Session Thirty-Five, The Proofs of Inherent Human Dignity
Session Thirty-Five
The Proofs of Inherent Human Dignity — The First Proof: The Qur’anic Verses — The Twenty-Fourth Through the Thirtieth Verse
April 19, 2025
The Twenty-Fourth Verse
“[They are] those who spend in ease and in hardship and who restrain anger and who pardon the people—and God loves the doers of good” (الَّذِينَ يُنْفِقُونَ فِي السَّرَّاءِ وَالضَّرَّاءِ وَالْكَاظِمِينَ الْغَيْظَ وَالْعَافِينَ عَنِ النَّاسِ وَاللَّهُ يُحِبُّ الْمُحْسِنِينَ). This verse points to certain instances of beneficence (iḥsān): spending both in secret and openly, the restraining of anger, and pardoning the people; all of these are presented as instances of beneficence, and those who act in this manner are reckoned as doers of good (muḥsinīn). For the verse concludes by stating, “and God loves the doers of good” (وَاللَّهُ يُحِبُّ الْمُحْسِنِينَ)—that God loves those who do good. In this set of attributes that has been mentioned—spending openly and in secret, restraining anger, and pardoning the people—the verse does not specify toward whom this spending is directed; rather, it speaks of the basic act of spending, of restraining anger, and of pardoning the people as such. What matters is that these forms of conduct are reckoned as beneficence toward others, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. With respect to “pardoning the people” (al-ʿāfīn ʿan al-nās), the verse is fairly explicit, since it speaks of pardon directed at “the people”—that is, the populace at large—and does not say “toward one’s religious brethren.” As for the other two attributes mentioned, it is true that their object is not stated as explicitly as in this latter case—it does not say “they spend toward the people” or “those who restrain anger toward the people”—yet it is evident that this, too, pertains to people in general, and is reckoned as an instance of beneficence, such that God loves those who do good.
What can serve us, in this discussion, as evidence is the very reckoning of these matters—particularly the pardoning of the people—as an instance of beneficence, and the fact that God loves such persons; this indicates the dignifying and honoring of the human being. Pardoning people, showing forbearance, the human being’s refraining from anger toward people—these are advantages and distinctions that God Almighty has established within human relations, although, admittedly, some of these may well be innate and rational in character. In any case, beneficence toward others is reckoned as an honoring on the part of God. The human being ought to conduct himself in this manner toward others; this is, in fact, a dignifying and an according of greatness, and it can serve as evidence for our discussion.
The Twenty-Fifth Verse
“O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm for God, witnesses in equity, and do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness. And fear God; indeed, God is Acquainted with what you do” (يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ لِلَّهِ شُهَدَاءَ بِالْقِسْطِ وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَآنُ قَوْمٍ عَلَى أَلَّا تَعْدِلُوا اعْدِلُوا هُوَ أَقْرَبُ لِلتَّقْوَى وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَبِيرٌ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ). It states: O you who have believed, be among those who stand firm for God; be witnesses to equity (qisṭ); let not enmity toward some people lead you to abandon justice. Two clauses of this verse may be cited as evidence:
First, “witnesses in equity” (shuhadāʾ bi-al-qisṭ); equity, in itself, as a value within human society, indicates God’s and the Sharīʿah’s regard for the condition of human society. Within society, both Muslim and unbeliever exist, and this statement encompasses all of them.
Second, that the conduct and enmities of a particular group toward you must never cause you, in your dealings with them, to depart from the path of justice—that is, justice is necessary for all; injustice is impermissible, even toward unbelievers. Does this prohibition against injustice not indicate that the human being is a being held in regard by God, such that even the unbeliever must not be subjected to injustice?
The Twenty-Sixth Verse
“And do not argue with the People of the Scripture except in a way that is best, except for those who commit injustice among them” (وَلَا تُجَادِلُوا أَهْلَ الْكِتَابِ إِلَّا بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ إِلَّا الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا مِنْهُمْ). It states: do not argue with the People of the Scripture except by the most excellent of methods, save for that group among them who have committed injustice and oppression. Here, with respect to the People of the Scripture, who are among the unbelievers, the verse states explicitly: do not argue with them except by a method more excellent than what they themselves have employed, or by that method which is most excellent of all. It is of great importance that Muslims, when they engage with unbelievers and the People of the Scripture, should employ the best form of argumentation (jidāl-i aḥsan). Were it not for the worth and regard accorded to them, were it not for their being held in honor, would such a recommendation have been given?
