Session Nine, The First Stage: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being

Session Nine

The First Stage: Examining the Existence or Non-Existence of Inherent Dignity in the Human Being — The Foundations of Inherent Human Dignity — The First Category: 1. Intellect — Evidence — The First Piece of Evidence: The Verse “And We have honored the children of Adam…” — The First Aspect: The Difference Between Honoring (Takrīm) and Preferring (Tafḍīl) — The Second Aspect: The Object of Honor — The Third Aspect: The Exclusion of the Angels

October 19, 2024

Summary of the Previous Session

We noted that one of the matters that can be invoked as the foundation of inherent dignity is the intellect. We briefly explained the intellect and how it can be considered as a foundation in this regard, and we stated that, in any case, the faculty of perception, cognition, and distinguishing good from evil, and the beneficial from the harmful, has been granted to the human being and is actualized; and this faculty remains with the human being until the end. An objection was raised here, which we addressed and answered. The sum of what we said in response to that objection was that the intellect has two meanings or possesses two dimensions: in one sense it is inherent, and in another sense it is acquired or contingent. Both meanings are employed in the Qur’an and the traditions. The first meaning exists in the human being qua human being as a dignity and a specific bounty that God has granted to the human being, and indeed, this itself is the source of other capacities. We mentioned another meaning for the intellect, which is acquired—meaning that the human being must acquire it, although the capacity for it exists in him, and he can traverse its various levels. This is not considered an inherent dignity. Thus, in one sense, the intellect is an inherent dignity, and in another sense, it is not.

Evidence

To prove that the intellect in the first sense—meaning the faculty of perception, cognition, and distinguishing good from evil, and utility from harm, regardless of its applications—exists in the human being qua human being and is considered an inherent dignity, several pieces of evidence can be mentioned.

The First Piece of Evidence: “And We have honored the children of Adam…”

One of the most important pieces of evidence is verse 70 of Surah al-Isra: “And We have honored the children of Adam, and carried them on land and sea, and provided them with good things, and preferred them greatly over many of those whom We created” (وَلَقَدْ كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ وَحَمَلْنَاهُمْ فِي الْبَرِّ وَالْبَحْرِ وَرَزَقْنَاهُمْ مِنَ الطَّيِّبَاتِ وَفَضَّلْنَاهُمْ عَلَى كَثِيرٍ مِمَّنْ خَلَقْنَا تَفْضِيلًا). Here, God, in a context of both conferring favor upon the human being and admonishing him, states: We have honored the children of Adam—regardless of their belief, religion, the region in which they live, or the time in which they exist—meaning We granted him something unique to him, and this applies to all of humanity and differs from the specific dignity and grace of God that pertains to certain human beings. Therefore, He states that We have honored (karramnā) the children of Adam.

There are several discussions concerning this verse, and though we are not presently enumerating all aspects related to it, we shall present those aspects that can assist us and be invoked as evidence.

The First Aspect: The Difference Between Honoring (Takrīm) and Preferring (Tafḍīl)

Two issues are mentioned in the verse: honoring (takrīm) and preferring (tafḍīl). God states: “And We have honored the children of Adam” (وَلَقَدْ كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ), and then states: “and preferred them” (وَفَضَّلْنَاهُمْ). A discussion that is to some extent decisive here concerns takrīm and tafḍīl, and whether takrīm and tafḍīl share the same meaning—meaning their terms are synonymous, and if so, why are they repeated?—or whether they fundamentally point to different aspects.

There are various views and opinions on this matter. The late Shaykh Ṭabrisī pointed to some of them in Majmaʿ al-Bayān, and others have been stated by different scholars. The late ʿAllāmah Tabataba’i pointed to most of them in al-Mīzān, and offered a view of his own. There are approximately six views regarding takrīm and tafḍīl and the difference between them; I shall present them very briefly. I do not wish to examine these views one by one at present; I mention this simply to familiarize you with the exegetical context of this verse.

