Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi in an Exclusive Interview with Fiqh-e Honar: In Current Conditions, It Cannot Be Said That Music Is Absolutely Forbidden

President of the Research Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudence in an Exclusive Interview with Fiqh-e Honar: In Current Conditions, It Cannot Be Said That Music Is Absolutely Forbidden

Today, one can convey ethical, human, and spiritual concepts through musical instruments or singing that is far from corruption and frivolity. For example, music used in wars to boost the morale of fighters, military marches, or the drums and cymbals used in Ta’ziyeh ceremonies not only lack corrupting concomitants, but also serve a positive function. Therefore, under current conditions, it cannot be said that music is absolutely forbidden; at the very least, deeming non-enrapturing (ghayr-e mutrib) music forbidden requires proof.

Editor’s Note: The discussion on the jurisprudential ruling of music seemingly never becomes outdated. It can perhaps be said that for centuries, music has posed a significant challenge to the science of jurisprudence, and each time, numerous questions regarding its dimensions confront jurists. The views of jurists concerning the ruling on music throughout the history of jurisprudence have naturally varied. However, in recent years, music has expanded further, becoming almost an integral part of modern human life, and more lenient or different views have been expressed by some jurists regarding its ruling. We brought the examination of the jurisprudential ruling on ghina and music to discussion with Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi, President of the Research Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudence. This professor of Advanced Jurisprudence (Dars-e Kharij-e Fiqh) and Principles (Usul) at the Islamic Seminary of Qom believes that under current conditions, ruling the absolute prohibition of music is impossible, or at least there is no proof for the prohibition of non-frivolous (ghayr-e lahwi) music. In this interview, he detailed the dimensions and history of the jurisprudence of music and ghina thoroughly and meticulously. The full text of the exclusive interview of Fiqh-e Honar with the President of the Research Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudence follows below:

Fiqh-e Honar: What is the precise definition of music? What is the difference between music and ghina?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: Music, in reality, is a composition of sounds and silences originating from specific instruments and tools. This is the specific meaning of music. This composition of sound and silence may also occur due to certain phenomena in the natural world—such as the sound of rain, birds, the sound produced by water hitting rocks, waterfalls, and so forth. In any case, what is intended in the discussion of music is music in its specific sense—namely, the composition of sound and silence produced by musical instruments and tools, not sounds resulting from natural phenomena.

Ghina, in reality, is the composition, modulation (tarji’), and prolongation (madd) of voice, or a state of sound produced by a human being; it does not originate from specific instruments, but is produced directly by a human being via a body part. Therefore, the important and essential difference between music and ghina is that music depends on and relies upon instruments, whereas ghina does not rely on instruments, but is the modulated human voice. Of course, among experts, there is disagreement regarding the definitions of music and ghina, and we do not possess a single, universally agreed-upon definition of music and ghina. However, briefly, it can be stated that in music, external instruments and tools annexed to human action are a condition, whereas in ghina, it is not so. Ibn Khaldun writes in the introduction (Muqaddimah) to his history: “This craft consists of setting rhythmic poetry to melody by modulating sounds according to known, orderly proportions.”

Thus, it becomes clear that music and ghina are distinct from each other. Jurists usually raise the discussion of music in Al-Makasib al-Mahramah (Forbidden Gainful Endeavors) under the discussion of instruments of diversion (alat al-lahw), malahi, and their transaction. Of course, in the Book of Testimony (Kitab al-Shahadat) as well, on the occasion of discussing justice (‘adalat), the use of instruments of diversion is raised as a factor compromising justice; for example, the late Ayatullah Golpayegani raised this discussion in Kitab al-Shahadat. Ghina also has an independent heading in Al-Makasib al-Mahramah, where the late Sheikh [Ansari] and others discussed it.

