The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Sixty-Two

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, First Part: Lifting, Third Topic: Apparent or Actual Lifting?, Examination of the Objection of Muhaqqiq Na’ini to the Sheikh, Examination of the Evidences for Apparent Lifting, Examination of the First, Second, and Third Evidences

December 22, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

We mentioned that in the case of the Hadith of Lifting, the three parts must be examined. In the first section, we spoke about the word raf’ (lifting) and pointed out that several aspects and topics must be examined regarding it.

The first topic or first aspect relates to the meaning of raf’ and whether it is in the meaning of raf’ or daf’ (preventing/repelling). The second topic or second aspect is whether this lifting is legislative (tashri’i) or ontological (takwini), which of course is obvious and clear. The third topic and third aspect is whether this lifting is actual (waqi’i) or apparent (zahiri).

We mentioned that there are two opinions here:

One opinion is that this lifting is apparent, and what is meant by apparent lifting is the lifting of the ruling apparently, while the actual ruling remains. Up to this point, three proofs and three evidences have been mentioned to establish the apparent nature of the lifting. Of course, Muhaqqiq Iraqi also has two or three other proofs, which we will examine in what follows; such as the fact that the Hadith of Lifting is in the position of granting a favor (imtinan), and this being in the position of granting a favor is itself an evidence for the apparent nature of this lifting. We shall subsequently refer to the evidences and proofs of Muhaqqiq Iraqi regarding the apparent nature of the lifting.

These three proofs and three evidences were mentioned by the late Mr. Khoei.

Conversely, it was stated that some words, statements, and evidences indicate that the lifting is actual; such as the statement of Sheikh Ansari, who considered the lifted object (marfu’) in the Hadith of Lifting to be “the obligatoriness of precaution” (wujub al-ihtiyat). It was said that this statement indicates that the lifting is actual; because the obligatoriness of precaution is fundamentally for attaining the reality, and when the obligatoriness of precaution is lifted, it is the reality itself that is removed.

Sheikh Ansari said that this lifting is actual; because the lifting of precaution is concomitant with the lifting of reality.

The late Na’ini objected to the Sheikh’s statement.

The summary of the Sheikh’s statement was that the lifted object, essentially and primarily, is “the obligatoriness of precaution” itself, but this is concomitant with the lifting of reality. Muhaqqiq Na’ini objected to the Sheikh that this is not so; rather, the lifted object is reality itself, and it is this lifting of reality that is concomitant with the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution, or in other words, the effect of lifting the reality is the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution. Thus, Muhaqqiq Na’ini, in the position of objecting to the Sheikh, asked: Why did you say that the lifted object is the obligatoriness of precaution? The lifted object is reality itself, but its lifting necessitates the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution, meaning its effect is the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution.

Examination of the Objection of Muhaqqiq Na’ini to the Sheikh

Now the question is: Is this objection of Muhaqqiq Na’ini against the Sheikh valid? In other words, is there any difference between the statement of the Sheikh and the statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini? Upon careful scrutiny of the words of the late Sheikh and Muhaqqiq Na’ini, it becomes clear that they do not differ much from one another. It may be said that the difference lies in whether we consider the lifting to be directed initially and essentially toward the obligatoriness of precaution, or toward reality. Ultimately, there is apparently a difference between these two expressions. However, from the perspective that Muhaqqiq Na’ini raised his objection, this difference has no effect. Whether we say “lifting” is directed toward reality and this is concomitant with the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution, or we say that the lifted object is the obligatoriness of precaution itself, the final fruit and result of both is the same. For this reason, some of the legal theorists have objected to the late Na’ini, saying: “Wa min al-gharibi jaddan ma ja’a fi al-taqrirati al-marhum al-Kazimi fi hadha al-maqam” (And it is extremely strange what appeared in the transcripts of the late [Muhaqqiq] Kazemi in this context)—which is recorded in the transcripts of the late Na’ini in the book Fawa’id al-Usul—that he wanted to object to the Sheikh; there seems to be no justification for this objection.

