Preliminaries, Preliminary Eight: The Difference between Presumptive Proofs and Practical Principles

Session Ten

Preliminaries, Preliminary Eight: The Difference between Presumptive Proofs and Practical Principles, The First, Second, and Third Theories, The Distinction Between the Discourse of Sheikh al-Ansari and al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini on the First Theory, Al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei’s Objection to al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini

September 27, 2025

Eighth Preliminary: The Difference between Presumptive Proofs and Practical Principles

The eighth preliminary among those suitable to be addressed prior to entering the discussion of the practical principles themselves concerns the difference between the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah) and the presumptive proofs (al-amarat). We have two discussions, the second of which is related in some manner to the first: namely, the difference between the presumptive proofs and the practical principles, and the priority/precedence of the presumptive proofs over the practical principles.

That we say the second discussion (which we will examine in the subsequent preliminary, namely, the ninth preliminary) is dependent on and related to this discussion is because some of the differences mentioned between the presumptive proofs and the practical principles serve as the premise for the priority of the presumptive proof over the principle. That is, the basis for prioritizing the presumptive proof over the principle depends to some extent on the nature of the difference we maintain between the two. This point will become clearer subsequently.

The eighth preliminary investigates what difference exists between a presumptive proof and a practical principle. What is well-known among legal theorists are perhaps these three differences. In other words, three methods or premises exist among legal theorists, each of which mentions a specific difference. These three differences represent three distinct theories concerning the difference between the presumptive proof and the principle, rather than a single scholar proposing all three differences.

The First Theory

One theory and method is that of Sheikh al-Ansari. It is understood from some statements of Sheikh al-Ansari and also al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini that the difference between the presumptive proof and the practical principle lies in their respective legislated elements (al-maj’ul). Ultimately, the presumptive proof has a legislated element, and the practical principle also has a legislated element. That which is legislated in the presumptive proofs is path-indicativeness (tariqiyyah), knowledge-equivalence (‘ilmiyyah), or their revealing nature (kashfiyyah) regarding the actual reality. The presumptive proof is a path to the actual reality (tariq ila al-waqi’). The presumptive proof reveals the actual reality. In other words, it possesses indicative value. The presumptive proof claims to take our hand and guide us to the destination, which is the actual reality.

However, the practical principles do not possess path-indicativeness or a revealing nature regarding the actual reality, but rather they enjoin practical conduct (ijab al-jary al-‘amali) or establish a legal assimilation to the status of knowledge in practical conduct (tanzil manzilat al-‘ilm fi-l-jary al-‘amali). The function of the principle is to render the practical duty—or more precisely, practical conduct—obligatory, outlining what you must do in practice. Two phrasings have been employed: either the enjoining of practical conduct, or the legal assimilation of the principle to the status of knowledge in practical conduct.

Just as when you possessed certainty, you performed an action in accordance with your certainty. If a person is certain that danger is lurking in a particular path, they do not travel that way. Just as they act in accordance with their certainty, if they apply the presumption of continuity (istishab), it is assimilated to the status of certainty; meaning they do not travel that path, regardless of whether danger is established by certainty or by istishab. Their practical conduct remains identical.

This is the difference understood from Sheikh al-Ansari (as derived from some of his words) and also al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini: that the legislated element in the domain of presumptive proofs is path-indicativeness, a revealing nature, and knowledge-equivalence, whereas in the domain of the practical principles, there is absolutely no concern with path-indicativeness to the actual reality, but rather it is purely either the enjoining of practical conduct or the legal assimilation of the principle to the status of knowledge in practical conduct.

The Second Theory

The second method or theory concerning the difference between the presumptive proof and the practical principle is that the subject of the principle is structured such that doubt has been taken as a condition in it: “that in whose subject doubt has been taken [as a condition]” (ma ukhidha fi mawdu’ihi al-shakk).

However, doubt is not taken as a condition in the subject of the presumptive proof: “and nothing has been taken in it except the establishment of the presumptive proof itself” (wa lam yu’khadh fihi illa nafsu qiyam al-amarah). Wherever doubt is taken as a condition in the subject, that is the domain of the principle; that is the place of the principle. Wherever doubt is not taken as a condition in the subject—assuming also that absolute certainty is absent—that is the place of the presumptive proof.

The Third Theory

The third theory or method concerning the difference between the presumptive proof and the practical principle is that if doubt and the apparent ruling based on doubt are mentioned in the phrasing of the evidence, this constitutes a practical principle. However, if no such thing is mentioned in the phrasing of the evidence and the level of proof (maqam al-ithbat), this constitutes a presumptive proof.

In other words, according to this method, the difference between the presumptive proof and the practical principle is shifted from the level of legislation (maqam al-ja’l) and the level of construction (maqam al-insha’) to the level of proof and the level of textual indication (maqam al-ithbat).

The Distinction Between the Three Theories

In the first theory, the difference is placed within the domain of legislation (specifically, the legislated element, al-maj’ul).

In the second method, the difference concerns the level of construction (maqam al-insha’); because it states that if doubt is taken as a condition in the subject of that ruling, it is a principle, and if doubt is not taken as a condition, it is a presumptive proof. Taking doubt as a condition in the subject of the proof (akhdh al-shakk fi mawdu’ al-dalil) relates to the level of construction and has no relation to the level of proof or the phrasing of the evidence.

