Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi in an Interview with Harim-e Imam: The Jurisprudence of Genetically Modified Organisms (Transgenic Jurisprudence)

Genetic engineering is among the new and so-called contemporary issues (al-masa’il al-mustahdathah), and its subjects are expressed with terms that fundamentally have no precedent in jurisprudential language. How can a jurist (faqih) apply a ruling to such subjects?

Generally, contemporary issues (al-masa’il al-mustahdathah) refer to newly emerged and novel matters in any field that have no precedent in jurisprudence; meaning they have not been addressed in past jurisprudential works, nor has any specific mention of them been made in the narrations, and consequently, their Sharia rulings are unknown. This applies whether the subject itself is completely new, such as genetic engineering, banknotes, artificial insemination, and the timeshare purchase of a house, or if the subject existed in the past and its Sharia ruling was declared, but it has changed due to transformations and developments, and the Sharia ruling is demanded in light of these changes, such as certain issues related to blood, mines, and so forth.

Novel issues naturally arise in every era, but the crucial point is that in recent decades, due to the unprecedented and astonishing growth of science and technology, we have witnessed a dramatic expansion of new issues and novel subjects. This increases the necessity of the commitment of the Islamic seminaries, and particularly jurists, to adapt and provide jurisprudential answers to these issues. Fortunately, Shiite jurisprudence possesses the vast capacity to respond to all of these issues, provided that we pay greater attention to empowering ourselves and keeping pace with these developments, which itself requires a detailed discussion on how we can achieve this goal and what preliminaries it requires.

In any case, to respond to contemporary issues, there are certain mechanisms that I will refer to briefly, but before that, it is necessary to emphasize that the method and methodology of independent reasoning (ijtihad) in contemporary issues do not differ significantly from the method applied to classical issues, although due to the lack of precedent, the work in this area is more difficult.

The most critical step to resolve these issues is referring to the sources. If the absolute (* اطلاقات*) and general (عمومات) implications of the evidences are sufficient—meaning that the issue under consideration clearly falls under one of the absolute or general implications—then its ruling, while considering the restricting (muqayyidat) and specifying (mukhassisat) factors, can be easily deduced. Of course, knowing under which absolute or general implication the subject falls is itself important. This, on one hand, depends on understanding the subject and grasping it correctly, and on the other hand, requires comprehensive mastery over the general and absolute implications of the evidences.

Thus, in reality, we need to understand two distinct aspects. On one hand, we must properly understand the new subject (or the old subject under new conditions), and on the other hand, we must acquire a precise and complete knowledge of the subject of the evidence to determine the nature of the relationship between the two. This involves comparing and evaluating the subject under consideration with the subject adopted in the language of the evidence. This is because the lack of a precise understanding of the subject and its dimensions on both sides prevents the jurist from reaching the Sharia ruling.

The famous saying that “the task of the jurist is not subject-identification” (mawdu’-shinasi) applies to some subjects, but not all of them; rather, the work of the jurist is occasionally directed toward instances rather than just general titles. Therefore, regarding contemporary issues that arise around new subjects, this statement may not be acceptable as a general rule.

Of course, in this position, I do not wish to discuss the definition of the subject, the object of the ruling, the different views surrounding them, or the opinions concerning the jurist’s intervention in subject-identification and its limits. However, briefly, I can say that it is necessary for the jurist, on one hand, to master the various dimensions of the subject (even if it is not necessary to enter into it as a specialist), and on the other hand, to pay sufficient attention to the subject in the language of the evidence—for instance, whether the title of the subject is restricted to specific conditions and times, or if the ruling is established absolutely. For example, it is narrated in some traditions:

Al-farqu bayna al-mu’minina wa al-mushrikina al-talahhi bi-al-‘ama’im;
“The difference between the believers and the polytheists is passing the tail of the turban under the chin (talahhi).”

If we interpret this narration like the Akhbaris, such that the ruling applies to the subject absolutely, the result would be that we must always act in this manner. However, if we regard it as directed toward a specific time and conditions, the matter differs. In this case, it can be said that since the polytheists had adopted binding the turban upward as their slogan and symbol, this command was issued to counter that slogan; but now that this slogan and symbol have ceased to exist, no subject remains for the tradition.

