Issue 7, First Secondary Case, Arguments for the Invalidity of the Marriage of the Imprudent Person Without the Guardian’s Permission

Session Thirty-Seven

Issue 7 – First Secondary Case – Arguments for the Invalidity of the Marriage of the Imprudent Person Without the Guardian’s Permission – Second Argument: Traditions – Second Category and Its Examination – Second Tradition and Its Examination – Summary of the First Secondary Case – The Three Suppositions Within the First Secondary Case – Two Observations Regarding the Text of Taḥrīr

December 21, 2025

Second Tradition of the Third Category

We stated that several categories of traditions have been invoked for the invalidity of the marriage of the imprudent person without the guardian’s permission; we mentioned three categories. From the third category, one tradition has already been transmitted. A further tradition is transmitted from Zurārah, from Imam al-Bāqir (peace be upon him): “From Zurārah, from Abū Jaʿfar (peace be upon him), who said: When the woman possesses [full control of] her own affair (mālikatan amrahā) — she sells and buys, manumits [slaves], bears witness, and gives from her property whatever she wishes — then her affair is valid (jāʾiz); she may marry, if she wishes, without the permission of her guardian. But if she is not so, then her marriage is not valid except by the command of her guardian.” According to this tradition, Imam al-Bāqir (peace be upon him) states: if a woman possesses [full control of] her own affair and has discretion over herself — that is, she can buy and sell, bear witness, manumit a slave, and give from her own property whatever she wishes — her actions are legitimate and effective. By “possesses [full control of] her own affair” is meant that she has reached maturity; he states that, if a woman has reached maturity, she is no longer under anyone’s guardianship, and whatever action she undertakes is valid and effective. He then states that she may, if she wishes, marry without the guardian’s permission. But if she does not possess [full control of] her own affair, and her affair is not valid, her marriage is valid only with the command, permission, and consent of the guardian. The approach to the argument from this tradition, although it makes no reference to imprudence and states only, “but if she is not so, then her marriage is not valid except by the command of her guardian,” is as follows: if she is not so — that is, if she does not possess [full control of] her own affair and cannot undertake these actions (buying and selling, bearing witness, manumission, and giving freely from her own property) — then her marriage, too, will not be valid except with the guardian’s permission. These matters mentioned as evidence of possessing [full control of] one’s affair — that is, buying and selling, manumission, giving from property — indicate financial competence. It is as though the tradition states: if the woman has attained financial competence, she can marry; if she has not attained financial competence, she cannot marry.

Question:

Professor: “But if she is not so” means: if she does not possess [full control of] her own affair. The crux of the argument is that these matters mentioned in the tradition as a sign of possessing [full control of] one’s affair are all signs of financial competence — that is, as it were, the Imam (peace be upon him) has made the effectiveness of the woman’s affair, and the effectiveness of her marriage, contingent upon financial competence. If she lacks financial competence, she cannot marry independently, and can marry only with the guardian’s permission. This is the approach to the argument from this tradition.

Examination of the Second Tradition

Regarding this tradition, an objection concerning its chain of transmission has been raised, on account of the presence of Mūsā ibn Bakr in its chain. An objection concerning the indication, which may possibly be raised regarding this tradition, is that “possessing [full control of] one’s affair” is a euphemism for maturity; what is meant by these matters that the Imam has named is, in reality, that when the woman has reached maturity and undertakes these actions, they are effective. It is true that these actions are mostly financial matters, but the matter of bearing witness is not a financial matter; it is a dealing and an action [of a different kind]. It is as though the Imam wishes to say that the various actions of a woman are effective and valid when she has reached maturity. Therefore, it alludes to maturity, not to financial competence. Therefore, there is room for reflection regarding the indication of this tradition toward the invalidity of the marriage of the financially imprudent person; although we can say that it carries an allusion to this matter.