Question:
Response: “To have an effect” means that this human being, in the end, possesses a certain worth and inviolability (ḥurmah); preserve this inviolability. … Why is the goal here said to be having an effect? … Whatever the goal may be—whether it is guidance, having an effect, or showing respect—in the end, all of these are present together, since the addressee is a human being; whatever the reason and whatever the purpose, when the verse says, “deal with him in this manner,” this means that this human being occupies a station and a degree of respect such that, if you wish for him to be guided, if you wish to avoid conflict, if you wish to have an effect, you must conduct yourselves in this manner. This is precisely honoring; why has the meaning of honoring and dignity become so strange in your understanding? It states that, when you wish to argue with an unbelieving recipient of scripture, you must conduct yourselves in this manner. …. This is altogether clear; in my view, to deny these matters is, in truth, to deny self-evident realities. Does the instruction to deal with a human being by the best possible method not mean that a certain station and standing is accorded to the addressee? When a parent is told to deal with their young child in such-and-such a manner, does this not mean that personhood has been accorded to that child? This is precisely what dignity means. We must accord to every human being a minimal degree of respect, personhood, and rights; we cannot say that, since he is an unbeliever, he is to be deprived of water and food, or ought to be tortured, and so forth.
The Twenty-Seventh Verse
“And [recall] when We took the covenant from the Children of Israel, [enjoining upon them], ‘Do not worship except God; and to parents do good, and to relatives, orphans, and the needy. And speak to people good [words]'” (وَإِذْ أَخَذْنَا مِيثَاقَ بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ لَا تَعْبُدُونَ إِلَّا اللَّهَ وَبِالْوَالِدَيْنِ إِحْسَانًا وَذِي الْقُرْبَى وَالْيَتَامَى وَالْمَسَاكِينِ وَقُولُوا لِلنَّاسِ حُسْنًا). It states: We took a covenant from the Children of Israel that they should worship none but God, and that they should show beneficence to their parents, to relatives, orphans, and the needy. Our evidence here lies in the command to speak well to people—the command to speak kindly with people, encompassing both unbeliever and Muslim. Were no worth, respect, and personhood accorded to them, would such a command have any meaning? Whatever the motivation may be—that it is more effective, that it is more conducive to guiding people—whichever it may be, all of these point to a single truth and reality. Is this truly our own outlook? When we encounter someone today who thinks somewhat differently, how do we regard him? Can we, with such an outlook, claim to occupy the station of guidance and outreach that the Prophet (peace be upon him) himself occupied? “And speak to people good [words]” (قُولُوا لِلنَّاسِ حُسْنًا)—even toward unbelievers. Of course, “and to parents do good, and to relatives, orphans, and the needy” (وَبِالْوَالِدَيْنِ إِحْسَانًا وَذِي الْقُرْبَى وَالْيَتَامَى وَالْمَسَاكِينِ) may well also indicate the claim and point to the honoring and dignifying of the human being, though admittedly not as clearly as “and speak to people good [words]” (وَقُولُوا لِلنَّاسِ حُسْنًا). Were it not for the worth, respect, and according of greatness to the human being, it would make no sense to instruct that one speak with kindness of speech.
The Twenty-Eighth Verse
“Indeed, God commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice. Excellent is that which God instructs you. Indeed, God is ever Hearing and Seeing” (إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُكُمْ أَنْ تُؤَدُّوا الْأَمَانَاتِ إِلَى أَهْلِهَا وَإِذَا حَكَمْتُمْ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ أَنْ تَحْكُمُوا بِالْعَدْلِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ نِعِمَّا يَعِظُكُمْ بِهِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ سَمِيعًا بَصِيرًا). The verse first commands the rendering of trusts to those to whom they belong, and then states that, when you wish to render judgment among people, you must judge with justice. This is a command to render just judgment among all people; does this not mean that a certain measure of respect, station, and personhood has been accorded to people of every religion and creed, such that justice is commanded with respect to them? The verse then continues, “Excellent is that which God instructs you” (إِنَّ اللَّهَ نِعِمَّا يَعِظُكُمْ بِهِ)—certainly, this is an excellent matter with which God admonishes you.
