Session Six, The First Stage: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being

Session Six

The First Stage: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being — Positions — The Second Position: The Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being — Clarifying the Subject of Discussion

October 6, 2024

Summary of the Previous Session

We noted that, before anything else, the meaning of inherent dignity must be clarified; that is, it must be precisely determined what each party means by inherent dignity when affirming or denying it. You have observed that there is no consensus on the meaning of inherent dignity—namely, that not everyone has the same meaning in mind. Nevertheless, we can say that one group supports inherent dignity and another opposes it, in the sense of whether the human being, by virtue of being human, possesses a nobility, station, and rank that is preserved under all circumstances. This is broadly a point of contention. You have observed some of these statements; two or three other statements remain, which I shall read out to you.

The Second Position: The Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being

The remaining two or three statements are from those whose words, at least on the surface, express opposition to inherent dignity in the sense accepted by some.

2. Ayatollah Miṣbāḥ Yazdī

The late Mr. Miṣbāḥ states in one passage: “The Qur’an accepts an inherent dignity for the human being, but at the same time, it has relegated evil humans to the level of animals.” According to this statement, inherent dignity and sanctity endure only as long as the human disposition and human nobility exist. He states elsewhere in the same book: “The dignity bestowed upon the human being is not a dignity that serves as a source of pride for all human beings; the nobility that is a source of pride is contingent upon human voluntary actions and behavior, and how one utilizes God’s blessings toward human perfection. Some distance themselves from their dignity, and like a snake shedding its skin, they shed the sheath of their dignity; these people leave the servitude of God and become the servants of Satan.”

In another passage, the late Mr. Miṣbāḥ points to the division of dignity into inherent, or contingent and potential, and states: “Dignity, as it relates to the actual value of the human being, is not established for the human being from the beginning; it is as though what is derived from the verse of dignity is nothing more than the capacity and potential for dignity. If humanity, in its ascending arc, does not transition from potentiality to actuality, and its animal powers manifest and become actualized, there is fundamentally no ground for value and dignity; the disbeliever, the atheist, and the criminal do not possess dignity.”

3. Ayatollah Javādī Āmolī

Ayatollah Javādī Āmolī states: “Human dignity in the Qur’an only finds meaning within the realm of religion; the realm of religion is that the human being must be a knower of religion, a believer in religion, and a practitioner of religion—meaning his knowledge, inclination, and conduct must be religious. If a person is self-centered rather than God-centric, he is not the vicegerent of God (khalīfat Allāh); and when he is not the vicegerent of God, ‘We have honored’ (كَرَّمْنَا) does not apply to him.”

In discussing divine vicegerency (al-khilāfah al-ilāhiyyah)—which is considered one of the components of human dignity, or his advantage and nobility—he states: “We can conceive of divine vicegerency in three ways: individual vicegerency, species-based vicegerency, and collective vicegerency.” He then states: “That which has been proposed as divine vicegerency is species-based vicegerency, not individual nor collective.” They say the same regarding being the object of the angels’ prostration—whether the one who was prostrated to by the angels at the time of creation was the person of Adam, or the human species, or all human beings; there is a difference between the species and all individuals.

Clarifying the Subject of Discussion

As for which components form the foundation of inherent dignity, we shall discuss this later; because, in my view, there is a serious gap in this discussion, in that no consensus can be observed regarding the meaning of inherent dignity. In the remarks of Mr. Miṣbāḥ, you observed that in one passage he speaks in a certain way…

It is true that this speech is double-sided and can be interpreted in a certain way. However, both in the words of Mr. Muṭahharī (of course, Mr. Muṭahharī’s words are more clearly indicative of accepting inherent dignity, unlike the words of the late Mr. Miṣbāḥ and the words of Mr. Jaʿfarī), they say what the human being has is potential and contingent dignity; this capacity has been provided in the human being so that he may, for example, reach a certain station. But as for inherent dignity—in the sense that the human being, qua human being, possesses certain characteristics and a station that cannot be divested or destroyed under any title—they certainly do not accept this. Thus, some who speak of inherent dignity have in mind characteristics such as non-divestibility, unchangeability, and the lack of will and choice in its removal. In their view, certain characteristics and advantages are established for the human being qua human being, which they express as inherent dignity.

