The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Sixty-One

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, First Part: Lifting, First Topic: The Meaning of Lifting, The Second and Third Opinions, Second Topic: Legislative or Ontological Lifting?, Third Topic: Apparent or Actual Lifting?, Evidence for Apparent Lifting, The First, Second, and Third Evidences, The Statement of Sheikh Ansari, The Objection of Muhaqqiq Na’ini to Sheikh Ansari

December 21, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

It was stated that in order to understand the Hadith of Lifting, the three parts of this tradition must be carefully examined. Those who argue on the basis of this narration say that “the lifting (raf’) of that which they do not know” means that whatever a human does not know (of the ruling, or of both the ruling and the subject) has been lifted; meaning that whatever a human has no knowledge of, Allah has lifted that ruling, and this is the very meaning of Exemption. To clarify this matter, it was stated that first, the meaning of raf’ must be determined. Regarding raf’, it is necessary to clarify several aspects.

The first aspect was whether raf’ is intended in its original meaning or is used in the meaning of daf’. It was mentioned that there are three opinions here: the opinion of Muhaqqiq Na’ini, who considers raf’ to be in the meaning of daf’, or more precisely, believes that raf’ is used in place of daf’ and that this usage occurs without any figurative framing or metaphor. This opinion was objected to and rejected. Two other opinions remain:

The Second and Third Opinions

The Second Opinion is that raf’ is used in its literal meaning; that is, a thing has been established and occurred, and a cause for its survival exists, but the effect of that cause is prevented and an obstacle is created against it. This is the literal meaning of raf’. Here, too, this very meaning is applied; however, that established matter is sometimes interpreted as the ruling established among past nations, and sometimes as a ruling that has been established and possesses the requirement of survival, but due to specific conditions, this ruling is set aside and is no longer established for the constrained (mudtarr), the coerced (mukrah), and the ignorant (jahil).

The Third Opinion is that raf’ here is used in the meaning of daf’; that is, from the beginning, it prevents the occurrence of the ruling and does not allow the cause of occurrence to take effect, but rather creates an obstacle against the requirement of occurrence.

These two views each have their proponents, and of course, we must determine which one is acceptable in this context. This is dependent on a matter that will be mentioned in the future; including what the relative pronoun ma means here and how its attribution (isnad) is made. Therefore, after explaining some of the matters related to the three parts of this hadith, this issue will be clarified.

Second Topic: Legislative or Ontological Lifting?

The second topic related to raf’ is that what is meant by raf’ here is legislative (tashri’i) lifting, not ontological (takwini) lifting. Ontological lifting would mean that among the nation of the Prophet (PBUH), error, coercion, necessity, forgetfulness, and their likes do not occur at all, which is contrary to reality. We clearly observe that among the nation of the Prophet (PBUH), all these cases exist; they commit errors, coercion takes place, and they suffer from forgetfulness. Therefore, raf’ here will be in the meaning of legislative lifting, because ontological lifting is contrary to intuitive perception (wijdan) and reality. This is also a point that must be paid attention to.

Third Topic: Apparent or Actual Lifting?

The third topic is whether the lifting in this hadith is actual (waqi’i) lifting or apparent (zahiri) lifting.

Actual lifting means that a ruling that exists in reality (in the Preserved Tablet, al-Lawh al-Mahfuz) or that ruling which exists in the sacred law but which a human has no knowledge of, is removed; meaning it is erased from the plane of reality. This is actual lifting.

Apparent lifting means that the ruling exists in reality, and that obligation is established in reality; however, if a human is ignorant of it, it is apparently lifted. That is, the ruling is established in reality, but for now, its obligation, necessity, or prohibition is set aside. The expression of the late Mr. Akhund in Al-Kifayah is: “Fa-al-ilzamu al-majholu mimma la ya’lamuna fa-huwa marfu’un fi’lan” (The unknown obligation among what they do not know is lifted for now). This means it is apparently lifted; this obligation is apparently lifted.

Now the question is whether the lifting of “ma la ya’lamun” refers to actual lifting or apparent lifting? Some believe that this lifting is apparent. Clues have also been mentioned for this claim, and this discussion has been raised both in the words of the late Muhaqqiq Na’ini and in the words of his student.

Evidence for Apparent Lifting

Several evidences have been mentioned for this claim:

The First Evidence

First, if we say that this lifting is actual, it leads to a corrupt consequence (tali fasid), which is that rulings would be exclusive to the knowledgeable (‘alim), and this is definitively void. Therefore, it is concluded that this lifting is not actual. Thus, this proof in the form of a hypothetical syllogism (qiyas istithna’i) is as follows:

If what was meant by lifting was actual lifting, it would necessitate that religious rulings be exclusive to the knowledgeable.

However, this consequence (tali) is void.

Therefore, the antecedent (muqaddam) is also void (meaning the hypothesis of actual lifting is void).

In other words, if what is meant by lifting is actual lifting, this would require that rulings be exclusive to the one who is knowledgeable of religious rulings. However, rulings are not exclusive to the knowledgeable, but rather are shared between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. Its conclusion (meaning the invalidity of the antecedent) is established. Therefore, what is meant by lifting is not actual lifting.

Why, if we say what is meant by lifting is actual lifting, do rulings become exclusive to the knowledgeable? Because actual lifting means that the religious ruling fundamentally does not address the ignorant (meaning no duty is directed toward the ignorant). This means that this duty becomes exclusive to the knowledgeable. The correlation (mulazamah) between the antecedent (the hypothesis of actual lifting) and the consequence (the exclusivity of rulings to the knowledgeable) in the first premise of the hypothetical syllogism is clear: when we say that this duty is actually set aside due to ignorance, it means that the ruling did not address the ignorant at all.

