Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi: Modern Art Is in Conflict with the Jurisprudence of Performing Arts
Introduction: The jurisprudence of performing arts can perhaps be described as the most important and extensive field within the jurisprudence of art. The performing arts have gained such influence and popularity among people that they have both generated numerous questions and caused every jurisprudential response to these questions to encounter various reactions. The performing arts can perhaps also be described as the most challenging field within the jurisprudence of art. On this occasion, we spoke with Ayatullah Sayyid Mujtaba Nur Mufidi, President of the Research Institute for Contemporary Jurisprudence. In this interview, he discussed both the general challenges facing the jurisprudence of performing arts and its particular challenges in the contemporary era. He also proposed solutions to these challenges. The full interview with this professor of advanced jurisprudence and principles of jurisprudence at the Qom Seminary follows:
What are the most important challenges facing the jurisprudence of performing arts?
Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: Before addressing the challenges facing the jurisprudence of performing arts, it is necessary to say something about the “jurisprudence of performing arts” itself so that it becomes clear what we mean by “performance” and, consequently, by the “jurisprudence of performing arts.” “Performance” has a broad meaning that encompasses several branches of art. According to one conception, “performance” consists of specific movements that a person makes to express and portray a particular state. In this conception, performance encompasses a range of arts, such as dance, opera, cinema, circus, illusionism, and the like.
According to this conception, the performing arts, as one of the seven arts, acquire a particular meaning that encompasses a broad range of activities. What is predominantly meant by “performance” and, consequently, by the “jurisprudence of performing arts,” and what generally comes to mind, relates primarily to cinema, theater, and their actors. For example, attention to works written on the “jurisprudence of performing arts” reveals that they have primarily discussed subjects and issues relating to this particular area. In other words, they deal with a form of acting that is more closely associated with cinema and theater. According to a more technical definition, however, performance has a much broader scope. This breadth has been overlooked in seminary conceptions of “performance,” resulting in the neglect of certain areas of performance, such as dance, opera, circus, and others.
With this point in mind, in response to your question, I would say that there are a number of general challenges affecting all specialized fields of jurisprudence. One of the most profound challenges is that the conceptual boundaries of “performance” are ambiguous; that is, its conceptual scope and limits have not been clarified as thoroughly as they should be. Another challenge is the lack of precise and correct knowledge and understanding of the subjects and issues of the performing arts.
For example, when we examine the works produced in this field, we see that most of them suffer from a lack of proper understanding. Subjects such as men resembling women, a man adorning himself with that with which a woman adorns herself, a man looking at a woman and vice versa, certain particular emotional relationships discussed in performance, the use of wigs, a man having his makeup done by a woman and vice versa, and so forth are generally discussed in these works. The issues relating to this field, however, are far broader, deeper, and more diverse. This is why I say that if the “jurisprudence of performing arts” is to be capable of resolving the problems currently affecting this artistic field, it must attain a precise and comprehensive understanding of the subjects and issues related to the performing arts.
For example, in theater, we encounter numerous styles, sometimes numbering more than fifteen. One of these is the nihilistic style and mode of thought. This style and mode of thought regard the very foundations of life and existence as futile and devoid of meaning. Irrespective of how large an audience this style and mode of thought may attract or how appealing it may be, the question is: What is the jurisprudential ruling on portraying futility and nihilistic thought? Is the presentation of such styles, ideas, and modes of thought legitimate or not? The same question applies to comedic styles accompanied by buffoonery and mockery, as well as to the various other styles common in cinema. Is the use of these styles in performance permissible and legitimate from a jurisprudential perspective? The same applies to opera and other forms.
The third challenge is that the “jurisprudence of performing arts” lacks a systematic and organized network of issues. Therefore, if it is to be presented as a systematic discipline, there is no alternative but to formulate and establish such a network. Naturally, if such a network of issues is established, it will become a roadmap for research that can be conducted in this field.
The fourth challenge is the absence of sufficient and organized sources. For its survival and advancement, every discipline requires the production of more numerous, stronger, and more rigorous sources so that it can resolve the issues it faces as a discipline. The jurisprudence of performing arts is no exception to this rule. Only through the production of sufficient sources can the religious rulings in this field be properly inferred.
The fifth challenge is the absence of interdisciplinary fields related to the “jurisprudence of performing arts.” Today, no field of knowledge can dispense with its related interdisciplinary fields. Indeed, it must even be said that the growth and development of a discipline are entirely dependent upon interdisciplinary fields. The “jurisprudence of performing arts,” however, is deprived of this benefit.
The sixth challenge is the lack of a shared understanding between members of the artistic community and jurisprudential researchers. Jurisprudential researchers may strive to understand the subjects precisely and determine the boundaries of the performing arts, but these efforts will not be particularly effective until they develop a shared understanding with members of the artistic community. Such an understanding will be formed when there is continuous dialogue between practitioners of the performing arts and researchers in the field of the “jurisprudence of performing arts.”
Apart from the general challenges facing newly emerging fields of jurisprudence—such as the absence of specific rules, sources, and scholarly writings—what particular challenges face the jurisprudence of performing arts?
Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: Modern art in general and cinema in particular possess a specific logic that has led the performing arts and their derivatives to regard themselves as being free of religious and ethical purposes. This logic rests upon a presupposition: art for art’s sake, cinema for cinema’s sake, and theater for theater’s sake. In other words, ethical or religious purposes and objectives should not be regarded as relevant to the performing arts. In addition to being a deadly poison for the art industry, this idea is also a serious challenge to the “jurisprudence of performing arts,” because it gives rise to an essential conflict between the “jurisprudence of performing arts” and the performing arts.
Alongside this logic, of course, there is another view that regards the performing arts as purposeful but also maintains that, to attain the ultimate objective—which may be a religious or ethical objective—the audience must be brought along by every possible means. In other words, in the performing arts, whatever is necessary to make the audience identify with the performance must be done so that the audience proceeds with it, step by step, until it reaches the intended conclusion and ultimate objective. Therefore, because we are pursuing a lofty objective through the performance, we may employ means that are not lofty and are even improper. In other words, they subscribe to the view that the end justifies the means. From a jurisprudential perspective, however, we are fundamentally not permitted to resort to every means or to achieve a result through any possible method. We cannot display every negative matter explicitly merely on the pretext that we will ultimately convey a valuable ethical message to the audience. This artistic perspective, however, maintains that this is required by the nature and essence of art; that is, if we wish to bring the audience to that final stage, we must first take them through these preceding stages.
This is an important challenge facing the “jurisprudence of performing arts,” for it creates an essential conflict between the “jurisprudence of performing arts” and modern performing arts, reducing the matter to a choice between negation and affirmation. In other words, if we wish to remain faithful to jurisprudential rules, we must strip the performing arts of their essence; and if we recognize the essence of the performing arts in their modern form, we must violate jurisprudential frameworks and rules.
Jurists generally do not have a favorable attitude toward the performing arts, including theater, cinema, and television. In your view, what presuppositions and principles have led them to make this judgment?
Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: This somewhat incorrect approach adopted by many jurists toward the performing arts is rooted in the presupposition that all manifestations of modern civilization are undesirable and must be rejected. This is an extremist and unacceptable perspective. If we accept it, no path will remain for us other than withdrawal, isolation, and intellectual stagnation. Although the proponents of this view may have good objectives and intentions—and their concern that the manifestations of modern civilization lead humanity astray is acceptable to a considerable extent—their manner of engagement and approach lack rational logic.
Another group, which has not adopted this extremist perspective, is itself divided into a broad spectrum of categories. They regard the origins of art and the predominance of contemporary productions as stemming from those who lack religious commitment and whose many artistic products have threatened and weakened the doctrinal, ethical, and behavioral foundations of societies, particularly Islamic society. This has been a serious concern for those responsible for promoting religion. They have been concerned about the doctrinal, ethical, and cultural health of societies. This concern is, to some extent, appropriate and acceptable, since this phenomenon gives rise to a form of cultural lawlessness. We now see that, in the digital world, we are moving toward the collapse of ethical, cultural, and doctrinal boundaries, and no power remains capable of exercising control or imposing restrictions to keep societies, particularly young people, away from this environment. Everyone is, in one way or another, exposed to this threat, and there is no means of escape.
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the media, particularly the performing media, have served as instruments and means for colonialists and domineering powers. In order to consolidate their domination and colonialism and plunder countries’ resources, they have used these very means to attack the beliefs of societies so that they may penetrate their hearts and minds. In other words, political, cultural, and even economic dimensions have all existed and have intensified these concerns.
Another point that I believe is highly important is the approach and perspective adopted toward inference and ijtihad in this field. Those concerns and challenges have their own place, but we must not overlook the fact that jurisprudential inferences and instances of ijtihad made without taking the conditions of “time” and “place” into consideration have naturally contributed to the adoption of these approaches. For example, if we consider Imam Khomeini’s approach, we see that it differs from many of those views. He said: “We oppose obscenity, but we do not oppose cinema.” The reason for the difference in his perspective is that he paid serious attention to the elements of “time” and “place” in ijtihad. On this basis, he distinguished between the two issues. In other words, he both recognized this modern phenomenon and warned of its destructive consequences, stating that the orientation of art and performance must be taken into consideration so that the sinister political, cultural, and economic objectives behind it are not realized.
From a research perspective, what challenges does research in the field of the jurisprudence of performing arts face, and how can these challenges be overcome?
Ayatullah Nur Mufidi: Almost all the challenges that I enumerated for the jurisprudence of performing arts also extend to research in this field. Their solutions are also inherent in those very challenges. In other words, a movement for identifying subjects and issues must be established so that the scope and boundaries of the issues become clear, sources are produced, a systematic network of issues is designed, the scholarly relationships connected with this field are identified and extracted, jurisprudential approaches appropriate to time and place are strengthened, and the jurisprudential system related to this field is extracted. At present, we are at the beginning of the path in all these areas and are not yet able to fulfill these expectations.