The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Seventy-Five

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, Second Topic: Examination of the Exclusivity or Non-Exclusivity of “ma” to Particular Doubts, The Five Paths, The Second Path, The Objections of Muhaqqiq Iraqi, Imam Khomeini’s Response to the First Objection of Muhaqqiq Iraqi, The Second Objection of Muhaqqiq Iraqi, The First Response, The Second Response, The Objection of Muhaqqiq Ha’iri to the Second Path

January 20, 2026

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Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion was on the paths of proving the exclusivity of the relative pronoun ma to external actions and particular doubts. We mentioned that several paths have been stated to prove this exclusivity. The first path was examined and it became clear that it cannot prove the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts. The second path was the issue of the unity of context (wahdat al-siyaq). This path has been objected to by some of the prominent scholars, and responses have been presented to it. Muhaqqiq Iraqi presented two responses to this path.

The essence of the mentioned path was that “la ya’lamun” must be interpreted in light of the other phrases; in the phrases “la yatiqun”, “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, and “ma-dturru ilayh”, it is certainly action (fi’l) that makes sense, because necessity, coercion, and ability are meaningful with respect to action, not with respect to the ruling. Therefore, what is meant there is certainly the action, not the ruling; consequently, in “ma la ya’lamun” as well, the action must be intended, not the ruling. Thus, by virtue of the clue of the unity of context, what is intended must be the action.

Muhaqqiq Iraqi raised two objections to this path:

The first objection was that if the observation of the other phrases is raised, there are three other phrases: “omens (tiyarah),” “envy (hasad),” and “whisperings in contemplating creation (al-waswasah fi al-tafakkur fi al-khalq).” Yet all of these cases are psychological states and action cannot be intended regarding them. This was responded to and was not accepted.

Imam Khomeini’s Response to the First Objection of Muhaqqiq Iraqi

In response to the first objection of Muhaqqiq Iraqi, Imam Khomeini states: If the criterion is the unity of context, the unity of context only makes sense if the words are repeated. For example, in “ma la ya’lamun”, “ma la yatiqun”, and “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh”, all comprise the relative pronoun ma. In this case, it can be said that the unity of context makes sense; however, if in two parts of a hadith there are words that do not themselves possess a common feature (ma bihi al-ishtirak) with one another, we cannot consider the unity of context by observing those words. We consider these three descriptions—“envy,” “whisperings,” and “omens”—to be completely separate from the rest, and therefore, in a sense, the unity of context fundamentally does not exist in this narration. Thus, the main objection directed at Muhaqqiq Iraqi is that we must fundamentally say that the unity of context does not exist here.

Additionally, he also mentioned that very point referred to yesterday (although in our view it is not accepted), which is that even regarding these inner states, the title “action” can be used, in the sense of an inner action (fi’l jawanhi), which we rejected.

The Second Objection of Muhaqqiq Iraqi

However, the main part of Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s second objection to the second path is this: He states that the claimant has in fact argued based on the unity of context and on this basis, has taken ma in “ma la ya’lamun” to mean action. However, alongside this, we have another contextual apparent meaning (zuhur siyaqi).

The first contextual zuhur is the very one that the claimant expressed, namely that ma in those three phrases is in the meaning of “action,” so in ma la ya’lamun it must also be in the meaning of action.

However, the second contextual zuhur or contextual unity is this: the descriptions mentioned in the hadith such as “ma la ya’lamun” mean ignorance of something you do not know. This has zuhur in that ignorance, by itself, directly, and immediately, attaches to that which is the subject of ignorance. What is that which is the subject of ignorance? It is the ruling. That is, “ma la ya’lamun” in the meaning of lack of knowledge or ignorance attaches to the ruling. The attachment of ignorance and lack of knowledge to the ruling is essential (bi-al-dhat), unmediated, and immediate.

However, if we attribute ignorance to the subject or action, it attaches to that subject and action mediatedly or accidentally (bi-al-‘arad). In other words, the essence of the subject bima huwa subject is not the subject of ignorance; rather, because it has acquired a title, it has become the subject of ignorance. This liquid itself, regarding which we now doubt whether it is wine or not, is not itself the subject of ignorance. Someone cannot come and say “I do not know this liquid” (ana la a’lamu hadha al-mayi’); he cannot say this. Yes, he can say “I do not know the wine-nature of this liquid” (ana la a’lamu khamriyyata hadha al-mayi’), meaning this title. Therefore, the essence of the subject is not the subject of ignorance; rather, ignorance attaches mediatedly and accidentally to the essence of the subject. Now, that medium and accident, for example, becomes a title. Therefore, there is a complete difference between the attachment of the lack of knowledge and ignorance to the ruling, and its attachment to the subject and action.

