Session Forty-Five, The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being
Session Forty-Five
The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being — The Second Proof: Traditions (Riwayāt) — The Conflicting Traditions — Examining the Recent Six Groups — Six Points — General Response
May 25, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
Our discussion concerned the proofs of inherent dignity. Under the second proof, which is the traditions, after quoting the traditions indicating inherent dignity, we noted that these traditions are afflicted with conflicting ones; traditions that, in contrast to them, indicate the absence of inherent human dignity. Ten groups of traditions were mentioned which are claimed to negate the inherent dignity of the human being. Now, we wish to see whether there is a way to reconcile these two groups of traditions or not.
Examining the Recent Six Groups
In our view, it is possible to reconcile these traditions. In order for the way of reconciling these traditions to become clear, observing several very important points is necessary. On this basis, we gave a brief response to these six groups, and indeed to all ten groups (since we had mentioned four groups previously), and we shall provide a general and common response. Some of these groups also possess specific responses, which we shall mention as far as we can reach. The issues and points are as follows:
First Point
In these traditions, certain rulings have been stated absolutely, whether in relation to ritual impurity (najāsah), humiliation, or the deprivation of some human beings of certain rights. However, what is certain is that these traditions, by virtue of their absolute nature (itlaq), are not accepted by everyone. Each of them may be restricted (muqayyad) in accordance with its own absolute scope.
As an example, regarding the ritual impurity of disbelievers, the traditions of which we read in the previous session, there is ultimately a disagreement as to whether they encompass the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb) or not; some do not consider them to encompass the People of the Book. Furthermore, there is debate as to whether this impurity is an outward impurity or an inward filth (khubth bāṭinī); and whether this impurity is inherent (dhātī) or accidental (ʿaraḍī)—as also pointed out in the traditions. Therefore, the absolute nature of these traditions, both in terms of the individuals who constitute the subject matter and in terms of the ruling itself, is open to debate, just as these discussions have indeed taken place regarding most of these traditions.
Second Point
In these traditions, no distinction is made between the blameless (qāṣir) and the blameworthy (muqaṣṣir); that is, for instance, the ruling of a blameless disbeliever differs greatly from that of a blameworthy disbeliever, and the same applies to the other categories regarding whom these rulings have been stated—whether those who falsely claim Islam (muntaḥilīn li-l-Islām), a Nasibi, or an extremist (ghālī), it makes no difference. The effect of this distinction on this issue must not be ignored. To clarify this matter, I shall read a statement by Imam Khomeini:
“Indeed, disbelievers, like ignorant Muslims, include the blameless (qāṣir)—who constitute the majority—and the blameworthy (muqaṣṣir). Obligations, in terms of both principles (uṣūl) and branches (furūʿ), are shared among all legally responsible individuals (mukallafīn), both the knowledgeable and the ignorant, the blameless and the blameworthy. Disbelievers are punished for both the principles and the branches, but only upon the establishment of proof (hujjahi) against them, not absolutely. Just as the fact that Muslims are punished for the branches does not mean they are punished for them regardless of whether they are blameless or blameworthy, the same applies to disbelievers, hand in hand, by virtue of reason and the principles of the Justice-adherents (al-ʿAdliyyah).”
Here, he explicitly states that one must distinguish between the blameless and the blameworthy. Although everyone is legally responsible for the branches of religion, punishment for abandoning obligations depends on whether they are blameless or blameworthy; this exists both among Muslims and among disbelievers.
Therefore, if we take the discussion of the blameless and the blameworthy into consideration, it is highly unlikely that many of these traditions encompass the blameless among the disbelievers and other groups; this is very important. It is true that even if we accept that these traditions encompass the blameworthy, a certain spectrum of people will ultimately face these beliefs, restrictions, deprivations, and pressures; however, there is a great difference in how far the scope of these rulings, regulations, restrictions, and deprivations extends—whether it encompasses the majority of people (akthar al-nās) or the minority (aqall al-nās).
Therefore, by observing this aspect, it becomes clear that a vast spectrum of disbelievers and deviant individuals are excluded from the scope of these traditions.
Third Point
We must also pay attention to the point that, generally speaking, there can be a middle ground between Islam and disbelief. It is not correct to say that “the human being is either a Muslim or a disbeliever” (al-insānu immā muslimun aw kāfir); rather, there are many people who are not Muslim but are not disbelievers either—for instance, they are hesitant, they have doubts, and they harbor no hostility. If we accept the existence of a middle ground between them (and indeed, in today’s world, a vast spectrum of people are as such), we can no longer say that these traditions, which relate to disbelievers for instance, encompass every non-Muslim. In other words, sometimes we say that a disbeliever is defined as a non-Muslim; “non-Muslim” is very broad, encompassing the hesitant, the doubters, the People of the Book, and polytheists from other than the People of the Book. If we subscribe to such a view, then we must reconsider the scope of these proofs.
