Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Thirteen

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, Objection Regarding the Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Presumption of Continuity, Imam Khomeini’s Response

September 30, 2025

Ninth Preliminary: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

The ninth preliminary concerns the precedence of presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). It is commonly asserted that there is no doubt regarding the precedence of presumptive proofs over the principles; indeed, all legal theorists maintain that the presumptive proofs are prior to the practical principles. However, they differ regarding the criterion for this precedence and the rationale for prioritizing the presumptive proofs over the principles, outlining various views in this regard.

However, before we explore the rationales for prioritizing the presumptive proofs over the practical principles and examine the views, an objection is raised regarding istishab (the presumption of continuity) that is appropriate to address first. Thus, it is not the case that the precedence of presumptive proofs over the principles is unanimously agreed upon from all perspectives, without any objection or complication. At minimum, regarding istishab, there is an objection that we will outline.

Objection Regarding the Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Presumption of Continuity

There is an objection concerning the precedence of presumptive proofs (amarat) over the presumption of continuity (istishab). That is: if the narrations of “Do not violate certainty with doubt” (La tanqud al-yaqina bi-l-shakk) are interpreted to refer to definitive and personal certainty (al-yaqin al-wujdani), then naturally we cannot violate this certainty by means of presumptive proofs.

According to this possibility, “Do not violate certainty with doubt” means: whenever you acquire personal, intuitive certainty such that no possibility of contradiction is entertained, do not violate this certainty with a subsequent doubt. Naturally, presumptive proofs do not generate such certainty for a person; no presumptive proof yields absolute certainty in this sense. The authority (hujjiyyah) of the presumptive proof has fundamentally no connection to this certainty. Presumptive proofs have been validated, whether from the perspective of legal assimilation to the status of reality (tanzil manzilat al-waqi’), legal assimilation to the status of scientific paths, or other rationales proposed in this context.

Therefore, on the one hand, istishab directs us not to violate certainty with anything. On the other hand, the evidence of the presumptive proof validates devotional/legal certainty (referring to it loosely as devotional certainty) for us; these two, then, conflict.

Suppose we possessed certainty of purity and performed wudu—meaning we possessed intuitive certainty of purity—and subsequently doubted the persistence of that purity. Then, authoritative testimony (bayyinah) is established indicating impurity and that this garment is not pure. Here, we cannot act upon this bayyinah. The entailment of the narrations of “Do not violate certainty with doubt” under this interpretation (wherein certainty means intuitive certainty and real conviction) is that we must act upon that prior certainty, deem the garment pure, and ignore the bayyinah. Yet, on the other hand, the presumptive proof, which is the bayyinah here, entails impurity, directing us to apply the effects of impurity. Thus, a conflict arises between the evidence of the presumptive proof’s authority and the narrations of la tanqud. We can no longer prioritize the presumptive proof over *istishab in this case.

Imam Khomeini’s Response

The response is that the term “certainty” (yaqin) in the narrations of “Do not violate certainty with doubt” does not mean intuitive, personal certainty, but rather means: “Do not violate a proof with a non-proof” (La tanqud al-hujjata bi-ghayri hujjatin).

If we define certainty as “proof” (hujjah), then naturally, if istishab entails purity as a valid proof, and on the other hand, bayyinah entails impurity as another proof, the presumptive proof is prioritized. This is because this is not a case of “Do not violate certainty with doubt” or “Do not violate a proof with a non-proof.” When the presumptive proof is established, it is itself a valid proof. Therefore, this becomes the violation of one proof by another proof (naqd al-hujjah bi-l-hujjah). Hence, it will not be covered by the prohibition of “Do not violate certainty with doubt.”

The narrations, under this interpretation we have provided, state: “Do not violate a proof with a non-proof,” but violating one proof with another proof is unobjectionable. One proof had been established, and now another proof has been established contrary to it; naturally, this contrary proof is prioritized. Thus, there is no issue in prioritizing presumptive proofs over the principles (even istishab).