Another matter regarding the subjects of contemporary issues is that we must determine whether the subject is completely novel, or if it existed in the past but has been transformed due to certain influences. Sometimes, the essence of the subject changes fundamentally, which is chemical transformation (istihalah), but sometimes some of its outward attributes change. For instance, if an organ is severed from the body, it falls under the ruling of a corpse (mayyit) and is ritually impure (najis); however, if it is transplanted into another body, the attribute of being a corpse is removed, and the ruling of impurity is lifted. Sometimes, the subject undergoes neither istihalah nor a change in its outward attributes, but with the change of conditions and the progress of human knowledge, the manner of its utilization becomes different, and consequently, its ruling also changes.

Paying attention to these changes is highly important. Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified), who introduced the issue of the influence of time and space in ijtihad, had this third type of changes in mind. He states:

“Time and space are two decisive elements in ijtihad. An issue that had a certain ruling in the past may find a new ruling in the relationships governing the politics, society, and economy of a system, even though it appears to be the same issue. This means that by precisely understanding the economic, social, and political relationships, that same primary subject—which outwardly has not changed from the past—has in reality become a new subject, which naturally demands a new ruling. The mujtahid must have mastery over the issues of his time.”

Of course, this point was mentioned with other expressions and in a much more limited manner in the words of past jurists, but none of them addressed it with such scope and precision.

This perspective can offer a highly effective contribution to resolving contemporary issues, and based on this foundation, many questions can be answered. In response to an objection by one of his students regarding the game of chess, Imam Khomeini pointed to a highly critical matter, stating:

“According to your view, the anfal (public resources) which have been made permissible for Shiites means that today they can, without any obstacle, destroy forests with such-and-such heavy machinery, destroy what preserves and maintains the health of the environment, endanger the lives of millions of humans, and no one would have the right to stop them. In short, according to what you have understood from the reports and narrations, modern civilization must be entirely destroyed, and people must live in huts or reside in deserts forever.”

Many examples can be cited in this regard; for instance, the Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him and his progeny) states:

Man ahya ardan mawatan fa-hiya lah;
“Whoever revives a barren land, it shall belong to him.”

If we wish to adopt the outward meaning of this narration, it has no boundaries or limitations. Therefore, according to the outward meaning of the narration, if someone in our era revives vast amounts of land using modern tools and machinery, it must all belong to him. However, considering the elements of time and space, it can be said that this ruling cannot be executed at present, because social order and justice would be endangered. On this basis, it is not far-fetched to suggest that this ruling was issued at a time when humans could only cultivate a limited amount of land, but under new conditions, its ruling has changed.

In any case, referring to the absolute and general implications of the evidences, paying attention to the titles of the subjects of the evidences on one hand, and paying attention to the intended subjects on the other, evaluating their relationship, and particularly scrutinizing the restrictions of the subject of the evidence and the subjects of these issues and their changes, along with the influence of the elements of time and space in deduction, represents a decisive step in deducing Sharia rulings for contemporary issues. For this reason, subject-identification is emphasized, and in a way, ijtihad in contemporary issues is founded upon it.

In addition to what has been said, one can also utilize the criteria of rulings (malakat al-ahkam) and the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah) to determine the practical duties of the legally bound individuals (mukallafin) after despairing of obtaining textual evidence.

The issues of existing jurisprudence are divided into categories such as acts of worship (ibadat), transactions (mu’amalat), judiciary (qada), and politics (siyasat), and the issues of each category are identified by specific criteria. We would like to know under which category the issues of genetic engineering fall. If it belongs to a special category, what is the criterion for identifying its issues?

The division and categorization of jurisprudential issues have been shaped based on the taste and preference of jurists. What is currently common is the categorization performed by Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli in the book Al-Shara’i’, and prior to that, categorization was performed differently.

The first classification in Shiite jurisprudence was conducted by Sallar al-Daylami. He divided jurisprudence into two parts: acts of worship (ibadat) and transactions (mu’amalat), and divided transactions into two categories: contracts (uqud) and rulings (ahkam). Likewise, rulings were divided into penal rulings and other rulings. This classification was later adopted by Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli. He divided the book Al-Shara’i’ into four sections: acts of worship (ibadat), contracts (uqud), unilateral declarations (iqa’at), and rulings (ahkam).

