Preliminaries, Third Preliminary: A Brief Comparison of Practical Principles between Shi’a and Sunni Jurisprudence
Session Three
Preliminaries – Third Preliminary: A Brief Comparison of Practical Principles between Shi’a and Sunni Jurisprudence – Fourth Preliminary: The Origin of Practical Principles
September 16, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
At the outset of our discussion on the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah), we noted the necessity of addressing several preliminaries.
The first preliminary clarified that the term “practical principle” (al-asl al-amali) was not employed during the earliest epochs of jurisprudence (fiqh) and independent reasoning (ijtihad). Rather, this terminology gradually integrated into the discourse of jurists (fuqaha) and legal theorists (usuliyyin) over time.
The second preliminary addressed the historical background and the three distinct developmental periods of these practical principles. We outlined these three stages and briefly traced their evolutionary trajectory. Through this, the substantial divergence between the first stage of the practical principles (wherein they were applied without being designated under the titles of the four main principles, al-usul al-arba’ah) and the contemporary era became evident.
Third Preliminary: A Brief Comparison of Practical Principles between Shi’a and Sunni Jurisprudence
The third preliminary offers a concise comparative overview of the practical principles within Shi’ite and Sunni jurisprudence. Having previously outlined the three developmental stages of these principles within Shi’ite jurisprudence, we now examine their comparative positioning.
The contemporary status of the practical principles—which began roughly with the era of Wahid al-Behbahani, was subsequently refined and structured by Sheikh al-Ansari, and continues to govern the framework of our jurists and legal theorists today—can be outlined as follows:
In the process of legal deduction (istinbat), jurists primarily seek decisive evidence (dalil) for a given divine ruling (al-hukm al-shar’i). If, within the probable loci of such evidence—namely the Quranic verses, the Book, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma’), or the intellect (‘aql)—they discover a proof and successfully derive the divine ruling, then the objective is achieved (fa-biha).
However, if they fail to deduce the ruling from legal evidence, or if no such evidence exists, they enter the second stage. This stage is confined to determining the practical duty of the duty-bound person (mukallaf). This practical duty either serves as an excuse (mu’adhdhir) for the mukallaf or renders the obligation binding (munajjiz); it is binding in the case of compliance with reality (al-waqi’), and excusing in the case of non-compliance, analogous to the function of presumptive proofs (amarat). The rules and principles that direct the mukallaf toward their practical obligations at this stage are designated as “practical principles” (al-usul al-amaliyyah). These principles represent the rules that define the practical stance of the mukallaf when a ruling cannot be derived from legal proofs.
As noted yesterday, this structured approach did not exist in earlier epochs. It might initially appear that the practical principles were presented in our jurisprudential and legal theory manuals with this degree of clarity and distinction from the outset; however, historical analysis shows otherwise. In the first developmental period, certain practical principles were treated merely as branches of rational proof (dalil al-‘aql), placed on par with the Book, the Sunnah, or consensus. These shifts demonstrate how significantly the contemporary framework has evolved from its origins.
The primary reason Shi’ite jurists turned increasingly toward the practical principles lies in the post-Infallible era. For a period, textualist jurisprudence (al-fiqh al-mansus) was dominant among jurists. When a question arose, jurists answered by relying directly on the sacred texts (nusus). Consequently, manuals of legal verdicts (fatwas) were compiled using the exact phrasing of the narrations (riwayat), or indeed consisted of the narrations themselves. During this early period, the systematic derivation of branch issues (tafri’) had not yet emerged, and what was prevalent was “received jurisprudence” (al-fiqh al-mutalaqqat). When Sheikh al-Saduq issued a verdict, he would write the exact text of the narration, as a distinct legal terminology had not yet developed.
However, after direct communication between the Infallible Imams and the public was interrupted, and as society—particularly the jurists—confronted novel occurrences and unprecedented questions, legal scholars sought to address this gap and compensate for the absence of primary textual access. Because they could no longer directly consult the Infallibles, they began to strengthen the jurisprudential framework using the methodologies the Imams had placed at their disposal. This marked the inception of the derivation of branch issues (tafri’ al-furu’), a task to which jurists dedicated extensive effort. By utilizing the specific rulings contained within the narrations, they extracted general rules and addressed contemporary inquiries. Thus, the foundation of the answers provided to the public was derived from the specific cases previously addressed by the Imams (peace be upon them).