According to the third method, the difference between the principle and the presumptive proof relates neither to the level of legislation nor to the level of construction, but rather lies within the domain of the level of proof and the phrasing of the evidence.

Of course, other theories and methods also exist for distinguishing between the principle and the presumptive proof, but the most important and well-known methods are those we have outlined.

Now, among these methods—given that each has its proponents—which one is superior and most appropriate, and what objections are directed at these methods?

The Distinction Between the Discourse of Sheikh al-Ansari and al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini on the First Theory

The late al-Na’ini and the late Sheikh, while sharing the view that the difference between the presumptive proof and the practical principle lies within the legislated element (al-maj’ul), nevertheless differ in one aspect, which is that al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini has appended an additional element. To explain:

You have heard that normal, rational, and mediated religious implications are considered valid in presumptive proofs—which is referred to as the positive principle (al-asl al-muthbit); in other words, it is said that the positive implications of presumptive proofs (muthbitāt al-amārāt) are authoritative.

However, regarding the practical principles, they state that normal, rational, and mediated religious implications are not authoritative. When you hear that a certain principle is a “positive principle” and is thus not authoritative, it means it is among the normal, rational, or mediated religious implications of the practical principle, and is therefore not authoritative. However, the implications of the presumptive proofs are authoritative. Why are the implications of the practical principle not authoritative, while those of the presumptive proofs are?

Question: …

Professor: I stated at the outset that although al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini and the late Sheikh stated the same thing regarding the fundamental difference between the principle and the presumptive proof, a distinction nevertheless exists between the two. I did not say this is a different distinction; it is the same distinction and lies within the same domain, namely, the legislated element.

However, the late al-Na’ini attended to a specific aspect and completed the argumentation in this section, stating: the implications of presumptive proofs are authoritative because knowledge of something is equivalent to knowledge of all of its implications and prerequisites. Therefore, if path-indicativeness and knowledge-equivalence are legislated in the presumptive proofs—meaning that the legislated element is path-indicativeness and its revealing nature—then knowledge of it establishes all of its implications and prerequisites.

Thus, with this explanation, the positive implications of presumptive proofs become authoritative, unlike the practical principle, where the issue of knowledge, path-indicativeness, and revealing nature is absent, but rather is purely the enjoining of practical conduct. This does not entail commitment to another thing or the implications of that thing. Therefore, in the case of the principles, enjoining practical conduct in accordance with something does not entail enjoining practical conduct in accordance with its implications. This point is also clear, and is understood by analyzing these two; the Master may obligate us practically to something, without obligating us to its implications.

One can separate the necessity of acting in accordance with a thing from the necessity of acting in accordance with its implications. If the Lawgiver states: presume the continuity of Zayd’s life and say Zayd is still alive—since his being alive has an unmediated religious effect, namely, the obligation of maintenance (nafaqah). The Lawgiver may obligate us to act in accordance with a principle, but does acting in accordance with a principle entail acting in accordance with its implications as well? That Zayd is alive, therefore, implies that he must have grown a beard? Yes, he is alive; at the time Zayd was 12 years old, he had no facial hair. Now 20 years have passed; ordinarily, he must have grown a beard. Here, we may not be obligated by the Lawgiver to this implication.

This is in contrast to the presumptive proof; for in the domain of presumptive proofs, when something possesses path-indicativeness and shows us reality, naturally when reality is revealed to us, its implications are also revealed. One can no longer separate them. When knowledge, revelation, and path-indicativeness are introduced, one cannot separate that thing from its implications. Therefore, they say that the positive implications of presumptive proofs are authoritative, whereas the positive implications of the practical principles are not.

This is the view that al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini has outlined regarding the difference between the principle and the presumptive proof, and has predicated this effect upon it.

Al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei’s Objection to al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini

Here, the late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei raised an objection against the statement of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini regarding the first method. The explanation provided was intended to show that alongside the first theory or method, a distinction also exists between the view of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini and the late Sheikh.

The late al-Muhaqqiq al-Khoei states: merely that we consider the legislated element in the domain of presumptive proofs to be knowledge-equivalence, path-indicativeness, and a revealing nature does not entail the authority of positive implications on the ground that knowledge of something is equivalent to knowledge of its implications. This is because knowledge of something is equivalent to knowledge of its implications if the knowledge is intuitive and actual (idha kana al-‘ilmu wujdaniyyan wa haqiqiyyan). If the knowledge is actual and real, then inevitably knowledge of something is equivalent to knowledge of its positive implications and prerequisites.

However, if the knowledge is devotional/legal (ta’abbudi), as is the case in the domain of presumptive proofs, this is pure devotion—it is devotional knowledge—and therefore we must examine what limits the Lawgiver has specified. It is not the case that because the Lawgiver has validated the presumptive proof, He has therefore also validated its implications. These are two distinct matters. It is possible that He has validated the thing itself in isolation, but has not validated its implications, because everything is governed by the devotion of the Lawgiver.

Therefore, he states that the authority of the positive implications of presumptive proofs is not established as a general rule. If its positive implications are to be authoritative, they require supplementary evidence (mu’nah za’idah) and a specific proof. Otherwise, the very proof that validated the presumptive proof cannot render its implications and positive effects authoritative for us.