Session Thirty-Four, The Proofs of Inherent Human Dignity

Session Thirty-Four

The Proofs of Inherent Human Dignity — The First Proof: The Qur’anic Verses — The Twenty-First Verse — The Twenty-Second Verse — The Twenty-Third Verse

April 18, 2025

Continuing the First Proof: The Verses

With respect to the proofs of inherent human dignity, we have, in our discussion of the first proof, indicated twenty verses; several further verses remain here, through which we shall pass more quickly. The purpose of citing these verses is to set forth the argument they sustain; for it may, at first glance, occur to someone to ask what connection these verses bear to the claim in question. A brief indication of the argument is accordingly necessary, and is likewise more useful in strengthening and establishing the claim.

The Twenty-First Verse

“O mankind, indeed We have created you from a male and a female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you. Indeed, God is Knowing and Acquainted” (يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنَّا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ مِنْ ذَكَرٍ وَأُنْثَى وَجَعَلْنَاكُمْ شُعُوبًا وَقَبَائِلَ لِتَعَارَفُوا إِنَّ أَكْرَمَكُمْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ أَتْقَاكُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلِيمٌ خَبِيرٌ). God addresses humanity in general, stating: We created you from man and woman, and made you into various tribes and groups so that you might come to know one another; “indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you” (إِنَّ أَكْرَمَكُمْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ أَتْقَاكُمْ). He then states that the criterion for greater dignity is piety (taqwā) toward God Almighty. The address here is directed to humanity in general—”O mankind” (يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ)—and is then followed by reference to “most noble” (akram), which indicates that the basic reality of dignity exists, as it were, for all human beings; that is, dignity has a floor and a ceiling, except that the ceiling of dignity, or the path of ascent toward it, is governed by the criterion of piety. Yet, with respect to the basic reality of dignity, there is, as it were, no difficulty whatsoever; this is taken as a settled matter, and this, in itself, may well indicate the existence of two types of dignity—one inherent, and the other acquired—precisely the distinction we indicated at the outset of our discussion. Acquired dignity, naturally, is attained through piety, and itself admits of numerous degrees; yet the basic reality of this dignity, on the apparent sense of this verse, is accepted as belonging to the human being.

Question:

Response: It states, “the most noble of you is the most righteous of you” (أَكْرَمَكُمْ أَتْقَاكُمْ)—that is, the most dignified among you is the most pious among you. … This conveys two matters: first, that the human being, as it were, qua human being, is possessed of a certain dignity … “most noble” here means that, in comparison with this basic reality of dignity, [a further degree] is accepted …

Should one object: a possible objection here is that “most pious” (atqā) stands opposite “most noble” (akram), indicating the highest degrees of piety. If being most pious is what occasions becoming most noble, then, to this same degree, piety would be equivalent to dignity—that is, we would consider “most pious” as set against “most noble” and say that this is stated on the strength of the basic reality of piety, which occasions dignity, such that “most pious” is said to be “most noble”; this would not, accordingly, indicate that one who lacks piety nonetheless possesses dignity. … Accordingly, someone might say that this verse does not, in fact, indicate the claim.

I would respond as follows: my point is that, given due regard for the opening of the verse, which states, “O mankind, indeed We have created you from a male and a female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another” (يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنَّا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ مِنْ ذَكَرٍ وَأُنْثَى وَجَعَلْنَاكُمْ شُعُوبًا وَقَبَائِلَ لِتَعَارَفُوا)—that is, We have placed you into various groups, races, peoples, and tribes so that you might come to know one another—and given that this is followed by, “indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you” (إِنَّ أَكْرَمَكُمْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ أَتْقَاكُمْ), our evidence lies precisely in the preceding clause, which speaks both to the basic reality of creation and to the human beings’ equality with one another notwithstanding their differences, and which takes as given that your creation, from that single root, accompanied as it is by certain existing differences, is, as it were, itself a form of dignity—yet the criterion of true dignity is piety. … The criterion of superiority is piety; that is, all of you possess worth; do not suppose that you acquire worth by virtue of race.

