Preliminaries, Sixth Preliminary: The Domains of Application of the Practical Principles

Session Eight

Preliminaries, Sixth Preliminary: The Domains of Application of the Practical Principles, Critique of the Discourse of Imam Khomeini, Seventh Preliminary: The Restriction of the Practical Principles, The First View, Critique of the First View, The Second View

September 23, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

In the sixth preliminary, the discussion focused on the domains of application of the practical principles. We outlined various views and briefly highlighted some of the objections raised against the three formulations of the late Sheikh and his followers.

Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) proposed a different formulation regarding the domains of the practical principles. The essence of the Imam’s view is that the duty-bound person (mukallaf) either acquires certainty regarding the actual, actualized ruling, either in detail (tafsilan) or in brief (ijmalan), or they do not. If they acquire certainty, this falls under the discussion of certainty.

However, if they do not acquire certainty regarding the actual, actualized ruling, either in detail or in brief, they either possess certainty regarding the establishment of a valid presumptive proof (amarah mu’tabarah) concerning the actual ruling, either in detail or in brief, or they do not.

If they possess certainty regarding the establishment of a valid amarah concerning the actual ruling, whether in detail or in brief, this pertains to the discussions of conjecture (al-zann). On this basis, the discussions of preoccupation (al-ishtighal / precaution) fall within the discussions of conjecture in his view.

If they do not possess certainty regarding the establishment of a valid amarah concerning the actual ruling, either in detail or in brief, at times a valid proof (hujjah mu’tabarah) is established for them regarding the actual reality, and at other times, it is not. If a valid proof is established regarding the actual reality, this is the presumption of continuity (istishab). If a valid proof is not established—meaning they are doubtful regarding the actual reality, or if they possess a conjecture, it is an invalid one without any religious proof—then the issue of exemption (al-bara’ah) is raised.

Critique of the Discourse of Imam Khomeini

As we noted yesterday, this view is immune to the objections that applied to the three formulations of the late Sheikh. It is also immune to the objections directed at the formulation of the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei, because the concept of “apparent ruling” (hukm zahiri) is not mentioned here. As we stated previously, the Imam also does not accept the apparent ruling in a certain sense and believes that we do not have something called an apparent ruling.

Question: He did not, in fact, mention the domains of the practical principles.

Professor: As for his division of the states of the mukallaf… I outlined the summary of the Imam’s discourse. He did not eliminate doubt. He stated: either certainty regarding the actual, actualized ruling exists or it does not. Where it does not exist, either certainty regarding the establishment of a valid amarah exists or it does not. Where certainty regarding the establishment of a valid amarah does not exist, either a proof regarding the actual reality exists or it does not. Where there is no proof regarding the actual reality and no certainty regarding the establishment of an amarah, this is precisely where the person is doubtful.

That is, he defined the domain of exemption within the context of doubt, the non-existence of certainty regarding the establishment of an amarah, and the non-existence of a proof regarding the actual reality. He defined the domain of istishab as the non-existence of certainty regarding the establishment of an amarah, but the presence of a valid proof regarding the actual reality. He placed the issue of preoccupation within the compendious certainty regarding the establishment of a valid amarah.

What else are the domains of the principles? Fundamentally, the title of his discussion here, which the esteemed compiler has placed at the beginning of the practical principles, is: “Prelude: The Division of the States of the Mukallaf and the Mention of the Domains of the Principles.” This is because these are inseparable. The states of the mukallaf are divided—which I explained in yesterday’s session—and based on that, the domain of each of these principles is outlined. Thus, it is not the case that he did not address this issue.

Therefore, the Imam’s formulation is immune to those objections. In addition to the point we mentioned—namely, that the term “apparent ruling” does not appear in the discourse of Imam Khomeini—he did not mention the issue of the possibility and impossibility of precaution, nor the division between doubt in the obligation itself and doubt in the object of obligation, which were the axes of these domains in the three formulations of the late Sheikh and the sources of objections.

The late Akhund raised several objections against the late Sheikh. The most significant objection regarding the three formulations was their vulnerability to counter-examples where a specific principle would not run, and another principle would run instead. For instance, according to the Sheikh’s first formulation, in a certain instance, exemption should have run, but preoccupation ran instead, or vice versa in some other formulations.