1. The first is that the meaning of preference (tafḍīl) and honoring (takrīm) is the same, and the repetition serves the purpose that “We have honored” (karramnā) reports the origin of the favor, while having nothing to do with preference. His wording is: “And if it is said: If the meaning of honoring and preferring is one, what is the meaning of the repetition? The answer is that His saying ‘We have honored’ indicates the bestowment of favor (inʿām) but does not indicate preference (tafaḍḍul); so the word ‘preference’ was brought to indicate that” (وَمَتَى قِيلَ: إِذَا كَانَ مَعْنَى التَّكْرِيمِ وَالتَّفْضِيلِ وَاحِداً فَمَا مَعْنَى التَّكْرَارِ؟ فَجَوَابُهُ أَنَّ قَوْلَهُ: «كَرَّمْنا» يُنْبِئُ عَنِ الْإِنْعَامِ وَلَا يُنْبِئُ عَنِ التَّفَضُّلِ فَجَاءَ بِلَفْظِ التَّفْضِيلِ لِيَدُلَّ عَلَيْهِ). This is one view: that they each share a single meaning, yet each points to a different aspect. Where there is no comparison with other creatures, the origin of the favor is mentioned, but when a comparison with others is intended, the discussion turns to preference (tafḍīl).

2. The second is that honoring (takrīm) pertains to the blessings of this world, while preferring (tafḍīl) pertains to the blessings of the Hereafter.

3. The third is that honoring (takrīm) refers to those blessings by which religious obligation is rendered valid (yaṣiḥḥu bihā al-taklīf), whereas preference (tafḍul) refers to the obligation itself presented to the human being so that he may reach the loftiest stations.

4. The fourth is that preference (tafḍīl) carries an additional nuance compared to honoring (takrīm), which is that preference (tafaḍḍul) is bestowment without desert; that is, as though if there is no desert and something is granted, it is preference, whereas if there is desert, it is honoring.

5. The fifth is a point made by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī concerning these two terms: honoring (takrīm) is used for essential matters or what is appended to essential matters, such as instinctive traits; whereas preference (tafḍīl) pertains to acquired matters—meaning that the human being has received gifts from God and has come to possess existential perfections. These perfections are inherent in instinctive matters, but there are other matters he must acquire. Consequently, takrīm is used for the former class of gifts, while tafḍīl is used for the latter; as though the former relates to what is inherent, and the latter relates to what is acquired.

6. The late ʿAllāmah himself has an explanation, which he believes is also supported by usage and language. He states that honoring (takrīm) is “the singling out of something for care (ʿināyah) and its ennoblement (tashrīf) with that which is unique to it and not found in others” (takhṣīṣ al-shayʾ bi-l-ʿināyah wa-tashrīfuhu bimā yakhtaṣṣu bihi wa-lā yūjadu fī ghayrihi). Honoring consists of singling out something for care and ennoblement—meaning ennobling and caring for it on account of something present in it and not in others; this is takrīm. On the other hand, preference (tafḍīl) is a relative meaning, which is “singling out for an increase in bestowment in comparison to others” (takhṣīṣuhu bi-ziyādat al-ʿaṭāʾ bi-l-nisbah ilā ghayrihi). That is, when something is given to everyone and someone is given more of it, the issue of preference arises, while they share in the origin of the bestowment; whereas honoring (takrīm) means the bestowment of a unique and exclusive bounty.

He then states that here, where God says: “We have honored the children of Adam” (كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ), that unique bounty He has bestowed upon the human being among cosmic creatures (he states this to exclude the angels and non-material creatures, i.e., immaterial beings) is the intellect. That is, by God’s granting him the intellect, He has cared for him, ennobled him, and magnified him. However, regarding things that other creatures possess—and who those other creatures are, whether they are only the jinn or the angels, is another discussion—there are bestowments given in which they share, but the human being has received more than they have.

Thus, that which has brought about human dignity is the intellect. His expression is: “And by this, it is shown that the purpose of the verse is to explain the state of all of humanity, putting aside that specific divine dignity and proximity that belongs to some of them…” (wa-bi-dhālika yaẓharu anna al-murāda bi-l-āyati bayānu ḥālin li-ʿāmmat al-bashari maʿa al-ghaḍḍi ʿammā yakhtaṣṣu bihi baʿḍuhum min al-karāmat al-khāṣṣat al-ilāhiyyati wa-l-qurb…). All of humanity enjoys the bounty of the intellect. He then states: “And it is the intellect by which they know truth from falsehood, good from evil, and the useful from the harmful” (wa-huwa al-ʿaqlu al-ladhī yaʿrifūna bihi al-ḥaqqa min al-bāṭili wa-l-khayra min al-sharri wa-l-nāfiʿa min al-ḍārr).

This explanation is mine: the origin of the capacity to distinguish good from evil, and the useful from the harmful, must not be confused with its application and instances. Both the one who oppresses and the one who is oppressed, both the just and the unjust, ultimately believe through their intellect that this possesses benefit and that possesses harm, this possesses good and that is evil; however, whether one understands the depth of the meaning of good or the depth of the meaning of evil depends on the degree to which this intellect is freed from those blemishes—which is what is deemed acquired.

