Preliminaries, Fifth Preliminary: Applying the Criterion of an Usuli Issue to the Practical Principles

Session Four

Preliminaries, Fifth Preliminary: Applying the Criterion of an Usuli Issue to the Practical Principles, Commentary on the Treatise on Rights, A Review of Past Discussions, Elements of Heartfelt Humility

September 17, 2025

Fifth Preliminary: Applying the Criterion of an Usuli Issue to the Practical Principles

Thus far, we have addressed four preliminaries regarding the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah).

The fifth preliminary investigates whether the discussion of the practical principles is properly classified among the issues of the science of Usul (al-Usul) or not. This is a query we have previously raised in a general manner regarding almost all topics: whether they are considered issues of the science of Usul or not.

1. Certain discussions raised under the heading of verbal/linguistic discussions (mabahith al-alfaz)—such as whether the imperative form (sighat al-amr) denotes obligation (wujub) or not, or whether prohibition (nahy) denotes unlawfulness (hurmah) or not—were categorized as issues of the science of Usul. This is because the criterion of an Usuli issue applies to them. Broadly speaking, the criterion is that an Usuli issue is one whose conclusion is employed as the major premise (kubra) of the deductive syllogism (qiyas al-istinbat), thereby yielding a legal ruling (al-hukm al-shar’i). On this basis, the discussion on whether commands and prohibitions denote obligation and unlawfulness is considered an issue of Usul. For instance, within the deductive syllogism, when we establish that the Quranic phrase “Establish…” (aqimu) is an imperative, and that the imperative denotes obligation, we conclude that “Establish” denotes obligation, and thus “Establish the prayer” (aqimu al-salat) indicates that prayer is obligatory.

Question: The syllogism consists of premises, and there is another syllogism…

Professor: Regarding the verbal discussions, we have a minor-premise (sughrawi) inquiry, which is what I was just referring to; this is indeed among the issues of the science of Usul. I said a part of the verbal discussions, not all of them. At any rate, a portion of the verbal discussions, such as these examples I mentioned, are undeniably considered issues of the science of Usul. Almost all minor-premise inquiries related to apparent meanings (zuhurat) belong to the issues of the science of Usul.

2. Likewise, major-premise inquiries (kubrawi) related to legal authority (hujjiyyah)—such as the authority of solitary reports (hujjiyyat al-khabar)—are issues of Usul. Of course, the authority of apparent meanings (hujjiyyat al-zawahir), as a rational matter, should not be discussed in Usul. There is a distinction: the authority of transmitted consensus (al-ijma’ al-manqul), the authority of popular opinion (al-shuhrah), and the authority of obstruction-based conjecture (al-zann al-insidadi) based on discovery (kashf)—all of these are considered issues of Usul because they serve as the major premise in the deductive syllogism.

However, the absolute authority of apparent meanings (hujjiyyat al-zawahir) is not an issue of Usul, even though we utilize it within the science. That is, rational people (‘uqala’) consider all apparent meanings to be authoritative; when they encounter the apparent meaning of a statement, they naturally act upon it (according to various theories here).

The authority of the apparent meanings of the Quran is an Usuli discussion in a certain sense, although it can also be raised outside of Usul. The criterion applies to these cases.

3. A portion of the verbal discussions—such as the derivative (al-mushtaq), the use of a word in more than one meaning, the correct and the broader meaning (al-sahih wa-l-a’m)—which are among the thirteen or fourteen introductory issues raised by al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani at the beginning of Kifayah, are not considered issues of Usul because the criterion does not apply to them. The reasons why they have nonetheless been discussed in the science of Usul have already been explained.

4. Discussions related to rational implications (mabahith al-mulazamat), which have been raised under verbal discussions in Usuli texts, especially until recent decades, are considered issues of Usul. This applies both to independent rational proofs (mustaqillat) and non-independent ones (ghayr al-mustaqillat), such as the implication between the obligation of an act and the obligation of its preliminary (al-mulazamah bayna wujub al-shay’ wa wujub muqaddamatih), the implication between an act and the prohibition of its contrary (al-didd), and the discussion on the co-existence of command and prohibition (ijtima’ al-amr wa-l-nahy).

Implications are also of two types: some are independent rational proofs, while others are not. The fact that these are typically raised under verbal discussions is itself subject to criticism. We are not examining this here; we have stated in its proper place that these are not fundamentally part of verbal discussions. However, regardless of whether they are categorized under verbal discussions or not, they themselves are issues of the science of Usul, because the criterion applies to them. The results and rules obtained from these discussions are utilized as major premises in the deductive syllogism. Thus, there is no issue in this regard.