Regarding ghina from a jurisprudential perspective, jurists discuss it in two stages: first, what is the definition of ghina? And second, which type of ghina is forbidden? It is not the case that whatever falls under the application of ghina is considered forbidden by all jurists. In the first stage, the majority of jurists (mashhur) consider ghina to be the modulation of voice (tarji’ al-sawt). Some include the condition of “frivolous” (lahwi) in the definition itself. In the second stage, they discuss what type of ghina is forbidden: Is every type of ghina forbidden, or is only frivolous ghina forbidden, or that ghina which is rapture-inducing (mutrib), or must it be accompanied by other characteristics, such as false/inappropriate content or other concomitants (muqarinat) that might exist in a gathering of ghina?

The late ‘Allamah al-Hilli states in Tahrir regarding ghina: “Ghina is forbidden, and it is the prolongation of the voice comprising rapture-inducing modulation (tarji’); its perpetrator becomes a sinner (fasiq) and his testimony is rejected, whether it is in poetry or the Quran, and likewise for its listener.” He considers ghina to be the prolongation of the voice incorporating rapture-inducing modulation, the practitioner of which becomes a sinner and whose testimony is rejected, regardless of whether it is in poetry or the Quran. He explicitly noted that ghina is also forbidden for the listener. Regarding music, after listing certain instruments of diversion, he states: “And whatever is besides that among all instruments of diversion is forbidden; its practitioner and its listener become sinners.” He considered playing these instruments forbidden and deemed both the performer and the listener sinners.

What is surprising is that Sheikh Tusi in Al-Khilaf defined ghina in a way that includes music as well: “Ghina is forbidden, whether it is the voice of the singer or played on reeds and strings, such as lutes, tanburs, etc.”

In this phrase of Sheikh [Tusi], the use of musical instruments and listening to them is considered absolutely forbidden. It is worth noting that early jurists (qudama) considered music absolutely forbidden and made a distinction between it and ghina; that is, some jurists, regarding ghina, mentioned the qualification of being frivolous (lahwi) and rapture-inducing (mutrib), but considered musical instruments absolutely forbidden. The reason for this is that the proofs for the prohibition of instruments of diversion are of two categories: in some narrations, the instruments themselves—such as the tar, tanbur, flute (mizmar), etc.—are made the subject absolutely, such as “I forbid you from dancing and the flute”; while in other narrations, the title of being “frivolous” (lahwi) is emphasized, such as the expression “engaging in malahi” or “malahi that distract from the remembrance of Allah”, from which the frivolous aspect of the musical instrument and the prohibition of this type of usage can be derived.

Nevertheless, many jurists, from early times until recently, believed that the instruments themselves possess subject-validity (mawdu’iyyah) and are absolutely forbidden. However, many late jurists (muta’akhirin) reconciled these two categories of narrations such that the prohibition of musical instruments applies in the event of their being frivolous (lahwi). To reconcile these two sets of narrations, some stated that absolute narrations are qualified (muqayyad) by other narrations. From certain narrations, it is derived that among these instruments, that to which the title “from which pure corruption arises” applies is forbidden, whereas non-frivolous and corruption-free instruments are not forbidden. His Eminence Ayatullah Khamenei adopted this solution for reconciling the narrations in his discussion on ghina. The late Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi raised the issue of contextual inclination (insiraf), asserting that the narrations incline contextually toward frivolous and rapture-inducing music. Another solution proposed by some is that basically none of the narrations are absolute, and contextual/verbal indicators exist showing that narrations naming instruments also expressed prohibition under the assumption of frivolous use.

Another solution is that although these narrations are numerous, some suffer from weakness in chain of transmission (sand) and some in signification (dalalah), and the definite minimum (qadr-e mutayaqqan) derived from them is frivolous music. Muhaqqiq al-Naraqi explicitly states: “And the weakness of these reports, all or some, is not harmful because it is compensated by the aforementioned fatwas of the companions and reports of lack of dispute and consensus.” That is, he accepts the weakness of the narrations and seeks to solve the issue through consensus (ijma’), the practice of the majority, and so forth.

Therefore, most contemporary jurists deem frivolous music suited for gatherings of sinful amusement and entertainment (majalis-e lahw va la’ib) to be forbidden, while considering non-frivolous music permissible. Of course, some contemporary jurists, such as the late Ayatullah Golpayegani and the late Ayatullah Saafi Golpayegani, considered music absolutely forbidden; hence, the late Golpayegani stated: “Everything to which the title of music conventionally applies is forbidden.”

