Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Twenty-One

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Criterion for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs, The Second View: Entry, The Second Formulation, Note, Critique of the Second Formulation, First Objection, Second Objection, Third Objection

October 12, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion concerned the criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). We noted that several views and theories exist in this regard. The first view was that of conflict and exception (ta’arud wa takhsis), which was examined and analyzed.

The second view is that of entry (wurud); meaning that presumptive proofs enter the practical principles. However, the criterion for this entry has been formulated in several ways. Three formulations have been proposed, all of which are addressed by al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini. Of course, among these three formulations, al-Na’ini himself prefers the third, asserting that it is superior to the others. We outlined and analyzed the first formulation in the previous session.

The second formulation was also briefly outlined. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi has also mentioned this formulation [21]. Before we detail this second formulation, I will refer to a point that helps us better understand the differences between these formulations, and also facilitates our understanding of entry in this context.

Note

The origin and source of disagreement regarding the criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs over the practical principles lies in this very matter we wish to highlight.

We possess here two categories of proofs:

1. The proofs that validate presumptive proofs;

2. The proofs that validate practical principles.

These two categories of proofs differ from each other in several respects:

One difference is that in most proofs of presumptive proofs, no limit or end-point (ghayah) is mentioned, whereas in the proofs of the practical principles, a limit is mentioned. That we say “most” is because, in some instances, the proof of a practical principle may not contain an explicit limit, but this is generally not the case. Thus, the proofs of the practical principles are qualified by a limit, whereas the proofs of presumptive proofs are not. The limit mentioned in the proofs of the practical principles is typically knowledge and certainty: “until you know it is specifically forbidden” (hatta ta’lama annahu haramun bi-‘aynih) or “violate it with another certainty” (unqudh bi-yaqinin akhar). However, disagreement has arisen regarding the meaning of knowledge and certainty in these contexts.

Another point concerns the object to which certainty and knowledge are related, which is itself a subject of debate. For instance, in the proof of exemption, it states: “until you know it is specifically forbidden.” Here, the object of knowledge is “prohibition.” Consequently, a debate arises as to whether what is meant is actual prohibition (haram waqi’i) or whether it encompasses both actual and apparent prohibition (haram zahiri). This very issue has given rise to different views and opinions.

In the first formulation, knowledge and certainty—which represented the limit in the proofs of the practical principles—were interpreted as “proof” (hujjah) or authority (hujjiyyah), in contrast to non-proof (la hujjah).

In the second formulation, knowledge is not interpreted to mean “proof” or “non-proof,” but rather retains its literal meaning. “until you know it is forbidden” means knowledge of the ruling, encompassing both the apparent ruling and the actual ruling. This is because even if it is an apparent ruling, it is backed by evidence; it possesses a definitive proof behind it. This is similar to the phrasing we employ regarding specific conjectures (al-zunun al-khassah); we say that although they yield only conjecture, they are backed by certain and definitive evidence. That is, we possess knowledge and certainty regarding their validity, and therefore, knowledge here means certainty regarding this path, and the “prohibition”—as we noted—encompasses both actual prohibition and apparent prohibition.

Question: …

Professor: This is the view of those who accept the apparent ruling… (whereas we fundamentally do not accept the apparent ruling and reject the existence of any ruling called the apparent ruling). It is the ruling derived from the principle as opposed to that derived from presumptive proofs. There is also a broader terminology, namely, the apparent ruling; meaning any ruling derived from definitive evidence—such as presumptive proofs or practical principles—in contrast to the actual ruling, which refers to what exists in the knowledge of God and is recorded in the Preserved Tablet; that is the actual ruling. These terminologies differ.

Question: …

Professor: Here it is clear: “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is specifically forbidden.” Here, they say that the prohibition must be known, must be certain. What does this mean? It means what is established for you by means of the presumptive proof or intuitive certainty… the assumption is that istishab is the subject of debate. Yes, it is prioritized. Indeed, it is not treated as a principle, so to speak… apparently, yes, here… indeed, it means that, for example, we hear from the Infallible Imam so that we acquire certainty, absolute certainty… it is possible that we can even apply other instances… we are not concerned with this. “until you know” is mentioned as a limit in these proofs. We noted what is meant by “you know” and what is meant by “forbidden.”

Thus, the second formulation is based on two pillars:

First, “you know” means that which induces knowledge (ma yujib al-‘ilm). Whatever induces knowledge, i.e., a definitive proof—even if it yields only conjecture—is that which induces certainty in the proof; this also encompasses the presumptive proofs. Presumptive proofs, it is true, yield only conjecture, but we possess certainty that what the presumptive proof establishes is apparently established in our regard; meaning we possess certainty regarding this apparent prohibition.

Question: …

Professor: I noted that the object of certainty differs here. The object of knowledge differs. We possess knowledge and certainty that this ruling has been established by means of the presumptive proof. The presumptive proof yields conjecture, but this is knowledge and certainty.

Thus, you see that in the second formulation, two modifications are made, whereas in the first formulation, only one modification was made. The modification in the first was to interpret knowledge as “proof” and doubt as “non-proof,” without modifying the meaning of “forbidden.” Here, however, two modifications are made. First, we modify “forbidden,” asserting that it encompasses both the actual and the apparent. In other words, the object of “you know” is the subject of debate, which is made to encompass both actual prohibition and apparent prohibition; it is not restricted to actual prohibition, but also includes apparent prohibition.