You might ask: why do you interpret certainty in “Do not violate certainty with doubt” in this manner, claiming that it does not mean intuitive certainty? Given that the apparent meaning (zuhur) of certainty is intuitive, personal certainty, upon what basis do you claim that certainty means “proof” and “evidence”?

Indicators of this exist within the narrations themselves. For instance, in the first sound narration (sahihah) of Zurarah, the Imam (peace be upon him) ruled that it is forbidden to violate certainty of purity with doubt concerning purity. The context of the narration is wudu. We wish to examine whether performing wudu generates that complete, comprehensive, and intuitive certainty for a person or not.

Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) stated: “Definitive knowledge that the wudu performed by a person was executed comprehensively, satisfying all of its conditions, is extremely rare” (fi ghayat al-qillah). That wudu which satisfies all conditions such that a person attains absolute certainty regarding that purity is extremely rare. He states that were it not for the rule of completion (qa’idat al-faragh) and similar rules, this would cause severe complications. Yet, it is because of such rules that we rule in favor of the certainty of purity; meaning that the certainty of purity is attained.

Nonetheless, despite the fact that intuitive certainty is not attained regarding wudu, the Imam ruled in favor of the presumption of continuity of purity (istishab al-taharah), and this is solely because what is meant by certainty is not that psychological state contrasted with conjecture, doubt, and illusion, but rather it is the proof and evidence itself.

Question: This is logical and philosophical certainty; we do not refer to conjecture as certainty in logic and philosophy.

Professor: The reality is that one must fundamentally examine what is meant by certainty. That is, we object to the very premise upon which this objection is built. Who has stated that what is meant by certainty in the la tanqud narrations is that intuitive certainty which the Imam claims is extremely rare in its realization? That certainty is fundamentally not the intended meaning here; rather, from a primary perspective, what is meant is customary certainty (al-yaqin al-‘urfi).

When the Imam tells the inquirer in various instances, “Do not violate your certainty with doubt,” it is with knowledge of the inquirer’s circumstances, and that the certainty which is realized extremely rarely is fundamentally outside the scope of the question. The Imam’s interlocutor is an individual whom the Imam cannot prohibit from violating a certainty—which is realized extremely rarely—with a doubt. If we consider this meaning, the Imam’s prohibition would be futile (laghw). Therefore, we say that certainty is interpreted according to its customary meaning and apparent sense. The Imam is stating: “Do not violate this very certainty that you possess (and it is clear through what channels it is attained) with doubt.”

Question: The presumptive proof yields only a seventy-percent conjecture, which is not assurance (itmi’nan); thus, the objection remains.

Professor: Yes, if we interpret “Do not violate certainty with doubt” to mean customary certainty, this objection remains. However, considering the practice of rational people to act upon paths that lead to reality and the Lawgiver’s confirmation, we can exclude that certain minimum (qadr-e-mutaqayyan) from the scope of doubt. That is, we say: it is true that it is not customary certainty, but given that rational people act upon the presumptive proof and the Lawgiver has confirmed it, it is certainly not among the instances of doubt.

Question: This is correct regarding ‘Do not violate certainty with doubt,’ but it is followed by ‘violate it with another certainty’ (unqudhu bi-yaqinin akhar).

Professor: Yes, there is room for this doubt and objection. This does not become an instance of doubt so as to exit the scope of this prohibition. The phrase ‘violate it with another certainty’ destabilizes this. If this is the case, it faces an issue from this perspective. … We cannot resolve it through this path… it is impossible. We rejected the core of legal assimilation (tanzil)… we either accept legal assimilation or we do not. We cannot accept legal assimilation in one place and reject it in another…

Our objection is to the indicators that the Imam has cited. The Imam has cited the narrations of istishab as evidence (specifically, all three of Zurarah’s sound narrations: the first, second, and third). He states that in all three of these, intuitive certainty cannot be realized, because it is extremely rare or exceptional, and therefore it must be interpreted to mean “proof” (hujjah).