Regarding instruments of diversion, jurists have two discussions: one is the discussion of instruments exclusively designated for forbidden diversion (lahw-e haram), and the other is shared instruments (alat-e mushtarakah) that have both permissible and forbidden uses. Regarding shared instruments, a general discussion exists that once we hold these instruments possess permissible uses, their use and transaction for the purpose of permissible benefit poses no problem.

In any case, there is no doubt regarding the principle of partial prohibition (hurmat-e fi al-jumlah) of certain types of music—expressed as the use of malahi and instruments of diversion—and many jurists have claimed consensus (ijma’), with some like Ayatullah Khoei claiming self-evidence (dharurat). However, regarding non-frivolous music that is not rapture-inducing (mutrib), Ayatullah Khoei himself held the view of permissibility.

Here, a very important and disputed discussion lies in the interpretation of “frivolous” (lahw). Among jurists, there is no single definition of frivolous music. For instance, contemporary jurists generally mention the expression “suited for gatherings of sinful amusement and entertainment,” which is truly not clear. Other criteria have also been expressed in the words of jurists: for example, Ayatullah Khoei considers one criterion for diagnosing frivolity to be whether it is provocative and arousing of lust (muthir-e shahwat). Some consider the criterion to be the state of dancing—that if it creates a state of dancing in ordinary people, it is frivolous and rapture-inducing. Some go further, considering frivolity to be to such an extent that a person involuntarily loses self-control and a state similar to intoxication develops in him. Indeed, certain types of music are like this. Martyr Motahhari, in one of his books, quotes from newspapers of that time that a man divorced his wife; when asked for the reason, he said his wife lost self-control in a gathering and committed unconventional and ugly acts. When I asked her why she did so, she said that when the music played, she lost self-control and became completely deprived of willpower, performing those movements.

Martyr Beheshti has a good discussion regarding music. He states: The forbidden music is that which invites human beings to sin and sedition and causes recklessness and loss of control in committing sins. He also emphasizes lust-arousal. Now, these corruptions may exist in the tune or in the content of the singer’s words, according to which it can also be forbidden.

Fiqh-e Honar: From the exception of instances such as weddings, etc., from the prohibition of music, can it be concluded that music, in and of itself, is not the subject of prohibition, and that other matters—such as misleading poetry, committing sins in music gatherings, etc.—have caused the ruling of its prohibition?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: In order to speak about the permissibility (hilliyyah) and prohibition (hurmat) of music and ghina, we should not rely solely on a single proof, especially one introduced by way of exception. A distinction must also be made between ghina and music, because typically they have different proofs and even different exceptions, and both cannot be lumped together. Regarding the very exception you mentioned, a debate exists. Many jurists throughout the history of jurisprudence, from Sheikh Tusi to ‘Allamah al-Hilli and contemporary jurists like Imam Khomeini and Ayatullah Khoei, accepted this exception and saw no concomitant connection (mulazamah) between this exception and the non-prohibition of ghina per se. However, some jurists believe that by observing the narrations, we realize that in reality these are not exceptions, but are in the position of explaining the criterion (malak) of prohibition. In two narrations related to weddings, an expression similar to this is recorded: “The one that conducts wedding processions poses no problem, and it is not that upon which men enter.”

It is not far-fetched to derive from this narration that at least these narrations, which are qualified by the annexation of certain matters, do not look at ghina per se, but explicitly have in mind the mixing of men and women in the gathering of ghina, considering wedding ghina performed among women permissible.

In any case, if we wish to discuss the permissibility and prohibition of ghina and music, it is better to evaluate the proofs in a complete set. There are verses of the Quran that have been interpreted as ghina. There is also a large collection of narrations, some absolute (mutlaq) and some qualified (muqayyad). The proof of intellect (dalil-e ‘aql) has also been considered by some jurists. With these proofs existing, one cannot draw a general conclusion based on a specific instance of exception; rather, this discussion requires a more comprehensive examination.

