The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, The First Proof: The Book
Session Forty-Eight
The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, The First Proof: The Book, The First Verse: Response to the Third Objection, The Fourth Objection, Response
December 2, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion concerned the argumentation based on the verse “And never would We punish until We sent a messenger” (wa ma kunna mu’adhdhibina hatta nab’atha rasula) [Sura al-Isra’, Verse 15], and how it indicates the Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah). The formulation of the argument based on this verse was outlined. Subsequently, we explained that several objections have been raised against this argument. Two objections were referred to and answered yesterday. The third objection was also mentioned, but its response remained to be addressed.
The summary of the third objection was that the aforementioned verse indicates only the negation of the actual occurrence of punishment (fi’liyyat al-‘iqab); because it states: We have punished no one prior to sending messengers and clarifying the obligation. Negating the actual occurrence of punishment does not entail negating the desert of punishment (istihbaq al-‘uqubah), whereas what is required in the argument based on this verse is the negation of the desert of punishment.
Therefore, this verse is inapplicable for the desired argument; because the verse ultimately states that We have not punished anyone, but this does not mean they did not deserve punishment. Perhaps they deserved punishment, but Almighty God, by virtue of His grace, favor, and generosity, did not punish them.
To summarize, in a single sentence, the proof is broader than the claim, and it is obvious that a broader proof cannot establish a more specific claim. This was the summary of the third objection that was outlined.
Response to the Third Objection
The response to the objection is that in the science of Usul—and specifically in the discussion of exemption—we do not require more than the negation of the actual occurrence of punishment. The issue of the desert or non-desert of punishment and reward is, in truth, a theological (kalami) issue, and the roots of these two propositions must be sought within that science. In the science of Usul, we primarily seek security from punishment (mu’min min al-‘iqab); we wish to know whether, if the mukallaf executes a certain action or abandons it, they will face any punishment or not? Must they entertain fear (khawf) regarding the consequences of committing or abandoning actions or not? It is obvious that fear becomes meaningful in relation to punishment.
In Usul, we require only this much: security from punishment. But whether the desert of punishment is established or not, and whether this verse indicates it or not, has no bearing on our discussion and does not affect it. What is important is the negation of the actual occurrence of punishment, and that for whatever reason, Almighty God does not punish anyone without sending messengers and clarifying the obligation, and this is sufficient to establish exemption (wa hadha yakfi li-ithbat al-bara’ah); this is sufficient to establish exemption.
Question: …
Professor: The same discussion arises again: namely, that the practical duty of the mukallaf for now, until the obligation reaches him, is the permissibility of action, and this is, in fact, an apparent ruling according to the mainstream premise… no, the permissibility of the obligation… we must see what we require in exemption… if we establish the negation of the actual occurrence of punishment, exemption from the obligation is established, both in prohibitory doubts and in obligatory doubts… the rule is: whoever obeys deserves reward, and whoever disobeys deserves punishment. For now, we are not concerned with the Theory of the Right to Obedience (Haqq al-Ta’ah); therefore, the basis of punishment and reward is obedience and disobedience; meaning that there is an entailment between obedience and the desert of reward, and between disobedience and the desert of punishment.
At minimum, according to the mainstream view, the obedient person deserves reward and the disobedient person deserves punishment. This itself is supported by the dictate of the intellect and the clarification of the sacred law: “And never would We punish until We sent a messenger”; as long as the obligation is not communicated, there is no punishment. Our assumption is that the verse negates the actual occurrence of punishment. We set aside the discussion of the intellect; although we say that this clarification of the sacred law is, in truth, an emphasis on that very dictate of the intellect…
Now, you state that we possess cases where prohibition exists but there is no punishment. This is by the clarification of the Lawgiver; meaning that if it were not for the clarification of the Lawgiver, every committed prohibition would entail punishment… Why? Because there is an entailment. Is it not so? I say: if someone commits a prohibition, and that prohibition had been communicated to him, he would certainly be punished. The favor and forgiveness of God is another discussion. On the other hand, the verse itself states: “We have punished no one without clarifying the obligation.” … This verse indicates the negation of the actual occurrence of punishment. This is correct… What does negating the actual occurrence of punishment mean? We say that as long as there is no clarification, no one is punished. We are not concerned with deservingness either. You state that in certain cases, punishment has been negated (by the statement of the Lawgiver), but prohibition exists.
Our response is: the negation of the actual occurrence of punishment is not everywhere equivalent to the negation of prohibition or the negation of the existence of the obligation, except where the Lawgiver Himself explicitly states so. If the Lawgiver possessed no clarification, would you say regarding zihar that it is prohibited? … The other side is identical; there is no difference… We say that the negation of the actual occurrence of punishment is understood from this verse. What does this mean? … You wish to derive other results and effects. I ask one question: is exemption established by negating the actual occurrence of punishment or not? … Favor or repentance; that someone has committed a sin and repents is another discussion and belongs fundamentally to another domain… We are stating that fundamentally, the negation of deservingness is not the intended meaning. This is correct. The verse negates the actual occurrence… we ourselves (and even the objector himself) have stated this.
We also accepted that the absence of the actual occurrence of punishment is not proof of the absence of deservingness. God, by His grace and generosity, perhaps out of favor, forgives the sinners. But the question is: in the science of Usul and in the principle of exemption, what do we seek? This very much, that we negate the actual occurrence of punishment, is sufficient. It wishes to say it is not prohibited… we are not concerned with deservingness. We now say: it is even possible that someone, due to detestability… why is it impossible? Is it possible? … It is possible that the desert of punishment exists. The objector has stated this. However, the Lawgiver does not punish. If we state that in cases where the possibility of prohibition is entertained, if you commit it, you will certainly not be punished, then if we say ‘it is permissible until a clarification regarding its prohibition reaches you from the Lawgiver’ (huwa ja’izun illa an yasila min al-shari’i bayanun ‘ala hurmatih), is there any obstacle?
