The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Eighty

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Second Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity or Non-Exclusivity of “ma” to Particular Doubts, The Five Paths for Generalizing the Hadith of Lifting to Particular and Ruling-directed Doubts and Their Brief Examination

January 27, 2026

Summary of the Previous Session

So far, we have stated and examined five paths among the paths of proving the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts. All of these paths were objected to, and the conclusion was that none of these five paths can prove the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts. A few other methods have also been mentioned which one might say are referable to the previous paths; although from one perspective, it is also possible to propose them independently, because they differ at least in terms of expression.

The Five Paths for Generalizing the Hadith of Lifting to Particular and Ruling-directed Doubts

The First Path

What is meant by ma in “ma la ya’lamun” is “action”; meaning “the lifting of ma la ya’lamun” means that the action which they do not know is lifted. Naturally, based on this explanation, like the other phrases, ma is in the meaning of action; like “the lifting of ma-dturru ilayh” and “the lifting of ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” and other cases. Therefore, ma in all these cases is in the meaning of action and that context is preserved, but action is considered in two ways: 1. sometimes action bima huwa action is considered; 2. sometimes action bima huwa that it is obligatory or forbidden is considered. Here, what is intended is not action bima huwa action, but rather action characterized by possessing a ruling, which ruling is either obligatoriness or prohibition. On this basis, “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” means that the action which is obligatory or the action which is forbidden is lifted.

If it be so, it no longer becomes exclusive to the subject matter.

The Second Path

What is meant by ma is that very “action,” but action becomes unknown in two ways: sometimes it is unknown in itself (bi-nafsihi) and sometimes by its description (bi-wasfihi).

According to this explanation, “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” means that what they do not know is removed. Now, what is it that they do not know? Meaning the action they do not know. What is meant by the relative pronoun ma is that very action, with the difference that “unknown” has a broader meaning: “the unknown action is lifted” (rufi’a al-fi’lu al-majhulu). Unknown action is broader than being unknown in itself or by its description. Sometimes the action itself is unknown, and sometimes its ruling. If the essence of the action is unknown, this is the very particular doubt (shubhah mawdu’iyyah); meaning the action itself is not known whether it is drinking wine or drinking water. And sometimes its ruling is unknown; for example, we do not know whether smoking tobacco is forbidden or permissible. Therefore, it encompasses both ruling-directed doubts (shubhah hukmiyyah) and particular doubts.

Therefore, “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” in the meaning of “the lifting of the unknown action, whether the ignorance is of it or of its description” (raf’ al-fi’l al-majhul sawa’an kana al-jahlu bihi aw bi-wasfihi)—if we interpret it in this manner, encompasses both ruling-directed and particular doubts.

The Third Path

This is the path that the late Mr. Akhund stated in Al-Kifayah. He states: What is meant by ma in “ma la ya’lamun” is the ruling; meaning “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” is in the meaning of “the unknown ruling is lifted” (rufi’a al-hukmu al-majhulu) or “the unknown obligation is lifted” (rufi’a al-taklifu al-majhulu). However, ignorance of the ruling can have different causes and sources.

Sometimes, ignorance of the ruling results from the lack of text (faqd al-nass); because we have no text, therefore the ruling is unknown to us. No matter how much we search, we do not find a proof that states the ruling of smoking tobacco.

Sometimes, the source of the doubt and ignorance is the ambiguity of the text (ijmal al-nass), which causes the ruling to be unknown.

Sometimes, the source of ignorance and doubt is the conflict of two texts (ta’arud al-nassayn).

These are the very three causes conceptualized for doubt in the ruling.

Sometimes, also, the source of doubt and hesitation in the ruling is a mistake in external matters.

This case is the very particular doubts, and those first three cases are ruling-directed doubts.

Therefore, generally speaking, the relative pronoun ma in “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” is in the meaning of the ruling and obligation. However, because there are different causes for ignorance regarding it, it is divided into several types. These causes either relate to the text or to the external world; either there is no text, or it exists but is ambiguous, or it has a conflict. These three cases relate to the ruling. However, if the source of the doubt is an external matter—meaning a mistake in external matters causes doubt in the ruling, for example, the color of this liquid has a specific form or its smell is in a way that the human entertains the probability that it is wine. With the emergence of this probability and its existence, doubt arises as to whether drinking this liquid is permissible or not. Therefore, the doubt in the ruling, or the ignorance regarding the ruling of drinking this liquid, is due to the fact that externally, something has arisen which has become the source of this doubt. Consequently, it becomes a particular doubt. As a result, “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” encompasses both ruling-directed and particular doubts.

