Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, First Proof

Session Fifty-Five

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah) – Evidence for Exemption – First Proof: The Book – The Third Verse – Evaluation of the Third Verse – Second Objection – Interpretations in the Verse – Evaluation of the Second Objection – Supporting Evidence for the Argument of the Third Verse

December 13, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion concerned the indication of verse 115 of Surah al-Tawbah regarding the Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), and the manner of formulating the argument using this verse was outlined. The verse states:

“And Allah would not let a people go astray after He has guided them until He makes clear to them what they should avoid.” [Quran 9:115]

It was noted that, according to the proponent of this argument, “And Allah would not…” (ma kana Allahu) points to an enduring divine custom (al-sunnah al-ilahiyyah) rather than past tense. “To let them go astray” (liyudillahum) means “to punish them” (liyu’adhibahum), and “what they should avoid” (ma yattaqun) refers to divine commands and prohibitions. Therefore, the meaning of the verse is that Allah never punishes a people unless He has clarified His instructions for them.

Subsequently, it was noted that certain objections have been raised against this verse.

The first objection, raised by Sheikh al-Ansari, is identical to the objection raised against the verse, “And We would never punish until We sent a messenger” [Quran 17:15]; because “We were not” (kunna) indicates past tense, and consequently, it is restricted to past nations, and the punishment in question refers to worldly punishment. This objection has been answered.

Continuation of the Second Objection

The second objection is that multiple interpretations can be conceived for this verse, and there are at least three alternative interpretations other than the one presented by the proponent of the argument (excluding the rendering of “to let them go astray” as “to punish them,” i.e., liyu’adhibahum).

The second interpretation, which was mentioned in the previous session, is that “to let them go astray” (liyudillahum) means “to place them among those who are astray” (li-an yaj’alahum fi-l-dallin); that is, to categorize them within the group of the astray.

If this meaning is considered, it would in fact represent a worldly punishment. Based on this, the meaning of the verse would be that Allah does not categorize any people among the astray unless He has clarified His instructions for them and they have failed to listen. Thus, according to this verse, no one is placed among the astray except after clarification from Allah.

Another interpretation is that “to let them go astray” (liyudillahum) means “to turn away from them” (liyurid ‘anhum); that is, Allah does not turn away from any people unless He has clarified His commands and prohibitions for them, and they ignore them, thereby causing Allah to turn away from them. Therefore, Allah’s indifference and turning away from any people is contingent upon His clarifying and revealing the means of piety to them, and their subsequent disregard.

If this meaning is also accepted, Allah’s turning away would pertain to this world; like the previous interpretation, Allah’s turning away and His indifference toward a people is itself a form of worldly punishment inflicted by Allah, the Exalted, upon someone.

Another interpretation is that “And Allah would not let a people go astray” (wa ma kana Allahu liyudilla qauman) means “Allah, the Exalted, would not leave a nation abandoned” (ma kana Allahu liyatruka ummatan); “until He makes clear to them what they should avoid” (hatta yubayyina lahum ma yattaqun). That is, when Allah sends a prophet to a people and guides them toward faith and monotheism, He does not abandon them after their guidance. Rather, He reveals and sends down a set of laws and regulations as a Shariah for the people to practice. This is the divine custom; meaning it is not the custom of Allah to merely send a prophet, but rather He sends a prophet equipped with a set of laws and a Shariah.

This interpretation also has no bearing on the issue of Exemption (Bara’ah). This is because not abandoning a people is fundamentally not a punishment—neither a worldly punishment nor a punishment in the Hereafter. Allah is informing here that He has never left mankind abandoned; it has never been the case that He sent a prophet and then left them to do whatever they wished. He sent a prophet and then revealed laws, regulations, and a Shariah to which they should adhere. Therefore, according to this interpretation, the verse is not useful for the argument.

Thus, these interpretations exist within the verse, and in the presence of these interpretations, it is no longer possible to utilize this verse as an argument.

These three interpretations are distinct from the one stated by the proponent of the argument. Hence, the potential interpretations of the verse reach four. According to one interpretation, the argument is acceptable, whereas under the other interpretations, it is not.

Evaluation of the Second Objection

We must now examine whether this objection is valid or not. The objector has mentioned several interpretations, but they must provide contextual clues and evidence for these interpretations. Some of these interpretations are fundamentally contrary to the apparent meaning of the verse (khilaf al-zahir). For instance, in the second interpretation, on what basis has “misguiding” (idlal) been interpreted as “turning away” (i’rad) and applied as such? This is entirely incompatible with the apparent meaning of the verse. Or, for example, rendering “to let them go astray” (liyudillahum) as “to place them among the astray” (li-an yaj’alahum fi-l-dallin) requires an ellipsis (taqdir) and is also incompatible with the overall meaning of the verse.