After Al-Muhaqqiq, some jurists (such as Al-Fadil al-Miqdad) presented other classifications, but what is currently common is the categorization of Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, which is presented in 52 chapters. These categorizations are mostly performed based on the discretion of the jurist.

In the contemporary era, the late Martyr Sadr presented a newer classification due to certain considerations. He summarized jurisprudential issues into four general categories: acts of worship (ibadat), financial matters (which include public property and private property, wherein the Sharia means of ownership, entitlement, and the rulings of disposing of this property are explained), personal conduct and etiquette (encompassing family relations and social relations), and finally, public conduct, meaning the behavior of public and governmental institutions.

As mentioned, these classifications depend on the tastes and inclinations of jurists and follow the specific criteria of the jurist. For example, Al-Shahid al-Awwal, in explaining the classification of Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, says: the purpose of a Sharia ruling is either proximity to God and the hereafter, or it is not. If the purpose is the hereafter, it falls under the category of acts of worship; and if the purpose is otherwise, then if it does not require verbal expression, it is placed under rulings, and if it requires verbal expression, namely a formula (sighah), it falls within the domain of contracts and unilateral declarations.

Therefore, considering the points mentioned, if we wish to introduce a change in this classification, not only is there no obstacle, but in light of novel issues, it is necessary. Indeed, new chapters have emerged in jurisprudence and gained renown as “applied jurisprudence” (al-fiqh al-mudaf), such as the jurisprudence of management, the jurisprudence of media, the jurisprudence of medicine, the jurisprudence of culture, political jurisprudence, and so forth.

On this basis, in my view, an independent chapter should be opened for this domain under the title “The Jurisprudence of Biotechnology” or “The Jurisprudence of Bioengineering.” This is one of the applied fields of jurisprudence about which more efforts must be made. The extensiveness of the issues related to it, combined with the pressing need to discover the Sharia rulings of the subjects associated with this field, and its broad application in various domains, has provided the capacity to designate it as an independent chapter.

Naturally, if we do so, genetic engineering, which is in reality modern biotechnology, can be examined within this chapter. The groundwork for this issue is also largely prepared. Both the Supreme Leader has seriously emphasized the applied fields of jurisprudence, and this movement has begun within the seminary itself.

One of the highly critical issues in genetic engineering is the preservation of identity. On one hand, opponents sometimes express that through genetic engineering, the resulting new identity is distinct from and contrastive with the previous identity. On the other hand, genetic engineers—especially of transgenic products—assert that the identity of the transgenic product is identical to that of the parent. Clearly, a change in identity can affect the Sharia ruling of the genetic product. We would like to know your opinion regarding the criterion for preserving identity in plants, animals, and humans.

Your question is brief. If the purpose is to raise an objection regarding genetic engineering—in the sense that because genetic engineering causes the products obtained through this path to acquire a new and novel identity, this work is therefore prohibited—this objection is open to reflection both in its minor premise (sughra) and major premise (kubra).

That it is open to reflection in its minor premise is clear from what you quoted on behalf of the specialists in this field, because they deny such a thing. The very fact that the acquisition of a new identity is a subject of disagreement is sufficient. Furthermore, the criterion and reference in these matters is common understanding (urf). One must see whether, when these products are presented to the urf, they recognize them with the same previous identity or with a new identity.

I do not think that, at least in the cases realized so far, the urf attributes a new identity to these products. For example, transgenic corn, from the perspective of the urf, is still corn, but with some differences; thus, they do not differ in kind. Currently, in the case of oilseeds, rice, wheat, and fruits, we have several types of products, yet all of them preserve their original title. Have the products obtained so far through plant breeding changed their identity?! The same applies to animals. Has breed improvement, which has been carried out for many years regarding certain animals like cattle, caused a change of title?! In this method, a specific breed is produced and propagated, but its identity, in the sense of the conventional truth of the title, remains intact.

