Session Four, Categories of Dignity
Session Four
Categories of Dignity — 1. Inherent Dignity — 2. Acquired Dignity — Differences Between the Two Categories of Dignity — Disagreement Over the Meaning of Inherent Dignity — Two Stages of the Discussion
September 29, 2024
Summary of the Previous Session
We had set out to offer some remarks on the categories of dignity; we presented an introduction, and following it, we now offer an explanation of the two well-known categories of dignity—namely, inherent dignity and acquired dignity. Please bear in mind that these two categories, whether in their designation or in their explanation, are not necessarily a matter of agreement. In brief, these two terms have become current to the effect that dignity is said to be of two categories: inherent dignity and acquired dignity.
1. Inherent Dignity
Inherent dignity means the dignity, honor, distinguishing quality, station, rank, and distinction of the human being qua human being. Inherent human dignity means the standing, station, worth, rank, honor, and distinction that is affirmed for the human being insofar as he is human; this is what is meant by the expression “inherent dignity.” This is typically considered in comparison with other beings; it is said that the human being possesses certain qualities and characteristics that other beings do not possess. This, moreover, is not merely a difference but an advantage. This, of course, is one way of conceiving the matter; for some, for instance, speak of God’s “constitutive endowments” (dādahā-yi takwīnī) to the human being—that is, the human being possesses certain constitutive endowments that other beings do not possess. We shall note later whether inherent dignity means merely certain particular favors that God has bestowed upon the human being, or whether it is reckoned as a greatness and honor belonging to the human being. Consider, for example, one of the matters cited with respect to the human being: upright stature. It is said that the human being stands upright, and that no other being does so. Some animals occasionally stand upright, but their constitution is not naturally so; they ordinarily move on their bellies or on all four limbs—and though some may at times move on two legs, they nevertheless still rely on their forelimbs for movement. We must ultimately determine just what scope this inherent dignity, of which we speak, actually encompasses.
In any case, on one conventional understanding, this is what inherent dignity means. I do not say there is no disagreement over it, but in any case, this is what is most commonly understood by inherent dignity—namely, certain things that God has given to the human being and has not given to other beings, constituting an advantage and a superiority, a standing and a station for the human being. Certain characteristics are then enumerated for it as well, which I shall set out in the course of comparing it with acquired dignity.
2. Acquired Dignity
Acquired dignity means that dignity which arises within some trait of human moral character or some attribute among the human attributes; for instance, a person comes to possess the attribute of generosity, forbearance, self-sacrifice, and the like. If you recall, both of these matters were touched upon in Muʿjam Maqāyīs al-Lughah. It did not, admittedly, use the term “inherent dignity,” but with respect to it the lexicon states: “honor in the thing itself” (sharafun fī al-shayʾi fī nafsih); and with respect to the acquired type, it states: “honor in some trait of character” (sharafun fī khuluqin min al-akhlāq). Both were cited as a form of honor; the distinction being that the honor connected to some dimension of moral character or some human attribute was of one kind, whereas the other kind of honor belongs to the thing in itself, insofar as it is human. This latter type has been termed “acquired dignity,” and its very name indicates that it is not something attained by the human being of itself, but rather something attained through acquisition, through practice, exercise, and persistence. It is a standing and an honor that arises through human action and effort; whereas the honor that belongs to the human being qua human being, without effort and without acquisition, is termed “inherent dignity.”
Differences Between the Two Categories of Dignity
These two categories differ from one another in ways that become broadly clear from the explanations already given.
Characteristics of Inherent Dignity
- First, in inherent dignity, as is evident from its very name, this dignity pertains to the essence (dhāt) of the human being, and not to some attribute that supervenes upon the human being; that is, all human beings possess it irrespective of belief, race, religion, color, or geographic region.
- It is not voluntary or subject to choice; that is, it does not come into being under the human being’s own volition.
- It cannot be divested; the human being is unable to strip it from himself. For instance, the human being cannot divest himself of upright stature. Suppose we consider those things cited for the human being—rational faculty, will, choice—the human being cannot negate these from himself. It is true that in certain instances a person may divest himself of his choice, but even that divestment of choice arises from the human being’s own will and choice.
