The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof
Session Sixty-Seven
The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, First Part: Lifting, Third Topic: Apparent or Actual Lifting?, The Sixth Evidence (The Statement of Shahid Sadr), Examination of the Sixth Evidence, The First, Second, and Third Objections
December 30, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion was on the sixth evidence and proof for establishing apparent lifting. This is the evidence and proof derived from the words of Shahid Sadr in response to some who believe in actual lifting. It was briefly stated that some believe in actual lifting, and their proof is that apparent lifting requires a surplus conceptual load (mu’nah za’idah), whereas actual lifting does not require such a load. For this purpose, two formulations have been presented.
The first formulation, which was stated in the previous session, was that the unity of context (wahdat al-siyaq) in the verse itself dictates that the lifting is actual; because that which is the object of “ma la ya’lamun” (that which they do not know) is the actual ruling, and that which is lifted is that very same actual ruling. Therefore, the lifting must also be actual so that this unity is preserved. Then, an objection and a response were also mentioned, and the result was that the requirement of the first formulation is that the lifting is actual, not apparent. We said that Shahid Sadr, in the position of responding, has stated a point which is our sixth evidence. Of course, as a reminder, Shahid Sadr’s statement comprises a negative aspect and a positive aspect. Its negative aspect is the negation of actual lifting and, in a way, is in continuation of explaining the apparent nature of lifting. In the positive aspect, there is also a point that we shall also state.
Continuation of the Sixth Evidence (The Statement of Shahid Sadr)
The summary of Shahid Sadr’s statement, which remained incomplete and was stated yesterday, was that the object of “ma la ya’lamun” is the actual ruling and the lifted object (marfu’) is also that very actual ruling, but the lifting is apparent; just as the late Akhund stated: “Fa-al-ilzamu al-majholu mimma la ya’lamuna fa-huwa marfu’un fi’lan” (The unknown obligation among what they do not know is lifted for now); what is meant by “actual lifting” here is not actualization (fa’liyyat) in contrast to legislative formulation (insha’), but rather what is meant is apparent lifting. He also wants to interpret the late Akhund’s statement based on this very meaning that he himself explained. Now, the point whose explanation remains (since we stated the main claim yesterday and the explanation of Shahid Sadr’s statement remains) is presented.
He states: The actual ruling can have two modes of enactment (wad’) and two modes of lifting (raf’):
The first enactment and legislation of the actual ruling is the very establishment of the ruling in the state of doubt, even if the duty-bound (mukallaf) is not bound by it; meaning a ruling that the Lawgiver has legislated in reality is established for everyone, including the doubting person, in the Preserved Tablet and in reality. There is no difference between the doubting and the non-doubting, the knowledgeable and the non-knowledgeable; even if the doubting duty-bound is not currently bound to perform it. Therefore, that actual ruling exists.
The second legislation is that He makes precaution (ihtiyat) obligatory for the doubting person so that certainty of reaching the reality is attained; meaning He says: I want to preserve the reality in any case, except that He legislates this in the form of an obligation to practice precaution. His expression is: He places its weight upon the duty-bound and places it upon his shoulders in the sense of obligating him to practice precaution (ihtiyatan) regarding it; He makes precaution obligatory for him. In the sense that he must perform that actual ruling at all costs, even through precaution.
Therefore, the actual ruling has two modes of enactment or legislation: one is the legislation of the ruling for everyone, even if the duty-bound is in a state of doubt and is not currently bound to perform it. That He says he is not bound to perform it means that He grants him permission (tarkhis) to omit it. This is one legislation. The second legislation can be in this manner (he raises this as possible options, not that the Lawgiver necessarily has two modes of enactment and legislation) that, in any case, He places this duty upon the shoulders of the duty-bound and says he must perform it at all costs, even through precaution. These two enactments or legislations relate to the actual ruling; the Lawgiver can legislate both in that manner and in this manner.
Corresponding to these two enactments and two legislations, he says we also have two modes of lifting:
Lifting in contrast to the first legislation means that the ruling is lifted in reality and in the actual state of affairs; meaning that the ruling is completely eradicated and no ruling remains for the doubting person at all.
However, lifting in contrast to the second legislation means the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution; meaning He says: I do not want you to perform this duty at all costs, even through precaution; at most you lose the reality, [but] you are excused.
Therefore, regarding the doubting person, two scenarios can be realized.
What is derived from the Hadith of Lifting here is that lifting here is in the meaning of the second possibility. “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” means that whoever has ignorance or doubt regarding the actual ruling, that actual ruling is apparently lifted from him; that obligatoriness of precaution which was for attaining the reality is lifted. Therefore, the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution through the Hadith of Lifting is in the meaning of apparent lifting.
Thus, in the enactment and legislation in the first sense, the actual ruling exists and is also established for the doubting person, except that the Lawgiver grants permission to omit it. However, in the second scenario, the meaning of enactment and legislation is that, in any case, the weight of this duty on the shoulders of the duty-bound is established through the obligatoriness of precaution; meaning the duty-bound must perform the actual ruling at all costs, even through precaution. Therefore, the lifting will also correspond to it. He states: the second meaning is intended here.