From the perspective of the major premise, if we say these products acquire a new identity, no problem arises. What is the objection if a product, through manipulation of its genes, is transformed into another product and acquires a new identity?! Therefore, no obstacle is created from the perspective of the major premise either.

What has been said related to plants and animals; regarding humans, however, the case is different. What programs genetic engineering has for humans and what process it will undergo will become known in the future. For example, if through manipulating human genes, they make him resistant to certain diseases, increase his physical and mental capabilities, or repair a damaged organ, such a thing does not cause a change in the human being.

If, for instance, a mother during pregnancy maintains a highly calculated diet and special care is taken, this can lead to the physical and mental strengthening of the child, and conversely, if negligence occurs in these matters, it may result in the physical and mental weakness of the child; yet under any circumstance, it does not cause a change of identity. In the debate of genetic engineering, a similar matter flows; meaning that in terms of human identity, no change is created in manipulations of this kind. Only in certain scenarios and according to certain possibilities in human genetic engineering can this issue be considered, and that is from the aspect of the consequences of certain effects, such as matters resulting from the lineage of a person to their father and mother. In any case, this issue requires a detailed discussion.

What is the standing of respect for animals—or more broadly, respect for living organisms—in the jurisprudential system? Are genetic engineering or the associated experiments conducted upon them contrary to the respect for animals or living organisms?

Generally, in the cognitive system of religion, since all beings are creations of God, each possesses respect according to its proportion, particularly beings that possess an animal or plant soul; and therefore, rights have been declared for them. In the narrations, rulings and rights have been mentioned concerning animals that are remarkable in their kind; among which is that regarding animals, the issue of maintenance (nafaqah) is raised, which is the responsibility of the owner, and should he refuse to provide water and food to his animal, the Islamic ruler can compel him to sell, slaughter, or feed the animal.

Or, for example, the fatness of an animal is considered a sign of the chivalry (muru’ah) of its owner. Likewise, if someone has a small amount of water for ablution and at the same time an animal is thirsty, he must give that water to the animal and perform dry ablution (tayammum). Instances of this kind have been transmitted regarding observing the state of the animal in working it, or utilizing it during its old age, which I am not currently explaining.

Regarding plants and trees, similar matters have been expressed. In the verses of the Quran, the prostration of trees is mentioned (although their prostration is in a specific sense), and in the narrations, specific recommendations have been made regarding the cutting of trees and plants.

In any case, from the sum of these matters, it is understood that living organisms, in the general sense, possess respect appropriate to themselves and enjoy certain rights. However, to say that genetic engineering and the associated experiments are contrary to the mentioned respect is unacceptable. Is grafting and hybridization, which are highly common and have been customary since ancient times, contrary to the respect for plants and trees?! Plant breeding or breed improvement in animals like horses and cattle, which is prevalent everywhere and even among Muslims and the religious, is it contrary to respect? Certainly not. The boundaries and limits of respect and rights declared in the Sharia for these beings are completely clear, and the mentioned cases do not conflict with any of them.

The same applies to genetic engineering. If, for example, a plant’s gene is manipulated so that it acquires greater resistance, or an animal’s gene is manipulated to prevent its extinction, nothing has been done contrary to the respect and rights of that plant or animal; rather, on the contrary, this can even be a form of respect.

One of the teachings to which opponents of genetic engineering resort is the issue of the perfect system of creation (al-nizam al-ahsan), the perfection of nature, the intelligence of nature, and the like. Is genetic engineering incompatible with this concept and considered an interference in creation?

To answer the question, I will point to two preliminary notes.

The first note is that the perfect system (al-nizam al-ahsan) regarding material things differs from immaterial things, and it means that every material being can reach its best possible state; in other words, the meaning of the perfect system is not that all material beings are created in their best state, but rather that they possess the capacity to reach their best possible state. On this basis, any effort humanity exerts in the world of nature can be interpreted in this direction. Possibilities in the material world possess this potential (quwwah), and the older the material world becomes, the more potentials reach actuality (fi’liyyah).