Even those who affirm inherent dignity for the human being, when they want to provide evidence for the existence of inherent dignity, resort to certain matters that we must examine to see whether they can be argued for or not. That is, can we really say that the human being, even if a disbeliever or atheist, is the object of the angels’ prostration and the vicegerent of God? Can we say he possesses such nobility? Or must we distinguish between these foundations and elements?

Therefore, some believe that inherent dignity is by no means divestible, changeable, or subject to decline, and is established for the human being qua human being. Some also say that inherent dignity does not exist in the human being, as can be inferred from certain statements. Some also say that the human being possesses inherent dignity, but this inherent dignity is subject to decline, change, and divestment. This shows that there is no consensus on the word “inherent” itself, and on its intended and understood meaning. One says that the meaning of “inherent” (dhātī) here is inherent in the sense of the Book of Demonstration (dhātī-yi bāb-i burhān), not inherent in the sense of the Isagoge (dhātī-yi bāb-i īsāghūjī) or the five universals (al-kulliyyāt al-khamsah).

Question:

Professor: His words are not consistent; in one passage this meaning is understood, namely that this characteristic accompanies the human being, but sometimes the human being distances himself from it. According to this meaning, this inherent dignity is divestible and changeable; this does not align with the meaning of “inherent” in the Book of Demonstration or with the meaning in the Isagoge, because it is divestible and changeable. However, according to another statement of his, “inherent” here means that which is considered capacity and potential.

Sometimes it is said that dignity is contingent (karāmat-i iqtiḍāʾī)—meaning the potential for dignity in the human being, the capacity for dignity—while sometimes they say inherent dignity means actualized dignity in the human being. The terminology differs. However, you see that this denial and affirmation directed toward inherent dignity does not rest on a uniform understanding.

We do not wish to say, for the moment, who is correct; rather, we want to clarify the subject of dispute and discussion so that when we subsequently turn to the proofs, it becomes clear what we expect from these proofs and what we wish to extract from them. Our meaning of inherent dignity is that very thing we have indicated; namely, the nobility, station, and rank that is established for the human being qua human being. This is a dignity that does not change with a change of color, gender, religion, or belief; a dignity that cannot be divested from the human being. We want to discuss this dignity; this is of great importance. We want to see whether, based on the verses of the Qur’an or the traditions, such nobility, station, and rank is established for the human being or not.

The late ʿAllāmah Jaʿfarī states that the human being possesses inherent dignity, but this is not in every situation and condition; meaning he may lose this inherent dignity. According to this statement, this dignity is changeable and divestible; meaning this nobility is taken from him. Thus, it is clear that inherent dignity and nobility for him carry a different meaning, and his view differs from someone who says inherent dignity and nobility cannot be divested from the human being. They may agree on certain aspects, but they are certainly incompatible in others.

To bring this closer to the mind, and as an example, I will mention that one of the elements that can grant nobility to the human being, and be considered a grace from God and an act of honoring and bestowing dignity from His side, is the existence of intellect in the human being. Certainly, the human being is distinguished from other creatures in this regard. But does this element change with a change of belief, color, religion, or gender? Can this be divested? Divestment due to natural, secondary, and accidental events is not what is meant here; this is an advantage that exists. I do not think even the opponents of inherent dignity deny this: … the existence of intellect, the existence of choice, the existence of will … I shall present a list of these advantage-conferring elements of the human being that can be the source of inherent dignity. I do not think anyone denies that the human being possesses something called choice beyond instinct; the human being possesses something called fiṭrah (innate disposition); no one can deny these.

Question:

Professor: Ultimately, this choice, even if used incorrectly, is an advantage. Does the fact that someone has been created with choice constitute an inherent advantage for him over other creatures or not? … This itself possesses intrinsic value … It can be a capital for acquiring a series of virtues. This is a capital that can add new assets; those things you mention, all of these are new assets …