Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles
Session Twenty-Five
Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Criterion for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs, The Third View: Government, The First Formulation, The Second Formulation
October 18, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion concerned the rationale or criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). We noted that one view is that of entry (wurud); meaning that presumptive proofs enter the practical principles. We outlined the rationale for this entry and examined it. The conclusion was that this rationale and criterion is unacceptable.
The Third View: Government
According to this view, the presumptive proofs govern (hakim) the practical principles. The late Sheikh, alongside other scholars such as al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, maintains that presumptive proofs govern the practical principles. However, regarding how government is realized, there is a disagreement or at least a difference in terminology. We will outline two formulations here: first, the formulation proposed by the late Sheikh, and second, the formulation proposed by al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini. Naturally, the difference between these two formulations must also be clarified.
The First Formulation
The late Sheikh explicitly states in the Rasa’il: “Indeed, it governs the principle, and does not except it” (fa-huwa hakimun ‘ala al-asli la mukhassisun lah); the presumptive proof governs the principle, and does not except it. Subsequently, he himself states: “For we mean nothing by government except that it is the eliminator of the subject of the other proof devotionally and assimilatively” (idh la na’ni min al-hukumati illa an yakuna rafi’an li-mawdu’i al-akhari ta’abbudan wa-tanzila), because the meaning of government is that one proof eliminates the subject of another proof devotionally and assimilatively.
This criterion differs from entry (wurud). In entry, the discussion was also about the elimination of the subject of the other proof. In entry, the elimination of the subject meant that one proof eliminates the subject of another proof, such as when it is stated “the solitary report is a clarification” in relation to “the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification”—which is rational exemption. There, it is stated that punishment without prior clarification is ugly; when a proof like “the solitary report is a clarification” enters, it eliminates the subject of the other proof, namely, the absence of clarification (‘adam al-bayan).
However, here, the matter is not that it eliminates the subject of that proof in reality, but rather it legally assimilates it as the eliminator (tanziluhu shar’an manzilat al-rafi’).
Pay close attention to the late Sheikh’s own phrasing: “Indeed, the proof of the presumptive proof, even if it is not the eliminator of the subject of the principle like the scientific proof” (inna dalila al-amarati wa-in lam yakun rafi’an li-mawdu’i al-asli ka-l-dalili al-‘ilmi). The proof of the presumptive proof is not like a definitive and certain proof that eliminates the subject of the principle in reality. When a person acquires certainty, the subject of the principle—which is doubt—is automatically eliminated.
The proof of the presumptive proof does not arrive to eliminate that. The proof of the presumptive proof does not eliminate doubt and ignorance of reality. If you possess doubt, with the attainment of certainty, this doubt is certainly eliminated. However, if you doubt, for example, the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer, and an authoritative report is established indicating its non-obligatoriness, this report—despite being authoritative—does not eliminate your ignorance and doubt regarding the actual reality, which remain even after the establishment of the presumptive proof.
It is for this reason that the Sheikh states: “Indeed, the proof of the presumptive proof, even if it is not the eliminator of the subject of the principle like the scientific proof, nevertheless it has been legally assimilated to the status of the eliminator” (wa-in lam yakun rafi’an… illa annahu nuzzila shar’an manzilat al-rafi’). It has been legally assimilated to the status of the eliminator; meaning that devotionally and assimilatively, He establishes this as the eliminator. Therefore, do not possess doubt any longer, as though when the presumptive proof is established, it is like certainty.
Thus, even though the presumptive proof does not eliminate the subject of the principle in reality, because it has been legally assimilated to the status of the eliminator, they say it governs. Therefore, the scope of the subject is devotionally expanded. The subject was solely a certain and definitive ruling and a certain and definitive obligation.
Now, if a presumptive proof is also established regarding the ruling, despite the fact that certainty is not attained and therefore the subject of the principle is not eliminated (for the subject of the principle is doubt, and when the presumptive proof arrives, doubt still remains; the subject of the principle is ignorance, and when the presumptive proof arrives, ignorance of the actual ruling remains preserved in its place; thus, the subject of the principle is not eliminated in reality. The only thing that eliminates the subject of the principle in reality is certainty. And certainty is certainly not realized here), nevertheless, because of this legal assimilation to the status of the eliminator—or legal assimilation to the status of knowledge and certainty—it governs the principle.
This is the essence of the late Sheikh’s formulation of the government of presumptive proofs over the practical principles: it is as if the scope of the subject is devotionally expanded.
