The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Sixty-Three

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, First Part: Lifting, Third Topic: Apparent or Actual Lifting?, The Statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi (Two Other Evidences for Apparent Lifting), The Fourth Evidence and Its Analysis, The First and Second Objections and Their Responses

December 23, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The third topic of the discussions related to the first of the three parts of the Hadith of Lifting was regarding whether what is meant by raf’ (lifting) in this narration is apparent or actual lifting. Of course, this discussion also exists regarding the word “la ya’lamun” (they do not know) itself, as to whether what is meant by la ya’lamun is the apparent or actual lack of knowledge; which will be examined separately, although it may also be related to the discussion concerning raf’.

Regarding the word raf’, we mentioned that there are two views: one group believes this lifting is apparent, and some others believe in actual lifting.

The three proofs of the late Mr. Khoei regarding the apparent nature of the lifting were mentioned and examined. Some others have also established evidences and proofs for the apparent nature of the lifting.

The Statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi (Two Other Evidences for Apparent Lifting)

Muhaqqiq Iraqi has established two other proofs for this claim.

The Fourth Evidence

He states: The Hadith of Lifting has fundamentally been introduced in the position of granting a favor (imtinan); meaning that it is as though Allah, the Exalted, has granted a favor to the nation of the Prophet, since He says: “lifted from my nation” (rufi’a ‘an ummati) and has lifted certain matters from them. Since this hadith has been introduced in the position of expressing a favor, and has enumerated nine matters as those that have been lifted, this indicates that what has been lifted is such that, had it not been lifted and had it remained established, it would have been contrary to imtinan.

Therefore, had that thing remained established, it would have been contrary to the favor, and now that it is lifted, it is a sign of imtinan. Imtinan, in reality, is a form of kindness, grace, service, assistance, and facilitation for others. When Allah wishes to grant a favor to the nation of the Prophet—meaning to remove a burden from their shoulders, to remove an obligation from the people—if He had not done so, it would have been accompanied by a form of hardship, difficulty, and severity. We must see what could have not been removed here and thus cause hardship and difficulty for the people.

1. One possibility is to say that the actual ruling itself has been removed as an imtinan, and had it not been removed, this would have caused difficulty and hardship for the people. Is the removal of this actual ruling—which is assumed to be unknown to the duty-bound (mukallaf) who has no knowledge of this actual ruling and is ignorant of it, and consequently, an obligation regarding it is fundamentally meaningless—considered an imtinan? Ultimately, imtinan must have a practical fruit in the lives of the people. When the duty-bound have no knowledge of the ruling, even assuming that it is established in reality, its removal is not considered an imtinan; because imtinan must be accompanied by a form of compassion, assistance, and the lifting of hardship. Now, even if, hypothetically, this actual ruling were established, what hardship does its removal lift from the shoulders of the people? Therefore, the lifting of the actual ruling is not considered an imtinan.

2. The second possibility is that Allah could have said: For someone who is ignorant of the actual ruling and does not know what the actual ruling is so that they may act upon it, it is obligatory for them to practice precaution (ihtiyat). That is, it would be said: Now that you do not know what ruling is binding upon you and what duty is upon you, practice precaution so that you attain the reality. It is obvious that the obligatoriness of precaution is considered a form of hardship and difficulty. Therefore, the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution can be an imtinan. That is, Allah, Blessed and Exalted is He, who stated: “lifted from my nation are nine” (or “nine traits”), did so from the gate of imtinan, and the requirement of this position is that the lifted object (marfu’) is not the actual ruling, but rather the lifted object is “the obligatoriness of precaution”. Thus, the lifting does not attach to the actual ruling; this lifting is not actual lifting, but rather the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution, and this is the very meaning of “apparent lifting”.

This view is exactly opposite to the statement of the Sheikh (Ansari), who considered the lifted object to be the obligatoriness of precaution and through that wanted to conclude that this lifting is actual. Muhaqqiq Na’ini also stated: It is the lifting of reality, and its effect or consequence is the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution. However, the Sheikh stated: It is the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution. But if the obligatoriness of precaution is removed, it means that in reality, the actual ruling is lifted. Muhaqqiq Iraqi also entered precisely from this angle, stating: The lifted object is the obligatoriness of precaution, and when the obligatoriness of precaution is lifted, this means that the lifting is apparent. You see that from a single “lifted object,” two different conclusions are drawn. This was the first evidence and proof of Muhaqqiq Iraqi.