Certainly, a portion of this change and transformation—meaning the actualization of potentials—occurs at the hands of humanity. For this reason, you see what immense transformations have occurred in human life from the time man set foot on this earthly world until today. All this change and transformation has been carried out with human thought and intellect and through what was placed at his disposal in the system of existence. Therefore, it can be said that all human inventions and products have been realized within this very perfect system, and no one can say that humanity should sit idly by and make no disposal in nature because this system is the perfect system, and the affairs of intelligent nature proceed according to the requirement of its creation!

The second note is that genetic engineering, which is not more than a few decades old, is in truth a branch of biotechnology. The age of biotechnology is actually very long and has had extensive traditional applications. From the preparation of bread, yogurt, and cheese to the discovery of alcohol, the discovery of insulin for treating diabetes, and the discovery of penicillin as an antibiotic, all have been obtained through biotechnology.

However, in modern biotechnology, which is known as genetic engineering, this work is carried out by manipulating genes, transferring them from one living organism to another, and activating them. For this reason, we see that the capacity to utilize this technology has increased dramatically, and in fact, it can be considered a turning point in human life.

Now, considering the first note, if someone transfers the gene of one living organism to another, have they interfered in the act of creation and questioned the perfect system of creation, or have they actualized a potential and disposed of creations?! Disposing of creations is not creation.

Furthermore, setting aside other objections and specific issues raised regarding genetic engineering, and considering the second note, according to this view, biotechnology in its broad sense must also be incompatible with the perfect system of creation, whereas the opponents of genetic engineering do not raise this objection in other branches of biotechnology. If this work is to be incompatible with the perfect system of creation and considered an interference in creation, then all that humanity has achieved over these years—whether in the microbial branch, the medical branch, the environmental and marine branch, agriculture, or at the molecular level—must be deemed an interference in the act of creation and incompatible with the perfect system of creation; because in this regard, there is no difference between other branches and genetic engineering.

Therefore, it appears that the aforementioned claim has no foundation. Of course, this objection, like the previous one, has an ideological and ethical origin rather than a jurisprudential and legal one, and has been raised mostly among some Christian theologians and some Sunni scholars.

Yes, regarding human cloning, as I have said before, the matter is different. Human cloning is performed through various methods and must be examined from various ethical, social, psychological, theological, and jurisprudential dimensions.

Another objection of opponents is that living organisms are considered inseparable components of the natural environment that interact codependently and reciprocally, which establishes a type of balance in nature. Conversely, genetic engineering causes disruption in this balance; in other words, releasing genetically modified living organisms into the environment can alter the population structure of living organisms in the wild and harm biodiversity, and such a thing is unacceptable.

This objection also addresses bioethical considerations rather than being a jurisprudential and legal objection. The principle that living organisms in the world of nature interact codependently and reciprocally is accepted in part (fi al-jumlah), but it is important to note that within nature itself, these changes have occurred in different times and periods, and indeed, organisms have become completely extinct, and new species have been formed. Therefore, these changes occur inevitably.

If the problem is that we must allow nature itself to be responsible for these changes rather than intervening in it, then we must generally prohibit any disposal in nature, from extracting mines and utilizing oceans to utilizing underground water and constructing dams; because according to this view, all of these actions can cause disruption in the balance of the environment, whereas the proponents of this view cannot commit to that.

What is important is that any disposal and utilization of nature must be carried out with care and compliance with the principles, rules, laws, and regulations accepted by experts, and potential damages to the environment must be minimized.

According to some opponents, the sale of transgenic products obtained through genetic engineering is associated with a type of deception (tadlis), since these products are non-natural and differ from natural products. For example, if transgenic rice enters the market, no one can distinguish it, and people purchase it assuming it is natural rice, which constitutes deception. What is your opinion in this regard?

First of all, considering transgenic products as non-natural is itself the primary subject of discussion; because transgenic food and agricultural products are not produced in laboratories, but rather, like other products, are produced in nature, albeit through a specific process previously carried out in the laboratory. Therefore, the core application of “non-natural product” to these products is open to reflection; because we cannot say that whatever human beings interfere in producing and creating is non-natural, but this depends on the type of human intervention and disposal and the place of formation and emergence of that product.