Because the axis of these domains was one of these two: they said when doubt arises for the mukallaf, either this doubt has a previous state or it does not. Where it does not have a previous state, either the doubt is in the obligation itself or in the object of obligation, and subsequently, they mentioned the issue of the possibility and impossibility of precaution. Or, from the very beginning, they stated that where a previous state does not exist, either precaution is possible or it is not. The case where precaution is possible was divided into doubt in the obligation itself and doubt in the object of obligation.

Thus, the axis of dividing the states of the mukallaf in the context of doubt was either the possibility/impossibility of precaution, or the doubt in the obligation itself/object of obligation. These were the bases of the objections to the Sheikh’s formulation. When these disputed axes and sources of objection are eliminated from the discourse of Imam Khomeini, no room remains for those criticisms.

Therefore, on the whole, it appears that what the Imam has outlined regarding the division of the states of the mukallaf and the domains of the practical principles is superior and most appropriate compared to the other formulations.

Seventh Preliminary: The Restriction of the Practical Principles

The seventh preliminary concerns the restriction of the practical principles. We have learned from the beginning of our studies in the science of Usul that the practical principles are four. Regardless of which specific section they should be placed in, and regardless of their prioritization, there are four principles: exemption (bara’ah), preoccupation (ishtighal), choice (takhyir), and presumption of continuity (istishab).

The question is: are the practical principles restricted to these four principles, or are there more? Do we possess only four practical principles, making the emergence of a fifth principle impossible? That is to say, is this restriction rational (hasr ‘aqli) or inductive (hasr istiqra’i)?

Inductive restriction means that as far as we have searched, we have found only these four principles, but the emergence of a fifth principle or the discovery of more practical principles remains possible. Just as in the case of jurisprudential rules (al-qawa’id al-fiqhiyyah), from the day the first books were written on these rules until today, new rules continue to be discovered. Of course, some are subject to dispute; some scholars do not recognize certain rules as formal jurisprudential rules. However, the path remains open for the discovery of new jurisprudential rules. Is the same true for Usul? Can we find new rules within the section of the practical principles? Thus, the discussion is whether the restriction of the principles to the four is rational or inductive.

The First View

The late Akhund [al-Khurasani] states: the number of practical principles exceeds four. We possess other practical principles, such as the rule of purity (qa’idat al-taharah), which runs in both ruling-based doubts (shubhat hukmiyyah) and subject-based doubts (shubhat mawdu’iyyah).

The rule of purity in a subject-based doubt is like when someone doubts whether their garment is pure or impure, and has no previous state to rely upon. Here, “Everything is pure for you” (kullu shay’in laka tahir) dictates that this garment is pure. At other times, the rule of purity may run in a ruling-based doubt; for instance, when someone doubts whether the secretion of wadi and madi (discharges other than urine and semen) is impure or not, and has found no evidence for their impurity. Since they doubt the purity or impurity of this fluid, the rule of purity dictates its purity. This doubt is a ruling-based doubt.

The late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khurasani states: alongside these four principles, we possess other practical principles such as the rule of purity. That is, in his view, the rule of purity is a practical principle. However, they ask: if the rule of purity is a practical principle, why was it not mentioned alongside the other practical principles? He proposed a reason for this, which we will address. The main point is that, in the view of the late Akhund, the restriction of the practical principles to these four is inductive. Furthermore, he states that these principles are not restricted to these four; they are more than four—they are five, including the rule of purity.

He states that there is a distinction here between subject-based doubts and ruling-based doubts. He says that those principles and rules that run in subject-based doubts are not considered among the issues of the science of Usul, but rather belong to jurisprudential discussions. This is because the criterion of an Usuli issue does not apply to them. In his view, an Usuli issue is one from which a general ruling is derived. However, whether this specific garment of mine is pure or not is a particular ruling, and every particular ruling belongs to jurisprudence (fiqh). Therefore, the application of the rule of purity in subject-based doubts is not considered among the issues of the science of Usul. However, those principles and rules that run in ruling-based doubts are indeed among the issues of the science of Usul (whether it is the rule of purity or another rule).

