Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Twenty

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Criterion for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs, The Second View: Entry, The First Formulation and Its Analysis, The Second Formulation

October 11, 2025

The Second View: Entry

Up to this point, we have discussed the criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah) on the basis of conflict and exception (ta’arud wa takhsis), explaining and analyzing this criterion. The conclusion was that this rationale is unacceptable.

Another criterion mentioned for prioritizing presumptive proofs over the practical principles is entry (wurud). Some believe that presumptive proofs enter the practical principles. We noted that entry means the entering proof (al-dalil al-warid) eliminates the subject of the entered proof (al-dalil al-mawrud), with the difference that this exclusion is devotional (bi-l-ta’abbud) rather than real and existential. That is, the entering proof intervenes and modifies the entered proof in such a way that it excludes an individual from the subject of the entered proof and eliminates its subject. This is a general explanation of entry.

As to how the entering proof eliminates the subject of the entered proof, three formulations (taqarib) have been outlined. That is, this criterion of entry itself has three formulations. We must outline and analyze all three. These three formulations are also expressed in the statements of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini.

These three formulations share one common premise: they all seek to explain the entry of the proofs of the presumptive proofs over the proofs of the practical principles. Yet, they also differ from one another. How a proof enters another proof can be conceptualized in various ways. We will outline these three formulations here, and subsequently examine them one by one.

The First Formulation

When we say that the proofs of the presumptive proofs enter the proofs of the practical principles, it is because, for example, in the proof of the principle of permissibility (asalat al-hiliyyah) or the principle of exemption (asalat al-bara’ah), it is stated: “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is specifically forbidden” (Kullu shay’in laka halalun hatta ta’lama annahu haramun bi-‘aynih). Or in the proof of istishab, it is stated: “Do not violate certainty with doubt, but violate it with another certainty” (La tanqud al-yaqina bi-l-shakk, bal unqudhu bi-yaqinin akhar). In both proofs, the words ‘knowledge’ (‘ilm) and ‘certainty’ (yaqin) are mentioned: “until you know” and “with another certainty.” In both the proof of the principle of exemption and the proof of istishab, the practical principles have been validated, but only as long as no knowledge and certainty contrary to them emerges.

For example, the principle of purity (asalat al-taharah) based on “Every thing is pure for you” (Kullu shay’in laka tahirun), or the principle of permissibility based on “Every thing is permissible for you” (Kullu shay’in laka halalun); both principles are valid, but until when? Their validity and authority are restricted to the assumption where no presumptive proof contrary to them exists. The limit of their validity is the non-existence of certainty. Thus, the limit of istishab is the absence of another certainty. Therefore, this is the domain of istishab, and that same previous state is presumed to continue.

The question is: what is meant by this knowledge and certainty? Does it mean intuitive certainty (al-yaqin al-wujdani)? Does it mean intuitive knowledge, or does it possess a broader meaning? For instance, does the proof of the principle of permissibility mean: everything is permissible for you until you acquire intuitive certainty that it is forbidden? Or does istishab mean: until another actual, intuitive certainty is acquired, build upon your prior certainty?

If it is tied to intuitive certainty, then conflict arises, which we have already negated. We noted that conflict does not arise here. Therefore, what is meant by certainty and knowledge in the proofs of the practical principles is “proof” (hujjah). “until you know it is forbidden” means: until a valid proof is established regarding its prohibition. In the other proof, it also means: “but violate it with another proof”—as long as no contrary proof exists, act upon your prior certainty.

Thus, if it is said that the proofs of the presumptive proofs enter the proofs of the practical principles, it means that the proof of the principle of permissibility is entered by the proof of istishab—meaning “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden” is the entered proof (mawrud) in relation to the solitary report; that is, the proof of the authority of the solitary report enters “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden,” because it eliminates its subject. It enters it because in “until you know,” knowledge does not mean intuitive knowledge, but rather a certainty that is a proof, a knowledge that is a proof.

Question: …

Teacher Response: When it enters it, it means it eliminates the subject of the entered proof. Automatically, that proof is put aside.

Objection: If you interpret “you know” (ta’lama) or “certainty” (yaqin) in these two proofs as “proof” (hujjah), asserting that it does not mean real, intuitive knowledge and certainty, the same applies to the practical principles. You seek to argue that the proof of the presumptive proof enters the proof of the principle and eliminates its subject because it has made the matter dependent upon authority—that very knowledge which we call “proof,” and that certainty which we call “proof.”

However, the problem is that the same is true on the side of the practical principle. The practical principle is also a valid proof, whatever its conclusion may be. If both are valid proofs, why do you prioritize the presumptive proof over the practical principle? One could argue that the practical principle should be prioritized over the presumptive proof.

In short, if you interpret certainty and knowledge in these two proofs as “proof,” claiming that it does not mean intuitive certainty, the same applies to the practical principles. The result of the practical principle, whatever it may be, is authoritative. If both are authoritative, why do you prioritize the presumptive proof over the practical principle?

Response: A difference exists between the proof of the principle and the proof of the presumptive proof, which prevents this reciprocity. This is because the proof of the presumptive proof is prior. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states: the presumptive proof has no limit mentioned in its proof, whereas the practical principle has a limit mentioned in its proof.

