Preliminaries, Preliminary Ten: The Division of the Practical Principles into Establishing and Non-Establishing Principles
Session Thirty
Preliminaries, Preliminary Ten: The Division of the Practical Principles into Establishing and Non-Establishing Principles, The Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, The Characteristics of Intuitive Knowledge, The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Characteristics, Applying the Four Characteristics to Presumptive Proofs and Practical Principles
October 25, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion concerned the tenth preliminary among the preliminaries of the practical principles (al-usul al-amaliyyah), which is the division of the practical principles into establishing principles (al-usul al-muhrizah) and non-establishing principles (al-usul al-ghayr al-muhrizah). We noted that this division was first introduced by al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, and the terminology of establishing and non-establishing principles is among his innovations.
The Discourse of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini
Before we proceed to any interpretation of these two divisions of the principles, it is appropriate to first quote the words of the great scholar himself; subsequently, we will analyze whether his statement is sufficiently clear and expressive or not. If it is not, what possibilities can be mentioned regarding it, or what understandings and interpretations of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s statement have been made?
Most importantly, different phrasings have been transmitted from him based on what is recorded in Ajwad al-Taqrirat and Fawa’id al-Usul. Therefore, due to the ambiguity in his phrasings, the different transmissions of his words in the two transcripts, other phrasings of his in other sections, and the interpretations made of his statement, this issue has become somewhat complex. For example, Shahid Sadr attributes a certain view to al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, claiming that al-Na’ini expressed a specific point; whereas others strongly deny this, believing that he did not state such a thing or that his objective was not that. Thus, before anything else, it is appropriate to quote and analyze al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s words.
The Characteristics of Intuitive Knowledge
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, according to what is recorded in Fawa’id al-Usul, outlines several characteristics for intuitive knowledge (al-‘ilm al-takwini) and personal certainty. In his view, when a person acquires certainty regarding something and attains knowledge and conviction, this certainty possesses four characteristics:
Certainty is a psychological attribute and state; meaning that a state arises within the horizon of the person’s soul such that they see everything clearly and manifestly. When it is said that certainty is light, the meaning is “light in itself” (nurun li-nafsih); meaning it possesses inherent illumination and contains no point of ambiguity or darkness. This characteristic is sometimes taken as the subject of a ruling or a religious effect.
As I noted previously, subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological attributes (al-qat’ wa-l-yaqin ‘ala wajh al-sifatiyyah) is sometimes taken as the subject of a religious ruling. For example, in certain cases, knowledge and certainty are considered the axis for the tracing of a religious effect for the judge; they say the judge’s knowledge (‘ilm al-qadi) or the judge’s certainty has such an effect. In that context, subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological attributes is intended. They state that if the judge acquires certainty, he can act upon his certainty and issue a verdict. This is within religious matters.
In customary matters, it may also be said: if someone discovers the answer to a riddle, we will give them such a prize. Or if someone acquires knowledge of a formula and achieves or discovers something, we will give them a prize. This is an effect. Therefore, one of the characteristics of certainty is that, as a psychological state and attribute, it possesses illumination and light within the horizon of the person’s soul, leaving no ambiguity regarding its object. Nothing else can substitute for subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological attributes. Even presumptive proofs (amarat), although they yield authoritative conjecture, cannot substitute for subject-constitutive certainty by way of psychological attributes. This characteristic is unique to certainty itself.
Certainty reveals actual reality (kashif ‘an al-waqi’) and performs the discovery of reality. Here too, certainty and conviction themselves are intended, but not from the perspective of their establishment within the horizon of the soul (which erases darkness and makes everything visible), but rather because they show actual reality and reveal reality. In this context, the aspect of the psychological attribute is not intended; rather, the aspect of revealing reality is what is important. Ultimately, when a person acquires certainty regarding something, even if this certainty is contrary to reality and is of the nature of compound ignorance (al-jahl al-murakkab), it nevertheless claims to reveal reality. Even if it has erred in conforming to reality, it nevertheless possesses that aspect of revealing.
This characteristic requires that other things possessing this characteristic can substitute for knowledge and certainty. If we assert that the aspect of revealing reality is considered in presumptive proofs, and fundamentally presumptive proofs have been validated because they reveal reality, then they can substitute for certainty. Of course, it is true that conjecture does not always and one-hundred percent conform to reality (unlike certainty where, at least in the view of the certain person, they have reached reality); however, at any rate, the probability of their conforming to reality is greater than other than themselves, and therefore the Lawgiver completes this revealing aspect. He refers to this as the “completion of the revealing value” (tatmim al-kashf).
The Lawgiver states: treat this significant probability of the presumptive proof’s conforming to reality as complete, and build upon the premise that it shows you reality. This completion of the revealing value is present in presumptive proofs.
However, the same is not true for the practical principles, as we will subsequently explain what difference exists between the practical principles and presumptive proofs, and subsequently outline al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s formulation regarding the difference between establishing and non-establishing principles.
Certainty entails practical conduct (al-jary al-‘amali); meaning that when a person acquires certainty regarding something, they act upon their certainty. For example, someone who is thirsty and is ignorant of whether water exists or not does not perform any movement, even if they die of thirst; because they do not know that water exists a hundred meters away. Therefore, this thirst may continue until it leads to destruction.
However, as soon as they acquire knowledge and certainty, they act upon their knowledge. Certainty and knowledge entail practical conduct. If the thirsty person knows that water exists fifty meters away, they rise and, despite their weakness and exhaustion, proceed toward it to rescue themselves from thirst.