In certain instances, no direct text (nass), narration, or statement from the Infallibles was available, but the issues of ignorance of the ruling (al-jahl bi-l-hukm) and doubt about the ruling (al-shakk fi-l-hukm) were addressed in some narrations. This prompted the jurists to turn systematically toward the practical principles.
Consequently, the transition to the era of analytical, derivative jurisprudence (al-fiqh al-tafri’i), the departure from received jurisprudence (al-fiqh al-mutalaqqat), the confrontation with novel issues, and the lack of direct access to the Infallibles collectively compelled jurists to compile rules that could—at minimum under conditions of ignorance or doubt—delineate a practical duty for the mukallaf.
Thus, the discussion on the practical principles expanded and developed extensively within Shi’ite jurisprudence. This development was a necessity that compelled jurists to extract (istiyad) these rules, particularly to determine the practical duties of the mukallaf in states of doubt and hesitation.
Conversely, Sunni jurisprudence maintained access to presumptive proofs (amarat zanniyyah)—and even non-conjectural tools—from the outset. They adopted methodologies such as analogy (qiyas), juristic preference (istihsan), opening the means (fath al-dhara’i’), blocking the means (sadd al-dhara’i’), unrestricted public interests (al-masalih al-mursalah), and similar legal instruments. Relying on these presumptive proofs and conjectures (zunun), they sought to discover the divine rulings.
The internal disagreements among the Sunni schools of thought regarding these instruments are separate matters. For example, regarding analogy (qiyas), not all Sunni schools adopt it uniformly, nor do they all recognize unrestricted public interests (al-masalih al-mursalah). These internal variations have been addressed previously, specifically in discussions concerning the rule of public interest (qa’idat al-maslahah) and the impact of time and space on legal deduction (istinbat). The four Sunni schools of thought differ both on the primary sources of divine law and on their respective scope and application.
Regardless of these disagreements concerning the scope or validity of these sources, Sunni jurists generally possessed a broader array of tools to locate legal rulings from the beginning. They derived rulings for many cases by relying directly on texts (nusus), or by applying rules they maintained were derived from the texts—whether categorized under unrestricted public interest, opening or blocking the means, analogy, or juristic preference. Consequently, situations where a legal ruling remained entirely doubtful occurred less frequently, reducing the immediate necessity to resort to practical principles.
This explains why the analysis of practical principles in Shi’ite legal theory (usul) is considerably more extensive than in Sunni literature.
Whether resorting to the practical principles to discover legal rulings is required to this extent remains a subject of debate, which is properly situated within the study of the foundations of jurisprudence (mabadi al-fiqh), where two primary perspectives exist:
The first perspective posits that if jurisprudence is rendered dynamic and updated—specifically by integrating the dual elements of time and space into the deductive process—the necessity of resorting to practical principles will decrease. Proponents of this view suggest that the current era demands reform and review from this perspective.
The second perspective argues that we cannot derive divine rulings beyond the limits of what has already been achieved. Consequently, the practical principles must be maintained with their existing scope and breadth, or even expanded further.
For the purpose of this discussion, we will not delve into this debate as it is not directly relevant to our immediate topic.
While we do not intend to present an exhaustive survey of Sunni literature on the practical principles, it is clear that the Shi’ite framework’s reliance on these principles—due to its specific methodological limits regarding acceptable sources of deduction—is greater than that of the Sunni schools. Beside the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and intellect (the latter being itself a point of contention), Sunni jurisprudence established alternative sources which we do not view as valid legal proofs, but which they utilize to derive rulings. Consequently, their reliance on practical principles has historically been less pronounced. This represents a fundamental divergence between the Imamiyyah and Sunni approaches to the practical principles, notwithstanding numerous detailed differences that we will not address here.
Fourth Preliminary: The Origin of Practical Principles
The fourth preliminary addresses the origin of the practical principles; namely, where their foundations lie.
In the second preliminary, we discussed the three historical periods of the practical principles, tracing the developments from the era of Seyyed al-Murtada and Sheikh al-Tusi to the era of al-Muhaqqiq (author of al-Sharayi’) and the epoch of the reviver, Wahid al-Behbahani. This historical trajectory is highly significant, and we noted today in the third preliminary how the early transitional phase occurred.
