The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Seventy

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, The Fruit of the Discussion on Literal or Figurative Attribution, First Topic: The Literal or Figurative Nature of the Attribution, The Statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini

January 12, 2026

Summary of the Previous Session

In the discussion on the Hadith of Lifting and arguing on its basis for legislative Exemption, we stated that it is necessary to examine the vocabulary and words of this hadith. First, regarding the word raf’ (lifting), we spoke about two topics:

1. Raf’ here is in its literal meaning, not in the meaning of daf’ (preventing/repelling). The difference between daf’ and raf’ was also explained, and we stated that here raf’ is in its very own meaning.

The second topic concerned the apparent or actual nature of the lifting. The discussion on this aspect was lengthy. The opinions, views, evidences, and proofs of the apparent nature of the lifting were examined. Objections were raised against some of these evidences, but some of these proofs and evidences were accepted. The summary of the discussion on this aspect was that the lifting here is apparent lifting. The most important proof for the apparent nature of the lifting—besides imtinan (granting a favor) and the fact that this narration was introduced in the position of imtinan, which is compatible with apparent lifting—was that if we want to consider the lifting to be actual, it has a corrupt consequence (tali fasid) and necessitates an impossible matter. That corrupt consequence is the exclusivity of rulings to those who are knowledgeable of the rulings.

At any rate, the conclusion of the discussion on the second aspect, which relates to the word raf’, was that this lifting is apparent lifting.

2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”

In the hadith: “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” (lifted is that which they do not know), it must also be determined what is meant by the relative pronoun ma in this phrase and the subsequent phrases; because it is stated in the narration: “ma-dturru ‘alayh” (that which they are constrained to), “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” (that which they are coerced into), and so forth. In most of these cases, the word ma appears as a relative pronoun.

Is what is meant by ma the ruling itself, or the object of the ruling (muta’allaq al-hukm)? In “ma-dturru ‘alayh” or “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, what is meant is certainly not the ruling itself, because it makes no sense at all for a human to have necessity (idtirar) for the ruling itself. Or, for example, in “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, what is meant is not the ruling itself, because coercion (ikrah) regarding a ruling is meaningless; rather, what is meant is the object of the ruling.

Then a discussion is raised here: if what is meant by ma is the objects of the rulings, then the lifting is attributed (usnida) to the objects of the rulings; therefore, the discussion arises as to whether the attribution (isnad) of lifting to the objects of the rulings is literal (haqiqi) or figurative (majazi).

The Fruit of the Discussion on Literal or Figurative Attribution

Now, what is the fruit of whether this attribution is literal or figurative? Two fruits have been explained:

1. We have a discussion as to whether what is meant by “ma la ya’lamun” is exclusively the particular doubt (shubhah mawdu’iyyah) or is it broader, encompassing both the particular doubt and the ruling-directed doubt (shubhah hukmiyyah)? When He says that it is lifted, does He mean what you do not know of the rulings and the subjects, or what you do not know of the subjects?

If we say the attribution of lifting to the object of the ruling is a figurative attribution, it yields one result, and if we say it is a literal attribution, it yields another. If we say the attribution of lifting to the objects of the rulings is a figurative attribution, we cannot derive the broader meaning from ma here and say it encompasses both ruling-directed doubts and particular doubts; because the attribution of lifting to the subject of unknown ruling is a figurative attribution, whereas the attribution of lifting to the unknown ruling is a literal attribution. There is no common denominator (jami’) between these two, and therefore we cannot intend both ruling-directed doubts and particular doubts from “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun”; because if we want to intend both, we must conceptualize a common denominator between them. Consequently, the result would be that we cannot argue on the basis of this hadith for Exemption in ruling-directed doubts.

Therefore, if we say that what is meant by the relative pronoun ma in “ma la ya’lamun” is the objects of the rulings rather than the rulings themselves (note that there are several assumptions that connect these two issues and specify the fruit of this discussion), we must then discuss: Is the attribution of lifting to the objects of the rulings literal or figurative?

