Session Forty-Seven, The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being
Session Forty-Seven
The Proofs of the Inherent Dignity of the Human Being — The Third Proof: Intellect — The Six Premises — Conclusion — Examining the Third Proof — The First Objection and Its Response — The Second Objection and Its Response — Supporting Evidence
May 31, 2025
The Third Proof: Intellect
In our discussion on the proofs of the inherent dignity of the human being, we have examined two proofs so far: the verses and the traditions. The third proof is the rational proof. This proof consists of several premises; by combining these premises, the desired conclusion is proved in part. These premises are as follows:
First Premise
The human being, without a doubt, enjoys certain advantages and possesses capacities that no other creature shares. This has been generally proven and explained in our previous discussions. For instance, the human being is blessed with the privilege of intellect (ʿaql) and possesses free will and choice (irādah and ikhtiyār); these are matters that God has bestowed upon the human being. Or that He has made him a being of emotion and feeling, which is established for all human beings prior to faith (īmān). This cannot be denied and requires no further discussion. All human beings possess an innate nature (fitrah), intellect, free will, choice, and feelings. While we can reduce all of these to a few core attributes, they remain undeniable.
Second Premise
These advantages place the human being in a superior position and status compared to inanimate objects and plants on Earth, as well as angels and jinn. That is, with these advantages and characteristics, the human being is placed in a position that grants him the capacity for divine vicegerency (khilāfah), becoming the object of prostration for the angels, and so on. This position is not available to any other creature; it is not available to angels, nor is it available to animals. Thus, by virtue of these advantages, the human being has acquired a capacity that makes him superior to all creatures and places him in a station beyond all of them. The tradition of the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) stating that God created angels with intellect alone, animals with desire (shahwah) alone, and the human being as a composite of both, supports this claim. If a human being walks the path of intellect despite the summons of desire, his value and worth are naturally greater than other creatures.
Third Premise
These capacities and advantages that God has placed at the disposal of humanity are not futile or in vain (ʿabath). God has a purpose in granting these specific blessings and dignities. His purpose is for the human being to reach the station of proximity (qurb) and eternal felicity. This station has various titles: being the object of prostration for the angels, divine vicegerency, the station of proximity, and eternal and otherworldly felicity. We can summarize all of these in a single sentence: reaching that station is the ultimate goal of the creation of the human being.
Fourth Premise
God, the Exalted, has provided humanity with the means of guidance and direction to reach this position, both from within and from without. From within, He has granted intellect and innate nature; and from without, He has sent messengers, revealed scriptures, legislated laws, and brought religion and Shariah for human beings, so that by acting upon these rules and laws, they may attain this goal.
Fifth Premise
To reach this destination and goal, the human being must utilize those talents, capacities, and advantages that God has placed at his disposal through his own choice and free will. Divine will has determined that this should not occur through ontological compulsion (jabr takwīnī); indeed, there is not even a legislative compulsion (ilzām tashrīʿī) to enter this path. God states: “We guided him to the way, whether he be grateful or ungrateful” (هَدَيْنَاهُ السَّبِيلَ إِمَّا شَاكِراً وَ إِمَّا كَفُوراً) [Surah Al-Insan, 76:3]. The internal and external tools to guide the human being toward this path have been placed at his disposal, yet there is still no compulsion (ikrāh) in choosing this path and in choosing religion. This is also a completely obvious matter; otherwise, if the human being were to become law-abidant and religious involuntarily, he would possess no advantage over angels and animals, because in that case, he would merely move along the path of proximity to God, the Exalted, by virtue of his instinct or natural constitution.
Sixth Premise
This path and way remains open to the human being until the moment of death. That is, God, the Exalted, has left this path open and has never closed the way of return to Him. The human being can return from the path of error until his very last moment. The work that prophets and saints (awliyāʾ) did with human beings throughout history, even in the final moments of their lives—such as the work of Prophet Moses with Pharaoh—was to awaken and alert them to the truth. The very fact that this path remains open for return, through choice, assistance, and the provision of its means, is highly significant.