Briefly let me state that regarding ghina and music, taking into account the totality of proofs, it can be said that the Shari’ah has specified several general red lines, to which the negative view of the sacred law mostly pertains:

First, the type of singing or music must not be such that it removes a human being from a normal state, causing abnormal behaviors to manifest from him. Some scholars have viewed this issue from a rational aspect, holding that intellect fundamentally deems such a thing repugnant (qabih). The author of Miftah al-Karamah cites intellect regarding the prohibition of ghina, although he was objected to by the author of Jawahir. The late Ayatullah Boroujerdi, in the discussion of frivolous travel (safar-e lahwi), makes a reference to the discussion of music. He states: “For that which is forbidden among diversion is that which causes the removal of man from his natural state such that a state of intoxication arises for him, with which no governance or dominion remains for intellect—like musical melodies that remove one who uses them from rational standards and make him deprived of willpower in his movements and stillnesses, moving and humming according to its tunes even if he is among the most rational and steadfast of people.” He believed that frivolous behavior is forbidden if it removes man from his natural state and induces a state resembling intoxication that compromises intellect. The late Ayatullah Masjed-Shahi Isfahani (author of Waqā’i’ al-Adhhan and teacher of Imam Khomeini) also pointed to this matter. In a treatise he wrote on ghina, he states: The rapture (tarab) forbidden in ghina is a state resembling intoxication (sukr) that seemingly causes the cessation of intellect. There is no doubt that such a state, in addition to sacred law, is rejected rationally as well. The late Ayatullah Muhammad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita’ also stated in response to an inquiry: Ghina is forbidden if it disrupts rational equilibrium in man.

His Eminence Ayatullah Shubairi Zanjani regarding music considers rapture-inducing music forbidden, explaining as follows: “The criterion for being rapture-inducing is that a music usually causes lightness of intellect and departure from the state of equilibrium.” This is the first red line, which relates to the frivolous and rapture-inducing quality of the sound and music itself. Of course, this discussion is raised in jurisprudence that not every frivolous act is forbidden, and frivolity with specific characteristics is forbidden. Sheikh Ansari explicitly notes that certain types of diversion, such as games, entertainment, or non-rational actions, are not forbidden.

Second, the content presented in the form of singing or music must not be false, corrupting, or misleading content. Certain verses of the Quran, such as “and avoid false speech” [Quran 22:30] and verse 6 of Surah Luqman, which states: “And of the people is he who buys frivolous speech (lahw al-hadith) to mislead [others] from the way of Allah without knowledge and takes it in ridicule. Those will have a humiliating punishment” [Quran 31:6]—which have been interpreted as ghina—are mostly observant of contrary content. For just as the qualifications in narrations impact the understanding of a verse, the qualifications present in verses are effective in understanding narrations. The expression “lahw al-hadith” or “qawl al-zur” (false speech) mostly pertains to false content.

The third red line is the motive and objective behind playing, singing, or listening to ghina and music: if it is with the motive of misleading (idhlal), even if its text poses no problem, it is forbidden. In certain narrations, it is recorded that during the time of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH), a group promoted stories and fables with the motive of turning people away from around the Prophet (PBUH). Verse 6 of Surah Luqman, interpreted as ghina, shares this occasion of revelation (sha’n-e nuzul). Ghina, if done with the motive of misleading, falls under the verse “to mislead from the way of Allah”. In reality, narrations applying “lahw al-hadith” to ghina express an instance (misdaq), rather than confining the verse. That instance becomes an instance of the verse provided that the qualifications present in the verse exist in it—qualifications such as being frivolous, intending misguidance, and ridicule. One cannot ignore all these qualifications and, owing to the absolute scope of narrations beneath the verse, rule the absolute prohibition of ghina and nullify the qualifications of the verse.