Fourth Point
Among disbelievers themselves, we must also consider a third category, contrary to the popular terminology, besides the Dhimmi disbeliever (kāfir dhimmī) and the Harbi disbeliever (kāfir ḥarbī). I pointed this out years ago in our discussions. The popular opinion is that a Harbi disbeliever is any disbeliever who is not a Dhimmi; they use the term “Harbi disbeliever” for non-Dhimmi disbelievers. However, we can say that a group of disbelievers are Dhimmis—those who accept the regulations and conditions of the Islamic state, submit to the poll tax (jizyah), and indeed, the government provides certain protections for them. Another category consists of Harbi disbelievers, who are those currently at war with Muslims. But there is also a third category here, whose rulings must really be distinguished from both the Dhimmi and the Harbi; we cannot say that the rulings of Harbi disbelievers encompass them, and of course, since they are not under the protection (dhimmah) of the Islamic state, the rulings of the People of Dhimmah do not apply to them either. This category consists of those who neither seek war with Muslims nor submit to the regulations of the Islamic state; they are neither at war nor at peace; they are neither treaty-bound (muʿāhad), nor Dhimmi, nor Harbi. This division, which states that “a disbeliever is either Harbi or non-Harbi” and divides the non-Harbi into treaty-bound and Dhimmi, seems to require reconsideration. We truly have disbelievers who are neither Dhimmi, nor Harbi, nor treaty-bound; they are neither at war nor at peace. A large spectrum of disbelievers today belongs to this type of disbelievers. Can we consider all the rulings mentioned for disbelievers to encompass this category as well?
Fifth Point
In our examination of the first four groups, we pointed out that in a portion of these traditions, a ruling might be strictly prohibited in consideration of whether a behavior or assistance leads to the strengthening of disbelief (taqwiyat al-kufr); however, that very behavior may have no prohibition whatsoever as long as the description of “strengthening disbelief” does not apply to it. This point must also be observed regarding these recent six groups. Ultimately, some of these restrictions and deprivations are from the perspective of preventing the strengthening of disbelief, and the propagation and spread of disbelief to Muslims.
For example, take that group of traditions indicating inward hatred toward disbelievers; traditions that prohibit inward love and encourage and prompt inward hatred. It is not unlikely (and indeed, signs and contextual clues can be mentioned for it) that the intention is to prevent Muslims, by virtue of this love, from gradually being drawn toward disbelief. Therefore, it wishes from the very beginning to prevent the ground from being prepared for attraction toward disbelievers, lest these heart-ties end up in the disbelief of Muslims. Ultimately, these have an effect; these attachments leave an impact, and the purpose is to prevent Muslims from becoming disbelievers.
Or, for instance, the traditions indicating the prohibition of marriage with the People of the Book; both aspects can be present in it: both lest these familial ties cause Muslims to be influenced by them and this intermixing causes the ugliness of disbelief and associating partners with God (shirk) to be diminished, and at the same time, it serves as a restriction against disbelievers and a limitation upon them, which is ultimately a rational matter. It is not as if we should think that these limitations conflict absolutely with human dignity. For example, in an organization, if they set regulations for dress and attire, stating that you must not go to such-and-such a place, or that you may go to such-and-such a place, does anyone interpret this as being contrary to human dignity? Even though the essence of it is a limitation, even in attire and connections—certain institutions and organizations are as such. Yes, when they accept this by their own choice, they must act upon it; this is a treaty and an agreement, and the product of mutual consent. But can anyone claim that even this negates the inherent dignity of the human being? It is not so.
Sixth Point
The apparent meaning of these groups of traditions (other than those traditions that indicate some form of punishment, which we shall address later) is, in fact, a type of limitation for some human beings—excluding, of course, the otherworldly punishment designated for certain matters. For now, we have nothing to do with otherworldly punishments and penalties; the discussion is that actions such as the prohibition of inheritance, the impermissibility of accepting a disbeliever’s testimony, or the prohibition of marriage with the People of the Book are, in truth, limitations and deprivations meant to make disbelievers reflect and pay attention to their path and belief, and these limitations do not conflict with inherent dignity. As I just pointed out, when they establish regulations for Muslims, stating that a Muslim cannot marry one of the People of the Book, or that a Muslim cannot leave his wealth as an inheritance to a disbeliever, or that the testimony of a disbeliever against a Muslim is not accepted—do these make sense more within the Islamic environment, or are they limitations against disbelievers? Regarding disbelievers, many matters have been recognized; their marriages are recognized, and their ownership is recognized. Yes, for example, we do not have this regarding Harbi disbelievers in that specific sense; their ownership is not respected, as if the property of a Harbi disbeliever is confiscated. Is the confiscation of property not customary in the world? Is it not rational?