So far, six premises have been mentioned, regarding which there is no doubt; all of these premises have been proven—some in our own discussions here, and others in their proper place.
Conclusion
The conclusion of the above six premises is that the human being possesses certain rights, and whatever conflicts with the rights arising from these dignities is unacceptable. If the human being possesses intellect, it means he can think and discover the unknown. We must arrive at the Origin and the Return (mabdaʾ and maʿād) through belief, certainty, and knowledge. The principle stating that emulation (taqlīd) is impermissible in the roots of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) and that one must attain certainty (yaqīn) means that this certainty may be accompanied by proof and demonstration, or it may be attained through other means; the important thing is certainty. That God has placed these at the disposal of humanity, while He could have ontologically compelled them to traverse this path, yet did not do so and asked them to choose their own path, indicates the existence of a right born of this divine blessing. Therefore, one cannot strip away the right to think, ponder, investigate, and discuss, nor can one strip away free will and force him to perform an action. In other words, whatever conflicts with these matters, or any ruling that somehow necessitates stripping away these matters, is unacceptable. Thus, these rational premises can prove in part that religious rulings and the regulations of Shariah cannot negate these rights from the human being, except by way of punishment or the precedence of public interests, which we shall address later.
Question:
Professor: Ultimately, the human being possesses the right to life, the right to live, and the right to think and ponder; he has natural needs that also establish a right for him. These are matters that appear to exist for all human beings prior to faith; however, as we shall state later and have repeatedly stated before, being free—meaning freedom of thought and action—does not mean that under no circumstances can these rights be stripped from him. The right to life does not mean that under no circumstances can anyone strip life from him; even in today’s human rights, which have a broader scope, despite the recognition of many rights, the legislator, ruler, and law enforcer are permitted to strip these freedoms, rights, and matters from a person if he performs an action that damages the freedom, rights, and life of others. Do they not sentence people to prison, restriction, and confinement today, despite all the talk of human rights and freedom? All of these have a limit and boundary, which is that they must not interfere with the rights of others. Our statement that any ruling necessitating the stripping of these matters is unacceptable is with consideration of this noted point. Therefore, this is also not absolute; it is not the case that anyone can do whatever they wish. Ultimately, every society has regulations, and these regulations must be accepted, and if anyone transgresses them, they will face deprivation and punishment.
Examining the Third Proof
Two objections have been raised against this proof:
The First Objection
The first objection is that if this issue is rational and the human being possesses such dignities, by virtue of which certain rights are proven for him in part, then why is there so much disagreement concerning it? If you wish to prove this with the help of intellect, why do some deny it while others accept it? This does not fall within the scope of the intellect’s comprehension.
Response
This objection can be answered because:
First: Disagreement in the comprehension of the intellect—where one person says this is comprehended by the intellect and another says it is not—has many parallels; this disagreement exists in many issues. If we wish to mention parallels, there are many cases that a group has accepted while others have rejected.
Second: The disagreement among thinkers regarding human dignity and the rights arising from it is sometimes due to a lack of precision and contemplation regarding its conceptual and assentive premises and foundations (al-mabānī al-taṣawwuriyyah wa-l-taṣdīqiyyah). Denials are perhaps born of this. If time passes and the various aspects of the issue become clear, it will perhaps be accepted. We have seen in many cases that the passage of time has revealed some hidden aspects of an issue and brought about new matters that led to the admission and acknowledgement of opponents.
Therefore, in our view, the existence of disagreement on an issue—where some agree and some deny—does not damage the rational nature of the proof. Being rational does not mean that everyone must accept it; this is not an intuitive and self-evident matter (amr badīhī) that is comprehensible to everyone by virtue of its self-evidence, but rather such a conclusion is obtained by joining multiple premises.