Question:

Professor: What does it mean that whims and desires prevent it? On one occasion, the late Imam remarked that this Mr. Reagan (the US president), without realizing it himself, was seeking God; because he sought absolute power, and he saw his power in dominating the world, whereas he was actually seeking absolute perfection, which is God. Those blemishes and whims—upon what basis does this person decide to do what he does? He sees his utility in it; however, he fails to see that this utility is a fleeting, useless, and unsustainable utility…

In any case, he believes that the intellect has been given to all of humanity, and everyone possesses it, and this is in fact the source of the other two aspects mentioned in the verse: “and carried them on land and sea, and provided them with good things” (وَحَمَلْنَاهُمْ فِي الْبَرِّ وَالْبَحْرِ وَرَزَقْنَاهُمْ مِنَ الطَّيِّبَاتِ). He states that the source of the human being’s movement on land and sea, and his utilizing sustenance and good things, is this very intellect; contrary to those who argue that this dignity mentioned in the verse is not an inherent dignity. They say this because the verse points to the aspects of dignity: “and carried them on land and sea, and provided them with good things” (وَحَمَلْنَاهُمْ فِي الْبَرِّ وَالْبَحْرِ وَرَزَقْنَاهُمْ مِنَ الطَّيِّبَاتِ). They argue that the verse points to these aspects of dignity, and these two do not make this dignity inherent; this is an objection we shall answer later. The late ʿAllāmah explicitly states that if the human being subjugates other creatures, if he applies administration in society, if he employs other creatures in his service—all of this is on account of this very faculty. Because the human being has been endowed with intellect and We have honored him, he has acquired these powers. Thus, this is a dignity granted to all of humanity, and it is independent of whether it must attain perfection. Yes, if this intellect is free from blemishes, and distant from whims and certain accidental states, it can naturally attain truths far beyond this.

The Second Aspect: The Object of Honor

The other aspect is how and through what is the honoring of the children of Adam actualized? He states that commentators have mentioned various possibilities or instances, and even traditions; in some traditions, “We have honored” (karramnā) has been applied to certain matters. He mentions those instances: speech (nuṭq), upright stature (taʿdīl al-qāmah), tall stature (imtidād al-qāmah), the movement of fingers to perform any desired action, eating with the hand (al-akl bi-l-yad), handwriting (khaṭṭ) and the ability to write, beautiful form (ḥusn al-ṣūrah), dominion over other creatures (al-tasalluṭ ʿalā sā’ir al-khalq), subjugation of other creatures (al-taskhīr li-sā’ir al-khalq), or that God, Blessed and Exalted is He, created the father of humanity with His hand, as He states: “I created him with My hand” (خَلَقْتُهُ بِيَدِي).

He states that these are all examples; none of them is that specific bounty on account of which God, Blessed and Exalted is He, says: “We have honored the children of Adam” (كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ). The main body of these traces back to the intellect. He then states: “For some of them are among what branches out from the intellect, such as writing, speech, and dominion over other creatures” (fa-baʿḍuhā mimmā yatafarraʿu ʿalā al-ʿaqli ka-l-khaṭṭi wa-l-nuṭqi wa-l-tasalluṭi ʿalā ghayrihi min al-khalq), and some of them are fundamentally instances of preference (tafḍīl) rather than honoring (takrīm)—meaning they are things in which others also shared, but the human being benefited from them to a greater degree. Indeed, some of these are outside the import of the verse and have no relation to it whatsoever, such as the creation of their father Adam with His hand while creating others differently.

His effort is focused, first, on the difference between honoring (takrīm) and preferring (tafḍīl), and that honoring or “We have honored” (karramnā) is in reality the ennobling of the human being with a unique bounty; and second, that this unique bounty is the intellect, and everything else either traces back to the intellect or is fundamentally an instance of preference (tafḍīl)… There is nothing other than the intellect here.