For instance, in the proof of the principle of permissibility, it states: “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden.” The ruling of permissibility is established for everything until knowledge is acquired contrary to it—a proof contrary to it is found. However, this limit is not mentioned in the proof of the presumptive proof. For example, a presumptive proof is validated stating that the report is authoritative: “the solitary report is authoritative” (khabar al-wahid hujjah). But no limit or condition is mentioned alongside it. They did not say: “authoritative until a principle is found,” or “until…”. No limit is mentioned for it. Therefore, the principle cannot govern or enter the presumptive proof, because the presumptive proof was not qualified by any limit from the outset. Consequently, when the presumptive proof arrives, it eliminates the subject of the practical principle.

Analysis of the First Formulation

On the surface, this formulation has no technical flaw; meaning that were it not for the apparent meaning of the proofs, we would say it is correct. However, the problem is that interpreting certainty as “proof” in the narrations of istishab and interpreting doubt as “non-proof” is an interpretation contrary to the apparent meaning (khilaf-e-zahir). This is incompatible with the apparent meaning of the proofs. How can we interpret “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden” as “proof”? To say “Every thing is permissible for you…”

Question: In custom, it is applied to something that is known, but it does not mean one-hundred-percent knowledge.

Teacher Response: These are two distinct issues. (In these two proofs and the cases that exist, we must ultimately take this as an indicator and evidence.) Ultimately, is this knowledge and certainty here interpreted as “proof” or not? … We must see what the apparent meaning of the proof requires. “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden.” If “until you know” is interpreted as “proof,” is this contrary to the apparent meaning or not? … Very well, we are currently analyzing this… No, we are currently discussing based on the first formulation… in the second formulation, they interpret certainty and knowledge as that very customary certainty… the reason why al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini has outlined three formulations here is precisely due to these differences.

According to the first formulation, knowledge and certainty are interpreted as “proof” (hujjah). You also agree that interpreting it as “proof” is contrary to the apparent meaning of the proofs. To say that “Every thing is permissible for you until you know” means “until a proof is established” (hatta taqum al-hujjah) is difficult. To interpret them in this manner is indeed difficult and unacceptable.

Question: …

Professor: Indeed, this very objection was raised in the “Objection” section. It states: “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden.” This proof is the proof of the practical principle—the proof of the principle of permissibility, the proof of the principle of exemption. They asserted that “until you know” means “until a proof is established.” They say that the certainty and knowledge mentioned sometimes in the proofs of presumptive proofs and sometimes in the proofs of the practical principles mean “proof” and “non-proof.” We noted this previously in our objection regarding whether the proofs of presumptive proofs encompass the practical principles (like istishab).

Question: Are these not jurisprudential rules (al-qawa’id al-fiqhiyyah)?

Professor: What does it mean to doubt the actual ruling? For example, is there an obligation to avoid this or not? Is this forbidden or not? You state that in prohibitory doubts, the principle of permissibility runs. The principle of permissibility is, in reality, a manifestation of the principle of exemption… Yes, textual exemption as opposed to rational exemption, which is the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification. … Yes, we offered a brief reference; in explaining the meaning of government, we mentioned several interpretations, briefly referred to the late Sheikh’s view, and passed over it. Now, we wish to examine whether the criteria we outlined for entry and government apply here or not.

The Second Formulation

In the second formulation as well, the concept of entry is raised, but instead of modifying the meaning of “you know” (ta’lama) and “another certainty” (yaqinun akhar), the object of knowledge (muta’allaq al-‘ilm) is modified. He stated: “until you know it is forbidden” (hatta ta’lama annahu haram); we intervene in the meaning of “forbidden.” That is, we say: what is meant by “forbidden” here? Is it actual prohibition (haram waqi’i) or apparent prohibition (haram zahiri)?

He states: everything is permissible for you until you acquire certainty that it is forbidden; at times, a person acquires certainty regarding actual prohibition, and at other times, they acquire certainty regarding apparent prohibition. Here, “until you know it is forbidden” encompasses both actual and apparent prohibition. The same applies to “another certainty”: “but violate it with another certainty”; meaning you acquire an actual or apparent certainty regarding the actual prohibition, or you violate it by means of this.

Question: Certainty does not have an actual and apparent division.

Professor: The meaning of actual certainty is certainty regarding the actual ruling. When He says “until you know” or “violate it with another certainty,” ultimately, in both, knowledge and certainty are mentioned, but this certainty and knowledge possess an object. An actual ruling exists behind this. Without restricting this to a specific direction, we say that what is meant by certainty here is certainty regarding the actual ruling and certainty regarding the apparent ruling, both.

Under this assumption, what does the meaning become, and how is entry realized in our discussion? The meaning is: “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is specifically forbidden,” meaning “until you know it is forbidden actually or apparently.” This prohibition is made to encompass both actual and apparent prohibition. If we do this, then entry is certain, and the proofs of the presumptive proofs will enter the practical principles.

Of course, this is subject to debate, and we are currently only presenting his second depiction—namely, that the proof of “Every thing is permissible for you” states that everything is permissible for you until you acquire certainty regarding an apparent or actual prohibition. Of course, this formulation has a continuation that we will outline.

Roughly two or three objections apply here; consider them carefully. God willing, we will outline these objections tomorrow.