The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Sixty-Five

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, First Part: Lifting, Third Topic: Apparent or Actual Lifting?, The Statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi: The Fifth Evidence and Its Analysis

December 28, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

It was stated that evidences have been established for apparent lifting in the Hadith of Lifting. Four evidences, three of which were stated by Muhaqqiq Khoei and one by Muhaqqiq Iraqi, were examined.

The fifth evidence was also stated by Muhaqqiq Iraqi and was subjected to objection. In the previous session, both this evidence and the objection raised against it were clarified.

The Summary of the Fifth Evidence and Its Analysis (The Statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi)

The Fifth Evidence

The summary of the fifth evidence and proof is that by joining two premises, apparent lifting is concluded: first, that the lifting of everything is the contradiction of its existence (raf’u kulli shay’in naqidu wujudih); and second, that contradictory things exist at the same level (al-naqidani fi martabatin wahidah). How apparent lifting is concluded from these two premises was explained in detail.

What is meant by ‘the lifting of everything is the contradiction of its existence’ is that when something is lifted, in reality its contradiction replaces it. Now the question is: What is removed in the Hadith of Lifting? In his view, an apparent ruling is removed, and perhaps that apparent ruling is the obligatoriness of precaution itself. Therefore, the actual ruling is not removed; because it was explained how lifting is subsequent to the actual ruling by two levels. For lifting occurs in the event of doubt in the actual ruling or ignorance of the actual ruling. Doubt and ignorance regarding the actual ruling are also subsequent to the actual ruling itself. Therefore, lifting is subsequent to the actual ruling by two levels. Thus, the level of lifting differs from the level of the actual ruling, and there is a distance of two levels between them. Consequently, lifting cannot be directed toward the actual ruling.

If the lifting of everything is the contradiction of its existence, then lifting must be directed toward a ruling that stands at an identical level with it.

Lifting occurs in the event of doubt and ignorance of the actual ruling, and doubt in the actual ruling can be the source of an apparent ruling; for example, the obligatoriness of precaution. Therefore, the Hadith of Lifting is in the position of stating that if you doubt the actual ruling, We do not even establish an apparent ruling for you. Therefore, “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” means that the apparent ruling in cases where you doubt the actual ruling is lifted. Thus, lifting attaches to the apparent ruling, and these two are at the same level.

However, if the lifting attaches to the actual ruling—since the actual ruling is two levels prior to lifting, and the lifting of everything is the contradiction of its existence—the ruling that can be considered here as the replacement ruling is the obligatoriness of precaution; that very ruling, meaning the obligatoriness of precaution, is an apparent ruling. Its lifting, meaning the contradiction of its existence, is the non-obligatoriness of precaution.

Therefore, the summary of the fifth evidence is that if lifting attaches to the actual ruling, it is incompatible with “contradictory things exist at the same level.” Hence, the obligatoriness of precaution must be removed as an apparent ruling. An apparent ruling that could be established and legislated in the event of doubt or ignorance of the actual ruling. Allah could say in every case where you are in doubt regarding the actual ruling: practice precaution. This obligatoriness of precaution is an apparent ruling. Now, if this obligatoriness of precaution is to be lifted, its contradiction must be established, which is the non-obligatoriness of precaution. These two (the obligatoriness of precaution and its lifting) stand at the same level. The lifting of the obligatoriness of precaution and its obligatoriness stand at one level. This is the content of Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s proof.

I explained this matter again because some had asked questions and this topic was not fully clear to them.

Objection to the Fifth Evidence

The objection raised against this evidence and proof was that this proof in reality returns to that very circular objection in the hypothesis of incorporating the condition of knowledge of the ruling into the ruling itself, or incorporating the intention of closeness (qasd al-qurbah) into the command. These two are exactly one and the same; they are two sides of the same coin. In other words, Muhaqqiq Iraqi, by expressing the impossibility of incorporating the intention of closeness or the impossibility of incorporating the condition of knowledge of the ruling into the ruling itself, seeks to state that here the lifting is apparent. Thus, he has aligned this proof with that very proof of the impossibility of incorporating the condition of knowledge of the ruling into the ruling itself. Hence, they stated: the very response we gave there to that circular objection is identically given here to this proof, because these two are two sides of the same coin.

