The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Sixty

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, First Part: Lifting, First Topic: The Meaning of Lifting, The First Opinion and Its Analysis, The Second Opinion

December 20, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The examination of the chain of transmission (sanad) of the Hadith of Lifting has been completed. As the popular opinion has pointed out, this narration is authentic (sahih), and even if the proofs of its authenticity are disputed, we consider the narration to be credible due to the popular practice based upon it, although the proofs of its authenticity are also complete.

Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting

Now it is time to discuss the indicative value (dalalah) of this narration. The phrase “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” (lifted is that which they do not know) is the subject of our discussion among the nine items mentioned. This phrase consists of several parts: first, the word rufi’a (lifted) itself; second, the relative pronoun ma (that which); and third, la ya’lamun (they do not know). These three are the primary parts of the phrase “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun”. In each of these parts, there are discussions. We begin with the first part, namely, rufi’a.

First Part: Lifting

Regarding the word rufi’a (lifting), several discussions must be pursued:

First, whether this word is used in its original meaning or in the meaning of daf’ (preventing/repelling), and if it is used in the meaning of daf’, whether this usage is literal (haqiqi) or figurative (majazi)?

Second, what is meant by this raf’ (lifting)? Is it an ontological (waqi’i) lifting or an apparent (zahiri) lifting?

Surrounding these two topics, especially the second topic, there are relatively detailed discussions.

First Topic: The Meaning of Lifting

The first topic is what raf’ means here. Before mentioning the existing opinions, it seems necessary to present a brief explanation of the concepts of raf’ (lifting) and daf’ (preventing/repelling) and the difference between them. Then, we shall examine the opinions.

Raf’ is usually used in a case where something has come into existence and the cause for its survival (muqtadi-ye baqa’) is also present, but if the effect of that cause is prevented—or in other words, an obstacle is created against the cause—the concept of raf’ is realized.

On the other hand, daf’ refers to a scenario where the cause for the realization of the thing has come into existence, but the thing itself has not yet existed. Now, if the effect of the cause is prevented prior to the realization of the thing, the concept of daf’ is realized.

Therefore, raf’ consists of preventing the effect of the cause after the existence of the thing and creating an obstacle to the survival of that thing. Conversely, daf’ consists of preventing the effect of the cause prior to the realization of the thing.

According to these two terms and the aforementioned definition, there is apparently a mutual exclusion (tabayun) between these two concepts. In raf’, the effect of the cause on survival is prevented—meaning that it prevents the cause at the stage of survival; in daf’, it prevents the cause at the stage of occurrence. Therefore, daf’ consists of preventing the effect of the cause at the stage of occurrence, and raf’ consists of preventing the effect of the cause at the stage of survival.

After understanding the meanings of raf’ and daf’, it is necessary to mention the three opinions regarding the meaning of raf’:

The First Opinion: Muhaqqiq Na’ini (may he rest in peace) stated: Raf’ here means daf’, and the usage of raf’ in place of daf’ is also literal (haqiqi), not figurative (majazi). That is, he both believes that raf’ is in the meaning of daf’ and does not consider this usage to be figurative; rather, he deems it literal, without any figurative framing or metaphor (bi-la ‘inayah wa tajawuz).

The Second Opinion: In contrast, another group believes that raf’ is used in the meaning of daf’, but this usage is figurative (majazi). They accept that raf’ is used here in the meaning of daf’, but considering that these two concepts are mutually exclusive, this usage cannot be literal. Naturally, every figurative usage also requires a figurative framing and semantic connection (‘alaqah majaziyyah).

The Third Opinion: Raf’ is used here in its original meaning, not in the meaning of daf’.

The First Opinion

Muhaqqiq Na’ini believes that raf’ in the phrase “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” is in reality in the meaning of daf’; meaning that fundamentally, no ruling has been legislated or occurred in these cases, such as cases of lack of knowledge, necessity (idtirar), coercion (ikrah), and their likes (since this discussion is not exclusive to ma la ya’lamun but encompasses all nine cases mentioned in the hadith). Therefore, “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” means that no ruling exists regarding cases such as lack of knowledge, necessity, and coercion, and indeed none has been legislated at all; not that a ruling occurred and was subsequently removed. Because if raf’ were in its original meaning, it would require that a ruling existed, was legislated and enacted, but has been removed in this case. This concerns the original meaning of raf’.

However, regarding the usage, he believes that there is no figurative usage at all. Because the root of these two is in reality one and the same. Why do you say they are mutually exclusive? That is, what permits the usage of raf’ in place of daf’ without any metaphor being involved is that just as the occurrence of a thing requires a cause, the survival of the thing is also in need of a cause. It makes no difference. Ultimately, preventing the realization of the cause, whether it is the cause of occurrence or the cause of survival, is one and the same; the need of the thing for a cause at the stage of survival is identical to its need for a cause at the stage of occurrence. Therefore, in light of this aspect, using the word raf’ in place of daf’ poses no issue, nor is there any need for a semantic connection, but rather this usage is literal.

Examination of the First Opinion

This statement has been objected to.