Question: …

Professor: We are not concerned with whether this is the task of the jurist (mujtahid) or the follower (muqallid). Ultimately, a portion of what relates to the follower falls within the domain of jurisprudence… Yes, in that sense, it is correct.

This is, in brief, the formulation of the late Akhund, who does not restrict the practical principles to four. In Kifayah, he explicitly states that we possess other practical principles, such as the rule of purity.

Objection: If the rule of purity (specifically the rule of purity that runs in ruling-based doubts) is among the issues of the science of Usul, why is it not discussed in Usul?

Response: The reason is twofold:

First: There is no dispute regarding it. The other practical principles are not universally agreed upon; in many cases, there is dispute regarding the scope of their application. However, the status of the rule of purity, in terms of its evidence and proofs, is entirely clear and requires little discussion.

Second: This rule pertains exclusively to the book of purity (Kitab al-Taharah), which is one of the specific chapters of jurisprudence. Conversely, the other practical principles run across all chapters of jurisprudence. For instance, the principle of exemption (bara’ah) runs across all chapters of jurisprudence, whereas the rule of purity is restricted to the chapter of purity.

Based on these two reasons, the Akhund states that we have omitted the discussion of the rule of purity. For instance, consider how much dispute exists regarding the presumption of continuity (istishab), and how vastly the views differ. Does istishab run in both non-existent and existent matters (al-umur al-‘adamiyyah wa-l-wujudiyyah), or is it restricted to existent matters? Does istishab run in gradual matters (al-umur al-tadrijiyyah) or is it restricted to instantaneous matters (al-umur al-daf’iyyah)? Does istishab encompass doubt in the capability of persistence (al-shakk fi-l-muqtadi) or is it restricted to doubt in [the existence of] an obstacle (al-shakk fi-l-mani’)? These are all subject to dispute, giving rise to numerous views. These debates, disputes, and multiple views do not exist regarding the rule of purity.

Critique

These two reasons or justifications proposed by the late Akhund have been subject to objection:

First: His claim that the principle of purity (asalat al-taharah) or the rule of purity is entirely undisputed, unlike the four practical principles, is questionable. We can say, for instance, that the principle of choice (takhyir) is also largely undisputed. At minimum, the level of dispute found in istishab and bara’ah does not exist regarding choice. Thus, little discussion has been dedicated to choice (specifically rational choice). Yet, extensive discussions have been conducted regarding exemption and istishab.

Second: His assertion that the rule of purity is restricted to the chapter of purity, whereas the other practical principles run across all chapters. This also does not justify the omission of the rule of purity from the science of Usul. Do we not possess, among Usuli rules, certain principles that run only within specific chapters of jurisprudence? The requirement that an Usuli rule must run across all chapters of jurisprudence is itself subject to objection.

At any rate, this represents one view, which maintains that the restriction of the practical principles to four is inductive.

The Second View

The second view maintains that the restriction of the practical principles to four is rational (as opposed to inductive), in contrast to the formulation proposed by the Akhund. The meaning of the restriction and division being rational is that the division is structured entirely based on affirmation and negation (binary division). That is, the categories are born of negation and affirmation.

Regardless of the objections that exist against the formulations of the late Sheikh, the Akhund, Imam Khomeini, or Mr. Khoei, you observed that the domains of the principles are presented based on the states of the mukallaf through negation and affirmation.

He states: either they possess certainty or they do not. Here, a third alternative is inconceivable. He states: where they do not possess certainty, either precaution is possible or it is not. Here too, no third alternative can be envisioned. Likewise, the subsequent vertical divisions are all governed by negation and affirmation.

If, from the outset, we proceed with the division based on the criterion of negation and affirmation, then inevitably that restriction and division becomes rational. There is a vast distance between this assertion and that of the Akhund. The Akhund states that the practical principles exceed these four. The second view states that the practical principles are restricted to these four categories, and it is fundamentally impossible to add another category.

The Topic of the Next Session

Here, the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei proposes a third view. There is a third perspective here, which we will also mention to see which view is correct.