In the first developmental period of the practical principles—which began with Seyyed al-Murtada, Ibn Zuhrah, and Sheikh al-Tusi—only certain principles, such as exemption (bara’ah) and presumption of continuity (istishab), were considered, and even then, not under the formal designation of “practical principles.” Where do the roots of these early discussions lie? What served as the foundation when Seyyed al-Murtada or Ibn Zuhrah raised these issues?
For instance, Seyyed al-Murtada wrote in some passages: “The original state according to the intellect is…” (al-aslu fi-l-‘aqli…), which, as we noted, refers to a branch of the principle of exemption (bara’ah). Elsewhere he states: “The original state is the non-existence of legal rulings; therefore, whoever posits them bears the burden of proof” (al-aslu intifa’u al-ahkam al-shar’iyyah, fa-man athbataha kana ‘alayhi al-dalil). This refers to primary exemption (al-bara’ah al-asliyyah), which some have termed “presumption of continuity of the rational state” (istishab hal al-‘aql) or “presumption of exemption” (istishab al-bara’ah). What is the origin of these early, limited references to the practical principles by Ibn Zuhrah, Ibn Idris, and Seyyed al-Murtada?
Undoubtedly, the origin of the practical principles lies within the Sunnah and the statements and actions of the Infallibles, analogous to our reliance on the apparent meanings (zawahir) of the Quranic verses, narrations, and other primary tools of legal deduction.
If we compile the narrations of the Infallibles that refer to these principles, serve as their foundations, or contain the concepts embedded in their terminology, we find several distinct themes that have been addressed by the jurists. these include: the term “precaution” (ihtiyat) and its recommended instances; the principle of not violating certainty with doubt; building upon the presumed purity of a doubted object; building upon the presumed permissibility of a doubted action; the principle of purity (asalat al-taharah); and the principle of permissibility (asalat al-hiliyyah).
Statements such as “Everything is permissible for you until you know it is forbidden” and “Everything is pure for you until you know it is impure” are direct textual citations (nusus) from which these principles are derived. For example, when an inquirer asks about a ruling of which they are ignorant, the Imam might instruct them to “observe precaution.” Narrations exist directing the duty-bound to observe precaution when the ruling on a matter is unknown. Whether this applies to doubt regarding the fundamental obligation (al-shakk fi asl al-taklif) or doubt regarding the duty-bound action (al-shakk fi-l-mukallaf bih) is a separate discussion; however, the general recommendation of precaution in instances of doubt is clearly established in the speech of the Infallibles.
Similarly, in other instances, choice (takhyir) is recommended where there is a conflict between proofs.
Question: This is not applied as a practical principle…
Answer: That specific “choice” is a religious, textual choice (al-takhyir al-shar’i), rather than a purely rational choice (al-takhyir al-‘aqli). In the case of two conflicting narrations, the remedial traditions (al-akhbar al-‘ilajiyyah) introduce the option of choice at a certain stage, specifically when no preponderating factor (murajjih) can be identified. However, this textual, religious choice in cases of conflicting texts served as a conceptual foundation that jurists subsequently utilized to formulate the rational principle of choice—the detailed mechanics of which are distinct. Thus, even within the principle of choice, historical roots can be identified.
The case of presumption of continuity (istishab) is even more direct; the rule of “non-violation of certainty by doubt” (‘adam naqd al-yaqin bi-l-shakk) is explicitly stated in the texts. While these rules were originally delivered in response to specific, particular cases rather than formulated as universal principles by the Imams, legal scholars and theorists subsequently analyzed these particular cases to extract, systematize, and apply them as general principles.
The Infallible Imams (peace be upon them) could not present these detailed principles and rules to the general public without the necessary scholarly foundations and intellectual readiness being established first. They addressed inquiries in accordance with the capacity of the questioner. Over time, as scholarly capacity and analytical tools developed, jurists systematically extracted these rules and principles. Therefore, the origin of the practical principles rests within the statements of the Infallibles.
While the practice of rational people (sirat al-‘uqala’) and rational analysis (‘aql) were later integrated, the initial material for discovering and expanding these rules was derived from the words of the Infallible Imams (peace be upon them), which naturally catalyzed the development of these legal sciences.
Additional details could be explored here, though we will limit our discussion to these points to avoid unnecessary delay.