Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles

Session Twenty-Two

Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Criterion for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs, The Second View: Entry, The Third Formulation, Preliminary Note, Explanation of the Subject

October 13, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion concerned the criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). We noted that one view in this regard is entry (wurud); meaning that presumptive proofs enter the practical principles. However, various rationales can be outlined to explain the nature of this entry.

Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini proposed three formulations (taqarib) of entry. We outlined the first two formulations in the previous sessions, alongside the objections raised against them. The origin of this disagreement is primarily related to two points:

1. In the proofs of the practical principles, a limit/end-point (ghayah) is mentioned, whereas in the proofs of presumptive proofs, no limit is mentioned.

2. To what object is the knowledge and certainty mentioned as the limit of the practical principles related—such as in “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is specifically forbidden”?

These points have given rise to various views and opinions. One scholar argued for entry, while another argued for government (hukumah). Within the view of entry itself, as you observed, several conceptualizations can be made.

In the first formulation, knowledge and certainty—which represented the limit of acting upon the practical principles—were interpreted as “proof” (hujjah), and doubt was interpreted as “non-proof” (la hujjah). The objections to this formulation were outlined.

In the second formulation, no modification was made to the meaning of knowledge and certainty themselves, but rather to their object, i.e., “prohibition,” which was made to encompass both actual and apparent prohibition. To be more precise, in the first formulation we made one modification, while in the second formulation we made two modifications, which we have detailed. The objections to this formulation were also outlined.

The Third Formulation

This formulation represents, in the view of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, the superior argument (ahsan ma yuqal) in this regard; the best argument that can be proposed to explain the entry of presumptive proofs over the practical principles. Let us examine what this formulation is and whether it is acceptable. If we reject this as well, we must naturally proceed to government (hukumah). I will only mention that al-Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi also has another formulation of entry, which we will refer to if time permits.

According to this formulation, the limit mentioned in the proofs of the practical principles—namely, knowledge and certainty in “Every thing is permissible for you until you know it is specifically forbidden” and “Do not violate certainty with doubt, but violate it with another certainty”—means attainment of proof (ihraz) and revealing nature (kashfiyyah), or in other words, an establishing proof (dalil muhriz) and revealing proof (dalil kashif).

On this basis, the meaning of “Every thing is permissible for you until you know” is that everything is permissible for you until you establish proof of its prohibition. The meaning of “Do not violate certainty with doubt, but violate it with another certainty” becomes: do not violate certainty with doubt, but violate it with an establishing and revealing proof. Thus, the limit, which consists of knowledge and certainty, is interpreted to mean an establishing and revealing proof, or the attainment of proof and its revealing nature.

Now, how can this formulation establish the entry of presumptive proofs over the practical principles? In entry, the premise is that with the arrival of the entering proof, the subject of the entered proof is eliminated, but through devotional designation and legal effort (bi-l-‘inayati wa-l-ta’abbud); meaning that one proof arrives, sidelines the subject of another proof, and eliminates it, but this occurs devotionally. We must examine how introducing the term “attainment of proof” (ihraz) causes the subject of the practical principles to be eliminated and actually set aside. This must first be explained.

To clarify this point, we will outline a brief preliminary note regarding certainty (qat’) and its divisions.

Preliminary Note

First, we previously noted that certainty is of two types: subject-constitutive certainty (qat’ mawdu’i) and purely path-indicative certainty (qat’ tariqi). Subject-constitutive certainty itself is divided into two types: subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological state/attributes (qat’ mawdu’i ‘ala wajh al-sifatiyyah) and subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character (qat’ mawdu’i ‘ala wajh al-tariqiyyah).

