Preliminaries, Eleventh Preliminary: The Priority of Certain Practical Principles over Others

Session Thirty-six

Preliminaries – Eleventh Preliminary: The Priority of Certain Practical Principles over Others – Second Aspect: The Priority of Certain Legislative Practical Principles over Other Legislative Practical Principles

November 9, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The eleventh preliminary concerns the priority of certain Practical Principles over other Practical Principles. We previously stated that we would investigate two aspects within this preliminary. The first aspect was the priority of legislative Practical Principles over rational Practical Principles. This aspect was thoroughly examined, and the rationale for the priority of legislative Practical Principles over rational ones was explained. We demonstrated that this priority is established either on the basis of Ingress / Outlining (Wurud) or on the basis of Governing / Overruling (Hukumat), and we elucidated both perspectives.

Second Aspect: The Priority of Certain Legislative Practical Principles over Other Legislative Practical Principles

The second aspect addresses the priority of certain legislative Practical Principles over other legislative Practical Principles; namely, the priority of “confirmatory principles” (al-usul al-muhrizah) over “non-confirmatory principles” (al-usul ghayr al-muhrizah). Confirmatory principles are exemplified by the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab), while non-confirmatory principles are exemplified by the Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah).

In the tenth preliminary, we discussed these two categories of principles and explained the distinction between confirmatory and non-confirmatory principles. Setting aside the ambiguities in the discourse of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini and the various interpretations of his words, several possibilities regarding confirmatory and non-confirmatory principles were mentioned, totaling seven possibilities.

Our view regarding the distinction between confirmatory and non-confirmatory principles is that confirmatory principles are those in which the agent is commanded to arrange all the practical effects of reality. That is, they are principles through whose execution we are practically commanded to arrange all of its effects; these constitute the confirmatory principles. Conversely, in non-confirmatory principles, only some of the effects are arranged. We provided an example: if a person implements the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) of ritual purity (taharah), they can use it to validate both the prayer they have already performed and the prayer they intend to perform. This constitutes the arrangement of all effects. Had they possessed actual purity, how would they have acted? When they had Certainty / Categorical conviction (Qat’) of purity, they would perform the Afternoon (‘Asr) prayer with that same certainty, while their Noon (Zuhr) prayer was also valid. The Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) functions in the exact same manner; through the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) of purity, the Noon prayer performed is deemed to have discharged their obligation, and they can also perform the Afternoon prayer with it. However, with the Principle of Permissibility (Asalat al-Hiliyyah) or the Principle of Purity (Asalat al-Taharah), only the prayer already performed is validated, but they cannot perform the subsequent prayer with it. This is the distinction between arranging all effects versus arranging only some effects. We stated that this distinction is preferable to the other possibilities, and this is the true difference between confirmatory and non-confirmatory principles.

Now, in a situation where both a confirmatory principle like the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) and the principle of Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) can be applied, and they yield two different results—such that one establishes an obligation and the other negates it (since if both led to the same result, the discussion of priority would not arise or would receive less attention)—we have a confirmatory principle called the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) (as an example) and a non-confirmatory principle like legislative Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah). Since we explained rational Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) yesterday, the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) definitely takes priority over legislative Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah). Why? Because legislative Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) is based on the Hadith of Raf’: “رُفِعَ مَا لَا یَعْلَمُونَ” (What they do not know has been lifted from them). Thus, the lifting is contingent upon the “absence of knowledge” (‘adam al-‘ilm). If the “absence of knowledge” is realized, it lifts the obligation, whether this relates to punishment or other matters, which we will not address for now.

The proofs of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab), however, dictate that certainty is not invalidated by doubt; meaning, certainty is not broken by doubt. The meaning of “certainty is not invalidated by doubt” is that doubt preceded by certainty is treated as equivalent to certainty itself. This doubt is disregarded so that the prior certainty is not broken by it. The doubt that is preceded by certainty is considered firm and established due to that prior certainty. All attention is directed toward that certainty itself. That is, in the presence of that firm and established matter, this doubt must not be paid attention to. Therefore, “do not invalidate certainty with doubt” means do not set aside that firm and established matter—which is certainty—and do not break it with doubt, which is an unestablished and infirm matter.

Thus, on one hand, “رُفِعَ مَا لَا یَعْلَمُونَ” demands that in the assumption of the absence of knowledge, no obligation is established. On the other hand, the proofs of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) demand that doubt preceded by certainty is treated as equivalent to knowledge. Consequently, it is excluded from the scope of “what they do not know” (ma la ya’lamun). Until now, doubt was truly an instance of “what they do not know,” and indeed it is so in reality; because when a person deems both sides of a proposition possible, this is a true instance of “what they do not know.” However, when the proof of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) treats doubt preceded by certainty as equivalent to knowledge, it is excluded from the scope of “what they do not know.” Therefore, it is said that the proofs of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) are Governing / Overruling (Hukumat) over the proofs of legislative Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), such as the Hadith of Raf’. Of course, not all proofs of Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) may be like this, but at least the Hadith of Raf’ is governed by the proofs of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab). The proof of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) has Governing / Overruling (Hukumat) over the Hadith of Raf’ and naturally takes priority over Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) as well.