He quotes a passage from the exegesis Rūḥ al-Maʿānī and refutes it, stating that with the explanations we have provided, this claim is also invalid: “And by this is shown the invalidity of the saying of some: indeed, honoring is through all of that. The author of Rūḥ al-Maʿānī erred when he said, after mentioning the views: ‘And all in reality are by way of example; and whoever claims restriction to one, like Ibn ʿAṭiyyah where he said: honoring is through the intellect and nothing else, has claimed an error, sought an extravagance, and opposed explicit reason and sound tradition'” (wa-bi-dhālika yaẓharu mā fī qawli baʿḍihim: inna al-takrīma bi-jamīʿi dhālika wa-qad akhṭa-a ṣāḥibu Rūḥi al-Maʿānī ḥaythu qāla baʿda dhikri al-aqwāl: wa-l-kullu fī al-ḥaqīqati ʿalā sabīli al-tamthīli wa-man iddaʿā al-ḥaṣra fī wāḥidin ka-Ibni ʿAṭiyyata ḥaythu qāla: innamā al-takrīmu bi-l-ʿaqli lā ghayrihi fa-qad iddaʿā ghalaṭan wa-rāma shaṭaṭan wa-khālafa ṣarīḥa al-ʿaqli wa-ṣaḥīḥa al-naql). This is the claim of the author of Rūḥ al-Maʿānī—what does it mean?! That your saying that the sole, unique bounty God has granted to the human being is the intellect is an error. He states that with the explanations we have provided, the invalidity of this claim or the objection to it becomes clear: “And the aspect of his error is obvious from what has preceded” (wa-wajhu khaṭa-ihi ẓāhirun mimmā taqaddama).

The order of the points I presented from al-Mīzān was based on my own arrangement; he has presented them differently. In short, you have observed both the views and opinions concerning this verse and the view of the late ʿAllāmah, namely that the honoring of the human being qua human being—all of humanity—by God, and His ennobling him through the bestowment of the bounty of the intellect, means He has granted the human being intellect and this is uniquely associated with the human being…

The Third Aspect: The Exclusion of the Angels

The third aspect is the exclusion of the angels. Here, you might say that the angels also possess intellect, and the jinn and devils also possess intellect, so this is not exclusive to the human being. He explained at the very outset that among “cosmic creatures”—which comprise animals and jinn—the jinn also possess intellect, the human being possesses intellect, and animals also possess a certain level of consciousness, though not this intellect. Thus, the angels are entirely excluded from the realm of the material system. He states that the angels are luminous beings; when the verse states: “And We have honored the children of Adam, and carried them on land and sea, and provided them with good things” (وَلَقَدْ كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ وَحَمَلْنَاهُمْ فِي الْبَرِّ وَالْبَحْرِ وَرَزَقْنَاهُمْ مِنَ الطَّيِّبَاتِ), it is pointing to this very material system that is before your eyes and whose creatures you see. Were it otherwise, it would not have mentioned land, sea, or good things here. Therefore, the angels are excluded from this; this is explaining the honoring of the children of Adam within the realm of cosmic, material, and non-luminous creatures.

Question:

Professor: Those two—namely: “and carried them on land and sea, and provided them with good things” (وَحَمَلْنَاهُمْ فِي الْبَرِّ وَالْبَحْرِ وَرَزَقْنَاهُمْ مِنَ الطَّيِّبَاتِ)—point to an aspect, rather than being the essence of dignity and honoring itself. However, mentioning these two aspects shows that the bounty God has granted to the human being, which is not present in other creatures, is the intellect. The discussion of carrying them on land and sea and providing sustenance from good things means, in reality, that other creatures in this world are intended. This is because carrying them on land and sea implies employing and subjugating other creatures. It is a contextual clue (qarīnah) indicating that He is referring to creatures that exist in this world… We are presently discussing dignity and honoring and that this is by means of the intellect; thus, the realm of creatures for whom this element is mentioned as an exclusive bounty for the human being is material rather than luminous creatures, and the angels are luminous beings.

However, among these very creatures—namely, the jinn and animals… it is true that the jinn are not seen with the outward senses, yet they are material; and animals are well known. We might even say that plants possess a certain level of consciousness but lack intellect; we must distinguish between them. The exclusivity of the human being with respect to the element of the intellect means that the human being possesses the capacity to distinguish good from evil, utility from harm, and beauty from ugliness… The human being possesses this capacity: distinguishing good from evil; and for this reason, he can acquire other gifts for himself—namely, the subjugation of other creatures and utilizing sustenance and good things. This intellect is not found in any other creature, not even in the jinn. Thus, exclusivity here is established. Therefore, the angels are excluded; what remains are the jinn, Satan, and Iblis. According to the verified view, Satan is also from among the jinn; indeed, we consider Iblis to be from among the jinn. Hence, we set aside the view that he was among the angels. Consequently, we must discuss the jinn: is the human intellect a specific bounty for them, or do the jinn possess intellect?… The time has passed; God willing, in the next session.