Summary of the First Secondary Case

It has thus become established from all that we have stated that, in the verses and traditions, there exists sufficient argument for the invalidity of the marriage of the imprudent person without the guardian’s permission. We can derive from certain verses and certain traditions that, if someone has imprudence both in financial matters and in the matter of choosing a spouse — in other words, has absolute imprudence — his marriage is not valid without the guardian’s permission and consent. As was stated in the previous session, contrary to what is well known, if someone has imprudence in financial matters but does not have imprudence in the matter of choosing a spouse, these evidences truly cannot establish that this marriage is invalid. As we have previously indicated, the late Sayyid, in the eighth issue of al-ʿUrwah, has referred precisely to a secondary case that corroborates this very meaning. The eighth issue of al-ʿUrwah states: “If a person is mature and competent in financial matters, but has no competence with respect to the matter of marriage and its particulars, such as the determination of the spouse and the manner of setting the dower, and the like — the apparent view is that he is like the imprudent person in financial matters.” If a person is competent in financial matters but lacks competence with respect to the matter of marriage, and cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful for himself in the matter of marriage — that is, he has not attained competence either in the determination of the spouse or in the manner of determining the dower and the like, which pertain to the matter of marriage, and cannot discern what is beneficial and harmful for himself — the apparent view is that this person is like the imprudent person in financial matters, “with respect to the need for the guardian’s permission.” “And I have not seen anyone address this.” He states, at the end, that he has not seen anyone address this issue. Interestingly, however, the author of Jawāhir has indeed addressed this issue; the author of Jawāhir, with respect to the tradition of al-Faḑalāʾ that we read in the previous session, states: “And the reconciliation between the imprudent woman and the one under guardianship is because the former is not subsumed under the latter, if it is supposed that her lack of competence is specifically with respect to marriage and the like, not financial imprudence; for the woman who is imprudent specifically with respect to property — there is no argument for the authority of the guardian’s permission in marriage, which is a non-financial dealing.” He refers to the reconciliation between these two and then states that one who is imprudent in financial matters but is not imprudent in the matter of marriage — there is no argument for the authority of the guardian’s permission in his marrying-off, because marrying-off is a non-financial dealing. The matter of unity or multiplicity of object sought is a foundational dispute, and we set it aside. But the basic point — that marriage is a non-financial dealing — is a clear matter; if someone was not competent in financial matters but had competence in the matter of marriage, on what grounds should we say his marriage is invalid? The late Sayyid stated, “and I have not seen anyone address this”; you have observed that the author of Jawāhir has indeed addressed this issue. Moreover, the very statement that, if a person has competence in financial matters but is not competent in the matter of marriage, his marriage is not valid — we accept this as well, and the evidences encompass it; that is, his marriage requires the guardian’s permission. But the third supposition — that he lacks competence in financial matters but has competence in the matter of marriage — no longer requires permission.

The Three Suppositions Within the First Secondary Case

With the explanations we have given, altogether three suppositions arise here:

