Preliminaries, Sixth Preliminary: The Domains of Application of the Practical Principles
Session Seven
Preliminaries, Sixth Preliminary: The Domains of Application of the Practical Principles, The Discourse of Imam Khomeini, The Distinction Between the Imam’s Discourse and Others
September 22, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
In the sixth preliminary, the discussion centered on the domains of application of the practical principles. We noted that Sheikh al-Ansari mentioned three formulations regarding these domains. These three formulations have been subject to objections. Among those who raised objections to these formulations was al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani. We do not wish to linger too long on this issue. However, we noted that the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei proposed a domain similar to one of those outlined by the late Sheikh. Naturally, the objections directed at the late Sheikh are also applicable to his formulation.
The Discourse of Imam Khomeini
Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) has another view regarding this and has outlined the domains of the practical principles in a different manner. He has presented this within the division of the states of the duty-bound person (mukallaf), which is customarily discussed at the beginning of the book on certainty (Kitab al-Qat’). That is to say, both the states of the mukallaf are divided, and the domains of the practical principles are introduced within that division.
As it is stated at the beginning of the book on certainty in Fara’id al-Usul: “Know that when the duty-bound person becomes mindful of a divine ruling, they either acquire certainty regarding the ruling, or conjecture regarding it, or doubt in it.”
These three states of the mukallaf are mentioned, and subsequently, the domains of the practical principles are specified. While this division of the states of the mukallaf and the domains of the practical principles outlined within it have been subject to debate, objections, and counter-examples, the Imam does not delve into those objections, but rather presents his own view.
We will explain Imam Khomeini’s view to see how it differs from the well-known view or the three formulations of the late Sheikh al-Ansari, and whether it is immune to the objections directed at Sheikh al-Ansari.
He states: the mukallaf either acquires certainty regarding the actual, actualized ruling (al-hukm al-waqi’i al-fi’li), either in detail (tafsilan) or in brief (ijmalan), or they do not acquire such certainty. This is one of the states: certainty regarding the actual, actualized ruling. Note these two characteristics: he does not speak of the divine ruling in a general sense. He states: “They either acquire certainty regarding the actual, actualized ruling, either in detail or in brief.” This certainty is sometimes detailed (tafsili) and at other times brief/compendious (ijmali). Alternatively, they do not acquire such certainty.
If certainty is not acquired, they either possess certainty regarding the establishment of a valid presumptive proof (amarah mu’tabarah) concerning the actual ruling, either in detail or in brief, or they do not. If they do not, they either have a valid proof (hujjah mu’tabarah) established for them regarding the actual reality, or they do not; rather, they experience doubt regarding the actual reality, or they possess a conjecture (zann) upon which no valid presumptive proof or religious proof has been established.
These states are all structured based on affirmation and negation (binary division). Later, in another preliminary concerning whether the practical principles are restricted to these four, it will become clear whether these states and domains are inductive or rational. What is the criterion for rational restriction? We will explain this subsequently.
At any rate, using this method—namely, affirmation and negation—the Imam begins from the state of absolute certainty until he reaches the final assumption where the person is doubtful in reality (possessing equal probability) or possesses an unsupported conjecture.
If the mukallaf acquires certainty regarding the actual, actualized ruling, its rulings are discussed in the book on certainty (Kitab al-Qat’). It makes no difference whether this certainty is detailed or compendious; for just as detailed certainty is authoritative, compendious certainty (‘ilm ijmali) regarding the actual, actualized ruling also leads to inculpation (tanjuz). When we state that compendious knowledge (‘ilm ijmali) is binding, it means it renders reality definitive for us. When we possess certainty, even if compendious, we require no further proof. This concerns the first part. Therefore, just as the Lawgiver cannot legislate contrary to detailed certainty, He cannot legislate contrary to compendious certainty either.
However, if certainty is not acquired, the mukallaf either possesses certainty regarding the establishment of a valid presumptive proof (amarah mu’tabarah) concerning the actual, actualized ruling, or they do not. If they possess certainty regarding the existence of an amarah (attaining certainty regarding a presumptive proof, even if it is conjectural), this belongs to the discussion of conjecture (al-zunun). There, they investigate which amarah is valid and which is not. When a valid amarah is established regarding an actual, actualized ruling—whether compendious or detailed—the ruling is established. It is true that this amarah itself does not yield absolute certainty, but rather conjecture; however, the proof that validated this amarah for us is certain. We have certainty and are positive about the establishment of a valid amarah regarding the actual, actualized ruling. This also belongs to the discussion on conjecture.