Actual and intuitive knowledge and certainty are excusing (mu’adhdhir) and binding (munajjiz). That is, if a person possesses knowledge of an obligation, this obligation becomes binding in their regard; meaning that in conforming to it, reward is traced, and in violating it, punishment is traced. And it is excusing; meaning that if it does not conform to reality and errs, this is considered an excuse for them. It establishes an excuse. Ultimately, knowledge of a binding obligation or knowledge of the non-existence of a binding obligation possess entirely distinct effects. At any rate, knowledge is both excusing and binding.
Applying the Four Characteristics to Presumptive Proofs and Practical Principles
We must now examine whether these characteristics we have outlined for knowledge and certainty exist in the case of presumptive proofs and practical principles or not.
The first characteristic certainly does not exist in either.
The second characteristic, which is the aspect of revealing, exists in presumptive proofs. Therefore, the Lawgiver has reinforced this revealing aspect, stating: build upon the premise that its revealing value is complete; just as certainty is a real revelation, this is also placed as a real revelation.
However, in the practical principles, this is not the case. The practical principles do not possess any aspect of revealing reality; because their subject is doubt. When we say doubt, it means that one does not know and is equally poised regarding its existence or non-existence. Let us see whether something of this nature can substitute for certainty or can fundamentally be revealing?
Fundamentally, since the practical principle does not possess revealing value, how can its revelation substitute for certainty? Is it not the case that the subject of the practical principle is doubt, and therefore revealing reality has no meaning in relation to it? Therefore, anything that does not possess a manifest and clear psychological state cannot reveal actual reality. This is the nature of the practical principle.
But do the last two characteristics—namely, the enjoining of practical conduct, and being excusing and binding—exist in the presumptive proof and the practical principle? These two characteristics (which, including the first, make three of these four characteristics) exist in presumptive proofs. Only the first characteristic is absent in presumptive proofs. In the case of the practical principle, neither the first nor the second exists. But what of these last two characteristics in relation to the practical principles? Do they exist or not?
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states: the practical principles are of two types: one category consists of establishing practical principles, and the other consists of non-establishing practical principles; establishing practical principles like istishab, and non-establishing ones like exemption (bara’ah). What is the difference between these two?
On the surface, we can derive from the word ‘establishing’ (muhriz) that istishab is a principle that establishes [reality], whereas exemption is a principle in which the aspect of establishing is absent.
The first question that may arise in your minds is: if the aspect of establishing exists in istishab, then what difference does it have with the presumptive proof? You state that the presumptive proof also establishes reality and reveals reality. What does this ‘attainment of proof’ (ihraz) fundamentally mean? When we say a principle establishes, what does it mean? And if ‘attainment of proof’ in this commonly understood sense is intended, what difference does it have with the presumptive proof? And what characteristic do those principles in which this aspect of establishing is absent lack?
What can be stated is that istishab possesses practical establishment (ihraz ‘amali), i.e., enjoining practical conduct. That is, the Lawgiver has validated it in such a way that you act in accordance with it, but He has never designated it as revealing. That is, He has not stated, for example: treat the conclusion of istishab as conjecture or place it as knowledge; rather, it means: “Act as though you are certain” (i’mal ka-annaka mutayaqqin), act in such a way as if you possess certainty. He does not say: build upon the premise that you possess certainty; rather, what is meant is that place your action like the action of a certain person.
Note two points regarding establishing principles:
Some of the practical principles, like istishab, are establishing, but not in the sense of the ‘attainment of proof’ present in presumptive proofs. That is the attainment of proof regarding actual reality, whereas this is practical establishment. Subsequently, they explain what practical establishment means. Establishing practical principles do not possess any aspect of revealing actual reality, unlike presumptive proofs. Therefore, the ‘attainment of proof’ we speak of regarding the presumptive proof is different from the ‘attainment of proof’ we speak of regarding the practical principles. Thus, there is no room for the objection: if some practical principles are establishing, then what is their difference with the presumptive proof?
He states: this attainment of proof is not cognitive/epistemic (‘ilmi) establishment, but practical establishment; or the enjoining of practical conduct. That is, some principles enjoin practical conduct. However, non-establishing principles do not possess even this.
Therefore, these two characteristics we mentioned for establishing principles do not exist in any of the non-establishing principles like exemption, choice (takhyir), and textual precaution (al-ihtiyat al-shar’i). That is, they do not possess the aspect of establishing, nor do they enjoin practical conduct. Therefore, they possess neither attainment of proof nor do they enjoin practical conduct; rather, the Lawgiver, in these cases, has seemingly legislated an apparent ruling (hukm zahiri) so that the mukallaf knows their duty in the context of doubt regarding the obligation.
He does not wish to say, for example, that exemption reveals reality; He does not wish to say that exemption enjoins practical conduct; He does not wish to say that exemption establishes reality; He does not wish to say: “act as though you are certain” (as He stated in istishab). Enjoining practical conduct in the case of istishab means “act as though you are certain”; in the case of exemption, there is not even this to say “act as though you are not obligated.” No, here He merely states: since you doubt the obligation, this is sufficient for you not to act; no obligation lies upon you. This is merely an apparent ruling.
Therefore, in the view of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, the practical principles are of two types: establishing practical principles and non-establishing practical principles. The difference between these two is completely clear. The difference between establishing practical principles and presumptive proofs is clear. The difference between presumptive proofs and certainty is clear. As you have observed, all of these are completely demarcated; their definitions and the way to recognize them are completely distinct.
The Topic of the Next Session
This was the summary of al-Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s statement. Now, what part of this statement is ambiguous? Where is its compendiousness? This must be explained. How does it differ from some statements he expressed in other chapters? What understandings have been derived from this statement? These are matters we must discuss.