The Second Objection
Even if we concede (selّmnā) that these advantages and ontological dignities exist for the human being, this does not necessitate conventional dignity (al-karāmah al-iʿtibāriyyah) and religious ruling. It is possible that God has granted these blessings to the human being, honored him, and these dignities are ontological; however, it does not follow that honoring the human being and protecting him is necessary in Shariah. That is, there is no entailment (mulāzamah) between them.
Response
The response to this objection is that the complete correspondence of legislation (tashrīʿ) to ontology (takwīn) is perhaps not necessary; that is, to say that whatever is in legislation is a reflection of ontology and that they correspond exactly, claiming the necessity of complete harmony between ontology and legislation, is unacceptable. However, one point is worthy of attention, and that is the absence of conflict between ontology and legislation; in the sense that it is impossible for God to make the human being a perfectionist by virtue of his nature, yet legislate rules and laws that prevent his perfection; this is impossible. Some say harmony between ontology and legislation is not necessary, but if what is meant is that there can be a contradiction between them, this statement is definitely unacceptable. It is impossible for God, on the one hand, to grant the human being intellect, yet on the other hand say that you have no right to think and ponder; He cannot create the human being with free will, yet strip him of free will on the other hand. Thus, there must not be conflict, contradiction, and incompatibility between legislation and ontology, even though there might not be complete harmony.
If you say (In qulta): If this is so, then why, for example, has such a heavy ruling been stated in the case of an apostate (murtadd), stating that if anyone turns back from the religion of God, he must be executed?
I say (Qultu): We can answer in this manner:
First: The basis of this heavy ruling regarding apostasy has been subject to objection by some great scholars and requires contemplation. Some believe that the death penalty and the stripping of the right to life relate to an apostasy that took place on the basis of a specific political orientation; meaning, in practice, it was a type of opposition, mockery, and weakening of the matter of religion—just as it was said regarding the famous verse that there were those who would become Muslim in the morning and leave Islam in the evening; this had become a practice, and Islam wanted to confront this.
Second: Even if such a ruling is proven for the apostate, this is a ruling related to after entering Islam; in the sense that it is as if God says: strive to choose the path with open eyes and become a Muslim, for if you enter, turning back from it carries such a punishment.
Question:
Professor: We do not want to resolve, one by one, the rulings that appear conflicting right now; yes, we are certainly faced with doubts here; in jurisprudence, we have rulings that perhaps do not align even with this scope we mentioned, and these must be resolved one by one. For now, we are mentioning a framework for this purpose.
Therefore, it seems that these objections are not valid.
Supporting Evidence
To make this discussion firmer and more acceptable, I shall point to some of the wisdoms behind human dignity and the honoring of non-Muslims, which can also serve as supporting evidence. For instance, considering them to possess these rights leads to the reconciliation of hearts (taʾlīf al-qulūb); it leads to attracting hearts to Islam. This is a very important issue: how you deal with a disbeliever when you encounter him. Attracting disbelievers to Muslims is itself a highly important issue. This issue has also been raised in jurisprudential books, stating that kindness and honoring disbelievers may be preferred (rājiḥ) if it leads to reconciling their hearts toward Islam and creating a desire for it.
Or, this action might lead to Muslims being born from them (an yatawallada minhum al-muslimūn); some of these actions cause their children to emerge from the fold of disbelief and return to the fold of Islam. The statements of the jurists that support this in some manner are not few. The author of al-Jawāhir pointed to this regarding the freeing of a disbeliever slave; when it creates this love that attracts him to Islam, this kindness must take place. The author of al-Jawāhir invoked “for every thirsty liver there is a reward” (لِكُلِّ كَبِدٍ حَرَّى أَجْرٌ) to argue that feeding them is necessary and quenching their thirst is necessary. They have invoked this in many places.
In any case, collectively, it seems that one can prove the dignity of the human being in part, the inherent dignity, through rational proof; naturally, this dignity, which is recognized as inherent and is established for the human being prior to faith, also establishes certain rights for him.
Discussion of the Next Session
In the next session, we shall discuss the domain of dignity, God willing.