Of course, in this case as well, it makes no difference whether we acquire detailed certainty regarding the establishment of a valid amarah or compendious certainty; there is no difference. What matters is the outcome and its implications.
The Distinction Between the Imam’s Discourse and Others
However, if—and pay close attention here, as this represents a fundamental distinction between the Imam’s view and that of most legal theorists—we acquire certainty that a valid amarah exists regarding the ruling, but this certainty is compendious (ijmali).
For example, we possess certainty regarding the existence of a sound narration (riwayah sahihah) indicating a certain obligation (such as the Friday prayer at Friday noon). Suppose one narrator states that the Friday prayer is obligatory, and another states that the noon prayer is obligatory. We do not know this in detail, but we know it compendiously. Compendious certainty (‘ilm ijmali) here does not concern the ruling itself, but rather the establishment of a valid amarah concerning the ruling. Here, the discussion of preoccupation (al-ishtighal / precaution) arises.
Notice that customarily in books of Usul, they first discuss the principle of exemption (bara’ah), and then investigate the principle of preoccupation (ishtighal) or precaution (ihtiyat). However, its proper place is here. Its place is within the discussion of conjecture (al-zann), not after exemption, because we possess compendious certainty regarding the authority of this amarah. We are certain that either this obligation or that obligation is established by one of these two amarahs. This compendious knowledge itself leads to the binding of that duty upon us; therefore, authorization to act contrary to it is impermissible.
Consequently, he concludes that the entire discussion on preoccupation (ishtighal) belongs to the discussion of conjecture (al-zunun), whereas it is usually discussed under the heading of doubt (al-shakk). The Imam explicitly states here that this discussion belongs to the discussions of conjecture; meaning that presumptive proofs (amarat), with this explanation, encompass the principle of preoccupation as well.
Question: …
Professor: What do you have compendious knowledge of? Is this compendious knowledge of the obligation itself, or of the establishment of a valid amarah regarding the obligation? This is not a discussion of certainty. The Imam states: sometimes we possess certainty regarding the obligation, regarding the actual, actualized ruling in detail. This certainty of ours is authoritative, and this obligation is binding in our regard. At other times, we possess certainty regarding the actual, actualized ruling in a compendious manner. If that compendious certainty and absolute certainty concern the ruling itself—for instance, we are certain that either the Friday prayer is obligatory or the noon prayer is obligatory—this falls under the discussions of compendious knowledge; if the certainty concerns the ruling itself, it has its own rulings and implications.
However, if we possess certainty regarding the existence of an amarah, rather than certainty regarding the ruling itself—meaning we possess certainty regarding the establishment of an amarah either in detail or compendiously. If it is detailed, the obligation itself is established for us. But if we possess compendious certainty regarding a valid amarah, this is where the issue of preoccupation arises.
Question: Precaution is also discussed in compendious knowledge regarding the ruling; where there is compendious knowledge regarding the ruling, preoccupation is also applicable.
Professor: There, if we have certainty… very well, not there… notice there… even if that is the case, its place is not after exemption. At most, we say… the core issue is this: does the discussion of preoccupation and precaution belong to the discussion of doubt as one of the states of the mukallaf, or does it belong to the discussions of certainty and conjecture? Which is it? This is what the Imam wishes to clarify. The Imam states that the place of discussing preoccupation does not lie in the third category, which discusses the state of doubt of the mukallaf. … Ultimately, it must be placed either within the discussions of certainty or within those of conjecture.
Currently, our discussion does not concern whether it is a ruling-based (hukmiyyah) or subject-based (mawdu’iyyah) doubt. I do not want you to redirect the discussion to subjects… No. You are mistaken. Because I stated that here, the discussion concerns the compendious certainty regarding the establishment of the amarah, not the ruling itself. His phrasing is: “And upon the second”—meaning where certainty is not acquired regarding the actual, actualized ruling—“he is either certain of the establishment of a valid presumptive proof regarding the actual ruling, either in detail or in brief, or he is not.” The object of certainty is the establishment of the amarah, not the actual, actualized ruling itself. What you are referring to is completely outside our discussion. It is certainty… state clearly whether this should be removed from the discussion of doubt or not.