The Twenty-Second Verse

“Whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land—it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one—it is as if he had saved mankind entirely” (مَنْ قَتَلَ نَفْسًا بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ أَوْ فَسَادٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَكَأَنَّمَا قَتَلَ النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا وَمَنْ أَحْيَاهَا فَكَأَنَّمَا أَحْيَا النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا). In this verse, two categories are excepted: first, should the killing of one soul be in retribution for another soul, which refers to retaliatory execution (qiṣāṣ); second, corruption in the land (fasād fī al-arḍ)—should a person be killed on account of corruption in the land, he does not fall within the scope of this verse. Those who are killed, or whom someone kills, apart from retaliatory execution and apart from corruption in the land—which constitute, in reality, their punishment and penalty—it is as though he had killed all of mankind. These two exceptions, in fact, serve in a certain manner as evidence for our claim; that is, human life, independent of belief, religion, and confession, possesses a worth such that killing it is equivalent to killing all of humanity. For God has excepted only these two instances in this verse, and has stated that the killing of a human being is otherwise impermissible; the killing of a human being and the shedding of his blood is impermissible.

Question:

Response: For the moment, we have only this verse before us; setting aside these two instances, … it does not say, “whoever kills a believer” or “whoever kills a Muslim” or “whoever kills such-and-such a person”; it says, “whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land” (مَنْ قَتَلَ نَفْسًا بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ أَوْ فَسَادٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ). There is, on the one hand, a person who commits corruption in the land … The verse asks: whose killing is equivalent to the killing of all mankind, and whose killing is not equivalent to the killing of all mankind? The one who is killed in retaliatory execution, and the one who commits corruption in the land. You may say that this very exception, and the fact that these two persons are killed, demonstrates that they, for instance, possess no dignity. My response is that these instances constitute penalty and punishment; that a person’s life should be taken by way of penalty, retribution, and punishment is not incompatible with the inherent worth of the human being in respect of his life requiring preservation. … As to what dignity means: you have constructed, out of the concept of dignity, some sort of horned and tailed creature that you now find alarming. Dignity means the according of greatness, the holding in esteem, the regard for worth and respect, the showing of due consideration. Yes, the animal, too, possesses dignity in certain respects … I would say that even the plant possesses dignity; from the standpoint of Islam, the plant, too, is held in regard. Every living being is held in regard; this is the very summit of Islam’s transcendent outlook. The plant and the animal, too, possess dignity, but each according to its own measure and degree. The basic principle, then, that dignity is affirmed for them as well—yes, it is affirmed for them too. You may say that this is not inherent dignity; my response is that it is, in fact, inherent. This ought not be divested, save in cases of penalty. … “Whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land—it is as if he had slain mankind entirely” (مَنْ قَتَلَ نَفْسًا بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ أَوْ فَسَادٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَكَأَنَّمَا قَتَلَ النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا)—this expression has never been employed with respect to any animal. … Several important discussions still remain; these verses exist, and so do their counter-evidences; the traditions exist, and so do their counter-evidences as well. Once these matters are concluded, we must turn to the question of scope: what is the scope of this principle? What rights are established by virtue of this inherent dignity? Is everything put forward in the West as a right thereby established? Even, for instance, the right to choose to marry an unbeliever? …. A great deal of discussion still remains for us. Take note of this point: should this dignity likewise be affirmed for other beings as well, … we have no reluctance or aversion whatsoever in this regard, and we say, yes, we are prepared to commit to this. Second, the difference between this and the dignity that the human being possesses lies in this: the verse has set the taking of one human life as equivalent to the killing of everyone. Where do we find anything of this kind with respect to any animal? What animal do we have such that, were you to kill one, it would be equivalent to your having killed them all? This expression exists for no animal whatsoever; it is not on the scale of the animal. It becomes clear, then, that the life of the human being, and the importance of his soul in God’s sight, differs altogether. The verse states that should you kill one person, without retaliatory execution and without corruption, it is as though you had killed all of mankind; where do we find anything of this kind elsewhere? … This degree of regard that the Lawgiver shows toward human life is no small matter. There are billions of souls in this world; it states that should you kill one person … To whom has this distinction been granted? Is this distinction not everlasting? Is this distinction confined to some particular group, or does it belong to all? … This advantage belongs to no other being—neither to the animal, nor to the plant. Is this favor and distinction particular to the human being, or not? … Suppose, hypothetically, that the verse had said, “whoever kills a soul, it is as if he had slain mankind entirely,” and had then stated, by way of a separate proof, either within this very verse or within the traditions, that the taking of a life in retribution for a life, or the killing of a soul for corruption in the land, is permissible to you, and had added five further such instances alongside it … I have already noted that this particular exception pertains to the penalty for those who kill another without any other justification. … All those, throughout the world, who hold to human dignity across every legal system, and who affirm a thousand rights for the human being, nonetheless themselves hold to imprisonment, incarceration, execution, and a hundred other penalties ….