Question: …

Teacher: For now, we have only briefly mentioned that there are possibilities raised here. One possibility is that this lifting is directed toward a ruling established in the past; meaning that some difficult and hardship-causing rulings existed, for example, in past nations and were subsequently lifted. This depends on the discussion of the meaning of raf’ and daf’, to which we referred. Some, to prove that this raf’ is used in its literal meaning and not in the meaning of daf’, have argued that since this word requires the removal of an established matter, this established matter can be interpreted as the rulings of past nations; meaning rulings that were in previous sacred laws and were subsequently lifted. At any rate, if he says the obligatoriness of precaution is lifted, this obligatoriness of precaution could have been realized in two ways: sometimes by the ruling of reason, and at other times by the ruling of the sacred law. Perhaps in past nations, the sacred law, in addition to the ruling of reason, had prescribed such a ruling (the obligatoriness of precaution), and here, according to the statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi, that ruling is lifted. At any rate, this is the first proof of Muhaqqiq Iraqi.

Muhaqqiq Iraqi has also brought another proof here, which we shall mention later.

Question: …

Teacher: For someone who is uninformed and ignorant, the actual ruling is not established… Yes, our assumption is fundamentally that it is a settled matter (mafrugh ‘anhu) that they do not know the ruling, and in a sense do not even entertain the probability of the existence of the ruling.

Question: …

Teacher: This is the statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi… The source of punishment is disobedience (‘isyan). When He lifts this obligation, disobedience regarding it is fundamentally meaningless, so that it would lead to punishment.

Examination of the Fourth Evidence

The First Objection

First, if we say that this lifting is actual, it leads to a corrupt consequence (tali fasid), which is that rulings would be exclusive to the knowledgeable (‘alim), and this is definitively void. Therefore, it is concluded that this lifting is not actual. Thus, this proof in the form of a hypothetical syllogism (qiyas istithna’i) is as follows:

If what was meant by lifting was actual lifting, it would necessitate that religious rulings be exclusive to the knowledgeable.

However, this consequence (tali) is void.

Therefore, the antecedent (muqaddam) is also void (meaning the hypothesis of actual lifting is void).

In other words, if what is meant by lifting is actual lifting, this would require that rulings be exclusive to the one who is knowledgeable of religious rulings. However, rulings are not exclusive to the knowledgeable, but rather are shared between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. Its conclusion (meaning the invalidity of the antecedent) is established. Therefore, what is meant by lifting is not actual lifting.

Why, if we say what is meant by lifting is actual lifting, do rulings become exclusive to the knowledgeable? Because actual lifting means that the religious ruling fundamentally does not address the ignorant (meaning no duty is directed toward the ignorant). This means that this duty becomes exclusive to the knowledgeable. The correlation (mulazamah) between the antecedent (the hypothesis of actual lifting) and the consequence (the exclusivity of rulings to the knowledgeable) in the first premise of the hypothetical syllogism is clear: when we say that this duty is actually set aside due to ignorance, it means that the ruling did not address the ignorant at all.

The second premise (the minor premise of the syllogism) is also clear, which is that rulings are not exclusive to the knowledgeable. We have a rule known as the Rule of Shared Rulings Between the Knowledgeable and the Ignorant (qa’idat al-ishtirak), which has been discussed in detail in its own place, stating that religious rulings are shared between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. The conclusion is that what is meant by lifting is not actual lifting. When we say “lifting,” it means that very obligation is lifted for now; not that in reality and from the Preserved Tablet the ruling is erased; because that itself leads to another corrupt consequence.

The Second Objection

Second, the suitability between the ruling and the subject (tanasub al-hukm wa al-mawdu’) in this context dictates that the lifting is apparent, not actual. What is meant by the suitability of the ruling and the subject here? In this proposition “the lifting of ma la ya’lamun,” we have a ruling, a subject, and of course, the attribution and relation between the ruling and the subject in its own place. The ruling is “lifting,” and its subject is “ma la ya’lamun”. The suitability between these two dictates that:

First, something must exist here in order to be lifted. When we doubt something or are ignorant of a specific characteristic or description, first that very thing must exist so that subsequently we can be ignorant of it or doubt it. The very designation of “ignorance” (jahl) requires that something exist in reality for us to be ignorant of it. Without the existence of an actual thing (a reality), fundamentally ignorance has no meaning.