They solved the problem through distinguishing between the essential ruling (al-hukm bi-al-dhat) and the accidental ruling (al-hukm bi-al-‘arad). As you know, responses have been given to this circular objection. For example, some solved the issue by distinguishing between general knowledge (‘ilm ijmali) and detailed knowledge (‘ilm tafsili), saying that in one, general knowledge is at play, and in the other, detailed knowledge is at play. Some solved it through distinguishing between the external existence and the mental existence of the ruling, and some also expressed it as the essential ruling and the accidental ruling. The essential ruling is that very ruling which Allah, Blessed and Exalted is He, possesses within Himself in the Preserved Tablet. The accidental ruling is the ruling expressed from the tongue of the Prophet or the Household (Ahl al-Bayt). The accidental ruling, in reality, is narrative of the essential ruling. Here, they say the circular objection is removed through distinguishing between the essential ruling and the accidental ruling. That is, the essential ruling is equivalent to that very ruling in terms of its mental existence, and the accidental ruling is equivalent to that very ruling in terms of its external existence. Therefore, they say knowledge of this ruling depends on that very ruling—knowledge of the ruling depends on the existence of that very ruling, the external existence of the ruling, the accidental existence of the ruling. However, that ruling on which your knowledge does not depend—or in other words, the ruling that depends on knowledge—is the essential ruling itself, meaning the ruling in terms of its mental existence. Here, too, the situation is identical.

The statement of the late Shahid Sadr is that the problem is one and the solution is also one. In the discussion of incorporating the condition of knowledge into the ruling, you said that knowledge cannot be incorporated into the subject of the ruling; meaning you were observing the formulation and legislation of the ruling. There, you said that knowledge cannot have a part in the ruling, and the meaning was that knowledge cannot participate in the legislation of the ruling. Now, here the discussion is not on legislation, the discussion is on lifting, and you want to place ignorance instead of knowledge. That is, you say ignorance cannot participate in the lifting of the ruling. This precisely returns to that very topic and is of the same scale. In other words, Muhaqqiq Iraqi in reality wants to say: because ignorance and doubt cannot participate in the subject of the actual lifting of the ruling, we are forced to say that ignorance participates in the apparent lifting of the ruling. Therefore, Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s proof to establish apparent lifting is that ignorance cannot be incorporated into the actual lifting of the ruling. This is exactly identical to the impossibility of incorporating the knowledge of the ruling into the formulation and legislation of the ruling.

This is the objector’s formulation of the fifth evidence or the second proof of Muhaqqiq Iraqi. First, he formulated it in this manner, then says: the very response we gave to the circular objection there also solves this problem. Therefore, we can conclude that this lifting is actual lifting. How did we solve the problem there? There, we solved it in this manner: we have an “essential ruling” (hukm bi-al-dhat) and an “accidental ruling” (hukm bi-al-‘arad). Whenever what is meant by ruling on one side of the vicious circle is the “essential ruling,” and on the other side is the “accidental ruling,” then the vicious circle is removed. Here, too, the situation is identical, and that other constraint will no longer exist. He says we have an essential ruling and an accidental ruling. Now, ignorance participates in the subject of the lifting of one ruling, but it is not so with respect to the other ruling; consequently, the problem is resolved.

The essence of Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s proof was stated. The objector’s formulation of this proof and how it returns to the impossibility of incorporating the condition of knowledge of the ruling into the legislation of the ruling was also clarified, and then he stated: just as we solved the issue there, we solve it here too. This, in reality, was further explanation regarding the matter referred to also in the previous session, but some had questions, which forced me to explain again.

Examination of the Objection

Now, is this analysis correct or not? The objection that appears here is that the very return of this statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi to that issue (the impossibility of incorporating the condition of knowledge) is open to reflection. In the objector’s statement, we can mention two possibilities.