Question: Currently, in compendious knowledge regarding the Friday prayer and the noon prayer, does the principle of preoccupation run or not?
Professor: Do you possess certainty regarding the ruling, in brief? … No, either you possess certainty regarding the ruling, which places it under the discussions of certainty, or you possess certainty regarding the establishment of the amarah in brief, which places it under the discussions of conjecture… we are currently discussing the object of our certainty.
Therefore, if the mukallaf does not possess certainty regarding the actual, actualized ruling, either in detail or in brief, but possesses certainty regarding the establishment of the amarah (possessing certainty that an amarah exists, whether in detail or in brief), this pertains to conjecture.
And “upon the second”—the other possibility is that they do not possess certainty regarding the establishment of a valid amarah regarding the actual, actualized ruling, either in detail or in brief. This itself has two states: “either a valid proof is established regarding the actual reality, or it is not, but rather he experiences doubt regarding the actual reality, or a conjecture without the establishment of a valid presumptive proof or a religious proof.” He states that here, at times, a valid proof regarding the actual reality is established for them, and at other times, it is not. Where a valid proof regarding the actual reality is established, this is the discussion of the presumption of continuity (istishab). However, it is not part of the discussions of conjecture. And if a valid proof regarding the actual reality is not established for them, this is the state of doubt; meaning they possess doubt regarding the actual reality or possess an invalid conjecture regarding it, without any religious proof. This is the discussion of exemption (al-bara’ah).
Therefore, he states that in terms of order, the discussion of exemption must be mentioned last. The discussion of preoccupation must be explained within the discussions of conjecture. There is also a connection between preoccupation and istishab. However, the order must be as follows: first, they discuss preoccupation, then istishab, and then exemption. Choice (takhyir) is not fundamentally considered an independent principle in a certain sense. The primary principles are these.
Thus, the three states of the mukallaf are mentioned here in a certain sense: the state of certainty, the state of conjecture, and the state of doubt. However, certainty is sometimes directed at the ruling itself and at other times at the establishment of the amarah regarding the ruling; these two are distinct. Under the first assumption, the book on certainty must be responsible for the discussion. If they possess certainty regarding the establishment of a valid amarah, this pertains to the discussion of conjecture.
Regarding istishab as well, he seemingly identifies a distinction between istishab, exemption, and the other principles. He states that while istishab is not an amarah, it is a proof regarding the actual reality (hujjah ‘ala al-waqi’). Exemption, in his terms, is not a proof regarding the actual reality, but istishab is. This represents a significant departure from the other domains of the practical principles outlined by other scholars. In comparison with the three formulations of the late Sheikh, the formulation of the late Akhund, and that of the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei, their formulations do not differ fundamentally, except for some variations in certain details. Sometimes the order of the axes changes—for instance, doubt in the obligation itself and doubt in the object of obligation are prioritized over the possibility and impossibility of precaution. You observed that these differences exist to some extent within the late Sheikh’s own formulations. However, this formulation of Imam Khomeini is entirely different from theirs and alters the structure and framework of the discussion on the practical principles.
Now, we must examine whether this division or the domains of the practical principles proposed by the Imam is immune to the objections directed at the Sheikh, or whether the same objections apply to it—or indeed, whether it might be immune to those objections but subject to other criticisms. Of course, the order of these principles—which principle is discussed first and which next—is not highly significant. What matters are the domains he has proposed.
Consider this matter carefully: do you believe this formulation of the Imam and the domains he has envisioned for the practical principles are acceptable? How does it compare to the statements of others? We will conduct a brief examination. As we noted, we do not wish to linger too long on the domains of the practical principles. God willing, the seventh preliminary, which we will address following this, concerns the restriction of the practical principles to these four principles. Are the practical principles restricted to these four or not? If so, is this restriction based on induction (istiqra’) or rational division? These are discussions we will address tomorrow.