is unknown to us, the Hadith of Lifting says: “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun”, [and] the ruling of obligatoriness is removed. However, if we are hesitant between the noon prayer and the Friday prayer, can the Hadith of Lifting remove the root of the obligatoriness?

Here, given that we said this lifting is apparent, if we want to consider it applicable, we must say precaution is not obligatory. However, we must examine: Can the Lawgiver remove precaution?

It has been stated repeatedly that the Lawgiver can only remove a ruling that He Himself has legislated. If the enactment (wad’) of something is in the hands of the Lawgiver, its lifting (raf’) is also in His hands. However, if the enactment of something is not in the hands of the Lawgiver, it is clear that the Lawgiver cannot remove it. And here it is also so; because reason rules on the obligatoriness of precaution. Therefore, since the Lawgiver is not considered the legislating agent of this ruling, He consequently cannot be its remover either.

On this basis, it must be said that in cases of general knowledge (‘ilm ijmali), the Hadith of Lifting does not apply.

Question: …

Professor: This makes no difference; because we previously proved the generality of the Hadith of Lifting with respect to both ruling-directed and particular doubts. Therefore, from this perspective as well, the result is identical… What is meant by general knowledge is that the Hadith of Lifting does not encompass that ignorance related to general knowledge, and does not say that because the duty-bound object is unknown to you, its ruling is therefore removed. This issue is clear.

Seventh Topic: Examination of the Inclusion of the Hadith of Lifting with respect to the Implicit Legislative Ruling

There is a discussion regarding the inclusion of the Hadith of Lifting with respect to conventional rulings (al-ahkam al-wad’iyyah); this question is raised: Does the Hadith of Lifting fundamentally also encompass conventional rulings, or is it exclusive to legislative rulings (al-ahkam al-taklifiyyah)? However, it is certain that the Hadith of Lifting applies in legislative rulings. In other words, the surest minimum (qadr-e mutayaqqan) of the rulings removed by virtue of the Hadith of Lifting is legislative rulings.

Nonetheless, legislative rulings are divided into two categories: one category is independent legislative rulings (al-ahkam al-taklifiyyah al-istiqlaliyyah), and the other category is implicit legislative rulings (al-ahkam al-taklifiyyah al-dimniyyah). Now, the discussion is: Is the Hadith of Lifting exclusive to independent legislative rulings, or does it also encompass implicit legislative rulings?

Independent legislative rulings are such as the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer, the necessity of supplication upon sighting the crescent moon, and many other rulings, or the prohibition of smoking tobacco.

Implicit legislative rulings relate to composite entities (murakkabat) that possess parts (ajza’) and conditions (shurut). Such as prayer, which comprises some parts and conditions. Now, if we doubt the part-nature (juz’iyyah) of the surah, can we negate the juz’iyyah of the surah by means of the Hadith of Lifting or not? That discussion we previously mentioned on a related occasion is in reality among the appendages and continuation of this very discussion.

Two Foundations on the Issue

Now, why is such a discussion raised with respect to implicit legislative rulings as to whether they too are encompassed by the Hadith of Lifting or not? Meaning, do juz’iyyah and shartiyyah (conditionality) disappear under the conditions of necessity, forgetfulness, error, and their likes?

The source of the doubt in this category of legislative rulings is that, in the view of some, implicit legislative rulings do not possess an independent command, and something that does not possess an independent command, its lifting is meaningless. For example, the late Akhund, regarding composites such as prayer, believes that the command to the composite does not split (la yanhal) into commands to the parts, and fundamentally no splitting (inhilal) is at play. The composite possesses a single command: the prayer, and all of these parts and conditions together have been placed as the subject of the command; meaning the command has attached to this composite possessing parts and conditions. Therefore, the parts and conditions certainly do not possess an independent command. Consequently, no part on its own possesses a command.

In contrast, however, the popular opinion is that the command to the composite splits according to the number of the parts of that composite. Meaning if we say the prayer has ten parts, the command to the prayer splits into ten commands, in such a way that each part or condition possesses a command.