These implications, if accepted (as some of them are rejected by certain scholars and are subject to dispute—for instance, the implication between the obligation of an act and the obligation of its preliminary is denied by many who assert there is no implication between the religious obligation of a thing and the religious obligation of its preliminary), are considered issues of Usul because the criterion applies to them.

Discussions on certainty (mabahith al-qat’) are not among the issues of Usul, and the criterion does not apply to them, regardless of how this certainty is attained, since its authority is intrinsic (zati). For the same reason that the major premise of the authority of apparent meanings is not an issue of Usul, this discussion is also not considered an issue of the science of Usul.

These are roughly the primary discussions we have addressed so far, and as you have observed, most of them are considered issues of the science of Usul.

5. Are the practical principles—namely, exemption (bara’ah), presumption of continuity (istishab), choice (takhyir), and precaution (ihtiyat)—considered issues of the science of Usul or not? The fifth preliminary addresses this.

It appears that the criterion we mentioned for an Usuli issue also applies to the practical principles, whether they are rational (‘aqli) or textual/religious (shar’i). This is because we have two types of practical principles:

One type consists of rational practical principles. That is, the intellect independently rules in favor of exemption based on the “ugliness of punishment without prior clarification” (qubh al-‘iqab bila bayan). The intellect also independently selects precaution in certain cases (rational precaution). In other instances, it dictates choice, which is rational choice. The presumption of continuity (istishab), however, does not have a purely rational and textual division in this manner [being primarily textual]. Nevertheless, these three principles are considered rational principles.

Rational practical principles are indeed among the issues of Usul. This is because they determine the practical duty of the mukallaf when they are unable to locate the divine ruling. When the mukallaf has no way to attain certainty regarding divine rulings, nor can they find the ruling through authoritative channels or devotional submission (ta’abbud), this serves as a path-based approach that clarifies their practical duty. Therefore, it can serve as the major premise in the deductive syllogism.

And likewise regarding the textual practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah al-shar’iyyah): presumption of continuity (istishab), textual precaution, textual exemption, and textual choice—all of these serve as the major premise of the deductive syllogism; hence, they are recognized as Usuli issues.

Question: Deducting a divine ruling?…

Professor: The difference is that although the textual practical principles ultimately determine our actual and practical duty, they provide us with an apparent ruling (hukm zahiri). What does this mean? No, the textual practical principles are, in fact, responsible for clarifying apparent rulings. If we doubt the actual ruling (al-hukm al-waqi’i) in a given instance, and, for example, the divine rule demands precaution or the presumption of continuity, we continue with that; this is an apparent ruling.

Rational practical principles, however, do not grant us an apparent ruling. Yes, this difference exists. The rational principle determines a practical duty for us, but it is not a ruling—it is not an apparent ruling. Whether we speak of the textual practical principles, which clarify an apparent ruling, or the rational practical principles, which do not, both are covered by the criterion of an Usuli issue.

Question: A divine ruling is not derived from it; rational precaution does not yield a divine ruling?

Professor: But it determines the practical duty… you are not paying attention. I am saying that textual practical principles give us an apparent ruling. Rational practical principles do not give an apparent ruling, but they clarify our duty… Does it not? Yes, precisely. As we stated then, the criterion for an Usuli issue does not require the deductive syllogism to be solely for obtaining a divine ruling; rather, we can also obtain the practical duty through the deductive syllogism. Indeed, we discussed this matter in detail when defining the science of Usul. While criticizing al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani’s definition, we provided a definition that accommodates this aspect.

The deductive syllogism is not meant solely to discover a divine ruling. Regardless of the disagreements regarding the definition of the science of Usul, the deductive syllogism is generally meant either to give us a divine ruling or to clarify our practical duty. The rational practical principles at least clarify this duty, even if they do not constitute an apparent divine ruling. Thus, the criterion of an Usuli issue applies to them.

Fa-tahassala mimma dhakarna kullih (In conclusion, from all that we have mentioned): the discussion on the practical principles is part of the issues of the science of Usul.

Question: Why can rules like the rule of passing past (tajawoz) and the like not be considered among the issues of Usul?

