Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Eight

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Criterion for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, Analysis of the First View (Conflict and Exception), Objection to the First View, Examination of the Objection, First Objection, Second Objection, Summary of the Discussion

October 7, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion concerned the criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). We noted that various views and theories exist in this regard. The first view is that of a conflict (ta’arud) between presumptive proofs and practical principles, and the exception (takhsis) of the proofs of the principles by the proofs of the presumptive proofs. We outlined this view according to the explanation of the author of al-Riyad and in his own words, and mentioned the objection raised against this view.

The objection was that conflict is realized only where the subject (mawdu’) of the two proofs is identical. If the subjects of the two proofs differ, conflict does not occur. This is because conflict means mutual contradiction (tanafi) and mutual denial (takadhub) of the two proofs. Mutual contradiction only makes sense within a single subject. If the subjects differ, mutual contradiction is not realized, and here the subject is not identical. This is because doubt is not taken as a condition in the subject of the proof of the presumptive proof, whereas it is taken as a condition in the subject of the practical principle.

The response to this objection was that in both, the ignorance of the actual ruling (al-hukm al-waqi’i) is present; meaning that both the presumptive proof and the practical principle are valid under the assumption of ignorance of the actual ruling. Therefore, the Lawgiver has validated both. Consequently, a conflict arises because the issue of ignorance of the actual ruling is present in both. That is, the presumptive proof is valid in the case of ignorance of the actual ruling, and the practical principle is also valid in the case of ignorance of the actual ruling. Thus, the subject is identical, and therefore conflict, in the sense of the mutual denial of the two proofs within a single subject, is realized.

Up to this point, the first view and the theory of conflict were established.

Analysis of the First View

We now wish to analyze the first view and see whether a conflict is indeed realized here or not?

The final claim of the proponent of conflict was that conflict is realized here because both the proof of the presumptive proof and the proof of the principle are valid under the assumption of ignorance of the actual ruling. The proof of the presumptive proof states that the solitary report is authoritative, “if you are not knowledgeable of the actual ruling” (idha lam takun ‘aliman bi-l-hukm al-waqi’i). The proof of the principle states the same. Therefore, the conflict and mutual contradiction of the two proofs within a single subject are realized.

Objection to the First View

The objection is precisely directed at this point: that a difference exists between the subject of the proof of the presumptive proof and the subject of the proof of the principle, and their subjects are not identical. Ignorance of the actual ruling, or doubt in the actual ruling, is sometimes considered as a part of the subject, and at other times is not.

In the presumptive proofs, ignorance and doubt regarding the actual ruling are not taken as part of the subject, even though its occasion of application is the context of doubt and ignorance. In the practical principles, however, ignorance of the actual ruling and doubt in it are taken as part of the subject. A difference exists between the subject and the occasion of application. What does this mean? This is, in reality, the most significant objection directed at the first view. To explain:

The first view asserts that there is a conflict here, emphasizing that the subject is identical and that the mutual contradiction of the two proofs within a single subject, as the cornerstone of conflict, is realized. We wish to say that this is not the case, because:

The practical principle, such as istishab, states: “If you doubt and were previously certain, build upon your certainty” (idha shakakta wa kunta ‘ala yaqinin fa-bni ‘ala yaqinik). If you doubt and possessed certainty previously, do not pay attention to your doubt, but build upon that certainty. On the other hand, the proof of the presumptive proof validates a presumptive proof like the solitary report for us. In the proof of the principle, doubt is taken as a condition; however, in the proof of the presumptive proofs, doubt or ignorance of the actual ruling is not taken as a condition.

The proof of the presumptive proof does not state: “if you are ignorant of the actual ruling, the report is authoritative” (idha kunta jahilan bi-l-hukm al-waqi’i fa-l-khabaru hujjah). It states: “the solitary report is authoritative” (khabar al-wahid hujjah). However, in the proof of the principle, it states: “If you doubt and were previously certain, build upon your certainty.” This indicates that in the practical principles, ignorance of the ruling or doubt is present as a qualification of the subject. “If you doubt” is a qualification of the subject. “If you doubt and were previously certain, build upon your certainty.”

However, in the proof that validates the solitary report for us, doubt or ignorance of the actual ruling is not present as a qualification of the subject. This is because the negation of doubt or the absence of doubt is compatible with both conjecture and certainty. Therefore, its authority is not conditional upon the qualification of doubt in its subject. It is merely that the solitary report is authoritative. But this does not mean that the solitary report is authoritative absolutely. The solitary report is authoritative where we are ignorant of the actual ruling. Therefore, the authority of the solitary report is conditional upon the ignorance of the actual ruling. This relates to the occasion of application (mawrid), not the subject (mawdu’).