At any rate, we do not intend to enter in detail into this discussion as to whether the lifting is ultimately directed toward the actual ruling itself or toward the obligatoriness of precaution. Of course, this has its own specific discussion which is perhaps not very necessary to address here, or if necessary, we shall address it on another occasion.

Examination of the Evidences for Apparent Lifting

The main point is that two opinions have been mentioned here regarding lifting: one is that this lifting is apparent, and the other is that the lifting is actual.

Regarding this lifting being actual, it was also stated yesterday, and today I emphasize that based on what Muhaqqiq Khorasani has stated, this lifting is the lifting of actualization (fa’liyyat). What is meant by apparent lifting is the lifting of actualization, and actualization is not meant in contrast to legislative formulation (insha’) (which is a stage subsequent to legislative formulation). Ultimately, these two views are proposed, and we do not want to rush to a conclusion now. For now, we will examine the evidences that the late Mr. Khoei mentioned and the proofs he brought, to see whether they are sufficient or not; whether those three proofs establish that this lifting is apparent or not.

Examination of the First Evidence

The first evidence mentioned yesterday was the suitability of the ruling and the subject. We said that here we have a ruling, which is lifting, and a subject, which is “ma la ya’lamun” (that which they do not know). This suitability between the ruling and the subject guides us to the fact that something exists in reality of which we are ignorant; because ignorance and doubt regarding a thing is a branch of the existence of that thing. There must be something of which we are ignorant, something must exist of which we are doubtful. Therefore, when it says: “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” (lifted is that which they do not know), that which they do not know or regarding which they have hesitation is lifted; because al-jahl masawiqun li-‘adamih; al-shakku fi al-shay’i yusawiqu ‘adamahu (ignorance is equivalent to non-existence; doubt in a thing is equivalent to its non-existence). The mere fact that we do not know is equivalent to certainty of non-existence. This point, in reality, is an internal clue that the lifting here is apparent.

Please note: What is the fruit of the discussion on whether this lifting is apparent or actual in our discussion? Why are we examining this? For example, if we say this lifting is apparent, what is the result? And if we say it is actual, what will be the result in the discussion of Exemption?

If we say this lifting is apparent, the Hadith of Lifting can be considered among the proofs of Exemption. However, if we say this lifting is actual, it can no longer be a proof of Exemption. When it says “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun”, it means the lifting of what you do not know, apparently; meaning that apparently no duty is established for you. However, if the lifting were actual—meaning that this ruling is also removed in reality—this is no longer compatible with the discussion of Exemption.

Question: …

Teacher: What is the claim in Exemption? In a case where there is no declaration (bayan), you have no duty until the declaration reaches you. Therefore, Exemption does not negate the duty in reality… However, if the negation of the duty occurs in reality, it is no longer identical to our claim (in Exemption)… Is this negation of duty apparent or actual?… The claim of the proponents of Exemption is that we currently have no duty, not that there is no duty in reality… If we said this lifting is actual, this differs from the claim of the proponents of Exemption… For now, I will defer this matter to later… Some have believed in actual lifting, and those who have said this lifting is actual have practically excluded it from the circle of argumentation.

Ultimately, in the discussion of Exemption, there is a claim, and we must examine the proofs to see whether they can establish this claim or not.

Question: …

Teacher: Therefore, you observe that the late Sheikh Ansari and others say: The Hadith of Lifting removes the obligatoriness of precaution. That is, it aims to state that this lifting is actual. Because if the lifting were actual… it cannot establish the duty apparently… No, it is not that we must say it is either apparent or actual. Now, let us proceed a little further so that the meaning of the narration becomes clearer.

Now, is there truly this clue, this suitability between the ruling and the subject? The foundation of this proof and its basis is that: “Ignorance of a thing is a branch of its existence” (al-jahlu bi-al-shay’i far’u wujudih); “Doubt of a thing is a branch of its existence” (al-shakku bi-al-shay’i far’u wujudih); meaning that our not knowing whether something exists or not, or our doubting it, is a branch of the existence of that thing.

