Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles
Session Twenty-Eight
Preliminaries, Preliminary Nine: The Precedence of Presumptive Proofs over the Practical Principles, The Criterion for Prioritizing Presumptive Proofs, The Fourth View: Detailed Distinction, Continuation of the Discourse of Imam Khomeini, Entry of the Proofs of Presumptive Proofs over the Proofs of Istishab, Entry of the Proofs of Presumptive Proofs over the Proofs of Exemption, Government of the Rule of Completion over Istishab, Summary of Imam Khomeini’s View, The Truth in the Matter, Precedence of the Rules of Completion and Passing Past over Istishab by Way of Government, The Necessity of a Detailed Examination of Proofs to Determine the Relation of Government or Entry, The Truth in the Matter
October 21, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion concerned the fourth view regarding the rationale or criterion for prioritizing presumptive proofs (amarat) over the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah). We noted that Imam Khomeini (may Allah have mercy on him) has spoken on this matter in a detailed manner, and has outlined its rationale.
By considering the meaning and criterion of government (hukumah), alongside the requirement that the governing proof must be a verbal proof, and also taking into account that the proofs of the practical principles and those of the presumptive proofs are evaluated in comparison with each other, he formulated the relation between the proofs of the presumptive proofs and the proofs of the practical principles. This relation is sometimes entry (wurud), sometimes government, and occasionally exception (takhsis). Subsequently, he mentioned specific examples and cases.
Continuation of the Discourse of Imam Khomeini
Regarding the authority of the solitary report, he stated that the proof of the solitary report’s authority is at times the Verse of Announcement (Ayat al-Naba’) and at other times the practice of rational people (sirat al-‘uqala’). In one, the relation is government, and in the other, it is entry.
Entry of the Proofs of Presumptive Proofs over the Proofs of Istishab
He maintains that the proofs of the presumptive proofs enter (warid) the proofs of istishab (the presumption of continuity). This is because what is meant by certainty (yaqin) in the narrations of “Do not violate certainty with doubt” (La tanqud al-yaqina bi-l-shakk) is “proof” (hujjah). We previously noted that he interprets the three sound narrations (sahihah) of Zurarah, which contain “Do not violate certainty with doubt,” to mean “Do not violate a proof with a non-proof” (La tanqud al-hujjata bi-la hujjatin).
Therefore, when a presumptive proof like the solitary report is established regarding a ruling, it is a valid proof, and with the establishment of the proof, naturally no domain remains for the application of istishab, and its subject is eliminated. It is as if the proof of the authority of the presumptive proof states: the solitary report is a proof.
Of course, this statement faced an objection which we previously outlined—namely, whether the import of the narrations of istishab is fundamentally this or not. We noted that this is contrary to the apparent meaning (khilaf-e-zahir), but we outlined a justification for it. Therefore, regarding the relation of the proofs of the presumptive proofs to istishab, he argues for entry.
Entry of the Proofs of Presumptive Proofs over the Proofs of Exemption
Regarding the proofs of the presumptive proofs and the proofs of exemption (bara’ah), he also maintains that the precedence is by the criterion of entry, regardless of whether the basis of exemption is the Hadith al-Raf’ (the Narration of Lifting) or the dictate of the intellect. That is, he considers both rational exemption (al-bara’ah al-‘aqliyyah) and textual exemption (al-bara’ah al-shar’iyyah) to be entered by the proof of the presumptive proof.
The Hadith al-Raf’—namely, “Lifting what they do not know” (Rafi’u ma la ya’lamun)—requires that what you do not know is lifted. Therefore, when the presumptive proof is established regarding a ruling, it is as if that matter exits the scope of “what they do not know.” In his view, “what they do not know” means “that for which there is no proof” (ma la hujjata ‘alayh). Thus, when the presumptive proof, which is authoritative based on the proofs, is established, the subject of the principle of exemption is negated. Therefore, the proofs of the presumptive proofs enter textual exemption.
Regarding rational exemption as well, the matter stands identical in his view. The rule of “the ugliness of punishment without prior clarification” (qubh al-‘iqab bila bayan), which is the basis of rational exemption, requires that as long as no clarification and proof is established regarding something, punishment is ugly; however, when a presumptive proof is established, this constitutes a proof and clarification. Therefore, it eliminates the subject of rational exemption.
Thus, he argues for entry in relation to istishab, rational exemption, and textual exemption (rational exemption fundamentally being a point of agreement).