Brief Examination of the Generalization Paths

Now, if we place these three paths alongside the path explained by Muhaqqiq Ha’iri, it can be said that that path is the fourth path (of course, other paths can also be mentioned for the inclusion of the hadith with respect to ruling-directed doubts). The path of Muhaqqiq Ha’iri, which has been repeated here several times on relevant occasions, was that ma is utilized in its very own original meaning (the ambiguous thing), but during application and implementation in the external world, in some cases it applies to action and in some cases to the ruling. Then, the attribution of lifting to these is a figurative attribution which requires implying a word as omitted; and of course, the function of the conjunct clause is the explanation and removal of the relative pronoun from ambiguity. Now, sometimes an action is involved and sometimes a ruling, but this does not cause a difference in meaning; therefore, the meaning is completely clear and the utilization is literal; however, the attribution of “lifting” to “ma” is a figurative attribution, according to the same explanation that was stated. For this reason, its inclusion with respect to ruling-directed and particular doubts poses no problem.

According to this view, ma is in the meaning of the ambiguous thing, the lifting of the ambiguous thing apparently means that it itself is removed, but this cannot be correct; the ambiguous thing itself cannot be the lifted object (marfu’). If the ambiguous thing itself were lifted, the attribution would be literal. However, we submit: this ambiguous thing which applies to action or applies to the ruling, its effects or all of its effects are lifted. Therefore, the attribution becomes a figurative attribution.

And lifting all effects is naturally in the hands of the holy Lawgiver, who can remove all effects. Now, sometimes it is all effects of an action, and sometimes all effects of a ruling. Both are in the hands of the Lawgiver. The action itself cannot be lifted; ultimately, if it itself were to be removed (if it applies to action), again a contradiction arises; the lifting of something which consists of an action—we see that this action exists: the coerced action, the constrained action, the unknown action. These have not been lifted; they exist. Therefore, certainly something must be implied as omitted, and that consists of “all effects”. This way and this path for proving generalization appears to possess preference over the other paths.

Question: …

Professor: Yes, punishment is no longer involved, no sin is recorded for him. Did you note? Is the core of the discussion on this or not?! For example, suppose: the person examined (whether he was a jurist [mujtahid] or a follower [muqallid]) regarding a deed and action, and no matter how much he searched he found no text. Here they say its effects are removed; meaning he has no obligation. Now, if subsequently a text is found that this obligation is established, he is no longer punished or held accountable, he does not have to perform its makeup (qada’), he must not perform it; these are its effects.

Therefore, if we want to evaluate the other paths that are mentioned here at least in part, we must say:

First, in all of them, the relative pronoun ma is utilized in a meaning other than its literal meaning; because all of them say ma is either in the meaning of action, or in the meaning of ruling. In the first and second paths they said: what is meant by ma is action, but with explanations they also included the unknown ruling in it. In the third path it is also said that what is intended is the ruling. This itself is contrary to the apparent meaning; because the utilization of the relative pronoun ma has occurred in a meaning other than its literal meaning.

Second, the context of the sentence must also be taken into consideration; meaning ultimately, we must interpret “ma la ya’lamun” in a way that is compatible with “ma la yatiqun”, “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, and other cases. The way the scholars interpret it, again far-fetched justifications must be presented for it. In one place they say what is intended is the ruling; if we say what is meant by ma is the ruling, in the other phrases we must also say what is meant is the ruling; meaning in the case of necessity, coercion, error, forgetfulness, and ignorance—in all of these the ruling is lifted. This preserves the unity of context to some extent, but its requirement is that ma is utilized in another meaning; the “lifting” of that ruling which, for example, either has no text, or has a conflict, or is ambiguous. Ultimately, it must be stated with these far-fetched justifications to be acceptable.

Or, for example, if we say what is meant by ma is action, again we must either say this action is of two types: the action unknown in itself or by its description. And regarding the other phrases we must say: the constrained action by its description. Again this difference arises among the phrases.

Therefore, in our view, on the whole, the truth in the issue is the very path that Muhaqqiq Ha’iri explained.

Discussion of the Next Session

We shall present a summary of this section of the hadith. Subsequently, we must present an explanation regarding the other phrases so that their suitability with this section is preserved; for example, regarding error and forgetfulness, which do not have the relative pronoun ma, or regarding omens, envy, and whisperings in contemplating creation, which also have explanations we must present.