The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration

Session Eighty-Six

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Fourth Topic: The Exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to the Titles of Primary Rulings, Fifth Topic: The Individual or Generic Nature of Imtinan

February 7, 2026

Fourth Topic: Does the Hadith of Lifting Exclusively Apply to Primary Rulings?

The discussion was regarding several topics that, in a way, define the scope of the Hadith of Lifting. Some topics related to the scope of this hadith were explained previously.

Another topic related to the scope of the Hadith of Lifting is that the hadith only lifts primary rulings (al-ahkam al-awwaliyyah), not secondary rulings (al-ahkam al-thanawiyyah). To clarify:

Sometimes it is observed that these very descriptions mentioned in the Hadith of Lifting are independently placed as the subject for some religious rulings. For example, regarding accidental homicide (al-qatl al-khata’i), there is a noble verse: “And whoever kills a believer by mistake – then the freeing of a believing slave and a compensation blood money presented to the deceased’s family.” A person who kills a believer by mistake must pay blood money and free a slave. This is a ruling established for accidental homicide. Certainly, the Hadith of Lifting is incapable of lifting this ruling. In other words, if the description itself—“error, forgetfulness, or coercion”—has been placed somewhere as the subject for an independent religious ruling, the Hadith of Lifting is incapable of lifting those rulings; rather, it only removes those rulings established for subjects under primary titles (al-‘anawin al-awwaliyyah); meaning it only lifts primary rulings, but cannot remove rulings established separately for these secondary titles (al-‘anawin al-thanawiyyah) themselves.

Another example is regarding forgetfulness in prayer: when some of the parts are forgotten, the obligation of the prostration of forgetfulness (sujud al-sahw) is ruled. Although the Hadith of Lifting—”lifted is that which they are coerced into, that which they are constrained to, error, and forgetfulness”—requires that all rulings present in the event of the occurrence of error and forgetfulness be removed, this specific ruling resulted upon the description of forgetfulness itself (such as sujud al-sahw) is not removed.

The question here is: Why is the Hadith of Lifting incapable of lifting this class of rulings? Because when we evaluate the Hadith of Lifting against the proofs of primary rulings, this hadith governs (hakim) over those proofs. For example, the legal punishment (hadd) for drinking wine or the prohibition of drinking wine is established. When the Hadith of Lifting is evaluated against the rulings related to drinking wine, it governs over its proofs. Therefore, in the event of coercion, the legal punishment is no longer established and the prohibition does not remain. However, this governing relationship (hukumah) does not apply with respect to the verse: “And whoever kills a believer by mistake – then the freeing of a believing slave.” Therefore, this hadith governs over the prohibition of drinking wine, but does not govern over the verse of accidental homicide. What is the difference such that here, those proofs are governed (mahkum) by the Hadith of Lifting, but in those cases they are not? To explain:

Generally, in every legislative proposition that possesses a subject (mawdu’) and a ruling (hukm), that subject possesses the requirement (iqtida’) for the establishment of that ruling, and for this reason, it is said that the subject is the cause of the ruling. This is a general rule in all rulings. The requirement for the establishment of the ruling for the subject exists in every legislative proposition.

In all primary rulings, such as the prohibition of drinking wine and the establishment of the legal punishment, and other similar cases, the requirement for the establishment of these rulings for their subjects exists. However, the meaning of this statement is not that in all cases, this requirement reaches the stage of actualization (fa’liyyat). Rather, in the absence of an obstacle, that ruling will reach actualization based on that requirement. However, sometimes, in contrast to that requirement, there is an obstacle that prevents the actualization of the ruling. Consequently, the ruling is set aside and does not reach actualization.

For example, observe these two propositions: on the one hand, we have the Hadith of Lifting: “lifted is error and forgetfulness.” It possesses the requirement for the lifting of the ruling. On the other hand, we have the noble verse: “And whoever kills a believer by mistake – then the freeing of a slave,” which also possesses the requirement for the establishment of this ruling.

In primary rulings, it is the same. When prohibition is established for drinking wine, it means that “drinking wine” possesses the requirement for the establishment of this ruling. However, when drinking wine occurs in the state of coercion, based on the Hadith of Lifting, that prohibition whose requirement for establishment existed for drinking wine does not reach actualization. Meaning the holy Lawgiver lifts it by virtue of imtinan (granting a favor). The Hadith of Lifting, as governing over that proof, prevents its actualization.