The second premise (the minor premise of the syllogism) is also clear, which is that rulings are not exclusive to the knowledgeable. We have a rule known as the Rule of Shared Rulings Between the Knowledgeable and the Ignorant (qa’idat al-ishtirak), which has been discussed in detail in its own place, stating that religious rulings are shared between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. The conclusion is that what is meant by lifting is not actual lifting. When we say “lifting,” it means that very obligation is lifted for now; not that in reality and from the Preserved Tablet the ruling is erased; because that itself leads to another corrupt consequence.

The Second Evidence

Second, the suitability between the ruling and the subject (tanasub al-hukm wa al-mawdu’) in this context dictates that the lifting is apparent, not actual. What is meant by the suitability of the ruling and the subject here? In this proposition “the lifting of ma la ya’lamun,” we have a ruling, a subject, and of course, the attribution and relation between the ruling and the subject in its own place. The ruling is “lifting,” and its subject is “ma la ya’lamun”. The suitability between these two dictates that:

First, something must exist here in order to be lifted. When we doubt something or are ignorant of a specific characteristic or description, first that very thing must exist so that subsequently we can be ignorant of it or doubt it. The very designation of “ignorance” (jahl) requires that something exist in reality for us to be ignorant of it. Without the existence of an actual thing (a reality), fundamentally ignorance has no meaning.

If the lifting were actual, ignorance of it would be equivalent to its non-existence. As soon as we doubt or become ignorant, this is equivalent to the lack of knowledge of that thing. This is an internal clue showing that when lifting is spoken of, what is meant is apparent lifting, not actual lifting. This is also understood from this very internal clue (the suitability of the ruling and the subject). This suitability dictates that something which exists and which a human is ignorant of is apparently lifted, not actually. This is also an evidence and clue that what is meant by lifting is not actual, but rather apparent lifting.

The Third Evidence

Another evidence that may well be mentioned in this context is that in cases of ignorance of the ruling, although the proponents of Exemption negate the obligatoriness of precaution (ihtiyat), they do not at the same time deny the goodness of precaution (husn al-ihtiyat). Fundamentally, the dispute between the proponents of Exemption and others is over the obligatoriness of precaution or its absence. That is, they do not oppose the fact that precaution possesses goodness. What does the goodness of precaution mean at all? The goodness of precaution means that in reality, there exists a ruling that is unknown to us. Thus, precaution possesses goodness in order to attain the reality; because we assume that reality might be one of these possibilities. Therefore, reality remains in its full force. Hence, the goodness of precaution is only compatible with apparent lifting. If the reality were to be lifted (if it were actual lifting), by virtue of the Hadith of Lifting, it would make no sense at all for someone to want to practice precaution as a recommendation (istihbab) (rather than as an obligation). This is also a clue.

Therefore, based on these three clues, we can say that lifting here is apparent, not actual. At the same time, objections have also been raised against this claim.

The Statement of Sheikh Ansari

Sheikh Ansari has an entirely different view; he speaks neither of actual lifting nor of apparent lifting (contrary to these two schools of thought and views we mentioned). He says: What is lifted here is the obligatoriness of precaution (wujub al-ihtiyat). That is, it is as if a ruling is doubted (it is unknown to us); this doubted ruling is lifted. How and through what path? By not making precaution obligatory. As soon as precaution is not made obligatory, it means that the doubted ruling has been lifted.

The late Sheikh does not say that the actual ruling is lifted; he says the obligatoriness of precaution. However, this does not mean that this lifting is also apparent lifting. Fundamentally, he considers the object of lifting to be something else. He says that what is meant by the lifting of “ma la ya’lamun” is that the obligatoriness of precaution is lifted, resulting in the ruling of the non-obligatoriness of precaution. This is the view of the late Sheikh.

The Objection of Muhaqqiq Na’ini to Sheikh Ansari

An objection has been raised against the late Sheikh (Muhaqqiq Na’ini objected, and Mr. Khoei objected). The objection of Muhaqqiq Na’ini is that what the Sheikh stated (that the lifting, or more precisely, the lifted object [marfu’] is the obligatoriness of precaution) is “fihi min al-musamahah” (contains loose formulation). Muhaqqiq Na’ini states: “Fa-inna al-murada min al-mawsuli nafsu al-ahkami al-waqi’iyyati li-annaha hiya al-majholatu” (For indeed, what is meant by the relative pronoun is the actual rulings themselves, because they are what is unknown). And lifting attaches to something of which we are ignorant. We are ignorant of the actual ruling. Lifting also becomes attached to what we are ignorant of, meaning that very actual ruling. Therefore, here it is not the ruling of the non-obligatoriness of precaution that is directly the object of lifting.

He says: According to the apparent meaning of the hadith, since the actual ruling itself is unknown, it itself is lifted. Of course, one of the results of lifting that unknown ruling is the non-obligatoriness of precaution. Otherwise, that this unknown ruling is apparently lifted is definite, meaning the Lawgiver establishes a latitude (sa’ah) for us.

Discussion of the Next Session

Thus, up to this point, our discussion led to the conclusion that we can rely on three evidences and clues that what is meant by lifting here is apparent lifting. However, from the words of some, it is inferred that this lifting is actual. Now, we must see whether this objection is correct or not.