- Inherent dignity does not admit of degrees; the rational faculty exists—though this concerns the existence of the rational faculty as such, and not its level. All human beings possess the rational faculty; this aptitude may be stronger in one than in another, but the rational faculty as such is possessed by all. Likewise, for instance, with choice: all are possessed of choice, barring certain accidents and impediments that may arise.
Characteristics of Acquired Dignity
- Acquired dignity is not an attribute of the essence; it is not “honor in the thing itself”; rather, as noted, it consists in some trait of human moral character or some attribute among the human attributes.
- It is voluntary and subject to choice, since it is attained through acquisition. If the human being acquires it, he comes to possess it; if he does not acquire it, he possesses nothing of it.
- It can be divested; that is, a person can, for instance, distance himself from the attribute of generosity, forbearance, and self-sacrifice. Of course, if these attributes are reinforced to such a degree that they become an ingrained disposition (malakah), then naturally their removal becomes more difficult, but it nonetheless remains possible.
- Fourth, it admits of degrees; that is, it can increase or decrease. One person is generous, and another is more generous still; one is forbearing, and another is more forbearing still.
Question:
Response: There, we say that God has given the human being this faculty and this aptitude to distinguish and discern matters from one another. Or consider, for instance, the faculty of laughter (quwwat al-ḍiḥk); when it is said that the human being is a “laughing being” (ḍāḥik), the rational faculty itself, not its degree, is what is meant. We cannot say that one person laughs more and another laughs less, in the sense intended here. One is more animal-like, another less so; one is more rational, another less so—this makes no sense in this context. Therefore, according to this account, acquired forms of dignity admit of greater or lesser intensity and are reckoned as admitting of degrees.
This is a general picture of inherent dignity and acquired dignity. This has likewise appeared in certain statements and writings. Pay close attention here! These matters truly need to be clarified; I sometimes encounter certain expectations to the effect that we ought to pass over these matters quickly, on the supposition that there is no need to dwell on such self-evident things. Yet it is precisely because these preliminary matters are not adequately clarified that problems subsequently arise. Let me explain now, and it will become clear to you.
Disagreement Over the Meaning and Scope of Inherent Dignity
This division, as we have presented it, represents one conception and approach to inherent dignity, which I shall explain in the course of presenting the various positions. According to this account, we have one inherent dignity and one acquired dignity. A relation and a connection also exist between the two; that is, inherent dignity is, in effect, the precondition and the capital for acquired dignity. Because God Almighty has bestowed these dignities upon the human being, the human being—having benefited from these qualities—has thereby acquired the capacity to attain further dignities. Because, in himself, qua human being, he has possessed this honor, has possessed intellect and will, has possessed choice and has been free to choose, because God has breathed into him of His own spirit, because he has been created in accordance with the divine fiṭrah (innate disposition), because this inclination toward God and this seeking of God exists within him, because he possesses both an angelic and an earthly mode of being together—he therefore has at his disposal a certain capital with which to acquire particular dignities. This is a general account of these two categories of dignity, their differences, and their relation to one another.
The expression “inherent dignity” and “acquired dignity” is perhaps a somewhat more recent formulation; for instance, in the words and writings of scholars prior to this, we may perhaps not have encountered these two terms; yet some have endeavored to construe these expressions, views, and writings in line with the very two categories indicated. I shall cite two examples for you.
1. The Statement of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī
The late ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, who has addressed this subject somewhat more extensively and offers indications in several places in his exegesis al-Mīzān, states, for instance, in distinguishing between Raḥmān and Raḥīm, that the attribute Raḥmān is a form of divine dignity (karāmah) that encompasses all of humankind, with no one excluded from it on account of any creed, persuasion, or conduct; this is general honoring (takrīm-i ʿāmm). He says that, opposite to this, we have a particular dignity, according to which divine dignity encompasses only certain human beings—those possessed of faith, righteous conduct, obedience, and worship. God then bestows upon these human beings a particular dignity; He has accorded them an honor, has granted them an advantage and a distinguishing quality. He states that Raḥmān encompasses all human beings irrespective of their particular qualities, whereas Raḥīm constitutes a particular honoring directed toward certain individuals. He is here discussing divine honoring; that is, he means that God possesses both a particular honoring and a general honoring. Now, does the fact that God possesses a general honoring and a particular honoring mean that human beings, too, possess two types of dignity? The meanings of raḥmāniyyah (being All-Merciful) and raḥīmiyyah (being Especially Merciful) are clear; but does this mean that God has bestowed a particular honor upon certain human beings specifically, and a general honor upon all human beings? Can we conclude from these two attributes, Raḥmān and Raḥīm, that God’s raḥmāniyyah entails a general human honor, while His raḥīmiyyah entails a particular human honor?