The difference between subject-constitutive and path-indicative certainty is clear. If certainty is taken as a part of the subject of the ruling, it is subject-constitutive certainty; meaning that for the tracing and establishing of a ruling, certainty is considered either as the entire subject or as a part of the subject. For example, it says: “If you acquire certainty regarding the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer, then the Friday prayer is obligatory upon you” (idha qata’ta bi-wujubi salati al-jumu’ati fa-tajibu ‘alayk). At other times, certainty is path-indicative; meaning it is not a part of the subject, but is considered merely as a path to reach actual reality.

Subject-constitutive certainty is also of two types:

1. Subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological state/attributes: meaning that if certainty is considered within the subject as a psychological attribute among psychological attributes, this is subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological attributes. For example, they might say: if you find certainty in the horizon of your soul regarding a ruling, a certain ruling is established for you. In this category, certainty is considered a part of the subject, but as a psychological state. Because in the horizon of the soul, a person sometimes possesses certainty, sometimes does not; sometimes they possess conjecture, and sometimes they possess doubt. Naturally, the establishing of the ruling here is dependent upon the realization of that state and attribute within the horizon of the soul.

2. Subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character: meaning that certainty is considered a part of the subject, but not as a psychological attribute, but rather because it is a path to reach actual reality. This is termed subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character.

The difference between these is that in the first state, that attribute must be realized within the horizon of the soul. If the internal certainty—that state of complete clarity—is not realized, you cannot trace the ruling. In subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character, however, it has nothing to do with the horizon of your soul; it says that because certainty inherently possesses complete path-indicativeness to reality and reveals reality, if it is attained, the ruling is also established, even if that state and attribute is not generated within the horizon of your soul. This involves certain details that we will omit.

Second, generally speaking, this discussion is raised: do presumptive proofs and practical principles substitute for subject-constitutive certainty or not? As for certainty itself, its status is clear, and its various divisions have been discussed. The real discussion lies in the substitution of presumptive proofs and practical principles for subject-constitutive certainty. (Of course, there are differing opinions. Some state that they fundamentally do not substitute for subject-constitutive certainty. Others have detailed, stating that presumptive proofs substitute for subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character, but do not substitute for subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological attributes.)

Explanation of the Subject

Following this preliminary clarification, al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states: if certainty is taken in the subject, not as a psychological attribute, but rather because it reveals reality, we can set aside this certainty taken in the subject of the proof and replace it with “attainment of proof” and “revealing nature.” That is, for example, the Lawgiver has stated: “If you acquire certainty regarding the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer, then it is obligatory upon you” (idha qata’ta bi-wujubi salati al-jumu’ati fa-tajibu ‘alayk). Under this assumption, we remove “If you acquire certainty” and replace it by saying: “If the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer is established for you, then it is obligatory” (idha uhriza laka… fa-tajibu), or “If the obligatoriness of the Friday prayer is revealed to you, then it is obligatory upon you.” We place attainment of proof or revealing nature in its stead.

He states that since the Lawgiver has designated presumptive proofs as establishing and revealing proofs, we can assert that the presumptive proof and the practical principles (specifically those practical principles like istishab which are recognized as establishing practical principles) substitute for subject-constitutive certainty by way of path-indicative character. True, subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological attributes is distinct; because what is the criterion there is the attainment of the state of certainty within the horizon of the soul, which nothing can substitute for. Since that state of certainty must be realized within the horizon of the soul, nothing can substitute for it.

The argument of al-Na’ini is that if we recognize presumptive proofs as proofs that establish reality, and consider their establishing and revealing character, we can replace certainty and absolute conviction in the proofs of the practical principles with attainment of proof and revealing nature. That is, we can say: “Every thing is permissible for you until you establish proof of its prohibition” (Kullu shay’in laka halalun hatta tuhriza laka hurmatuh). According to the third formulation, we noted that we modify the limit and the meaning of the limit, but this modification is distinct from the modification made in the first formulation. There, we stated that “you know” (ta’lama) is interpreted as “proof,” and doubt is interpreted as “non-proof.” Here, they state that ta’lama is interpreted as “attainment of proof”; meaning: everything is permissible for you until you establish proof of its prohibition.