Furthermore, even if we accept the first interpretation, we can still argue using the verse through another path. At most, it might be said that “placing them among the astray” (liyaj’alahum fi-l-dallin) refers to worldly punishment; however, by way of priority (a fortiori / bi-tariq al-awlawiyyah), we can argue: when Allah subjects someone who disregards divine clarification, instructions, commands, and prohibitions to worldly punishment (i.e., misguiding them and placing them among the astray), He will a fortiori do so in the Hereafter as well. That is, a fortiori, in the punishment of the Hereafter, clarification is a prerequisite; if there is no clarification, Allah does not punish. Thus, the priority lies in the fact that punishment in the Hereafter is also contingent upon clarification. The ultimate point is that when worldly punishment in this world (misguidance and being categorized among the astray) is contingent upon clarification, this contingency and conditionality exist a fortiori in the Hereafter.

Question: 

Professor: The discussion does not concern the punishment of this people and its actualization; rather, the discussion concerns how the punishment revolves around clarification; that is, punishment revolves around clarification, and this priority (awlawiyyah) indeed exists… The issue goes back to something else. If we prove that it is restricted to worldly punishment, then it would pertain to past nations and no general rule would be obtained that continues to apply to the end. You ultimately wish to derive from this that whoever is punished in this world is necessarily punished in the Hereafter…

There are two separate issues here: one is that if we say they are placed among the astray, those who are astray will a fortiori be punished on the Day of Resurrection. However, the issue of contingency upon clarification (al-tawaqquf ‘ala al-bayan) is a different matter. The proponent of Exemption (Bara’ah) does not wish to prove that past nations who were among the astray will be punished on the Day of Resurrection—well, let them be punished. He is stating something else: if it pertains to past nations and the punishment was worldly, then it is no longer suitable for the argument.

I said that the late Sheikh’s first objection had two aspects. One aspect was “We were not” (kunna), which refers to past tense. The second aspect is that it speaks of worldly punishment. Now, if we ultimately prove worldly punishment for past nations—even if, as you say, we argue that their worldly punishment necessarily means that past nations face punishment in the Hereafter, and Allah is informing us that past nations also face punishment in the Hereafter—does it still indicate the Principle of Exemption? We are discussing the Principle of Exemption… Therefore, being placed among the astray and their punishment in the Hereafter, on its own, is still insufficient to prove Exemption. You are saying the same thing… namely, that you say “We were not” (kunna) refers to time… and we also interpret “to let go astray” (liyudilla qauman) as “to place them among those who are astray” (liyaj’alahum fi-l-dallin). That is, we set aside that aspect: it means “among the astray” and this is the very state of being placed among the astray, which has punishment in the Hereafter. Very well. That is, Allah, the Blessed and Exalted, never places any nation (meaning it is not His custom or practice) among the astray; that is, He does not place them in this group in this world.

The third interpretation is also contrary to the apparent meaning of the verse; namely, that Allah’s intention behind “after He has guided them” (ba’da idh hadahum) is that He does not abandon them after sending messengers, but rather brings them a Shariah. The apparent meaning of the verse is that sending messengers, revealing scriptures, and providing the Shariah are all part of that very guidance. It does not mean that He does not abandon them after guidance and brings them a Shariah, law, and regulations. Thus, the second and third interpretations are contrary to the apparent meaning of the verse. As for the first interpretation mentioned by this objector, we can use it to prove Exemption. Therefore, whether it is the first interpretation or the second, the verse can establish Exemption.

Supporting Evidence for the Argument of the Third Verse

This is corroborated (yu’ayyidu dhalika) by the occasion of revelation (sha’n al-nuzul) narrated for this verse. Two occasions of revelation have been mentioned for this verse:

1. A group of Muslims passed away before the religious obligations, duties, and prohibitions were clarified. Some individuals came to the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him and his family) and inquired: “O Messenger of Allah, what is the status of our brothers who passed away before the obligations were revealed?” This verse was then revealed: “And Allah would not let a people go astray after He has guided them…”, meaning: “Allah would not punish a people after He has guided them.” After all, these brothers of yours had been guided, and they passed away before clarification occurred; therefore, they will not be punished.

2. Occasionally, some obligations and instructions were abrogated (naskh). It would take time for these duties to reach some Muslims, and before the news reached them—because they were in other regions—they passed away. A group came and asked about their status. This verse was revealed: “And Allah would not let a people go astray after He has guided them…”

These two occasions of revelation directly pertain to the Prophet’s own nation (ummah). Therefore, they have no connection to past nations, and they express a general rule and ruling.

Thus, on the whole, in light of this supporting evidence we have mentioned and the responses we provided to the first and second objections, it appears that this verse—on the same scale as “And We would never punish until We sent a messenger”—indicates the Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah). Two objections were raised, both of which have been answered.

Discussion for the Next Session

Two or three other verses remain, which we will, God willing, evaluate in the future.

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