A point was also stated by the erudite jurist, the late Ayatullah Sayyid Ahmad Khwansari, that this verse does not pertain to the passive hearer (sami’) or active listener (mustami’) of ghina, but pertains to the singer (mughanni) and expresses humiliating punishment regarding him. This statement means that the producer of ghina, with the qualification that the content of his ghina is frivolous and false and his motive is misleading, is intended by the verse. The late Ayatullah Haj Sheikh Abdul-Karim Ha’eri also, relying on the expression “misleading” (idhlal), states that misleading fundamentally makes no sense regarding the listener; it is the presenter regarding whom misleading carries meaning.

It is very important that in narrations concerning the prohibition of ghina, a distinction be made as to which narrations relate to the singer and which relate to the listener. Some jurists who counted ghina among major sins (kaba’ir) pointed to the promise of punishment in this verse; whereas, assuming the signification of the verse, it ultimately signifies being a major sin regarding the singer, and to prove prohibition regarding the listener, reference must be made to other narrations in which the criterion of a major sin might not exist.

The fourth red line is that in certain instances, the singing, sound, content, and even motive themselves pose no problem; however, in terms of the concomitants (muqarinat) and peripheral factors that exist in a gathering of ghina, it is censured and forbidden. From certain narrations, this matter is derived, and some jurists—such as Muhaqqiq Sabzawari and Faydh Kashani—in discussing the prohibition of ghina, place their main reliance on these very concomitants, such as the mixing of men and women, drinking wine, dancing, and other un-Islamic acts. Now, we do not wish to say all narrations observe such a condition; but at least in a portion of narrations related to ghina, indications of this matter are seen. For instance, in the narration of Abi Basir in response to a question regarding the earning of female singers, it states: “That upon which men enter is forbidden.” This narration pertains to a mixed gathering of ghina. Some of these narrations fundamentally pertain to a man listening to a woman’s singing. Regarding instruments of diversion and the discussion of music as well, this point is derivable from certain narrations; for example, in the reliable report (muwaththaqah) of Ishaq ibn Jarir, it states “men entered upon it”, which refers to the presence of unrelated men (biganah) and the mixing of men and women.

Paying attention to the context of issuance (fadha-ye sudur) of narrations recorded regarding ghina is also very important. For example, one must see in what atmosphere Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him)—from whom the majority of narrations on ghina originate—was responding to questions about ghina. What type of ghina were the questions about, to which the Imam naturally responded accordingly? From certain historical texts, such as the Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun—which has a detailed discussion on ghina in the Jahiliyyah era and after Islam—and also from the book Al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-‘Arab Qabl al-Islam, the valuable work of Jawad ‘Ali, it is derived that ghina and music among Jahiliyyah Arabs did not enjoy prevalence as an art and profession; hence, in the Prophet’s narrations, we see little trace regarding ghina. However, among Persians and Romans, it prevailed as an art backed by scientific foundations, creating artistic works. After the Islamic conquests occurred and Muslims became acquainted with ghina and music that had a professional precedent in Persia, caliphs and rulers toward the end of the Umayyad state and subsequently the Abbasids used musical instruments and ghina in their gatherings of pleasure and drinking, driving it toward absolute frivolity and corruption. The majority of singers were women and non-Arab slave girls, and these gatherings were accompanied by drinking intoxicants, dancing, etc. In such an atmosphere, from Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him) onward, we see the intensely negative stance of the Imams (peace be upon them) toward ghina, because in that setting, ghina was an instrument of sinfulness and debauchery (fisq va fujur).