According to the view of the late Mr. Akhund, the Hadith of Lifting does not encompass the commands belonging to the parts and conditions. In other words, the parts and conditions fundamentally possess no command so that they would be subject to the Hadith of Lifting. The Hadith of Lifting can remove the ruling itself, but has no efficiency with respect to the parts and conditions.

Therefore, that it is discussed whether the Hadith of Lifting—in addition to independent legislative rulings—encompasses implicit legislative rulings as well, originates from whether we fundamentally possess implicit commands with respect to parts and conditions or not. If we say an implicit command has attached to the part and condition, the Hadith of Lifting can apply; because when we say “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” (lifted is that which they do not know), it means that command and ruling which you do not know is removed. The command and ruling with respect to the part, such as the surah which is unknown, is lifted.

However, if we say we do not possess implicit commands and the composite possesses only a single command (the command to the collection of parts and conditions), consequently the Hadith of Lifting no longer applies with respect to those parts and conditions. The Hadith of Lifting removes the ruling and command. And according to the popular foundation, the command and ruling exist, except in an implicit manner. Therefore, the Hadith of Lifting can remove that unknown part.

Therefore, if we accept the splitting of these commands into an independent command and an implicit command to the parts (as the popular opinion indeed holds), in this case we can say that the Hadith of Lifting also applies with respect to the parts and conditions. However, if we do not accept the splitting, consequently the Hadith of Lifting cannot apply; because fundamentally, what do we want to lift? What does the Hadith of Lifting want to remove? There is no command and ruling with respect to the parts and conditions so that it would be removed.

The Truth in the Issue

Now, according to the opinion of the non-splitting of the command which the late Akhund stated, is it that the Hadith of Lifting cannot apply? Can we truly consider the application of the Hadith of Lifting to be only in cases of an independent command?

As was stated, the application of the Hadith of Lifting depends on the existence of the command; whether it be an implicit command or an independent command. If the independent command or the independent legislative ruling is unknown, the Hadith of Lifting removes it. If the implicit legislative ruling is unknown, the Hadith of Lifting removes it. However, according to the foundation of those who believe in non-splitting and say that the implicit legislative rulings do not have a separate command, can the Hadith of Lifting still encompass them or not?

The requirement of research is that there is no obstacle to the application of the Hadith of Lifting. The Hadith of Lifting seeks to remove the legislative ruling. The legislative ruling is sometimes, for example, the ruling of the obligatoriness of the root of the prayer, whose enactment was in the hands of the Lawgiver and its lifting is also in the hands of the Lawgiver, and the Lawgiver can remove it. If this prayer possesses parts and conditions (for example, this prayer has ten parts) and our foundation is that the parts and conditions do not possess a command separately or in a dependent and implicit manner, and there is only a single command here (which is the command to the prayer) and no other command and ruling is involved, can the Hadith of Lifting remove the details of the unknown or doubted part?

It is true that the Lawgiver has not made the part the commanded object independently, but ultimately, when He makes a composite the commanded object and considers a series of parts and conditions for it, we can say: ultimately, its enactment and lifting are in the hands of the Lawgiver.

Question: …

Teacher: This goes back to that discussion we previously had and deferred to the future: Can the Lawgiver lift the part or not? The question is: Can the Lawgiver have made a nine-part prayer obligatory or not? He certainly can. He can perform this. Therefore, the enactment of the tenth part, even in the form of making this whole obligatory, is in the hands of the Lawgiver, and therefore its lifting is also in the hands of the Lawgiver. The Lawgiver, who has made the ten-part prayer obligatory, can make the nine-part prayer obligatory. Meaning He can exclude that tenth part from this composite. What objection does it have? Why must we say it must definitely be an independent command? Fundamentally, why must we say… sometimes the role of reason is involved… The discussion is: What is that commanded object and desired object of the Lawgiver? Currently, it has become nine-part… If forgetfulness occurs, does the commanded object become nine-part? The Lawgiver had placed the commanded object as ten-part until now, and under the assumption of forgetfulness, He has placed it as nine-part. What objection does this have? He has removed that ruling of the obligatoriness of the ten-part prayer, even if we say no command at all has attached to the parts.