Therefore, the attachment of ignorance to the subject is fundamentally meaningless directly and requires a medium. There must be a title through which that title is presented as an accident. However, in the case of the ruling, it is not so. If we say “ma la ya’lamun” attaches to the ruling itself, here it no longer requires a medium. The difference between the attachment of “ma la ya’lamun” to the ruling and the attachment of “ma la ya’lamun” to the action or subject is the difference of a medium in establishment (wasitah fi al-thubut) and a medium in occurrence (wasitah fi al-‘arud). This is also a contextual zuhur.

Therefore, we have two contextual zuhur here, and ‘urf prefers the second contextual zuhur.

This is the second response of Muhaqqiq Iraqi against the claimant (meaning the one who claims that the Hadith of Lifting is exclusive to particular doubts). In contrast, he claims: no, it cannot be exclusive to particular doubts at all, but rather is exclusive to the ruling.

These are the two objections of Muhaqqiq Iraqi to this path.

Examination of the Second Objection of Muhaqqiq Iraqi

Other objections are also directed at this path. Perhaps three or four objections have been made to this path. Muhaqqiq Ha’iri made an objection, the late Mr. Khoei, with an explanation close to Muhaqqiq Ha’iri, objected to him, and others also made objections. In order to avoid repetition, prior to explaining the other objections, we shall examine Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s statement, and then proceed to the rest of the matters.

Up to this point, the claimant relied on the unity of context to prove the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts. Muhaqqiq Iraqi made one objection, which we answered. We also stated the second objection of Muhaqqiq Iraqi. Now, is this second objection of Muhaqqiq Iraqi to the second path valid or not?

The First Response (Imam Khomeini)

Some, including Imam Khomeini (may he rest in peace), objected to Muhaqqiq Iraqi. Muhaqqiq Iraqi stated that the action itself or the essence of the subject cannot essentially (bi-al-dhat) become the object of ignorance, but rather ignorance must attach to it through the medium of a title. He (Imam Khomeini) states: “And ignorance of the title is a medium in the establishment of ignorance with respect to the action itself, not a medium in occurrence (la wasitah fi al-‘arud).”

They say if the title of wine-nature or vinegar-nature is a medium in occurrence, a medium in occurrence is a figurative title; it possesses no reality, and is attributed to something else through the medium of another thing; like someone who sits in a car and moves, and we attribute this movement to the passenger, this is figurative. However, in the medium in establishment, there is no figurative use involved. Therefore, if ignorance attaches primarily and essentially to the title—meaning wine-nature—and then through its medium attaches to the external action itself or the subject, this is in reality a medium for the attachment [of ignorance] to the action itself and the subject. Now the question is: if that action has become unknown to us in this manner, is it actually unknown or figuratively?

If Muhaqqiq Iraqi could prove that this is a medium in occurrence, here the attribution of ignorance to it would be figurative, but here in reality it is not a medium in occurrence; it is a medium in establishment. This is the objection that Imam Khomeini (may he rest in peace) has against Muhaqqiq Iraqi.

One of those who objected to Muhaqqiq Iraqi is the author of Muntaqa [al-Usul], whose explanation is also almost similar to this explanation. We see no further need to repeat it.

Question: …

Professor: There, everything is within the scope of legislation. The Lawgiver bima huwa Lawgiver is what is intended. We do not look at the aspect of the Necessary Being and absolute power here. A legislator can only remove what he himself has enacted. The Lawgiver cannot perform a miracle bima huwa Lawgiver; we say the Lawgiver bima huwa capable-on-an-absolute-basis can perform a miracle, but the Lawgiver bima huwa Lawgiver can no longer perform a miracle; there, it is a discussion of law and legislation, and therefore we say his path is the path of rational beings, rather the chief of the rational beings, and he acts in the same manner as the rational beings.

Therefore, the Lawgiver can remove things that he himself has enacted, but what about something that fundamentally does not relate to the Lawgiver, such as the desert of punishment—what relation does it have to the Lawgiver? It is reason that says whether the desert of punishment exists here or not; therefore, the Lawgiver cannot say: contrary to the ruling of reason, you have no desert of punishment here. Can the Lawgiver combine two contradictories?

Question: …

Professor: We spoke of the discussion of miracles; we said the Lawgiver bima huwa Lawgiver has fundamentally nothing to do with miracles. The sphere of legislative formulation is different from the sphere of ontological creation by Allah. The Lawgiver cannot say: I declare from today that those who have committed sins have no desert of punishment. Because it has nothing to do with the Lawgiver; it is reason that says the sinner deserves punishment and the obedient deserves reward.