The narrations do not establish this. That is, they cannot serve as evidence for this purpose. On the other hand, interpreting certainty as “proof” is contrary to its apparent meaning (zuhur). If we assert that certainty means “proof” and doubt means “non-proof,” this is contrary to the apparent meaning. To assert that this certainty and doubt do not refer to those psychological states, but rather mean “proof” and “non-proof,” is contrary to the apparent meaning. At minimum, the narrations do not support this.

Question: We possess certainty regarding the validity of the wudu; it is true we do not possess certainty regarding the actual reality, but I have a presumptive proof that my wudu is correct, and the narration refers to the outward state (zahir), not the actual reality (waqi’).

Professor: Do you possess intuitive certainty? … No, … Why? Because it is a proof? … No, indeed. If you wish to assert this, it ultimately returns to “proof” and “non-proof”… interpreting certainty as “proof” and doubt as “non-proof” is contrary to the apparent meaning… this would be that very customary certainty. It returns to that.

Therefore, we must either say what is meant is the apparent ruling, or we must say what is meant is the proof. Both conflict with our preferred view. Fundamentally, the reason why this doubt and objection is raised here is the commitment to those premises—namely, that we possess neither an apparent ruling, nor devotional certainty, legal assimilation, and the legislation of the content—and thus this complication arises. This complication arises with the statement he has provided: “And it is strongly probable that what is meant by certainty in the narrations of istishab is proof and evidence” (wa yahtamilu al-qawiyya an yakuna muradu bi-l-yaqini fi akhbari al-istishabi hiya al-hujjatu wa-l-dalil).

This is the core of the issue: upon what basis is this strong probability established? Unless we say that, on the one hand, we face those complications whereby we can neither interpret certainty as devotional certainty (non-intuitive certainty) nor commit to the apparent ruling, and on the other hand, this doubt exists, resulting in a conflict between them.

Question: …

Professor: No, this prior certainty no longer encompasses that. Yes, with the principle of purity (asalat al-taharah), it is possible… no, fundamentally we must examine whether istishab can establish the result of another istishab or not? That is, you establish purity once through istishab, and subsequently doubt whether that presumed purity persists or not, and then apply istishab again… fundamentally, this certainty refers to its literal meaning; meaning it does not encompass anything other than actual or intuitive certainty. That is a discussion we will pursue within istishab.

This objection is a significant objection. The claim of the precedence of presumptive proofs over istishab faces this objection. Considering the complications mentioned, we must either accept that the presumptive proof does not precede istishab and they conflict, or we must commit to an interpretation contrary to the apparent meaning, in which case we lack evidence and indicators. To state that despite these, the presumptive proof is prior, is itself the core of the issue. We are discussing whether it is prior or not. Therefore, asserting consensus based on their premises faces no issue. However, under our preferred view, this objection stands. We must see what path exists to resolve this objection. Consider this carefully.

The Topic of the Next Session

The subsequent discussion concerns the criterion for prioritizing the presumptive proof over the principle, or the rationale for the precedence of the presumptive proof over the principle. Why does the presumptive proof precede the principle? There is dispute regarding this, and various views exist. Some consider this from the perspective of government (hukumah), others from the perspective of entry (wurud), some on the criterion of exception (takhsis), and another view is that the criterion of the precedence of the presumptive proof over the principle is customary reconciliation (al-jam’ al-‘urfi).

Another view is a detailed distinction in the matter; meaning that we cannot prioritize all presumptive proofs over the principles on a single criterion, but rather it varies depending on the case. In one instance, it precedes on the criterion of government, and in another, it precedes on the criterion of entry. This varies according to the cases, which is the view and opinion of Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him).

We must explain these views. Prior to that, we will also briefly refer to these terms themselves—what government, entry, exception, non-applicability (takhassus), and customary reconciliation mean, and what differences and implications they have.