Question:
Response: God’s mercy is general, but does this mean a human honor for all human beings? … All beings are encompassed by this mercy; all human beings, within the scope of their own species, possess certain qualities; that God honors humankind in general, that God has a general honoring directed toward all human beings, … He has bestowed upon human beings, in particular, a favor that He has bestowed upon no other being; several such things, for instance, have been mentioned. Can we say that this attribute of God’s raḥmāniyyah, given the account just presented, entails an inherent dignity for the human being? … This is particular to the human being specifically. … God, Blessed and Exalted, provides sustenance to plants in accordance with their own nature; the human being, with respect to that vegetative dimension of his life, likewise benefits from sustenance. The human being also has an animal dimension; with respect to his animal dimension, he shares in common with all animals. The human being thus has something in common with both animals and plants. Given that, in animal life and in vegetative life, he shares in common with other plants and animals, he naturally enjoys certain benefits in keeping with that animal and vegetative life. True, this is not exclusive to the human being; yet even within vegetative and animal life, animal life carries a certain advantage over vegetative life … You have diverted the question; my question was this: does this divine bestowal, in respect of its encompassing all human beings qua human beings, constitute an honoring? Has God observed the station of the human being in granting him such favors? Can we say that this is equivalent to, or entails, inherent human dignity—in the sense that God has given certain things to the human being qua human being that He does not withdraw, that He takes from no one, and that human beings themselves are likewise unable to divest themselves of? This arises from the very essence of the human being; these matters are non-volitional. The expressions vary; does the fact that God has honored the human being entail that the human being thereby possesses an inherent dignity? Here we must discuss the meaning of “inherent” and speak of “particular dignity”; is this “inherent” of the kind proper to demonstrative reasoning (bāb al-burhān), or of the kind proper to the Isagoge (bāb īsāghūjī)? What difference does this distinction make?
2. The Statement of Imam Khomeini
Imam Khomeini (may God have mercy upon him), in his book Sharḥ-i Ḥadīth-i Junūd-i ʿAql wa Jahl (Commentary on the Tradition of the Armies of Intellect and Ignorance), offers a relevant statement. This book, which is a most valuable work, I strongly recommend that you study; for it is among those books that I believe can, in a sense, transform a person. In this book, although he does not raise the terms “inherent dignity” and “acquired dignity,” he speaks of certain constitutive distinctions (imtiyāzāt-i takwīnī) belonging to the human being. He states: “God, Blessed and Exalted, has shown particular tenderness and mercy toward the human being, beyond those mercies he shares with the other animals and which pertain to his animal life or his vegetative station; indeed, even within these stations, He has distinguished the human being from other animals through certain dignities.” This is precisely the point I raised earlier; that is, there are certain matters held in common between the human being and other animals, yet, at the same time, even within this animal life, particular advantages have been granted specifically to the human being—in the manner of eating, the manner of walking, the wearing of clothing; these have no connection whatsoever to the human and spiritual dimensions or to the station of vicegerency (khilāfah), yet within that very animal and vegetative life, particular dignities have been specifically established for the human being. Or consider, for instance, what he says regarding human clothing: “The human being possesses two garments: an outer garment and the garment of piety (taqwā). He says the outer garment is among God’s favors, serving to cover the nakedness of the children of Adam, and that this is a particular dignity (karāmat-i khāṣṣ) belonging to the progeny of Adam (peace be upon him), which has not been bestowed upon other beings; yet the faithful employ this favor, too, solely in fulfillment of the divine obligations.” His expression here is: “this is a particular dignity belonging to the progeny of Adam”; here he attributes the dignity to God—that is, God has performed an act of dignifying; similarly to what the late ʿAllāmah stated, namely that God has honored the human being. That God has honored him is not in dispute; rather, the question concerns particular honoring as against general honoring. Now, does God’s general honoring—that is, those dignities that God has accorded the human being qua human being—constitute this very inherent human dignity, or is this an altogether different matter? Here, too, the particular dignity to which he refers does not denote that particular divine honoring; this, too, is something particular to the human being, distinct from that particular honoring, the garment of piety, and those human and spiritual stations of the human being.