Yes, the Lawgiver can say: O sinners, I have forgiven your sin today; I do not punish you. Meaning: despite your possessing the desert of punishment, I do not punish you; He reports the absence of His own punishment, which falls within the scope of legislation. However, for Him to say: O people, whichever of you is a sinner does not possess the desert of punishment either—this is impossible because it has nothing to do with the Lawgiver. It is reason that, when it sees the Lawgiver has enacted a law, rules that whoever obeys this law deserves reward and whoever opposes this law deserves punishment. This is the ruling of reason, and the Lawgiver has no entry into this domain.

The Second Response

The Second Response: Of course, we can also mention another response to Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s objection: on what basis, in the conflict between these two contextual apparent meanings (zuhur siyaqi), do you say the second contextual zuhur takes precedence? What proof do you have for this? He claimed that ‘urf prefers the second contextual zuhur. We say: on what basis? What evidence do you have for this preference? The basis of Muhaqqiq Iraqi’s second response is on this very claim: the precedence of the second contextual zuhur over the first contextual zuhur; this itself is open to reflection, this itself is a claim without proof. Why?

The Objection of Muhaqqiq Ha’iri to the Second Path

An objection was raised by Muhaqqiq Ha’iri against the second path, which, with a slight difference, was also stated by the late Mr. Khoei. (Among those who raised the claim of the exclusivity of the Hadith of Lifting to particular doubts and external actions is Sheikh Ansari. He believes that the Hadith of Lifting is exclusive to particular doubts, and one of his proofs is also this unity of context. If you recall, he mentions several paths there, and the commentators and researchers of Al-Rasa’il have added some other paths to them. This unity of context is among the clues and proofs that the late Sheikh mentioned in Al-Rasa’il. However, many have criticized it. One of these individuals is Muhaqqiq Ha’iri.

He states that fundamentally, ma as a relative pronoun is in the meaning of an ambiguous thing (shay’ mubham). The function of the relative pronoun is to refer to an ambiguous thing. Ma, al-ladhi, and their likes, which are usually mentioned as relative pronouns, also possess this very meaning, and the conjunct clause (silah) comes and explains it. Grammarians have defined the relative pronoun as: an ambiguous noun which, for the determination of its meaning and the removal of its ambiguity, requires a conjunct clause; that very thing which in Persian we call “that which”. Therefore, “ma-stuhrihu ‘alayh” or “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” means something regarding which they were coerced; “ma-dturru ilayh” is also in this very meaning. Its role is to remove ambiguity. This is the very literal and actual meaning of the relative pronoun and the conjunct clause.

Ma and any relative pronoun, just as they are subordinate to the conjunct clause in their original meaning, are also subordinate to the conjunct clause in scope and restriction; meaning the conjunct clause specifies this ambiguous thing.

He states: in all cases where ma is used in this hadith, it is used in its very original and actual meaning; meaning that very ambiguous noun which, for the removal of its ambiguity, is in need of a conjunct clause. Except that the conjunct clauses of these cases are different. In “ma la ya’lamun” the conjunct clause is one thing, in “ma-stuhrihu ‘alayh” the conjunct clause is another. That the conjunct clause in each case applies to different things and instances does not create a difference in the utilized meaning (al-ma’na al-musta’mal). The applicability of these to various cases and instances does not create a difference in their meaning. He states: the unity of context dictates that in all these cases, we use ma in its very own ambiguous meaning, except that in the stage of application, in “ma-dturru ilayh” and “ma-stukrihu ‘alayh” it applies only to the external action and subject, whereas in “ma la ya’lamun”, due to “la ya’lamun” itself which is the conjunct clause, this has scope and encompasses both action and the ruling; meaning it covers both ruling-directed doubts and particular doubts.

Then he gives an example: if, for instance, it is said “ma yukalu” (that which is eaten) and “ma yura” (that which is seen). Ma, in both, is in one and the same meaning: an ambiguous noun. However, the instances of “ma yura” are very different from the instances of “ma yukalu”. “Ma yura” means whatever is seen. It is clear that the domain of the visible is far broader than the domain of the edible. Now, because the domain of the edible is far smaller than the domain of the visible, can we say that the unity of context dictates that the edible instances must be identically the same as the visible instances or vice versa? Can we do this? Certainly not. Therefore, he states: the unity of context cannot prove the exclusivity to particular doubts, or in other words, ruling-directed doubts cannot be excluded from the domain of the hadith.