Preliminaries, Preliminary Ten: The Division of the Practical Principles into Establishing and Non-Establishing Principles
Session Twenty-Nine
Preliminaries, Preliminary Ten: The Division of the Practical Principles into Establishing and Non-Establishing Principles, Historical Background, Implications of the Division, Commentary on the Treatise on Rights, The Right of Pilgrimage, The Importance of Hajj in the Quran and Narrations
October 22, 2025
Tenth Preliminary: The Division of the Practical Principles into Establishing and Non-Establishing Principles
The tenth preliminary concerns the division of the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah) into establishing principles (al-usul al-muhrizah) and non-establishing principles (al-usul al-ghayr al-muhrizah). Of course, establishing principles are sometimes referred to as assimilative practical principles (al-usul al-tanziliyyah). Currently, we seek to examine how these two categories of principles differ from each other, whether the term “attainment of proof” (ihraz) is fundamentally correct in relation to the practical principles, and if so, what this term means. Does the “attainment of proof” asserted regarding some of the principles share the same meaning as “attainment of proof” in presumptive proofs (amarat), or do they differ?
Historical Background
Prior to discussing these two divisions, let us refer to the innovator of this view. We do not observe the terminology of establishing and non-establishing principles anywhere prior to the era of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini was the first to employ this terminology, and subsequently, these terms found their way into the writings and statements of others. Of course, in the terminology of prominent scholars such as Allamah al-Hilli, Sheikh al-Ansari, and their peers, the term “establishing principle” (al-asl al-muhriz) was occasionally employed, but it was not highly clear and manifest. Therefore, the division of the principles into establishing and non-establishing is considered one of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s innovations.
Implications of the Division
However, more important than the issue itself is to examine whether this division yields any practical implications or not. That is, what implications arise from dividing the principles into establishing and non-establishing?
First Implication: Among the implications of this division is that if we accept it, the establishing principles will certainly precede the non-establishing principles, and perhaps this precedence, in the view of some, is by way of government (hukumah). Of course, we have a debate regarding this, but ultimately, many scholars—including the late al-Na’ini himself—believe that the establishing principles govern the non-establishing principles. This is because when an establishing principle runs in an instance, it eliminates the subject of the non-establishing principle by resolving the doubt. The precise mechanism of this will be outlined subsequently.
For example, istishab (the presumption of continuity) is commonly presented as an establishing principle. If we accept that istishab is an establishing principle, its precedence over the other practical principles will no longer face any difficulty.
Second Implication: Another effect of this view appears in the discussion of the substitution of presumptive proofs and practical principles for certainty (qat’), which was examined in detail previously. Specifically, the establishing principles can substitute for subject-constitutive path-indicative certainty (al-qat’ al-mawdu’i al-tariqi). Subject-constitutive certainty is, in some instances, inherently effective. One of the instances where subject-constitutive certainty is applied is the issue of testimonies (shahadat). In testimony, subject-constitutive certainty is important; when a person acquires certainty and absolute conviction (of course, this certainty is not solely subject-constitutive by way of psychological attributes, but is broader than that), in testimony, subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological attributes is not the sole concern; what is important is subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character. And indeed, if that certainty is also present (subject-constitutive by way of psychological attributes), it will be effective a fortiori.
If, regarding the issue of testimony, we assert that testimony must be sensory (‘an hissin) and that testimony based on conjecture/intuition (‘an hadsin) is ineffective—and indeed the correct view is exactly this—then the question arises: if a person lacks absolute certainty in an instance, can they bear testimony by relying on istishab? For example, a house belonged to Zayd; a person was even present during the purchase of this house, and therefore possesses certainty that this house belongs to Zayd. However, this event occurred ten years ago. Currently, if they doubt whether Zayd’s ownership of this house has been terminated or not, istishab establishes the persistence of ownership. The question is: can they bear testimony by relying on the presumption of the continuity of ownership? If we assert that istishab is an establishing principle, it can substitute for subject-constitutive path-indicative certainty.
Question: …
Professor: If we consider istishab to be an establishing principle, it can substitute for subject-constitutive path-indicative certainty. However, if we do not consider it establishing, it can certainly never occupy such a position.
This is another implication, on the basis of which establishing principles can substitute for subject-constitutive path-indicative certainty, whereas non-establishing principles lack this capability.
Question: …
Professor: Establishing principles are not matters that the Lawgiver explicitly details. The rulings related to certainty and what matters can substitute for it (whether it is a presumptive proof or a principle) are, in reality, analyses we can provide by considering the nature of certainty, presumptive proof, and the principle, and by relying on the proofs of their authority. However, as to whether, for example, one proof substitutes for another, we may derive from certain instances within the proofs that the Lawgiver, in some cases where certainty and conviction were absent, nevertheless accepted this matter.