1. The first supposition is the absolutely imprudent person — that is, one who has competence neither in financial matters nor in the matter of marriage. In this case, it is certain, on the authority of these evidences, that his marriage is not valid without the guardian’s permission; he requires the guardian’s permission. Of course, whether we can conceive of this as an unauthorized contract (fuḑūlī) — that is, that he marries and then the father or paternal grandfather grants ratification — is a separate discussion, which is our second secondary case. When we say that the absolutely imprudent person requires the guardian’s permission, we mean that, if he undertakes this action without permission, this contract is not valid [in actuality]. But if he undertakes this action without permission, here we must determine whether we can conceive of it as unauthorized or not; in any case, the absence of actual validity is certain.
2. The second supposition is where he has financial competence but is imprudent in the matter of marriage and lacks competence in it; this is encompassed by the evidences — that is, it is like the absolutely imprudent person; the evidences do not exclude this case.
3. The third supposition is where the person lacks competence in financial matters but has competence in the matter of marriage; this is a supposition whose occurrence is possible, as is likewise derived from the statement of the author of Jawāhir — a person who understands nothing of financial matters, but understands other matters well. Is he encompassed by the evidences for the invalidity of the marriage of the imprudent person without the guardian’s permission, or not? In our view, he is not; the evidences truly do not encompass this supposition. According to the well-known basis, the mere fact that a person lacks financial competence means that his marriage is not valid without the guardian’s permission; because, in their view, imprudence means the absence of financial competence, and marriage revolves around financial competence. We have an objection to this matter; the validity of marriage revolves around competence in the matter of marriage [itself]. If he also has financial competence, the matter is clear; he has no need whatsoever for the guardian’s permission — of course, we state this setting aside the discussion we had regarding the marriage of a competent virgin. At the very least, we can discuss this in the case of the man. If there is competence with respect to the matter of marriage and marrying-off, whether or not there is competence in financial matters, this marriage is valid. At most, if we say that he had no right to financial action in determining the dower, the dower is corrupt; if the dower is invalid, the basic marriage is not necessarily invalid; at most, after the invalidity of the dower, recourse is had to the customary dower. This concludes the discussion of the first secondary case of the seventh issue.

Two Observations Regarding the Text of Taḥrīr

There is a further supposition that the late Sayyid has mentioned, which perhaps did not need to be stated independently; the text of Taḥrīr nearly encompasses this supposition as well. The text of Taḥrīr is as follows: “The imprudent spendthrift, whose imprudence is continuous from the time of his minority, or who has been placed under interdiction for squandering [his wealth] — his marriage is not valid except with the permission of his father, or his paternal grandfather, or, in their absence, the judge”; either the father or the paternal grandfather, and if neither of them is available, the judge’s permission is required. If we say that the qualifier “spendthrift” in the Imam’s (may God’s mercy be upon him) statement is explanatory, and that he confines “imprudent” to financial matters — that is, according to the well-known basis — what about someone who is imprudent in a non-financial matter? His ruling has not been stated here. That is, in a non-financial matter, he may or may not be imprudent. Now, if someone is imprudent financially but is not imprudent non-financially, he will not be encompassed by this statement of the Imam. Thus, at one point we say that “spendthrift” is an explanatory qualifier, and the Imam’s view is, like the well-known position, that “imprudent” means one who lacks financial competence; with respect to the supposition where the person is not imprudent in non-financial matters, we might say that the unqualified scope of the statement deems this invalid as well — although we might say that this statement does not encompass that case, which, of course, is improbable. If we also say that the qualifier “spendthrift” is restrictive — meaning that it refers only to the imprudent person in financial matters — then, in this case as well, he has not addressed the imprudent person in non-financial matters. In either case, the seventh issue has, in this respect, a certain deficiency, namely that the ruling for the case of the financially imprudent person does not encompass one who is not imprudent in the matter of marriage; in either case, there is a problem. Here our view differs from that of the Imam (may God’s mercy be upon him). Thus, we have, roughly, two annotations and observations regarding this text of Taḥrīr:

1. One concerns the very meaning of “imprudent” — in our view, “imprudent” is not confined to financial matters.
2. Second, that one who is imprudent in financial matters but is not imprudent in the matter of marriage does not need the guardian’s permission for his marriage — that is, his marriage is valid even without the guardian’s permission. Whereas, if we say that he, too, like the rest, regards the criterion in this matter as competence in financial matters, and has made marrying-off revolve around this, the result is that, outside this supposition, the marriage would not be valid — whereas the evidences encompass this supposition as well.

Discussion for the Next Session

For this issue — namely, the conditioning of the validity of marriage upon the guardian’s permission — two conditions have been mentioned; we have, up to this point, established the basic validity [of the marriage] and its contingency upon the guardian’s permission; but two conditions have been stated for it — one condition stated by the Imam, and one condition stated by Muḥaqqiq, the author of al-Sharāʾiʿ. We must examine these two conditions to determine whether they are correct or not.