Furthermore, regardless of whether the mentioned products are natural or not, it is undeniable that transgenic products and others possess differences. It is possible that if someone knows, for instance, that the rice they are purchasing is transgenic, they would not purchase it. On this basis, it must be declared to the buyer so that the issue of deception (tadlis) does not arise, and such a thing is resolvable; as it is apparently predicted in international and domestic laws and regulations that transgenic products must be labeled.

If this law is complied with, there will be no problem. Deception (tadlis) is realized if this obligation is violated, in which case its consequences and effects are predicted in jurisprudence and the law. Of course, laws and regulations may possess defects that must be completed.

One of the objections of opponents of genetic engineering is that manipulating genes—especially in foodstuffs and agricultural products—may entail future harms, representing a threat that could confront humanity with numerous hazards. Given the probability of future harm, and by relying on the principle of the necessity of repelling potential harm (wujub daf’ al-darar al-muhtamal), can we prevent it and rule on its impermissibility? If possible, please also explain the content of this principle.

I will first offer a brief overview of the principle of the necessity of repelling potential harm, and then respond to your question. This principle is among those to which reference has been made in theology, the principles of jurisprudence, and jurisprudence; for instance, in some issues of theology, including the necessity of knowing God, the necessity of belief in the hereafter, and the necessity of appointing and following an Infallible Imam, reference has been made to it.

In the principles of jurisprudence, it has been resorted to in issues such as the authority of absolute probability (zann) and the necessity of precaution (ihtiyat) in doubts accompanied by systematic knowledge (ilm al-ijmali).

The Akhbaris, relying on this very principle, ruled on the necessity of precaution in doubts regarding prohibition (al-shubuhat al-tahrimiyyah), whereas the Usulis made the principle of the rational ugliness of punishment without prior declaration (qubh al-iqab bila bayan) their evidence and ruled on exemption (bara’ah).

In jurisprudence, reference has also been made to this principle in cases such as the necessity of imitation (taqlid) or precaution for a non-mujtahid, and also precaution in imitating the most knowledgeable (a’lam) mujtahid.

With all of this, the principle of the necessity of repelling potential harm is a subject of disagreement from several aspects: first, is this a rational, conventional, or innate and natural ruling? Second, is absolute harm intended, or specifically otherworldly harm, namely punishment? A large group of Usulis believe that what is intended by harm, or its definite core, is otherworldly harm or punishment, and there is no evidence for the necessity of repelling definite worldly harm, let alone potential worldly harm. In contrast, some believe that repelling worldly harm in significant matters—which the Lawgiver has paid attention to observing precaution within—is obligatory, otherwise it is not.

In my view, committing worldly harm, if based on a rational motive (da’i uqalayi), is unobjectionable, even if that harm is definite; whether the rational motive is to prevent a more important harm, to acquire a necessary benefit, or fundamentally neither of these, but simply a justifiable rational motive. For example, if someone, to defend their belief, honor, and homeland, endangers their life and participates in jihad and war, despite having certainty of worldly harm to their life and property, their action cannot be condemned or considered an instance of oppression, and the rational people do not blame or criticize such a person.

After mentioning this introduction, I address the subject under question. Regarding genetic engineering and transgenic products, the most important objection raised is precisely what you pointed to; namely, the concerns regarding the future and the potential harm that might result from using these products.

Considering what has been discussed, one cannot rely on potential future harms to prevent activity in this field and prohibit their trade and sale; because this work is carried out for significant and important rational motives. What is said in justification and defense of genetic engineering and activity in this field involves critical matters that cannot be easily dismissed.

For example, in the field of agriculture and food products, this program can be a key solution for the ever-increasing demand for food in the world. Considering the shortage of water resources, pastures, forests, climate changes, and the salinization of lands, we will certainly face difficulties in the future in securing food for the growing world population. Now, if a program is executed that helps increase the quantity and quality of these products, raises production efficiency, possesses the capability of production under difficult climatic conditions, and concurrently limits the application of pesticides and chemical materials and increases resistance to plant pests and diseases, are these not sufficient for us to proceed with it despite potential harms?

That committing potential worldly harm in the presence of an important rational motive is neither rationally ugly nor condemned by rational people is fully applicable to genetic engineering.