Sometimes we say that this doubt or ignorance is a branch of the absolute existence of that thing. Sometimes we say it is a branch of the existence fi al-jumlah (in part) of that thing.

We assume that it is correct that ignorance regarding something is a branch of its existence. However, the question is: Is this branch a branch of existence fi al-jumlah or a branch of existence in an absolute manner (wujud-e mutlaq)?

If it is a branch of absolute existence, this clue is complete; because ignorance and doubt regarding a thing only occur where the ruling is established in an absolute manner. However, if we say that this is not a branch of the absolute existence of that thing, but rather a branch of existence fi al-jumlah, then in this case, the ignorant person has ignorance regarding this ruling which was legislated with respect to the knowledgeable.

What is meant by existence fi al-jumlah? It means the existence [of the ruling] with respect to the knowledgeable. This becomes existence fi al-jumlah. Sometimes we assume the ruling to be in an absolute manner and say it is established both for the knowledgeable and the ignorant. Sometimes we say this ruling is established only for the knowledgeable. Ultimately, both are existence, but one is absolute existence and the other is existence fi al-jumlah. Now, what prevents us from accepting the existence fi al-jumlah of the ruling and saying that doubt in it is a branch of its existence fi al-jumlah? If we say this, it does not necessarily lead to apparent lifting; because this ruling can still be established for the knowledgeable. That is, the ruling may be established, but the person is ignorant of it. Meaning it is as though it was legislated with respect to the knowledgeable. This is no longer apparent lifting, it becomes actual lifting. Therefore, the first clue regarding the apparent nature of this lifting can be open to objection.

Examination of the Second Evidence

The second clue, proof, or evidence is the sharing of rulings between the knowledgeable and the ignorant (ishtirak al-ahkam). Now, this has a detailed and foundational discussion. Some believe that we have no narration indicating the sharing of rulings between the knowledgeable and the ignorant.

Question: …

Teacher: They also answer those cases… I will not enter into that discussion… You may refer to Muntaqa al-Usul, volume 5, page 388… I am saying it is a disputed… I do not want to say now that there is not… Some do not have this objection… There is disagreement in it, although the popular opinion among the legal theorists is that rulings are shared between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. Fundamentally, we have a rule known as the Rule of Sharing (Qa’idat al-Ishtirak). There are two Rules of Sharing: one is the Rule of Sharing of the disbelievers with the Muslims in the branches of religion (furu’), and the other is the Rule of Sharing of rulings between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. These two are in completely different realms. The popular opinion says this, but some do not accept that rulings are shared between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. Therefore, the acceptance of the second evidence is, in fact, based on this foundation…

Examination of the Third Evidence

The third clue and evidence was that even the proponents of Exemption consider precaution to possess goodness (husn). Precaution is meaningful where a ruling is established in reality, and precaution is practiced to attain that reality or in the hope of attaining it. Ultimately, the proponents of Exemption also consider precaution to possess goodness, although they deny its obligatoriness. Thus, it becomes clear that a ruling is established in reality, and the Hadith of Lifting apparently removes this ruling.

This point is also open to discussion: Does the goodness of precaution necessarily exist for attaining the reality? That is, does it necessarily depend on there being a ruling in reality, and the person who practices precaution must base their action on attaining the reality? It is possible; this is in the case where we have an independent proof for the goodness of precaution, which we sometimes do. Fundamentally, if there is no proof for the obligatoriness, but rather a proof for desirability (matlubiyyat), it does not contradict it. That is, it is possible that the action does not reach the limit of obligation, but the probability of its desirability is entertained even if it is not obligatory, rather than for attaining the reality. This gives the probability of desirability.

Question: …

Teacher: It is possible that it is merely for this probability of desirability. If this is so, it no longer indicates apparent lifting. Our discussion for now is on Exemption from obligation and prohibition. Currently, the core of the discussion is on this… So can this not be a proof that it performs apparent lifting?… Our claim for now is not that.