If we say the attribution of lifting to the object of the ruling is figurative, we can no longer say that what is meant by “ma la ya’lamun” is broader, encompassing both particular doubts and ruling-directed doubts; because we cannot conceptualize a common denominator between them. If the attribution of lifting is figurative—which is the case in the context of subjects—it has no shared common ground (qadr-e mushtarak) with the attribution of lifting to the unknown ruling, which is a literal attribution. Literal attribution is completely different from figurative attribution; therefore, according to one assumption, we must consider this attribution to be literal, and according to another assumption, figurative. Of course, we shall speak more about attribution later; currently, the discussion is on the fruit and benefit of the discussion on whether this attribution is literal or figurative.

1. The other fruit is that in the event of accepting the figurative nature of the attribution, we are forced to imply something as omitted (taqdir); then the discussion arises: what is that which must be implied as omitted? Is it the effect suitable for that lifted object, or all effects (jami’ al-athar), or the punishment for the effects? Therefore, the fruit of the discussion on the figurative or literal nature of the attribution becomes manifest in the necessity of implying an omitted element in this narration. This is also another fruit worth mentioning here.

First Topic: The Literal or Figurative Nature of the Attribution

After it has become clear that what is meant by the relative pronoun ma in those phrases is not the rulings themselves, but rather the objects of the rulings, the discussion is on whether the attribution of lifting to these matters is a literal or figurative attribution. If the attribution is figurative, it requires a legitimizing factor (musahhih); we cannot attribute lifting to these matters without a legitimizing factor. If the attribution is literal, it does not require a legitimizing factor, just as in all figurative usages a legitimizing factor is needed.

Here, Muhaqqiq Na’ini has a statement that we shall transmit, and subsequently see whether this statement is correct or not.

The Statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini

Muhaqqiq Na’ini states that the attribution in the Hadith of Lifting is a literal attribution and does not require a legitimizing factor; because a legitimizing factor is needed under two conditions or in two scenarios, and the Hadith of Lifting has neither of these two scenarios or two conditions:

1. One is that what is meant by lifting here is ontological (takwini) lifting. Because we see that these matters exist among the Islamic nation; now, given this reality, how can they say these are removed? Had these matters been ontologically removed, there would have been neither coercion, necessity, error, nor forgetfulness among the nation. Therefore, ontological lifting is ruled out. Had these matters been ontologically removed, it would mean that the Prophet said that all these matters have been removed from my nation; meaning my nation commits no error, nor do they fall into forgetfulness, nor do they face doubt and hesitation. This is certainly not what is intended. Therefore, if what is meant by lifting is ontological lifting, we must imply something as omitted (taqdir) in order to attribute lifting to these matters.

2. The other scenario in which we require a legitimizing factor is when this sentence is in the position of news-conveying (ikhbar), not legislative formulation (insha’). Because when the Prophet says “lifted from my nation are nine,” two possibilities exist:

One possibility is that the Prophet reported a fact. The other possibility is that he formulated a legislation by means of this sentence; meaning he says: I lift these matters, so rufi’a means I formulate the lifting of these matters.

If this sentence is in the position of news-conveying, considering that the report is expressed by the Prophet and we are certain of his truthfulness, we must say that in order for the Prophet’s words not to be characterized as false, we must imply something as omitted; otherwise, falsehood (kidhb) arises, because we see that such a thing exists among the Prophet’s nation.

Therefore, Muhaqqiq Na’ini believes that if the attribution of lifting to these matters is to be figurative, it requires a legitimizing factor, and a legitimizing factor is possible only in two scenarios: first, when what is meant by lifting is ontological; second, when this sentence is in the position of news-conveying, not legislative formulation. However, this is not ontological lifting, so it does not require a legitimizing factor. Also, the Prophet here is not in the position of news-conveying but rather in the position of legislative formulation; therefore, the attribution of lifting to these matters is a literal, not figurative, attribution. Now, why is this not ontological lifting? Because had error and forgetfulness been ontologically removed from the nation, no member of the nation should commit an error or fall into forgetfulness. However, this is certainly not the case, and therefore it is not ontological lifting. In addition, the Prophet here is not in the position of news-conveying but rather in the position of legislative formulation.

The conclusion is that the attribution of lifting to these matters is a literal, not figurative, attribution, and therefore does not require a legitimizing factor either.

Therefore, in the view of Muhaqqiq Na’ini, this attribution is literal, and if it is literal, it does not require a legitimizing factor either. If it were figurative, it would require a legitimizing factor, which is to imply an omitted element (taqdir).

Discussion of the Next Session

Now, we must first examine the statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini and then conduct research to see whether this attribution is literal or figurative.