In any case, the expression “inherent dignity” and “acquired dignity” has not been employed in these statements, yet the pronouncements and matters set forth in this connection may well be construed in conformity with it. God’s dignity toward the human being, God’s honoring of the human being … honoring (takrīm) means the exalting of the human being; God has exalted the human being, has accorded him honor, station, standing, worth, and rank, having given him something particular. We may say, then, that the human being has thereby become possessed of that honor; when God bestows, the human being becomes possessed of that dignity. God honors and exalts; well, then, the human being is thereby exalted; it cannot be that God honors while the human being remains unpossessed of dignity. It cannot be that God exalts and confers honor while the human being remains unpossessed of that honor. Hence, in the statements of the great scholars, even though these two terms are not frequently mentioned as such, we may nonetheless derive from the statements of the exegetes and of many scholars that the human being, in particular, possesses this honor, greatness, rank, worth, station, and majesty.
Question:
Response: With respect to Raḥmān, it is said that this is a form of divine dignity that encompasses all of humankind; God’s dignity toward the human being … What, then, is general mercy (raḥmat-i ʿāmmah)? …
What matters is this: this inherent dignity, whose basic reality is certain, is something that God has specifically established for the human being in certain particular respects—which we now choose to call “inherent dignity”; but what, precisely, is this inherent dignity? The expressions vary; some speak of “constitutive distinctions”; others speak of “constitutive endowments”; at times, particular instances are cited—special tendernesses; for instance, it is said that the formation of love between mother and child is, in this respect, distinctive to the human being; animals possess this too, but not in the manner in which it has been established in the human being, found in no other being. Is it constitutive distinctions and constitutive differences that are intended here? Do these constitutive endowments also encompass the breathing of the divine spirit? Do they also encompass the establishment of the divine vicegerency (khilāfah), or not? Is this honor and dignity, which some refer to as “inherent honor and dignity,” confined solely to the constitutive distinctions of the human being? The constitutive distinctions and differences between the human being and other beings are evident enough; but does the verse “and I breathed into him of My spirit” (وَنَفَخْتُ فِيهِ مِن رُّوحِي), or the verse “We have indeed created the human being in the best of forms” (لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنسَانَ فِي أَحْسَنِ تَقْوِيمٍ)—matters that pertain to the creation of the human being—do these, too, revert to this very dimension of inherent dignity, or does this breathing of the spirit, this fashioning of creation in the best of forms … does “We have indeed created the human being in the best of forms” or similar expressions bear no connection to these constitutive distinctions and differences? Here there is disagreement; we must examine the various positions on this matter and study the evidence.
In this session, we have offered a general account regarding the categories of dignity, and we have summarily noted that these two categories can be traced in the statements of the great scholars; yet what precise meaning is intended by inherent dignity, or what interpretation is to be given to acquired dignity, remains open to discussion. With respect to acquired dignity, there is no disagreement; but with respect to inherent dignity, disagreement exists. Among the most significant points of disagreement is precisely this: what scope, exactly, does this inherent dignity encompass; indeed, do we have any such thing as inherent dignity at all, or not? Are the four characteristics stated for inherent dignity universally accepted? That is, for instance, is it the case that these forms of dignity cannot be divested? These matters remain open to discussion.
Two Stages of the Discussion
We shall proceed, going forward, by discussing the matter in two stages; pay close attention—this is important; these constitute the foundations and pillars of this discussion.
The first stage concerns the very existence of inherent dignity and the determination of its scope. If we wished simply to pass over this and cite four proofs and verses, declaring the principle either established or rejected, the fact is that no firm foundation could be laid in this manner; in the first stage, we must determine whether we have any such thing as inherent dignity at all. If we do, what are its foundations and proofs; what is its scope; what conceptions exist regarding this inherent dignity?
The second stage is this: once inherent human dignity has been established, does this inherent dignity establish certain rights and duties for the human being, or not?
These constitute two distinct questions: the existence of inherent dignity as such, and then, further, whether this inherent dignity fundamentally gives rise to particular rights for the human being or not. These we shall pursue, God willing, in the sessions to come.