It is possible that the objector’s meaning is that just as a vicious circle arises in that issue, Muhaqqiq Iraqi intends to say that a vicious circle arises here as well. That is, Shahid Sadr’s opinion is that the statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi returns to that very previous issue, and its response is also that very same response. This is one possibility: both the essence of the statement and its response to the circular problem in incorporating the condition of knowledge of the ruling into the ruling itself are returned [to that previous issue].

The second possibility is that he merely wants to say: let us present the very response here that we gave to the circular objection there, regardless of whether the essence of this evidence returns to that topic or not.

In other words, it is possible that he wants to refer both the evidence and proof and its solution to what has been in the past, and it is possible that he only presents the response (without intending to say that this problem is identically the same).

However, the reality is that the very referral of this matter to the past matter is open to reflection.

The foundation of Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s statement is based on those very two premises that were stated: first, that “the lifting of everything is the contradiction of its existence,” and second, that “contradictory things exist at the same level.” Now, what relation does this truly have to the issue of “incorporating the condition of knowledge of the ruling into the ruling itself”?

They say: the lifting of a thing means the establishment of the contradiction of its existence; meaning that if a ruling is to be lifted, the contradiction of that ruling must be established. What problem exists here? Second, two contradictories must be at one level. This is also an acceptable statement.

Now, let us apply this. In the previous session, I also mentioned, and today at the beginning of the speech I explained, that if we want to say the actual ruling is removed and its contradiction is established—the actual ruling meaning that very ruling which Allah has established for the human in the hypothesis of doubt and says: if you doubt the actual ruling, I remove that actual ruling for you—is the level of the actual ruling identical to the level of the lifted object (that which is lifted) or not? In reality, it is not identical; their level is not identical. The actual ruling is established in its own place. Doubt and ignorance regarding the actual ruling must arise, and then this (ruling) is removed. Therefore, lifting is subsequent to the actual ruling by two levels.

Now, we said that lifting consists of the contradiction of the existence of the thing. If the actual ruling is to be removed, meaning a ruling whose contradiction is established, how is it possible for something that is subsequent by two levels to be lifted? Fundamentally, “lifting” cannot attach to the prior stage. This cannot establish its contradiction here. This matter is extremely clear and does not need to be referred to that past issue. These two are fundamentally in separate realms.

Question: …

Professor: In what case does lifting attach to the actual ruling? When “if you doubt” (idha shakakta), “if you are ignorant” (idha jahilta); “if you gain ignorance of the actual ruling” or “if you doubt the actual ruling”… Why? Because “ma la ya’lamun” also includes doubt. “Lack of knowledge” (‘adam al-‘ilm) also includes doubt. What does “ma la ya’lamun” mean? Whether you are ignorant or you doubt. Now He says: if you doubt the actual ruling, then doubt in the actual ruling is subsequent to the actual ruling. If we say “the lifting of everything is the contradiction of its existence,” can we, at the subsequent level of the actual ruling, remove that actual ruling? Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s statement is:… either you must say his first premise has an objection, or his second premise. However, for this discussion to return to that issue (incorporating the condition of knowledge), it really has no relation to it. Not that it is merely similar to it; then rulings become exclusive to the knowledgeable… I want to submit that this is not that issue. Even assuming that it is that issue, it is solvable… Yes, Shahid Sadr himself has answered this circular objection, although Muhaqqiq Iraqi accepted both. Note… Very well. No, fundamentally the discussion is that we want to say it is not the lifting of the actual ruling, but rather the apparent ruling. … He is saying: Sir! This discussion is in reality that very one, and its solution is also that same one. Therefore, this evidence is of no use. Pay attention… Fundamentally, it is this very discussion where he is diverting the issue. That objection is raised in order to conclude from it that the actual (correct) lifting… No! That if the lifting were actual, it is that very same (past problem). He wants to conclude from that side that the problem is this…