As we said in explaining the difference between raf’ and daf’, these two concepts are apparently mutually exclusive. This exclusion is completely manifest both in terms of lexicography and common custom (‘urf). Daf’ is applied where a thing has come into existence, but the effect of the cause on its survival is prevented. Conversely, raf’ is where the thing has not yet come into existence, and its very occurrence is faced with an obstacle. These two meanings are mutually exclusive, and ‘urf also understands this meaning. For example, in the terminology used in medicine, sometimes prevention (pishgiri) is discussed and sometimes treatment (darman). Prevention is daf’, and treatment is raf’. Thus, both in lexicography and in ‘urf, these two are mutually exclusive, and naturally, if a word is to be used in a meaning exclusive to its original meaning, this usage will certainly be figurative; provided, of course, that one of the semantic connections is present there.

Does the need of both for a cause (one needing a cause for survival and the other needing a cause at the stage of occurrence) constitute a permission for usage or not? He, in fact, mentioned this shared aspect as the root of the literal usage without any figurative framing or metaphor. However, is this the case? It is similar to saying: among the words applied to the entities of this world, the sky is blue and the sea is also blue. Both are boundless, meaning their end is not seen. Numerous shared aspects exist between these two entities. But would these shared aspects permit the usage of the word ‘sky’ for ‘sea’ without any figurative framing or metaphor (that is, in a literal manner)? Certainly not. Because one pertains to the ontological world (‘alam-e waqi’iyyat wa takwin) and the other pertains to the conventional world (‘alam-e i’tibar wa wad’). Shared aspects in the ontological world do not permit the usage of one of these two words in the meaning of the other.

In light of this obvious conceptual difference, it is unclear for what reason Muhaqqiq Na’ini claimed that the word raf’ here is used in place of daf’, and that too without any figurative framing or metaphor (bi-la ‘inayah wa tajawuz). This is a strange statement. Therefore, this assertion of the late Muhaqqiq Na’ini has also been objected to.

The Second Opinion

The second view is that raf’ here is in the meaning of daf’. The reason for this is clear; because the purpose is that rulings have been legislated generally, but they do not continue in these cases. That is, the cause for survival disappears, and these descriptions, such as “that which they do not know” (ma la ya’lamun), “that which they are forced into” (mudtarr ‘alayh), and their likes prevent the effect of the cause for survival and do not let this ruling continue. Thus, raf’ in these cases is in the meaning of daf’; because the ruling exists (the ruling has been legislated from the beginning without observing this ignorance).

However, some other aspects are also taken into consideration. That is, those who say raf’ is in the meaning of daf’ themselves sometimes say: this ruling is legislated in a general way for all states and conditions, and the ruling is established for everyone, except that it does not continue in these cases; meaning its survival is prevented.

Another group conceptualizes the issue differently and interprets raf’ with respect to the establishment of these rulings in previous nations. Because the premise is that raf’ is where a ruling is established, and this comes and removes it, preventing the effect of the cause at the stage of survival. This ruling must have been established prior to this.

In the first aspect, the establishment of these rulings is within this very sacred law itself. In the second aspect, the establishment of the rulings is among previous nations. Therefore, raf’ is in reality in the meaning of the lifting of rulings established in past nations. Yes, that he says “lifted from my nation” (rufi’a ‘an ummati) is itself a clue and witness that, ultimately, these rulings were seemingly established in the past—meaning, for example, there was no difference between the state of necessity and non-necessity, coercion and non-coercion, knowledge and lack of knowledge. However, in this nation, those rulings that were established even in these nine cases have been lifted.

Question: …

Teacher: This has been discussed extensively; I am only presenting the views. Yes, it is open to objection. The first view, in which the late Na’ini says raf’ is in the meaning of daf’ and its usage is also literal, we have rejected. There remain two other views: one is that raf’ is in the meaning of daf’; meaning that from the beginning, these rulings are not established in this sacred law. Truly, he wants to say that these rulings are not established at all in cases of necessity. Raf’ is used in place of daf’, and naturally this usage is figurative. The third view we mentioned is that raf’ is used in its own meaning. However, if it is to be used in its own meaning, we must assume that these rulings were established and have now been removed. To correct this, two aspects have been stated: one aspect is the establishment fi hadhihi al-shari’ah (in this sacred law), which is set aside in the state of necessity and prevents the effect of the cause at the stage of survival; and the other aspect is that it considers and justifies raf’ in view of the establishment of these rulings for previous nations.

Now, whether raf’ is in its own meaning or in the meaning of daf’, and its justification, also becomes important in the subsequent stage.

Here, some of the prominent scholars state generally that this discussion has no practical effect at all. This is an unimportant discussion that has been needlessly dwelt upon, and it suffices merely to gain some familiarity with this discussion. Now, we do not want to enter extensively into the examination of the second and third views either. We have briefly examined and set aside the first view. However, as for the second and third views, whether ultimately raf’ is in the meaning of daf’ or raf’ is in its own meaning, we must conceptualize that established matter in a way that makes the usage of raf’ acceptable in this position.

Discussion of the Next Session

We shall only present a summary of this matter as to what meaning raf’ is ultimately used in, and then we will proceed to the next discussion: Is this raf’ ontological (waqi’i) or apparent (zahiri)?