Question:
Response: We hold that this very verse, which states, “do not commit injustice, and conduct yourselves with justice,” indicates honoring. … We are not concerned, here, with the origin of this human understanding—whether it derives from innate disposition, from reason, or from self-evident truths; we are not concerned with this at all; yes, the human being apprehends that injustice is inherently reprehensible and that justice is inherently good. … But the fact that I have no right to commit injustice against my fellow human being indicates a minimal degree of inviolability belonging to him. I am not at all concerned with the source of this apprehension; does this not show that my fellow human being, and the other human being, occupies a station such that injustice toward him must be avoided? … Does this not indicate inherent dignity for the human being? That injustice must not be done to the human being qua human being … The fact that you cannot commit injustice even against an unbeliever—does this establish a right for the unbeliever, or not? … Some fear has been instilled in you, such that you flee from this question: can injustice be done to an unbeliever, or not? The very fact that you cannot commit injustice even against an unbeliever … Has anyone ever issued a juridical opinion holding that injustice toward an unbeliever is permissible? … Yes, some say that, should an unbeliever be treated in such-and-such a manner, this does not constitute injustice; this is among the strangest of statements. What I wish to say is this: when we are prohibited from committing injustice against a human being and are obligated to observe justice toward him, two matters may be derived from this: first, that this constitutes an advantage belonging to that being and that human being, namely that I have no right to commit injustice against him; second, that this establishes a right in him with respect to us. Is there any difficulty in deriving these two matters from this verse? …
The Twenty-Ninth Verse
“And O my people, give full measure and weight in equity and do not deprive the people of their due and do not commit corruption on the earth, spreading corruption” (وَيَا قَوْمِ أَوْفُوا الْمِكْيَالَ وَالْمِيزَانَ بِالْقِسْطِ وَلَا تَبْخَسُوا النَّاسَ أَشْيَاءَهُمْ وَلَا تَعْثَوْا فِي الْأَرْضِ مُفْسِدِينَ). It states: O my people, render the scale and the measure with equity and in full, and do not reckon people’s goods as lesser or of less value than they actually are, and do not stir up corruption and turmoil upon the earth through wicked conduct. There is no doubt whatsoever that this concerns conduct toward people in general, and not toward believers in particular. Does this instruction concerning transactions—in buying and selling—not indicate a measure of respect for the human being? It states: when someone wishes to sell goods to you, do not shortchange him; when you wish to sell something to him, do not give him less than his due. Can this be anything other than the observance of respect and of a right belonging to him? Were no respect or right involved, what difficulty would there be in selling short or shortchanging in a transaction? We shall later note that this is precisely what we observe in the conduct of the Household of the Prophet (peace be upon them). If these do not constitute proof of the honoring of the human being, then what do they constitute? Certain doubts persist in your mind, which you continue to repeat, namely that the same has been said with respect to animals; yes, they too have been honored. When we speak of inherent dignity, we mean that the human being, qua human being, possesses this worth. It is true that, in certain instances, this very human being, despite possessing this respect and worth, engages in conduct for which he must be held to account, and what has been ordained for him, in that instance, is penalty, retribution, and punishment.
The Thirtieth Verse
“And do not let the hatred of a people for having obstructed you from al-Masjid al-Ḥarām lead you to transgress” (وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَآنُ قَوْمٍ أَنْ صَدُّوكُمْ عَنِ الْمَسْجِدِ الْحَرَامِ أَنْ تَعْتَدُوا). It states: let not your enmity and hatred toward a group that has barred you from entering al-Masjid al-Ḥarām lead you to commit transgression and aggression against them. Could anything be clearer than this? Transgression and aggression against the polytheists who have shown enmity and have barred entry to al-Masjid al-Ḥarām is prohibited. The verse states: let not these enmities compel you to commit transgression and aggression against them.
Here, you might say that some particular interest or necessity required that they not be subjected to transgression and aggression—that this was a matter of necessity and exigency. But this is not an acceptable interpretation. This was an instruction pertaining to all circumstances—in conditions of peace and tranquility, in conditions of war, in conditions where Muslims held the upper hand or where others held the upper hand over them—everywhere, this same instruction was given: you have no right to commit transgression and aggression, even against the polytheists. Does this not indicate that they, too, possess a certain inviolability—even though they themselves did not observe your own inviolability?
In any case, these verses demonstrate that the human being possesses inviolability, and that, in consequence, certain rights are affirmed for him; he possesses rights—the right to justice. We shall say later that the highest of these rights is the right to justice. We shall state that the human being, qua human being, enjoys these rights; the right to justice is a right belonging to the human being—that is, he can demand it, and nowhere has permission been given to act contrary to justice, even toward unbelievers, polytheists, the unjust, and aggressors. Freedom, too, with whatever conditions attach to it, is, broadly speaking, a right. Choice is a right. The human being, qua human being, possesses these rights by virtue of divine creation. These rights are the offspring of these advantages, forms of dignity, and honorings that God has accorded him.
Several further verses exist that can likewise indicate this matter. In summary, up to this point, we hold that we possess verses which, though employing different modes of expression and different perspectives, all sustain the basic principle of the human being’s dignity, personhood, and being held in honor.
The Discussion of the Coming Session
There exist, of course, opposite to this, certain verses that stand in apparent conflict with the verses we have cited; what, then, do you make of these conflicting verses? Verses certainly exist that indicate a denial, and how we propose to resolve this apparent conflict is a matter we shall, God willing, address in the coming session.