The Twenty-Third Verse

“God does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes—from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, God loves those who act justly. God only forbids you from those who fight you because of religion and expel you from your homes and aid in your expulsion—from making allies of them. And whoever makes allies of them, then it is those who are the wrongdoers” (لَا يَنْهَاكُمُ اللَّهُ عَنِ الَّذِينَ لَمْ يُقَاتِلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ وَلَمْ يُخْرِجُوكُمْ مِنْ دِيَارِكُمْ أَنْ تَبَرُّوهُمْ وَتُقْسِطُوا إِلَيْهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ * إِنَّمَا يَنْهَاكُمُ اللَّهُ عَنِ الَّذِينَ قَاتَلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ وَأَخْرَجُوكُمْ مِنْ دِيَارِكُمْ وَظَاهَرُوا عَلَى إِخْرَاجِكُمْ أَنْ تَوَلَّوْهُمْ وَمَنْ يَتَوَلَّهُمْ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ). The verse states: God does not forbid you from those who have not fought you in the matter of religion and have not expelled you from your homes—act righteously toward them; “and act justly toward them; indeed, God loves those who act justly” (وَتُقْسِطُوا إِلَيْهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ); it then continues, stating that, as for those who have fought you in the matter of religion and have expelled you from your homes and your land, He forbids you from showing them righteousness in this same sense. The recommendation here to maintain good relations, beneficence, and righteousness toward human beings who do not share your religion—these are certainly unbelievers, but unbelievers who have not waged war, unbelievers who have not expelled you from your land; toward those who do not share your faith or your religion, provided they have not waged war against you and have not harmed or expelled the faithful and the believers, you are to maintain good and excellent relations. This does not mean, of course, that the level of relations with one’s fellow believer and religious brother is confined to this same degree; that relation is far beyond this. Religious brothers and believers are naturally defined within an altogether different sphere and a different kind of relation; but why, one might ask, does the verse here recommend good conduct toward unbelievers? From the standpoint of human relations, it states that you are to show righteousness and beneficence. Does the very act of showing righteousness and beneficence toward another human being constitute an according of greatness, an honoring, and a dignifying, or not? Nothing here stands as an impediment to this. That is, this constitutes a general and universal command to show beneficence toward other human beings; is this not an honoring?

You might raise the objection that regard has likewise been shown toward trees and animals; yes, that too is an honoring. You might raise a further objection, that this does not constitute proof of inherent dignity. My response is this: the command to act with equity (qisṭ), alongside beneficence, is particular to human beings; equity is something that finds its meaning specifically within human society; this differs from justice (ʿadl). It is true that He likewise instructs us not to wrong animals, and that the plant, too, must not be wronged; but the matter of equity finds its meaning and significance only within human society, and differs from justice as well. Does the command to act with equity toward other human beings, alongside righteousness and beneficence, not signify an honoring and an according of greatness? Does it not signify inherent dignity? What, indeed, does inherent dignity mean? It means that the human being, independent of whatever belief he may hold …

Question:

Response: If I were to say, “honor the learned, except for the corrupt among them” (أَكْرِمِ الْعُلَمَاءَ إِلَّا الْفُسَّاقَ), would this not mean that the learned person, qua learned person, possesses dignity? … I say that the learned person, qua learned person, must be honored; but if I attach a qualifying clause beneath this, does this mean that it negates the honoring of the learned person qua learned person? The learned person, qua learned person, must be honored; except that I have the right to attach a qualifying clause stating that the learned murderer ought not be honored …