Currently, given that this view is proposed by the late al-Na’ini, we must first examine what he stated in this regard.
Question: …
Professor: This is entirely dependent upon how we define establishing principles. This is a highly important point. According to one potential interpretation of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s statements—because his discourse here is ambiguous, and several possibilities have been outlined for it—the tracking of the actual effects (tarattub athar al-waqi’) based on the establishing principle is also raised. However, this is only a possibility and within the framework of a specific interpretation. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi has also outlined almost identical views. However, there is disagreement as to what exactly al-Na’ini meant, and al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s phrasings also differ to some extent; for instance, it is expressed in one manner in Fawa’id al-Usul and in another in Ajwad al-Taqrirat. Therefore, this very ambiguity and compendiousness in the late al-Na’ini’s statements renders the issue somewhat difficult.
We must first outline the late al-Na’ini’s statement, subsequently clarify the point of ambiguity, and then examine the possibilities outlined in his discourse. For example, Shahid Sadr outlined two or three possibilities in interpreting al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s statement, and naturally raised objections against them. To be able to analyze al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s statement correctly, we must know precisely what he says.
Question: …
Professor: “Attainment of proof” (ihraz) here does not have that meaning. One issue that may cause error is that when we say “establishing” (muhriz), it comes to mind that what is meant is the attainment of proof regarding actual reality, whereas this is fundamentally not its meaning. The issue is not the attainment of proof regarding actual reality. Another meaning has been designated for “attainment of proof” here. The important point is that “attainment of proof” in presumptive proofs is completely different from “attainment of proof” in the practical principles. This is a point that must be carefully guarded, and the two must be separated to avoid error.
Commentary on the Treatise on Rights
Previously, we explained the Right of God, then the Right of the Person over Himself (haqq al-insan ‘ala nafsih), subsequently the Right of the Person over his physical organs—where they enumerated several important organs—and then the right of certain actions, deeds, and acts of worship. We explained the right of prayer.
The Right of Pilgrimage
The subsequent right addressed in the words of Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) is the right of fasting (haqq al-sawm). However, in some manuscripts, “the right of Pilgrimage” (haqq al-hajj) is mentioned. The right of Pilgrimage, as a highly important act of worship, is fundamentally absent in some manuscripts, whereas in others, it is mentioned after prayer, and in some, after several other items. Assuming that this right is present in the treatise, regardless of the variation in its manuscripts, we will outline it in continuation of the right of prayer, and this is perhaps supported by the similarity that exists between Hajj and prayer, as well as the expression employed by Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) himself. We will provide a brief explanation of it here:
Brief Explanation
“And the right of Hajj is that you know it is an arrival before your Lord, and a flight to Him from your sins, and in it is the acceptance of your repentance, and the fulfillment of the obligation which Allah the Almighty has made obligatory upon you.” [Risalat al-Huquq]
As you observe, the expression “an arrival before your Lord” (wafadatun ila rabbik) has also been employed regarding prayer. Hajj is a vessel and a means by which you enter the presence of the Lord, the Blessed and Exalted; meaning it is the gateway to enter the divine presence. Both prayer and Hajj have been introduced as gateways to entry and vessels of wayfaring. This is the very similarity derived from this expression “an arrival before your Lord.” You must know that this is your entry into the presence of the Lord.
“and a flight to Him from your sins” (wa firarun ilayhi min dhunubik); fleeing from sins toward the Lord, the Blessed and Exalted. “and in it is the acceptance of your repentance” (wa fihi qabulu tawbatik); in Hajj, there is the acceptance of repentance and the forgiveness of sins.
“and the fulfillment of the obligation” (wa qada’u al-faridah); and this is the performance of an obligation that God, the Blessed and Exalted, has made obligatory upon you and which you must execute.
What is it that Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) has outlined here as the rights of Hajj, as an act of worship? Previously, we asked: how is it possible to conceptualize a right for these actions? Sometimes we speak of the right of a person, the right of an object, the right of a tree, the right of a mountain, the right of the heaven, and the right of the earth. Objects can possess rights, but how can acts of worship—such as prayer, fasting, Hajj, and struggle (jihad)—possess a right?