The second modification is that it states: “until you know it is forbidden.” You have defined “forbidden” to encompass both the apparent and the actual. But what of knowledge and certainty? Do certainty and knowledge retain their literal meaning? Here, certainty and knowledge retain their literal meaning—meaning intuitive certainty, not “proof” or anything else. However, it is as if because the proof of their authority is certain and definitive, what is established for us is this very ruling—whether this ruling is apparent or actual.

This is the formulation proposed by al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi and al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini. Its difference from the first formulation is also clear.

Question: Actual prohibition and actual obligation do not possess a common denominator (qadr-e-jami’).

Professor: No, what is the objection?… both represent restriction… there is no common denominator. Even if there is not, they ultimately possess a common denominator… see, these are all predicated upon the acceptance of the apparent ruling. Otherwise, since we reject the apparent ruling, this discussion takes another form… there is no difficulty in conceptualizing a common denominator… that relates to the tracking of its effects, but as for the meaning of prohibition itself, encompassing both the apparent and the actual, we can conceptualize a common denominator between them.

Critique of the Second Formulation

The second formulation has also been subject to objection; three objections have been raised against the second formulation. One objection was proposed by al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi and echoed by others. Two other objections were proposed by al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, which I will now outline.

The first objection, similar to our objection to the first formulation, is that it is contrary to the apparent meaning of those proofs (khilaf-e-zahir). To assert that “forbidden” encompasses both the apparent and the actual is contrary to the apparent meaning of the proofs. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi himself stated: “For this is contrary to what the apparent meaning of those proofs requires, because it is obvious that the apparent meaning of the proof of permissibility and its like is that the limit is the recognition of specifically that to which the doubt is related—which is the actual, ontological ruling itself—not that which encompasses the apparent ruling in the realization of the limit.” [21]

He states that the possibility of interpreting “forbidden” to encompass both the apparent and the actual is contrary to the apparent meaning of the proofs.

For in “Every thing is permissible until you know it is forbidden,” “until you know it is forbidden” is the limit. We previously noted that the very difference between the proofs of the principles and those of the presumptive proofs is that a limit is mentioned in the proofs of the principles, whereas generally no limit is mentioned in the proofs of the presumptive proofs. The limit mentioned in the proofs of the practical principles is knowledge of prohibition—meaning that which you doubt, you must acquire knowledge of. What was it that we doubted? Did we doubt the actual ruling or the apparent ruling? We doubted the actual ruling. Therefore, now that knowledge is acquired, it must be knowledge of that same actual ruling.

Thus, his objection is that we cannot interpret “forbidden” to encompass both apparent and actual prohibition; because under this proof, we can only set aside the principle of permissibility or “Every thing is permissible for you” when we acquire knowledge of the ruling. But which ruling? “until you know it is forbidden” means until you acquire knowledge of the actual ruling of this thing; meaning that you actually understand that it is forbidden. To assert that this also includes apparent prohibition is incompatible with the apparent meaning of the proof.

Question: If we did not possess the principle of permissibility, we would also doubt the apparent state; “Every thing is permissible for you” is not only regarding the actual reality, if there were no principle of permissibility we would not know the apparent duty either, so it also encompasses the apparent ruling.

Professor: We wish to examine what the import of this proof requires…

The proof of the principle of permissibility states: “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden.” Subsequently, they interpreted “forbidden” to encompass both actual prohibition and apparent prohibition. Now, what is the limit here? We are not concerned with actual and apparent prohibition in a certain sense. We now possess knowledge and certainty, for example, regarding the apparent ruling.

However, the problem is that we doubt its validity and authority. We are certain that we must act upon this, and its import is authoritative in our regard. But is the knowledge of the validity and authority of presumptive proofs mentioned as a limit in the proofs of the practical principles or not? If knowledge of the authority of presumptive proofs were mentioned as a limit in the practical principles, we could assert that “forbidden” means authority and validity.

However, the problem and difficulty is that knowledge of authority is not taken as a condition for the limit of devotional submission to the practical principles. That which is taken as a condition for the limit of the practical principle is the knowledge of the contradiction of the principle’s content; meaning that if something is found contrary to the content of the practical principles, we set the practical principles aside. But does knowledge of the contradiction of the practical principles’ content suffice for entry? No, what is required for entry is precisely the issue of knowledge and certainty regarding the validity and authority of the presumptive proof.

Therefore, the second objection is that what is mentioned as a limit in the practical principles differs from what you are discussing. This limit is incompatible with your formulation.

The third objection, to which al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini referred, is that if we possess knowledge of the validity of the presumptive proof, we also possess knowledge of the validity and authority of the principles. What is the difference between them? At any rate, knowledge of authority and validity is present both in the case of the practical principles and in the case of the presumptive proofs.

Question: …

Professor: We wish to say that the same is true in the practical principles; there is no difference. This cannot serve as a rationale for the precedence of the presumptive proof over the principle, or the entry of the presumptive proof over the principle… that is another objection. The third objection, in reality, wishes to say that you have attempted to distinguish between the presumptive proof and the practical principle from this perspective, but no such distinction exists… We are, after all, comparing them. We are not examining them in isolation.