The Second Formulation
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini has presented almost identical points with different terminology and some additions. He also maintains that the presumptive proofs govern the practical principles. However, al-Na’ini’s terminology is not “legal assimilation to the status of the eliminator”; his terminology is “legal assimilation to the status of a complete revelation” (tanzil manzilat kashif tamm). Just as knowledge, certainty, and absolute conviction possess complete revealing value, the presumptive proof, by means of the proof of its authority, is assimilated to the status of a complete revelation.
Therefore, we noted that the terminology is different; because he states that the proof of the presumptive proof expands the subject of the principle, in the sense that it legally assimilates the content (mu’adda) of the presumptive proof to the status of knowledge and certainty—whether devotionally or assimilatively. The presumptive proof certainly does not possess complete revealing value; the revealing value of the presumptive proof is incomplete, but the Lawgiver intervenes to assimilate this incomplete value to the status of a complete revealing value; He assimilates this conjecture to the status of knowledge.
Thus, you see that the terminology is different: al-Na’ini employs the phrase “legal assimilation to the status of knowledge and certainty” (tanzil manzilat al-‘ilm wa-l-yaqin), whereas the late Sheikh employs “legal assimilation to the status of the eliminator” (tanzil manzilat al-rafi’). However, that ‘eliminator’ is itself certainty and absolute conviction. Therefore, in this respect, they do not differ significantly. In one, the phrase ‘knowledge and certainty’ is used, while in the other, ‘complete revelation’ and ‘complete revealing value’ is used.
Furthermore, al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states regarding government: we possess “apparent government” (hukumah zahiriyyah) and “actual government” (hukumah waqi’iyyah). Actual government relates to actual rulings; meaning that if the governing proof and the governed proof are both actual rulings, this government is actual. For example, “If you doubt between three and four, build upon the greater number” (idha shakakta bayna al-thalathi wa-l-arba’i fa-bni ‘ala al-akthar) or “build upon four.” It states: if you doubt between three and four, build upon four. This is an actual ruling. It has no connection to the practical principle; therefore, this actual ruling has clarified the duty in cases of doubt between three and four, which is to build upon four.
Subsequently, another ruling arrives: “There is no doubt for the habitual doubter” (la shakka li-kathir al-shakk). This is also an actual ruling; it states: someone who doubts frequently is like one who does not doubt, and let him not pay attention to his doubt. Naturally, this proof governs that proof, because it restricts the scope of its subject. It states that someone who doubts frequently, as though he does not doubt; He legally assimilates the habitual doubter to the status of non-doubting, i.e., to the status of certainty and absolute conviction. This excludes the habitual doubter from the scope of the subject. Here, restriction has occurred within the scope of the subject. Therefore, actual government relates to the government of the proof of one actual ruling over the proof of another actual ruling.
Apparent government, however, is solely between apparent rulings. For example, we say that the causal principle (asl-e-sababi) governs the effectual principle (asl-e-musabbabi), or the establishing principle (asl-e-muhriz) governs the non-establishing principle (asl-e-ghayr-e-muhriz). Here, both are apparent rulings. The causal principle is a principle, and the effectual principle is also a principle, and both are considered apparent rulings. The government of one apparent ruling over another apparent ruling is known as apparent government.
Thus, al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states: we possess an actual government and an apparent government. The government of presumptive proofs over the practical principles is also an apparent government. Apparent government is, in reality, between apparent rulings.
So, what is the difference between what the Sheikh says and what al-Na’ini says?
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states that the presumptive proof is equivalent to knowledge—“legal assimilation to the status of knowledge and certainty”—whereas the Sheikh states: consider this presumptive proof equivalent to the eliminator. That one is equivalent to knowledge and the other equivalent to the eliminator are different from each other.
The subject of the practical principles is doubt. One view is that when the presumptive proof arrives, despite the fact that it does not itself eliminate and erase doubt and ignorance, because it is an authoritative proof, He says: consider this presumptive proof equivalent to the eliminator; as if it eliminates your doubt. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states: consider it equivalent to knowledge and certainty. Therefore, there is no mention of elimination. A difference exists between “legal assimilation to the status of the eliminator” and “legal assimilation to the status of knowledge.”
Thus, the late Sheikh and al-Na’ini do not differ regarding the fact that the proofs of the presumptive proofs govern the proofs of the practical principles. However, government according to the Sheikh consists of “the legal assimilation of the presumptive proof to the status of the eliminator,” whereas according to al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, the presumptive proof is legally assimilated to the status of knowledge.
Now, does the view of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini really differ from that of the late Sheikh?
This is an issue that must be clarified, alongside whether the criterion of government in prioritizing presumptive proofs over the practical principles is acceptable or not.
These two formulations of government have both shared objections (mushtarak al-wurud)—meaning objections that apply to both—and specific objections (ikhtisasi) that apply to each of these two formulations. We must examine whether these shared and specific objections can be resolved here or not.