Those who, relying on the necessity of repelling potential worldly harm, do not consider the production of transgenic products permissible, must, by virtue of this very principle, also prohibit the use of chemical pesticides in agricultural products and consider the sale of these products problematic; because there is no doubt that many products in whose production process agricultural pesticides are used entail potential, and indeed definite, harms.

Regarding some chemical medicines used for treatment, the same objection exists. Or, for example, regarding the waves of mobile phones and satellites scattered in space, some believe that these lead to the occurrence of problems such as infertility, cancer, miscarriage, and so forth. On this basis, all of these must be deemed problematic.

Yes, there is only one point, and that is that genetic engineering is at its beginning, and naturally, as time passes, it will become more complete and its defects will be resolved gradually. The utilization of many human inventions in the general sense was associated with problems and harms at the beginning that had not been predicted, but gradually, and after facing the complications resulting from them, they sought to resolve those problems and harms.

Let me present a simple example. Compare the airplanes that were newly invented with contemporary airplanes. Casualties resulting from the average airplane in the beginning (considering the small number of users and airplanes) are not comparable to casualties resulting from airplane crashes today (considering the high volume of passengers and airplanes). The further we proceed, its defects have decreased and safety has increased. This also applies to medicines. If you compare the side effects of using any new medicine in the beginning and today, you will fully confirm that over time, these products have become more complete and their side effects have decreased. Many instances of this kind can be cited. The same applies to genetic engineering.

It is necessary to point to this note as well, that strict laws regarding the safety of these products have been enacted both at the international and domestic levels, which must be completed, and precise supervision must be exercised over compliance with safety principles to minimize potential harms, and the liability arising from these harms and damages must be clearly and obviously specified.

If there is a conflict among expert opinions, and some reject genetic engineering outright while others support it, what should be done? Is there a solution in this case?

Generally, differences of opinion exist in all issues. In issues related to life with which the world is currently engaged, differing opinions are expressed. For example, regarding dam construction, some believe that this work creates environmental problems and disrupts the ecosystem. Conversely, a large group rejects this claim and is engaged in constructing dams everywhere.

Or, for example, regarding the use of palm oil or saturated oils, and even regarding dairy produced in factories and milk packaged in specific containers with long shelf-life capabilities, these differences of opinion exist. Even regarding a surgical operation, there is often a difference of opinion among physicians and doctors.

Obviously, in these cases, expert discussions must be conducted, and a collective of the most outstanding experts and specialists must discuss the subject, reach a conclusion, and act. One cannot expect everyone to agree on an issue and for there to be no opponent. Naturally, in the meantime, proofs, documentations, the scientific and empirical credibility of the experts, and even the experience of other countries can be decisive.

As the final question, some believe that certain American and Israeli corporations are behind this program, pursuing specific agendas by promoting transgenic products, and the target group of these corporations is third-world and Muslim countries. What is your view?

If this matter is proven, it will then acquire a secondary title (al-‘unwan al-thanawi), and due to the occurrence of the secondary title, its ruling will change.

However, considering the extensiveness of activity in the field of genetic engineering, the objectives declared by the scientists of this field, and the acceptable effects experienced at least in parts of modern biotechnology, it appears unlikely that the invention of this technology was carried out solely with these objectives.

Furthermore, these products are cultivated on a large scale in some developed countries, particularly the United States and Canada. Of course, I do not deny the issue of the profit-seeking of these corporations; indeed, multinational corporations in any commercial subject think of profit-seeking and pursue their sinister agendas, and we must be vigilant.

However, the question is whether the foundation of genetic engineering and transgenic products was established upon these agendas and its invention was for this purpose or not? I do not think that this science and technology was invented solely with these objectives.

Of course, it is possible that subsequently, this same technology is placed in the service of the filthy goals of imperialist powers, and in some areas they perform illegitimate acts and cause damage to humanity, just as this has occurred in other technologies.

Many destructive weapons currently produced were obtained in the light of a science and technology whose foundation and nature were not destruction, warmongering, and slaughter, but the abuse of it led to these detrimental results. Regarding genetic engineering, the matter is the same.