Thus, in the practical principles, ignorance of the actual ruling is a qualification of the subject and a part of the subject. In presumptive proofs, however, ignorance of the actual ruling is a qualification of the ruling, not a qualification of the subject. If it were a qualification of the subject here as well, the claim of the proponent of conflict would be complete; because both proofs would be directed at the ignorance of the ruling as a qualification of the subject. One would state that this is authoritative, and the other would state that that is authoritative, thereby producing mutual contradiction and mutual denial. However, here, according to this explanation, ignorance of the ruling or doubt in the ruling is recognized as a qualification of the subject in the principles, and as a qualification of the ruling in the presumptive proofs. This is the difference between the subject and the occasion of application.

Therefore, in both the practical principles and the presumptive proofs, the ignorance of the actual ruling is involved. The practical principles run where we do not know the actual ruling, and possess ignorance or doubt. The same applies to presumptive proofs. The solitary report that states that the Friday prayer is obligatory is authoritative when we do not know the actual ruling. However, there is a vast difference between the two. In the practical principles, ignorance of the actual ruling is a part of the subject and its qualification. In the presumptive proofs, however, ignorance of the actual ruling is not a qualification of the subject, but rather its occasion of application and a qualification of the ruling; meaning that the ruling runs in this context.

Consequently, the foundation of conflict, which was built upon the mutual contradiction of the two proofs within a single subject, is demolished. The conclusion is that the subject is not identical; thus, conflict is demolished. This is the response presented against the proponent of conflict. However, we must examine whether this objection to the view of conflict is valid or not?

Question: In conflict, it is not a condition that the subject be identical… they conflict in the point of intersection.

Professor: Ultimately, that subject is identical. Do not deny these self-evident truths. Identity of subject is realized in various ways and forms. At times, the identity is within the designation and concept itself; naturally, the conflict arises within that designation. At other times, the identity is within some instances, as is the case in the point of intersection. In two concepts whose relationship is general and specific in some aspects… do you wish to deny the major premise or the minor premise? The major premise is: in conflict, is the mutual contradiction of the two proofs within a single subject a condition? Definitely, yes.

So you accept the major premise? In conflict, which means the mutual contradiction of the two proofs and the mutual denial of the two proofs, if one proof were to negate a ruling from one subject, and the other proof were to negate a ruling from another subject, this would no longer be a conflict. We say that sometimes the mutual contradiction of the two proofs within a single subject possesses various types. The unity of the subject is sometimes conceptual, sometimes instance-based, and sometimes it may be unity within, for example, some species of a genus. It depends on whether we discover the aspect of these two proofs, which must be a single aspect.

Question: Both the occasion of the presumptive proof and the occasion of the practical principle are doubt. That is, both the practical principle encompasses this and the presumptive proof does. Therefore, the objection is not from the perspective that there is no mutual contradiction according to the subject; the main objection to the author of al-Riyad is that their relationship is general and specific, which does not produce conflict, and the specific is prioritized.

Professor: This is an objection that has been raised here and must be analyzed. First, I stated that according to this objection to the author of al-Riyad, there is no conflict because the subject is not identical… this is subject to analysis. You were denying the fundamental need for the unity of the subject… yesterday you were denying this very point… so you accept the unity of the subject? … I said let us see whether your objection is major-premise-based (kubrawi) or minor-premise-based (sughrawi)? You were also objecting to the major premise of the issue.

Examination of the Objection

The objector, in responding to the author of al-Riyad, stated that in the subject of the proof of presumptive proofs, doubt and ignorance are not taken as conditions, even though they run in the context of doubt and ignorance. In the proof of the principle, however, doubt is taken as a condition in its subject.

We must examine this very claim: is this indeed the case? Are the proofs of the presumptive proofs really all in this manner, and the proofs of the principles all in that manner? When we examine their proofs, we find counter-examples on both sides.

For instance, suppose the proof of a certain presumptive proof is the verse: “Ask the people of the remembrance if you do not know” (Fas’alu ahla al-dhikri in kuntum la ta’lamun). In this verse, doubt and ignorance are taken as conditions in the subject. It states: “Ask the people of the remembrance if you do not know.” Here, in the proof itself, this qualification is mentioned as a part of the subject; it says: if you do not know. In the proofs of presumptive proofs, this qualification is sometimes mentioned, and at other times is not. Thus, we have both types of proofs.