Government of the Rule of Completion over Istishab
He maintains that the proofs of the rules of completion (faragh) and passing past (tajawoz) govern istishab, regardless of whether we consider istishab to be a presumptive proof or a practical principle. In both cases, he states that the proofs of the rules of completion and passing past govern istishab. To explain:
1. If we consider istishab to be a presumptive proof, the rule of completion and passing past is prior. This is because, although it is true that under the assumption of its being a presumptive proof, doubt is no longer taken as a part of the subject in istishab—just as is the case in other presumptive proofs—rather, doubt is considered as a non-firm matter that is not violated by it (bima annahu amrun ghayru mubramin la yanqadhi bih). When He states “Do not violate certainty with doubt,” it means do not eliminate your certainty with a non-firm matter. When the presumptive proof is established (the presumptive proof being a firm matter), it can set aside that non-firm matter. Here, it is as if a restriction is created within the scope of the non-firm matter, and He states that the presumptive proof is not considered among the instances of doubt and non-firm matters.
But how does the proof of the rule of completion and passing past require that it precede istishab?
The import of the rule of completion and passing past is that if you have passed past the place of worship and prayer, it is as if no doubt exists regarding it; its import is “the non-existence of doubt upon passing past” (‘adam al-shay’iyyat al-shakk ma’al-tajawoz). It is true that both the rule of completion and passing past is a presumptive proof, and istishab is also a presumptive proof. It is true that in neither of them is doubt taken as a part of the subject, but a difference exists between them, which is that doubt in the rule of completion and passing past, as a presumptive proof, has absolutely no bearing; because He states that doubt after passing past the place is fundamentally as if it is not doubt. In istishab, however, doubt is taken in some manner. Therefore, the proofs of the rule of completion and passing past govern istishab.
2. If istishab is a practical principle, the proofs of the rule of completion and passing past still govern the proofs of istishab. This is because the import of the proofs of istishab is: “If you doubt, build upon certainty practically” (idha shakakta fa-bni ‘ala al-yaqini ‘amalan); it states that if you doubt, build upon certainty—meaning, apply the effects of certainty. Naturally, this certainty is path-indicative certainty, not subject-constitutive certainty.
Therefore, the subject of istishab, if it is a practical principle, consists of doubt, whereas the import of the rule of completion and passing past is the non-existence of doubt. The rule of completion and passing past states that if you have passed past the place of worship and prayer, this doubt of yours is like non-existence (ka-l-‘adam), it is not doubt. Istishab states: “If you doubt, build upon certainty.” With the existence of the proof of the rule of completion and passing past, no room remains to act upon “build upon certainty.” Therefore, the proofs of istishab, or the proof of istishab, is governed by the proof of the rule of completion and passing past.
Summary of Imam Khomeini’s View
At any rate, the summary of the Imam’s view is that we must evaluate the proofs of the presumptive proofs alongside the proofs of the practical principles, and see what the import of these two categories of proofs is. It is possible that for a single presumptive proof, one of its proofs requires government, while another proof requires entry—such as the solitary report itself, where some of its proofs require government and others require entry.
He even states: “And perhaps the proof of the principle is governing over the proof of the presumptive proof” (wa-rabbi-ma yakunu dalilu al-asli hakiman ‘ala dalili al-amarah). It is possible that in a certain instance, the proof of the principle governs the proof of the presumptive proof. This means that here, the general rule of the precedence of the presumptive proof over the principle is set aside. In a certain case, the proof of the principle may govern the proof of the presumptive proof.
Question: Meaning it is prior? That is, despite being a principle, it is prior to the presumptive proof?
Professor: Naturally, it becomes so… unless there is an obstacle. He states: when he says “perhaps the proof of the principle is governing,” yes, one of its proofs may be thus, but other proofs may not be so, and this causes a difference. Yes, if the sole proof is this governing proof, then naturally the principle governs the presumptive proof.
The Truth in the Matter
It appears that what the Imam (may Allah have mercy on him) has stated in this context is correct and true, and its rationale and cause is precisely what we have outlined—though someone might say this faces a fundamental, premise-based objection.
Of course, considering his three points at the beginning of the discussion, he stated:
First: The criterion of government is the addressing and overseeing of one proof in relation to another proof—a “manner of addressing.”
Second: When we wish to compare the presumptive proofs and the principles in terms of precedence and subsequence, we must evaluate their proofs.
Third: The governing proof can only be verbal.
Committing to a detailed distinction is inevitable.