Thus, if we interpret knowledge and certainty to mean “attainment of proof,” and interpret this limit as an establishing and revealing proof, then whatever possesses this characteristic of being an establishing proof and possessing a revealing character is recognized as the limit of the practical principles. The presumptive proof possesses this characteristic. Therefore, when the presumptive proof arrives, the practical principle is set aside. “Every thing is permissible” is valid until an establishing proof is found contrary to it. One of these establishing proofs is the presumptive proof. Therefore, the practical principle runs until an establishing or revealing proof is found contrary to it.

Consequently, if attainment of proof and revealing nature are designated as the limit of the practical principles, it means that if the establishing proof arrives, the subject of the principle is eliminated. “Every thing is permissible for you” states: everything that is doubtful for you is temporarily permissible until an establishing proof arrives contrary to it. Therefore, with the arrival of the establishing proof (the presumptive proof, the solitary report), the subject of the proof of the principle is eliminated and set aside. And this is precisely entry (wurud). What is entry? Entry means that with the arrival of the entering proof, the subject of the entered proof is eliminated. Here as well, with the arrival of the solitary report, the subject of the practical principle is eliminated. Is entry anything other than this?

When a proof like the solitary report arrives and, contrary to the import of the principle, establishes a ruling, it means it has established proof of it. Attainment of proof is the boundary of the practical principle or its finish line; because as soon as attainment of proof and the establishing proof are introduced, the subject of the practical principle is eliminated. In this manner, presumptive proofs enter the practical principles.

He continues, stating that if we accept attainment of proof as the limit of the practical principles, then even some practical principles will enter others. For instance, istishab is considered to enter principles other than itself, because istishab is an establishing principle (asl-e-muhriz), whereas exemption is not an establishing principle. It is natural that establishing principles enter non-establishing principles, because establishing principles eliminate the subject of non-establishing principles.

Of course, all of this is by devotional designation and legal effort from the Lawgiver (bi-l-ta’abbudi wa-l-‘inayati min al-shari’), whereby conditions are established such that the subject of the entered proof is negated and eliminated. Therefore, this enters that.

Thus, first, we can assert that presumptive proofs enter the practical principles.

Second, establishing practical principles like istishab also precede non-establishing principles like exemption.

This is the essence of the third formulation of entry.

Question: Does the entailment of his statement regarding subject-constitutive path-indicative certainty not mean that “until you know” (hatta ta’lama) is interpreted as “until you establish proof” (hatta tuhriz)? He states that “until you know” means “until you acquire certainty” (hatta taqta’), but since certainty in the phrasing of the narrations is expressed as a path, presumptive proofs can also substitute for certainty.

Professor: He cannot interpret knowledge as “attainment of proof” without a basis. Indeed, one of the objections to his view is that this is contrary to the apparent meaning. Neither lexicography nor custom supports this meaning… they ask: why do we interpret ta’lama as tuhriz? … The point you are raising is that knowledge and certainty are used in their literal meaning. No, he wishes to say that “until you know,” where it is mentioned as a limit in the practical principles, in light of this point we have outlined, is used in its literal meaning—meaning that just as we stated there, we state here that it is as if the presumptive proofs, as establishing proofs, take the place of ta’lama… we modify the meaning of ta’lama… that is its explanation. We cannot simply state that ta’lama means “attainment of proof.” We can say… well, that is its explanation. Why do we say ta’lama means “attainment of proof”? You cannot argue that it is used in its literal meaning, but because this substitutes for it, it is interpreted in this manner. When you assert this, it means ta’lama is no longer used in its literal meaning… that is its very meaning… We are outlining that al-Na’ini states that because istishab is an establishing principle, on this basis (according to this formulation), istishab enters the other practical principles… He also distinguishes between the establishing principle and the establishing proof. Fundamentally, we must examine whether this division of principles into establishing and non-establishing is correct or not.