These examples that were mentioned, which the traditions also indicate—the prohibition of marriage, the prohibition of the entry of polytheists into the Sacred Mosque (al-Masjid al-Ḥarām), the deprivation of inheriting from a Muslim—these are in fact special privileges for Muslims, before being limitations for disbelievers. Several groups of traditions we read in the previous session are of this kind; they relate to Muslims; they say to the Muslim: you cannot marry a disbeliever; this is like a limitation that an institution or organization places upon its own members. They say to the Muslim: you cannot leave an inheritance to a disbeliever; is the limitation on this side or that side? Even if a portion of these is considered a limitation for the disbeliever, these are intended more from the aspect that disbelievers reflect upon their deviation and their false and incorrect path, and it is, as it were, a type of general punishment; the divine legislative system can place a general punishment and penalty upon the very false belief itself, and therefore, this does not conflict with the inherent dignity of the human being.
Seventh Point
Generally speaking, even if we accept all of this, it does not conflict with the scope within which we believe in the inherent dignity of the human being. Sometimes, a person might believe in inherent dignity for the human being absolutely, in the sense that they recognize all the rights currently recognized for the human being by rational people to be recognized for every human being. For example, one of the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the right to choice in marriage; a disbeliever can marry a Muslim, and a Muslim can marry a disbeliever—the right to freely choose a spouse. We do not recognize this right. Therefore, we may differ in the scope of some rights; however, as we shall state later, we believe that within that scope, the rights connected to those three specific blessings for the human being must be recognized, and if something conflicts with these matters, it must be set aside. Reason, free will and choice, and human emotions and feelings, which we pointed to in the first group of foundations (and whether these are reducible to one another is not very important), necessitate certain rights, but this does not mean that anyone can marry any woman or man of any religion; this does not conflict with those rights. We shall explain this further in the discussion of the domain. However, those natural rights are born of human nature and born of human creation. Therefore, natural rights arising from what is placed within human nature must be recognized; hence, what these traditions indicate, in part, has no conflict whatsoever with those natural rights arising from natural needs.
These several matters help us to resolve the conflict between these traditions.
Only one other matter remains, and that is the specific punishments of disbelievers or extremists (al-ghulāt), which we must answer in the section of objections and doubts—such as burning the extremists, or throwing a certain criminal from a mountain, taking the life of a Muslim as a heavy punishment, or restricting a captive disbeliever; these mentioned punishments have an explanation and justification that we shall state later.
In short, my argument is that, with consideration to the points we explained, many of these traditions do not conflict with the traditions indicating dignity. If we observe them together and keep these points in mind, it becomes clear that they do not negate the inherent dignity of the human being.
Only some of the traditions we read in the previous session, in addition to this general response we gave, also possess specific responses. Perhaps some of these, at first glance, cannot be resolved by this general response—such as the traditions indicating cursing (laʿn); how do we want to resolve this cursing? Even if we keep all those points in mind, the permissibility of cursing is ultimately incompatible with dignity. The permissibility of slander and lying about a disbeliever, a Nasibi, and an extremist—how do we want to resolve this? Even if we keep all those seven points in mind, what shall we do ultimately with the group that indicates the permissibility of cursing? Suppose this does not encompass the blameless, nor does it encompass the Dhimmi and non-Harbi disbelievers, but only takes the Harbi disbelievers, and the issue of strengthening disbelief is not present either; this ultimately, even if within a small and minor scope, conflicts with those traditions. Ultimately, when it says you can slander, insult, and curse, these are clear manifestations of disrespect toward the human being; this means that the human being does not possess inherent dignity. Therefore, we must also provide specific responses to some of these traditions: one concerning the traditions indicating cursing, one concerning the traditions related to slander, and one concerning the tradition that the property of a Nasibi can be seized (meaning the non-sanctity of his property); or the traditions indicating the ritual impurity of disbelievers. These three groups require further explanation; ultimately, we must also provide specific responses to some groups of these traditions.