True, someone might say: the criterion of government is fundamentally not this. Or they might say: the governing proof does not necessarily have to be verbal. In that case, they might find a way to escape the detailed distinction. However, if we take these three points into account—and indeed the correct view is exactly this—then the detailed distinction is correct. Wherever, for example, a proof does not address another proof or is not verbal, we cannot raise the issue of government there. It is clear that the practice of rational people and the conduct of rational people, or the dictate of the intellect, which are non-verbal proofs (dalil labbi), according to the point we have outlined, can never govern a principle; because they are fundamentally not verbal.
Even if we do not accept the premise that the governing proof must be verbal, and we assert that the governing proof can also be non-verbal, we still cannot assert, regarding the practice of rational people, consensus, and the intellect as bases for the presumptive proof, that they govern the proofs of the practical principles. This is because another problem exists, namely, the lack of addressing of these proofs in relation to the proofs of the practical principles. We stated that the primary criterion of government is that the governing proof must address the governed proof.
But can you really accept that the practice of rational people oversees and addresses the scriptural proofs—for example, the proof of “Do not violate certainty with doubt”? Fundamentally, addressing and overseeing are meaningful within a verbal proof. At one time, you might say: in government, this addressing and overseeing are not required. But this is an invalid statement. In government, we must absolutely take into account the addressing and overseeing of one proof in relation to another.
Question: This is based on the premise; meaning we can say: rational people consider the solitary report to be knowledge, and this causes the expansion of knowledge in the governed proof.
Professor: If there is no addressing, can you? The criterion of government is the addressing and overseeing of the governing proof in relation to the governed proof. Can we argue for government while one proof possesses absolutely no addressing or overseeing in relation to the other proof? … It differs. Why? This differs… my discussion is precisely at this point.
See, some say government consists of the addressing and overseeing of one proof in relation to another proof. That is, they see the identity of government in this addressing and overseeing. They consider this qualification of addressing and overseeing to be the constituent of the essence of government. If someone asserts this, but nevertheless states that the governing proof does not necessarily have to be verbal, and can be a non-verbal proof—our interlocutors are this category. We say: how can this be? How can a proof that is not verbal (it is non-verbal, like the practice of rational people) govern another proof, while this criterion of addressing is also present in it? Meaning both that it addresses it and that it is not verbal… does this objection apply to this category or not?
Therefore, we cannot commit on one hand to the requirement that in government, the issue of overseeing and addressing is valid, and on the other hand state that the verbal nature of the proof has no bearing. One cannot commit to both of these. Is this objection valid? … Do you accept this? Wait… our assumption is that addressing exists. … We are raising an objection against this. … On one hand, we say it is impossible for someone to state that the criterion of government is the addressing and overseeing of one proof in relation to another—a “manner of addressing”—but at the same time, reject the verbal nature of the governing proof and state that it does not necessarily have to be verbal.
Now let us proceed to the other claim. You say it is possible for someone to state that the proof does not necessarily have to be verbal, and also that the governing proof does not necessarily have to address and oversee the governed proof. Yes; if someone asserts this, naturally this objection does not apply to him. But let us proceed to the core of these two premises:
First: Is it necessary for the proof to be verbal or not? We say that if we consider the issue of addressing and overseeing to be valid, the proof must absolutely be verbal. Therefore, we must first examine that first premise: is addressing and overseeing valid in the governing proof, or in other words, in the realization of government? We say: yes, because government is not realized without it. Without this condition, we possess no governing or governed… they say this is government… it cannot be government… if it is on the side of restriction, this becomes entry… this expansion is not existential. Rather, it is by way of legal effort and devotional designation. For example, when they say “this is a clarification” (hadha bayan), does this actually exclude it from “no clarification” (la bayan)? Does it actually exit? …
It is for this very reason that we object that legal assimilation is incorrect… well, it is not… your mind has become accustomed to the idea that, for example, the practice of rational people can also expand or restrict the subject, encompass it, or exclude it… fundamentally, when we say… rational people are not like this, they do not perform legal assimilation… indeed, we cannot accept an incorrect premise; we cannot possess an incorrect premise.
At any rate, the correct view is exactly what the Imam has stated, and in our view, this statement is acceptable.
The Topic of the Next Session
The tenth preliminary concerns the establishing and non-establishing principles; meaning that the practical principles are divided into two categories: establishing principles (al-usul al-muhrizah) and non-establishing principles (al-usul al-ghayr al-muhrizah).