It is good to point out a note that the late Imam [Khomeini] expressed regarding the element of time and space, which unfortunately has received less attention in the seminary, whereas in current times it can have great application. In one place he states: We cannot seize upon the absolute scope (itlaq) of a proof without considering the conditions of issuance and context of issuance. In the affair of the letter that the late Mr. Qadiri wrote to the Imam—the topic of which was an inquiry from him regarding purchasing musical instruments and playing chess—the Imam had stated: If it is for other than gatherings of sinful amusement and entertainment and possesses no corruption, it poses no problem; regarding chess as well, under the assumption of departing from being gambling, he ruled permissibility. Mr. Qadiri wrote a letter in which he objected to the late Imam that what you stated is incompatible with the absolute scope of narrations recorded regarding the prohibition of buying and selling musical instruments, as well as the absolute scope of narrations prohibiting playing chess. The Imam gave a concise response emphasizing attention to the element of time and space in ijtihad. In his view, the proofs observed the conventional music of the era of issuance of narrations, which was frivolous music suited for gatherings of sinful amusement and entertainment and the forbidden acts occurring concomitantly with them. However, over time or in a period such as the era of the Islamic Republic, music distances itself from those concomitants and corruptions of music gatherings; naturally, here we cannot seize upon the absolute scope of those proofs and claim that it is also problematic here. Those very absolute proofs were interpreted by some jurists, through existing indicators and evidence, as applying to the concomitants and corruptions resulting from them.

In current conditions, of course, these concomitants do not exist or exist to a much lesser degree. Today, one can convey ethical, human, and spiritual concepts through musical instruments or singing that is far from corruption and frivolity. For example, music used in wars to boost the morale of fighters, military marches, or the drums and cymbals used in Ta’ziyeh ceremonies not only lack corrupting concomitants, but also serve a positive function. Therefore, under current conditions, it cannot be said that music is absolutely forbidden; at the very least, deeming non-enrapturing (ghayr-e mutrib) music forbidden requires proof.

Fiqh-e Honar: Considering that all arts are somehow dependent on music—for instance, in performing arts, photo exhibitions, painting, calligraphy, etc., music is always used—can it be said that opining the prohibition of music means the prohibition of art?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: I fundamentally do not accept that arts are dependent on music. This premise is not a correct premise; because right now we have films in which music is not used for even one minute. Not that they were produced in Iran—no—rather, produced in Western countries, and fundamentally it is a model or style of film production that relies solely on speech and scenes created, without using music at all. Yes, in many places music is used; but this does not mean that no art advances without music.

Assuming we accept this premise, the answer is still negative. It is true that music has become concomitant with many arts; however, music has not transformed into the essence of that art. Therefore, even assuming it were so, this does not mean the prohibition of other arts; although it might entail creating limitations in certain artistic domains and lessen the impact level of certain arts, such a concomitant connection (mulazamah) as stated fundamentally does not exist.

Fiqh-e Honar: Assuming the permissibility of music, what proof exists for the non-permissibility or disfavoring (marjuhiyyah) of promoting music?

Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: If we hold a categorization for music in terms of subject, and consequently consider each category to possess a ruling, placing one category as non-frivolous (ghayr-e lahwi) music that is far from corrupting concomitants, promoting such music poses no problem. Even sometimes by secondary ruling (hukm-e thanawi), we can deduce the permissibility (ibahah) and preference (rujhan) of its promotion. Of course, this depends on whether the ruling we assign to music is as a primary title (‘unwan-e awwali) or secondary title, and what subject its subject is. The issue of promotion is also presentable within that same context. Yes, a distinction can be made, which is the importance that promoting music holds relative to the first section; because using specific instruments and producing specific sounds not used in gatherings of sinful amusement and entertainment and lacking those concomitants is permissible and poses no problem. However, promoting music is broader—meaning someone might teach playing an instrument that can be used both in gatherings of sinful amusement and entertainment and in non-frivolous gatherings. Here, it cannot be said that teaching or even buying and selling the instruments is forbidden, because it is among shared instruments (alat-e mushtarakah), and it is established in jurisprudence that shared instruments pose no problem.

Someone might say a certain specific musical instrument has no non-frivolous use whatsoever. If we assume such a thing exists, its promotion is not a matter of objection at all [if non-frivolous use is proven]; but if it is shared—that is, possessing capability of application in frivolous and non-frivolous gatherings—there is no reason to say it is not permissible.

Of course, from certain narrations, in a way, the general censure and repugnance of music can be derived, even if it does not reach the extent of prohibition. However, this is dependent upon titles and contexts, and if those titles do not exist, one cannot rule general disfavor (marjuhiyyah).