Now the question here is: Why does this (meaning the non-actualization of the ruling by virtue of the Hadith of Lifting) not occur in the ruling of freeing a slave (tahrir raqabah) for accidental homicide? The response is that if the Hadith of Lifting were to govern over the establishment of the blood money or freeing a slave by virtue of accidental homicide, it would mean that the ruling which the Lawgiver Himself established under the assumption of error no longer possesses the requirement of actualization, and these are incompatible. How is it possible for the Lawgiver, on the one hand, to establish a ruling for accidental homicide, and on the other hand, for the Hadith of Lifting to come and negate that ruling? This as if necessitates a form of incompatibility. It is contrary to wisdom (hikmah) for the Lawgiver, on the one hand, specifically with special attention, to establish a ruling for accidental homicide and then come and lift error absolutely; therefore, it differs from drinking wine. For another reason, error cannot be both the cause of the establishment of the ruling and the cause of its absence.

In primary titles, the Hadith of Lifting restricts (taqyid) the scope of the subject. However, in secondary titles, it cannot govern, because if it were to govern, it would annihilate the subject itself, and fundamentally governing (hukumah) would no longer have any meaning. The governing of the Hadith of Lifting over the proofs of primary rulings is conceivable; because in a way, it restricts and limits the scope of the subject in them. However, if the Hadith of Lifting were to govern over the proofs of secondary titles, the discussion is no longer about narrowing and limiting the scope of the proof and its subject, but rather it would negate the subject of the governed proof (al-dalil al-mahkum). For this reason, the Hadith of Lifting possesses no lifting quality (rafi’iyyah) with respect to the subjects of secondary rulings and does not encompass them, but it governs with respect to the subject of primary rulings.

Question: …

Professor: It is as an example… It might not be like this everywhere… Like a ruling is established upon forgetfulness (such as sujud al-sahw), now if such a ruling were not established, would it cause a problem and be contrary to imtinan?… Can it not be said that this explanation is identical in all cases? Yes, it is acceptable in the case of accidental homicide, but in some cases where the ruling is established upon the assumption of forgetfulness, if, for example, such a ruling were not established, would it cause a problem, contrary to imtinan?… This explanation is different. Here it lifts error absolutely, and there it lifts accidental homicide…

Fifth Topic: The Individual or Generic Nature of Imtinan

Regarding the statement that the Hadith of Lifting is introduced in the position of imtinan (granting a favor), is what is meant an individual (shakhsi) or generic (now’i) imtinan? This issue is important because, based on this hadith, wherever these nine matters occur, those rulings or actions are lifted and their effects removed. The assumption is also that the lifting of these matters has occurred as an imtinan upon the nation of the Prophet (PBUH): “lifted from my nation are nine…”

Now, is this imtinan considered according to the genus (now’) or according to the individual (shakhs)? For example, we say if someone destroys the property of another, he is liable (damin): “whoever destroys the property of another is liable for it” (man atlafa mala al-ghayri fa-huwa lahu damin). Now, if someone destroys the property of another by error (not intentionally), can it be said that the Hadith of Lifting removes the liability regarding this destruction, because the destruction was accidental? Here, it is said: in destruction, even if it is accidental, liability is established; because the hadith is in the position of imtinan, and if we rule on the absence of liability here, this would be contrary to imtinan with respect to the owner of the property. It is true that the Hadith of Lifting is in the position of imtinan, but where destruction occurs by error and causes the loss of someone’s property, if we want to rule on the absence of liability, this is contrary to imtinan with respect to that person.

Or, for example, in the chapter on sale (bay’), it is possible that someone is constrained or coerced into selling property. Regarding coerced sale (al-bay’ al-ikrahi), they have stated that this sale is void (batil). However, if someone performs a constrained sale (al-bay’ al-idtirari) (for example, he is forced to sell his house at a low price), they have stated it is valid (sahih). Why did we believe in validity here and in invalidity in coercion? Because if we consider the constrained sale to be void, this is contrary to imtinan. And the Hadith of Lifting was introduced only in the position of imtinan. Although both are sales. Both are also among the nine descriptions (one is coercion, the other is necessity). However, why is the constrained sale valid? Because if it were ruled void, it would be contrary to imtinan.

Therefore, the criterion is individual imtinan (similar to what was explained in “no harm” [la darar] and “no hardship” [la haraj]). However, in this individual imtinan, care must be taken that it does not conflict with the imtinan with respect to others.