We noted that what is meant by these actions is not the external existence of these actions themselves; because every action that a person performs, when it acquires external existence, possesses a share of existence (lahu hazzun min al-wujud). But it has not been realized yet. When we are commanded to perform prayer, that prayer which we must perform has not yet been realized; because if it were realized, commanding it would be meaningless, as it would be obtaining what is already obtained (tahsil al-hasil). Therefore, what is meant is that prayer has a nature, a reality, and an identity. Hajj also possesses a reality and is not merely a collection of words and concepts. These actions possess a reality, a celestial image, and an objective existence, and it is that reality that possesses these rights. Prayer and Hajj possess rights upon us.
Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) states: “that you know it is an arrival before Allah, and a flight to Him from your sins…” That you know Hajj is the cause of your entry into the presence of Allah, the Blessed and Exalted; Hajj brings about flight and escape toward Him from sins, brings about the acceptance of repentance, and is an obligation that God has made obligatory upon you. The category of the right of Hajj is of the category of knowledge and recognition. Regarding prayer as well, at the outset they mentioned two rights: “that you know it is an arrival before your Lord…” and subsequently, they also stated that you must know in whose presence you stand. Here, regarding Hajj, he has mentioned four characteristics that you must know regarding Hajj. All are of the category of recognition, knowledge, and awareness; this is the right of Hajj.
In prayer, after explaining those two rights, Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) declared: since this is the case, you must possess heartfelt and practical humility, and they also outlined the way to acquire heartfelt humility, without restricting it to merely knowing the reality of prayer and the Object of worship.
However, here regarding Hajj, he has not addressed specific practical actions, but has merely stated: the right of Hajj is that you know these four things regarding it; because the beginning of every movement, progress, and perfection is built upon knowledge, recognition, and awareness. Now, suppose a person who performs Hajj is not clear regarding the reality of Hajj. Can this journey be effective in their existence? Can they benefit from this immense opportunity as is worthy and appropriate? If they do not know that Hajj causes a person, after performing this obligation, to become like one who is newly born, they cannot utilize this great bounty as they should.
These four matters which Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) himself has outlined regarding Hajj must be explained in detail one by one. And it is noteworthy that perhaps the most important elements and pillars of Hajj have been referred to in this explanation. The selection of these characteristics and elements here is of specific significance.
The Importance of Hajj in the Quran and Narrations
Prior to explaining these four matters, I will briefly refer to the fact that Hajj is one of the most important divine obligations. It is true that in this treatise, it is mentioned after prayer, but in certain narrations, it is mentioned alongside prayer.
In the Holy Quran, numerous verses have been outlined regarding Hajj, the House of God, and its rites (manasik). Where God, the Blessed and Exalted, declares: “And [due] to Allah from the people is a pilgrimage to the House – for whoever is able to find thereto a way. And whoever disbelieves – then indeed, Allah is free of need of the worlds.” [Quran 3:97]. This verse establishes Hajj as obligatory and introduces its abandoner as among the losers. It states that this obligation is binding upon anyone who possesses the capability, and if someone abandons Hajj, they have in reality harmed themselves; for God is free of need of the worlds. Meaning He wishes to say that the benefit of Hajj returns to the pilgrim himself, not to God: “indeed, Allah is free of need of the worlds.”
This significance has existed not only from the era of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) but indeed prior to it, when Ibrahim (peace be upon him) began the building of the House of God. God addressed him, saying: “And proclaim to the people the Hajj [pilgrimage]; they will come to you on foot and on every lean camel; they will come from every distant pass.” [Quran 22:27]. God commanded Ibrahim (peace be upon him): invite all people to the Hajj of the House of God, and they will come to you on foot and riding, from every distant and deep path. Meaning that Hajj and circumambulation (tawaf) of the House began from the era of Ibrahim, but in Islam, it has been emphasized with a specific order and structure, and is therefore considered one of the most important Islamic acts of worship.
In a narration, it is transmitted: “Whoever dies without performing the Hajj of Islam [while having the capability], let him die, if he wishes, a Jew or, if he wishes, a Christian.” If someone does not perform the Hajj of Islam while satisfying its conditions, their death is like the death of a Jew or a Christian. This is at their own choice—their death is either the death of a Jew, placing them among the Jews, or the death of a Christian, placing them among the Christians.
The well-known narration of Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him) also emphasizes that, fundamentally, one of the pillars of the religion of Islam is Hajj: “Islam is built upon five [pillars]: prayer, almsgiving, pilgrimage, fasting, and guardianship (wilayah).” Fundamentally, Islam is established upon five pillars, one of which is Hajj. Of course, the last item, which is wilayah, is the axis of all of these, possessing its own specific meaning. At any rate, Hajj is highly important.
Therefore, in the recognition of Hajj, we must take four steps, which we will analyze in the next session, God willing.