Question: …
Professor: If certainty regarding the obligation is acquired, even if no messenger has been sent, that certainty itself is sufficient for the necessity of precaution and avoidance. The discussion is that when certainty is acquired—it is itself a clarification, and this clarification is broader than a textual or rational clarification. As we also noted yesterday, when this verse states “until We sent a messenger,” it does not mean that only the Lawgiver must speak. If the intellect spoke, that too is a clarification. Certainty, from whatever path it is acquired, possesses intrinsic authority, and it is certainly a clarification. … Yes, if by the dictate of the intellect—definitive and certain intellect—or by any other proof (for example) you slept at night, woke up in the morning, and with the flight of a crow from a tree acquired certainty, here this is the obligation and you must obey it. If you act contrary to it, you will be punished; because you have acquired certainty and conviction.
Certainty possesses intrinsic authority, and indeed legislating authority for it is impossible. Now, if your intellect establishes a definitive ruling for you, you must obey it, and if you do not, you are punished. What is important here is certainty. I stated: even if from the flight of a crow, or even if you see in a dream, wake up in the morning, and acquire certainty, this is certainty and nothing can be done regarding it. Unless you are an excessive certain-holder (qat-ta’), which has its own discussion as to whether the certainty of the qat-ta’ is authoritative or not.
The Fourth Objection
The fourth objection is the one al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini raised. He states: “And never would We punish until We sent a messenger”; sending messengers is a metaphor for completing the proof (itmam al-hujjah), not clarifying the obligation. Therefore, this verse is fundamentally unrelated to our discussion. The verse relates to past nations and their punishment.
Almighty God wishes to declare: every nation that We punished in the past, We first completed the proof for them. We made them all understand, we brought a proof that if you violate it you will be punished, and despite completing the proof, they paid no attention, and thus the punishment was sent down upon them.
Therefore, this has fundamentally no connection to the issue of exemption; because in the discussion of exemption, we wish to state that every doubtful ruling (whether a prohibitory or an obligatory doubt) is the domain of exemption, because without clarification, We do not punish anyone. Thus, this has no connection to this story. This story relates to past nations, where God wishes to state that We completed the proof for all of them.
Response
A part of this objection is, in truth, derived from that very objection of the late Sheikh. His objection was that this verse relates to past nations (its indicators also being this) and “kunna” is a past-tense verb indicating past tense. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini also, in reality, states that this relates to past nations, but he interprets “until We sent a messenger” to mean completing the proof, rather than sending messengers in its literal sense. That is, it is not merely the sending of messengers, but alongside every messenger, the proof was completed; meaning the messenger arrived, invited, established a miracle and proof of truthfulness, warned, and reminded the people of the signs of punishment, yet they disobeyed, and following this completion of proofs, the punishment was sent down.
Therefore, the basis of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s objection is identical to the late Sheikh’s statement, but he has expanded the meaning of sending messengers, interpreting it to mean completing the proof. We repeat here the same response we provided to the late Sheikh.
First: This (verse) does not relate to past nations as a mere historical narrative or an isolated past event. Although “kunna” is a past-tense verb, it is stripped of temporal reference and is employed to express a custom and path of the Divine. Its justification was also outlined; this is, in reality, a customary method to express that divine custom and path, and we also mentioned its indicators. God wishes to state that fundamentally, Our custom and method are not to punish without sending messengers. Sending messengers, it is clear that the literal meaning of this term is not intended; it possesses a metaphorical meaning, i.e., without clarifying, We do not punish. Therefore, it is probable that sending messengers is a metaphor for completing the proof here.
But in reality, considering this verse as a whole and the explanations provided, which of these is intended? Is “until We sent a messenger” the mere sending of messengers? Sending messengers is, in reality, for the purpose of communicating divine instructions. One of the most important offices of the messengers is clarifying divine rulings and laws. It is true that the sending itself is a proof, but specifically in this context, at minimum, clarifying rulings and obligations was part of the messengers’ mission.
Therefore, the verse wishes to state: without clarifying the obligation, which was indeed achieved through the messengers and the books of the messengers, We have not punished anyone in any other manner. We first announced these, and after the people failed to act, We subsequently punished them.
Therefore, it appears that on the whole, this verse, considering the customary understanding and the customary extraction from it, can indicate exemption. The verse wishes to state that Our punishment and retribution are dependent upon clarifying the obligation, not the actual obligation itself. “until We sent a messenger” is, in truth, that very metaphor for clarifying the obligation. Now, if an obligation existed in reality, but was not communicated to us, will punishment follow it?
It can be stated definitively that those to whom an obligation has not been communicated (within its own framework, of course) are never punished, even if they deserved punishment. This is sufficient to establish exemption.
You state: we possess cases where we have an obligation but there is no punishment. Thus, the possibility of establishing an obligation without any punishment following its violation exists. You wish to say that its possibility exists, so by negating the actual occurrence of punishment, we cannot negate the obligation.
We say: negating the actual occurrence of punishment in the absence of clarification (‘adam al-bayan) definitely indicates the absence of obligation. You mention the case of zihar and its peers as an objection; we respond that there, we possess clarification. We do not say that if clarification of an obligation reached us and God lifted the punishment, we can commit it. No, the claim is: if clarification of an obligation did not reach us, certainly no actual punishment will follow it, and this is sufficient to establish exemption (wa hadha yakfi fi ithbat al-bara’ah).
The Topic of the Next Session
The argumentation based on the second verse.