If the lifting were actual, ignorance of it would be equivalent to its non-existence. As soon as we doubt or become ignorant, this is equivalent to the lack of knowledge of that thing. This is an internal clue showing that when lifting is spoken of, what is meant is apparent lifting, not actual lifting. This is also understood from this very internal clue (the suitability of the ruling and the subject). This suitability dictates that something which exists and which a human is ignorant of is apparently lifted, not actually. This is also an evidence and clue that what is meant by lifting is not actual, but rather apparent lifting.

The Third Objection

Another evidence that may well be mentioned in this context is that in cases of ignorance of the ruling, although the proponents of Exemption negate the obligatoriness of precaution (ihtiyat), they do not at the same time deny the goodness of precaution (husn al-ihtiyat). Fundamentally, the dispute between the proponents of Exemption and others is over the obligatoriness of precaution or its absence. That is, they do not oppose the fact that precaution possesses goodness. What does the goodness of precaution mean at all? The goodness of precaution means that in reality, there exists a ruling that is unknown to us. Thus, precaution possesses goodness in order to attain the reality; because we assume that reality might be one of these possibilities. Therefore, reality remains in its full force. Hence, the goodness of precaution is only compatible with apparent lifting. If the reality were to be lifted (if it were actual lifting), by virtue of the Hadith of Lifting, it would make no sense at all for someone to want to practice precaution as a recommendation (istihbab) (rather than as an obligation). This is also a clue.

Therefore, based on these three clues, we can say that lifting here is apparent, not actual. At the same time, objections have also been raised against this claim.

The Statement of Sheikh Ansari

Sheikh Ansari has an entirely different view; he speaks neither of actual lifting nor of apparent lifting (contrary to these two schools of thought and views we mentioned). He says: What is lifted here is the obligatoriness of precaution (wujub al-ihtiyat). That is, it is as if a ruling is doubted (it is unknown to us); this doubted ruling is lifted. How and through what path? By not making precaution obligatory. As soon as precaution is not made obligatory, it means that the doubted ruling has been lifted.

The late Sheikh does not say that the actual ruling is lifted; he says the obligatoriness of precaution. However, this does not mean that this lifting is also apparent lifting. Fundamentally, he considers the object of lifting to be something else. He says that what is meant by the lifting of “ma la ya’lamun” is that the obligatoriness of precaution is lifted, resulting in the ruling of the non-obligatoriness of precaution. This is the view of the late Sheikh.

The Objection of Muhaqqiq Na’ini to Sheikh Ansari

An objection has been raised against the late Sheikh (Muhaqqiq Na’ini objected, and Mr. Khoei objected). The objection of Muhaqqiq Na’ini is that what the Sheikh stated (that the lifting, or more precisely, the lifted object [marfu’] is the obligatoriness of precaution) is “fihi min al-musamahah” (contains loose formulation). Muhaqqiq Na’ini states: “Fa-inna al-murada min al-mawsuli nafsu al-ahkami al-waqi’iyyati li-annaha hiya al-majholatu” (For indeed, what is meant by the relative pronoun is the actual rulings themselves, because they are what is unknown). And lifting attaches to something of which we are ignorant. We are ignorant of the actual ruling. Lifting also becomes attached to what we are ignorant of, meaning that very actual ruling. Therefore, here it is not the ruling of the non-obligatoriness of precaution that is directly the object of lifting.

He says: According to the apparent meaning of the hadith, since the actual ruling itself is unknown, it itself is lifted. Of course, one of the results of lifting that unknown ruling is the non-obligatoriness of precaution. Otherwise, that this unknown ruling is apparently lifted is definite, meaning the Lawgiver establishes a latitude (sa’ah) for us.

Discussion of the Next Session

Thus, up to this point, our discussion led to the conclusion that we can rely on three evidences and clues that what is meant by lifting here is apparent lifting. However, from the words of some, it is inferred that this lifting is actual. Now, we must see whether this objection is correct or not.