The same applies to other legislative principles. For instance, in legislative precaution (ihtiyat shar’i), a person acts cautiously to attain assurance or certainty regarding the discharge of obligation. The basis of this precaution is the legislative assumption: “أخوک دینک فاحتط لدینک” (Your religion is your brother, so take precaution for your religion). The import of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) is also clear. If, in a certain case, we must choose between legislative precaution and the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab), naturally the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) takes priority; because it is a confirmatory principle and possesses a type of Governing / Overruling (Hukumat) or Ingress / Outlining (Wurud) over the proof of the practical principle of precaution.

Now the question is: does this priority relate to being confirmatory or non-confirmatory, or do we consider these two proofs themselves—the proof of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) in comparison with the proof of Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah)? Based on the explanation we provided, the proof of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) gains Governing / Overruling (Hukumat) over the proof of Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah). But how does the issue of confirmation (ihraz) and non-confirmation, with the interpretation we have provided, justify this priority? A confirmatory principle is that principle upon which all the effects of certainty can be arranged. A non-confirmatory principle is one upon which only some of the effects of certainty are arranged. Therefore, the question arises: how will these be connected? That is, can the issue of confirmation and non-confirmation, in the sense we mentioned, in itself justify priority or not?

Question:

Professor: How could it not have an effect? Do we not say that confirmatory principles take priority over non-confirmatory principles? Regulatory principles (al-usul al-tanziliyyah) take priority over non-regulatory principles… We must examine the individual proofs of the principles and then see whether they fundamentally demand priority, and if they do, what the rationale for that priority is.

Question: …Whether it is confirmatory or not? If it is confirmatory, based on “what they do not know,” what they do not know is examined, and if it is confirmatory, it is considered knowledge and reality is confirmed.

Professor: Practical Principles do not confirm reality. I have repeated this multiple times so that no mistake is made: the confirmation of Indicative evidences (Amarat) is different from the confirmation of Practical Principles.

Question: One is cognitive confirmation (ihraz ‘ilmi) and the other is practical confirmation (ihraz ‘amali).

Professor: Governing / Overruling (Hukumat) is established precisely through this confirmation… How? You see, Mr. Mokari says that this aspect (i.e., the aspect of confirmation) has no effect; whether this aspect is present in it or not, when we look at the proof itself, this proof takes priority… Why does it take priority? Because the proof of “لَا تَنْقُضُ الْیَقِینَ بِالشَّکِّ” itself is Governing / Overruling (Hukumat) over “رُفِعَ مَا لَا یَعْلَمُونَ”. Why? Because doubt preceded by certainty is treated as equivalent to knowledge. Thus, with this explanation, it is excluded from the scope of the absence of knowledge… This possesses practical confirmation, not cognitive confirmation… We do not have access to reality… I know that this has cognitive confirmation… Mr. Mokari, you who say that this (the aspect of confirmation) has no effect, then what is the rationale for the priority of confirmatory principles over non-confirmatory ones? Each has a specific domain of application, and we act according to that domain; meaning, in cases where both are applicable… Meaning case-by-case? … The assumption is that in a certain case, it is possible to run both the confirmatory principle and the non-confirmatory principle… If we have a prior state, the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) is applied, and if we do not have a prior state, other cases like Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) are applied.

My question is: on one hand, we believe in the priority of confirmatory principles over non-confirmatory principles. Do you accept this or not? … Why do you say that Indicative evidences (Amarat) take priority over Practical Principles? Do you not accept this rule? Certainly, this priority must have a criterion and a basis; one cannot simply state in a general manner and without proof that Indicative evidences (Amarat) take priority. Now, there is a difference of opinion regarding the rationale of this priority; some believe in Governing / Overruling (Hukumat), some in Ingress / Outlining (Wurud), and some, like Imam Khomeini (ra), provide a detailed distinction.

Therefore, regarding Practical Principles as well, when we say some are confirmatory and some are non-confirmatory—and according to Imam Khomeini (ra), the confirmatory is itself divided into absolute confirmatory and aspectual confirmatory—on what criterion is the priority of confirmatory principles over non-confirmatory principles based? It certainly requires a criterion. One cannot simply say that we act on a case-by-case and general basis and measure the proofs of each separately.

Yes, that aspect of priority is determined by examining the proofs. Just as we say here that the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) takes priority over Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) due to Governing / Overruling (Hukumat). With this statement, we are in fact explaining the criterion of priority. This explanation we provided was actually an exposition of the rationale for the priority of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) over legislative Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), not merely choosing a principle without proof.

Another point that exists is… why does it take priority over a case that lacks such a prior state? The answer lies precisely in the explanation that was presented.

In summary, if doubt is preceded by certainty, it is treated as equivalent to knowledge, and this fundamentally excludes it from the scope of “what they do not know” (مَا لَا یَعْلَمُونَ). Yes, this is the very issue of Governing / Overruling (Hukumat).

However, the main discussion and question was: does confirmation and non-confirmation, or regulation and non-regulation according to some views, establish a basis for priority or not?

Please reflect and ponder on this matter with greater care. The specific question is: we claim that confirmatory principles take priority over non-confirmatory ones, or regulatory principles take priority over non-regulatory ones. The example we give is that the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab), as a confirmatory principle, takes priority over Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) as a non-confirmatory principle. In explaining this priority, we observe the proofs of these two principles and see that the proof of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) is Governing / Overruling (Hukumat) over the proof of Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah). The question here is: does this rationale proposed for the priority of the proof of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) over the proof of Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), or in general the prioritization of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) over Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), have any connection with the characteristic of being confirmatory and regulatory of these principles or not? Are these two criteria identical, or do they differ?

Please contemplate this issue so that we may address it, God willing, in tomorrow’s session.