Professor: This is precisely the difference between Usuli rules and jurisprudential (fiqhi) rules. If you recall, al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani raised an objection at the beginning of this discussion regarding the principle of purity (asl al-taharah): why has it not been discussed here, given that it is similar to a practical principle? A doubt was raised regarding the principle of purity. However, regarding the rules of completion (faragh) and passing past (tajawoz), they bear no resemblance to these principles. The principle of purity (asalat al-taharah) and the principle of permissibility (asalat al-hiliyyah) are the ones where such a doubt and objection can be raised. A rationale was provided there, which we will address in due course when we discuss whether the limitation of the practical principles to four is based on induction (istiqra’) or rational division. We will discuss these in their proper place.

Commentary on the Treatise on Rights

Our discussion regarding the right of prayer (salat) was not completed last year. A passage of the Risalat al-Huquq of Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) pertained to prayer. In brief, we noted: at the opening of this discourse, the Imam mentioned two rights for prayer. For the sake of recollection, I will read this. It may be repetitive, but to return to this discussion after a hiatus of several months, we must read it:

“And the right of prayer is that you know it is an arrival before Allah, the Almighty and Majestic, and that in it you are standing before Allah.”

The right of prayer consists of two things:

One is to know that the prayer is actually a vessel or an entry to Allah; meaning, recognize the prayer itself for what it is.

And “that in it you are standing before Allah”—meaning, what position you occupy in prayer and before whom you stand. We explained these two rights in detail.

Elements of Heartfelt Humility

Following this, the Imam stated that you must be in this manner before Allah—referring to the humility of the heart, the inner faculties (jawanih), and the physical limbs (jawarih). If we wish to summarize the next statement of Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) under two headings after mentioning these two rights, it is this: now that you know these two rights, humility and submissiveness (khushu’ wa khudu’) must be present in both your heart and your body and limbs. Subsequently, we outlined the elements of heartfelt humility enumerated in the words of Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him).

“So when you know that, you should stand in the position of one who is humble, abased, desiring, dreading, hoping, and fearing.”

Now that you know these two rights, you must be (in prayer) as though you have stood in the position of one who is abased, desiring, dreading, and fearing. We have discussed this.

First, the feeling of abasement and insignificance; that man is nothing before Allah. Yet, at the same time, he is desiring (raghib). Note the synthesis between being nothing and desiring Him. “al-Rahib, al-Kha’if”; we noted that there is a difference between rahab and khawf. Both denote fear, but there is a distinction between the two, although there are differing opinions here.

Lexicographers have defined rahab as prolonged and continuous fear—a permanent state of fear. The rahib is one who is constantly in fear. However, al-Raghib al-Isfahani defined rahab as fear accompanied by anxiety. There is a difference between fear and anxiety.

Some have defined rahab as awe/reverent fear (khashyah), which appears correct. The late Allamah in al-Mizan also derived monasticism (rahbaniyyah) from this same root, rahab, meaning khashyah.

If we understand this as khashyah, it means a type of fear accompanied by glorification and veneration; it is a specific kind of fear. When a person faces a great figure, they experience a state of fear, but this fear is different from the fear of encountering a predatory beast. Both are fear. The darkness of night or the attack of an animal causes fear, but this fear is devoid of any veneration or glorification toward that danger. Khashyah is fear accompanied by veneration. When someone stands before a great person, they experience a state of apprehension, but the nature of this apprehension differs from ordinary fear.

Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) states here: the worshipper must present themselves before Allah in such a state; meaning they must have apprehension and, at the same time, khashyah—possessing both fear (khawf) and khashyah.

He continues: “the hopeful, the wretched, the entreating, the one glorifying the One before whom he stands.” These are all a continuation of the matters mentioned as elements of heartfelt humility, inner entreaty, and internal submission.

1. To be hopeful (al-raji). Let his state be thus.

2. The wretched (al-miskin—meaning one who is helpless).

3. The entreating (al-mutadarri’—the state of weeping and lamentation; how is an entreating person? It means a state of pleading and requesting).

4. Glorifying the One before whom he stands (al-mu’azzim man qama bayna yadayh—venerating the One in whose presence he stands; this is the glorification and veneration of Allah, the Blessed and Exalted). All of these reside in the heart.

So note, from “that you stand in it” to “glorifying the One before whom he stands”; all of these are in the position of explaining heartfelt humility and clarifying its elements. How is heartfelt humility realized? If he had simply said: “You must be humble in heart before Allah,” we might ask, how? The Imam explains that when we say “be humble in heart,” it means a state of abasement, a state of desire, a state of dread (rahbah), a state of fear, a state of wretchedness, a state of entreaty, and a state of glorifying or magnifying Allah, the Blessed and Exalted.

From here, he begins to describe the physical humility or the outward state of the body—meaning physical humility (al-khudu’ al-jawarihi)—which we will discuss next week.