Conversely, regarding the proofs of the primary principles, this qualification is sometimes mentioned and at other times is not. The proof of the principle of exemption (asalat al-bara’ah) or the principle of permissibility (asalat al-hiliyyah) is: “Every thing is permissible until you know it is specifically forbidden” (Kullu shay’in halalun hatta ta’lama annahu haramun bi-‘aynih) or “Every thing is unrestricted until a prohibition is issued regarding it” (Kullu shay’in mutlaqun hatta yarida fihi nahyun). Here, the ruling is permissibility or unrestrictiveness until a prohibition is issued. There are also instances where no qualification is mentioned at all. Therefore, we observe on both sides that what has been claimed here regarding the difference between the proofs of the principles and the proofs of the presumptive proofs is open to counter-examples.

Generally speaking, the objector’s claim is predicated upon the acceptance of the apparent ruling (al-hukm al-zahiri). This is because the basis of the objector’s view is that we can envision two possibilities for the subject: one is the existence of the subject without any qualification, and the other is the existence of the subject qualified by doubt in the actual ruling.

However, we have stated that the Lawgiver fundamentally does not legislate two rulings for one subject in two different states. This is indeed the basis for denying the apparent ruling. The Lawgiver considers a subject and assumes a ruling for that subject. Subsequently, He states: “Very well, whoever does not reach that ruling, their duty is this, for example.” It is not the case that from the outset, two rulings are legislated: one as the actual ruling for the subject without any qualification, and another as the apparent ruling for the subject qualified by doubt and ignorance of the actual ruling. Therefore, we do not possess anything called an apparent ruling; we have rejected this.

Question: …

Professor: That is not an apparent ruling.

We fundamentally do not possess a second ruling called the apparent ruling. Therefore, to assert that in one state doubt and ignorance are considered a part of the subject and its qualification, and in another state doubt and ignorance are not considered a qualification of the subject, is incorrect. We have a single subject for which a ruling is established, and the presence or absence of ignorance and knowledge, or doubt and certainty, has absolutely no bearing upon it.

Consequently, to attempt to separate the subject of the practical principles from the subject of the presumptive proofs in this manner, and thereby negate conflict, is incorrect.

Summary of the Discussion

In summary, the first view and the conclusion we have derived from these objections is that the first view asserts a conflict between presumptive proofs and practical principles. This is because the practical principles have been validated by proofs, regardless of whether a presumptive proof contrary to them exists or not. The presumptive proofs have also been validated by proofs, regardless of whether a principle contrary to them exists or not. The result of this conflict is, of course, exception (takhsis). That is, we are compelled to except the proofs of the practical principles by the proofs of the presumptive proofs, and state that the practical principle is valid as long as no presumptive proof contrary to it exists. We noted that this view ultimately leads to exception. The view of conflict results in exception; meaning that the proofs of the presumptive proofs except the practical principles.

The objection was raised that their subjects are not identical; therefore, conflict is not realized. This is because doubt is not taken as a condition in the subject of the presumptive proof, whereas it is taken as a condition in the subject of the practical principle.

In defense of the proponent of conflict, it was argued: it makes no difference; in both, ignorance of the actual ruling is involved. Both run under the assumption of ignorance of the actual ruling; therefore, the subject is identical.

The objection was raised that, yes, in both, ignorance of the actual ruling is involved, but in the practical principles, it is involved as a qualification of the subject—or in other words, within the subject—whereas in the presumptive proofs, it is not involved as a qualification of the subject, but rather the occasion of the presumptive proofs is the ignorance of the actual ruling. That is, by distinguishing between the subject and the occasion of application, the issue was resolved, and we explained what the subject and occasion represent. Thus, up to this point, conflict is not realized.

Two objections were raised against this explanation. We noted that, first, this distinction is open to counter-examples. Second, if we do not accept the apparent ruling, no room remains for this distinction.

The conclusion up to this point is that conflict has not been resolved by these objections. That is, we have not been able, up to this point, to respond to the proponent of conflict or, in other words, the proponent of exception.

Up to this point, the conclusion is that conflict is conceptualized, and we must except the proofs of the practical principles by means of the proofs of the presumptive proofs.

Question: Here, do we have an identity within some instances or not? Whether doubt is taken as a condition in the subject or in the occasion, ultimately, in terms of instance, it is both an instance of the principle and an instance of the presumptive proof.

Professor: This is the very discussion whose conclusion is not exception. Its conclusion is not what the author of al-Riyad asserted. The author of al-Riyad stated: it is true that the relationship between them is general and specific in some aspects, but we treat them as general and specific absolutely, and except the proofs of the practical principles by the proofs of the presumptive proofs… they are not fundamentally separate… when we say there is conflict, there is mutual contradiction… for now… several stages of this back-and-forth… very well, it becomes possible in that very instance… the core of the author of al-Riyad’s statement is… very well, the discussion is that if it is general and specific in some aspects, then why exception?