He states: in this manner, the unity of context is preserved, and therefore we can no longer say that the lifting is actual on the grounds that if the lifting were actual, and the lifted object were also actual, and “ma la ya’lamun” were also the actual ruling, this would not be compatible with the rule of shared rulings between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. Ultimately, rulings are shared between the knowledgeable and the ignorant. Now, how this sharing is established is another discussion. Sometimes one says: rulings are shared between the knowledgeable and the ignorant because incorporating the condition of knowledge into the object of the ruling (muta’allaq al-hukm) is impossible. Someone may not accept this impossibility, but through another path, accept this sharing and say: no religious ruling is exclusive to the one who is knowledgeable of the ruling; the ruling is established for everyone, whether knowledgeable or ignorant. Therefore, we cannot say that this lifting is actual.
Therefore, the object of “ma la ya’lamun” is the actual ruling; the object of lifting is the actual ruling, but the lifting is apparent. It is as though we have three things: here we have a lifting, we have a lifted object, and we have “ma la ya’lamun”. It is said: “ma la ya’lamun” is the actual ruling, the lifted object is the actual ruling, and the lifting is apparent. This is the summary of his statement.
If we say the lifting is apparent, it means precaution is no longer obligatory. It is no longer necessary for you to attain the reality at all costs; because they have taken lifting in the second meaning, in contrast to enactment in the second meaning.
Examination of the Sixth Evidence
Now, is this statement correct or not? Regardless of Shahid Sadr’s claim that the lifting is apparent (or in other words, they want to say this lifting is not actual, because this is the negative aspect of Shahid Sadr’s statement, and he wants to say this lifting is not actual), this is a claim raised by him, but his proof is open to discussion. Now, regarding this proof, there are two or three observations.
The First Objection
The main problem is why, fundamentally, he says we have three things: first, the object of “ma la ya’lamun”; second, the object of lifting; and third, the lifting itself. Because his expression was: the object of ma la ya’lamun is the actual ruling, the lifted object is also the actual ruling, but the lifting is apparent. The objection is: Can we separate the lifting from the lifted object and say these two are separate from one another? Yes, the object of “ma la ya’lamun” can be anything: the actual ruling or the apparent ruling. Because it stated: “the lifting of ma la ya’lamun”; its object is the lack of knowledge, which, for example, can be the actual ruling. However, can we distinguish between the lifting (raf’) and the lifted object (marfu’)? Lifting is in fact the action (fi’l) and the lifted object is the object of the action (maf’ul). Can we divide this action into apparent and actual? Even if we have a dispute, the dispute is over what the lifted object is. Is that which is removed the actual ruling or the apparent ruling? Therefore, the separation between the lifting and the lifted object is open to discussion. Or, in other words, he says the object of “ma la ya’lamun” is one thing and the object of lifting is another thing. Muhaqqiq Iraqi said: “the lifting of ma la ya’lamun” means the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution in cases where the actual ruling is unknown or doubted. However, he had no further discussion on whether the lifting is apparent or actual; he said the lifted object is the apparent ruling. Yes, the actual ruling is unknown to us. As if “the lifting of ma la ya’lamun,” according to Muhaqqiq Iraqi, was that in cases where you do not know the actual ruling, this apparent ruling of the obligatoriness of precaution is removed, so you do not need to practice precaution. He did not have any talk of lifting such that we would say the lifting is actual or apparent.
However, Shahid Sadr has in fact, besides the lifted object and “ma la ya’lamun” (the discussion on which concerns these two, the discussion on the lifted object and “ma la ya’lamun” as to whether they are the apparent or actual ruling), conceptualized regarding the lifting itself as if we have two liftings: an actual lifting and an apparent lifting… whereas there is no justification for us to separate these. Sometimes we say the lifted object is “the obligatoriness of precaution,” which is an apparent ruling, so the lifting becomes apparent. Sometimes we say the lifted object is the actual ruling, so the lifting becomes actual; therefore, lifting, in view of whether the object of the lifted object is the actual or apparent ruling, is characterized by being actual or apparent, and other than that has no meaning.
The Second Objection
He said if we interpret it in this manner, the unity of context and unity of focus is preserved. They said lifting here is in the meaning of the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution; because enactment in the second meaning is the legislation of the obligatoriness of precaution. Therefore, its lifting is the lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution. This statement, with the object of “ma la ya’lamun,” becomes two things: one has become the actual ruling, and the other the apparent ruling, and this is not unity of focus. He said the object of “ma la ya’lamun” is the actual ruling, the lifted object is also the actual ruling, but the lifting is apparent. Meaning this actual ruling is apparently lifted. He claimed that through this solution, the unity of context is preserved. However, in reality, with this explanation, the unity of focus and context has not remained preserved.
The Third Objection
He considered his statement to be close to the words of the late Akhund and stated that the late Akhund also expresses this very point. With the explanations presented, it became clear that this statement is other than the words of the late Akhund. The late Akhund also ultimately, like Muhaqqiq Iraqi, believes in apparent lifting, because he considers the lifted object to be an apparent ruling. Therefore, the difference between the late Mr. Akhund’s statement and Mr. Sadr’s is also obvious. Consequently, interpreting the late Akhund’s words based on his intended meaning is also incorrect.