Preliminaries, Tenth Preliminary: Division of Practical Principles into Confirmative (Muhriz) and Non-Confirmative (Non-Muhriz)

Session Thirty-two

Preliminaries – Tenth Preliminary: Division of Practical Principles into Confirmative (Muhriz) and Non-Confirmative (Non-Muhriz) – Ambiguities and Challenges in the Words of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini – Primary Axes of Ambiguity in the Words of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini – Difference Between Confirmative and Non-Confirmative Principles – Sevenfold Hypotheses

October 27, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

The discussion was centered on confirmative principles (al-usul al-muhrizah) and their distinction from non-confirmative principles. We quoted the words of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini and explained the complexities and ambiguities present in his discourse.

We noted that not only do the expressions of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini vary across his own books, but there are also discrepancies between what is stated in Fawa’id al-Usul and what is recorded in Ajwad al-Taqrirat. Furthermore, the interpretations offered for these statements differ significantly; some scholars have even claimed that Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini recanted his original position on certain aspects of this issue.

Primary Axes of Ambiguity in the Words of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini

At any rate, the main axes where the discourse of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini is shrouded in ambiguity and complexity are several:

1. The Nature of the Legislated Element (al-Maj’ul): What is fundamentally the legislated element in Practical Principles, both confirmative and non-confirmative? In one place, Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini states it is “practical implementation” (al-jary al-amali). In another place, he defines it as “intermediacy in proof” (al-wasatiyyah fi al-ithbat). Then, in distinguishing between confirmative and non-confirmative principles, he asserts that a confirmative principle is “practical implementation based on the assumption that it is the actual reality,” whereas a non-confirmative principle lacks this assumption. This constitutes the first axis: what is the actual legislated element in Practical Principles according to Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini?
2. The Meaning of Practical Implementation: What does “practical application” or “practical implementation” (al-jary al-amali) actually mean? If we maintain that the legislated element in Practical Principles is practical implementation, does this refer to the actual action performed by the duty-bound (mukallaf)—since application and implementation are actions of the duty-bound—or does it refer to the obligation and necessity established here?
3. The Nature of Practical Attainment: In distinguishing between confirmative principles and Indicative evidences (Amarat), he states: “Attainment (ihraz) in Indicative evidences is cognitive attainment, whereas in Practical Principles, it is practical attainment.” What does practical attainment mean? Is practical attainment identical to practical implementation and application, or is it something else?

These are the axes that have created difficulties in uncovering the intent and objective of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini. Therefore, we must examine whether it is fundamentally possible to reconcile and harmonize these statements.

We mentioned that some scholars believe Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini completely recanted the view that the legislated element in Practical Principles is practical application and implementation. That is, he arrived at the view that the import of confirmative principles, like Indicative evidences (Amarat), is “intermediacy in proof,” but qualified “from the perspective of practical implementation.” To distinguish between attainment in Indicative evidences and attainment in confirmative principles, he added this qualification: “from the perspective of practical implementation.” Otherwise, in both cases, the legislated element according to him is “intermediacy in proof.” Thus, practical attainment means intermediacy in proof from the perspective of practical implementation. Consequently, Practical Principles do not concern themselves with actual reality at all; they do not mirror reality. The “attainment” he mentioned as an attribute for a specific class of principles is, in fact, understood in this very sense: practical attainment.

We will not delve further into the details of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini’s expressions and the methods of reconciling them, as this would be highly time-consuming and is not strictly necessary.

4. The Concept of Assumption of Equivalence (Tanzil): One of the axes I previously alluded to but did not elaborate on extensively concerns the concept of assumption of equivalence (tanzil) itself. Does Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini accept tanzil at all, or not? We read some of his expressions; some of these statements refer to the issue of tanzil, and it is certain that some scholars have attributed this view to him. Conversely, others deny it, claiming he does not accept tanzil at all and that there is no tanzil involved. This is a matter of debate. Regarding whether Practical Principles or Indicative evidences (Amarat) are treated as equivalent to something else, we might say he accepts tanzil in the case of Indicative evidences but not in the case of Practical Principles.

The question then arises: what happens to the distinction between confirmative and non-confirmative principles? The issue of tanzil itself is highly debated. Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani has an extensive discussion on this in Nihayat al-Dirayah. The late Ayatollah al-Khoei, who was a student of both (primarily of al-Na’ini), has statements regarding tanzil that are also somewhat ambiguous. In one place, he refers to it as “submission to knowledge and certainty,” and in another, he terms it “tanzil.” Is the intent of tanzil identical to submission (ta’abbud) or not?

In short, such difficulties exist within the views and opinions of these scholars. These challenges are particularly pronounced in certain areas, naturally rendering the subject matter highly complex.

Difference Between Confirmative and Non-Confirmative Principles

Regardless of these three or four axes that require investigation within the words of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini—as the innovator of the division of Practical Principles into confirmative and non-confirmative—we wish to see how many hypotheses can be formulated from these statements. Ultimately, what is the difference between confirmative and non-confirmative principles? How should we define their difference? Should we say that in confirmative principles there is practical attainment, whereas in non-confirmative principles there is no attainment at all? Meaning, one is practical application and implementation, while the other merely outlines a duty and an apparent ruling for the duty-bound?

The Sevenfold Hypotheses

We can outline several hypotheses regarding the difference between confirmative and non-confirmative principles. Some of these hypotheses are present in the words of the late al-Na’ini himself, while others are not.

Accordingly, we can generally categorize these hypotheses into two groups:

• The first group is derived from the expressions of the late al-Na’ini himself; for instance, several interpretations can be proposed regarding the meaning of practical application and implementation.
• The second group of hypotheses is independent of the expressions, terms, and vocabulary used by the late al-Na’ini. We will enumerate the views and hypotheses in a general manner. The reason I mentioned that several hypotheses exist here (regardless of whether Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini stated them or whether his expressions can accommodate them) is that, following these discussions, we want to see what the difference between a confirmative and a non-confirmative principle ultimately rests upon, and on which axis we should focus. Therefore, we mention these hypotheses, whether they are found in the words of al-Na’ini and can be applied to them or not.

The First Hypothesis

One hypothesis is that a confirmative principle is one in which the duty-bound is commanded to apply the effects of certainty, whereas a non-confirmative principle is one in which the duty-bound is not commanded to apply the effects of certainty. To explain:

In Indicative evidences (Amarat), the assumption is that the aspect of revealing reality (kashfiyyah), path-indicativeness (tariqiyyah), and the substitution of speculative probability (zann) for knowledge (ilm) is prominent. It is as if the duty-bound is commanded to act in accordance with this very knowledge that has been established submissionally (ta’abbudan) toward reality (though it is not actual knowledge); to the extent that it possesses path-indicativeness toward reality, he is commanded to act upon it.

However, this is not the case in Practical Principles; the issue of path-indicativeness toward reality plays no role whatsoever. Nonetheless, it is said here that if there is a command to apply the effects of certainty—such as in the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab)—it becomes a confirmative principle. Note that when the evidence for a confirmative principle like Istishab states, “Do not violate certainty with doubt,” it means: apply the same effects now that you previously applied when you had certainty. In other words, do not let your doubt prevent you from applying those effects. “Do not violate certainty with doubt” is actually commanding—via a path-indicative (tariqi) command, not an intrinsic (nafsi) one—the application of the effects of knowledge and certainty. Conversely, in non-confirmative principles, such as Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), there is absolutely no command to apply the effects of certainty. When you negate an obligation from yourself through Bara’ah, it does not mean you are being commanded to act as if you had certainty. No, such a concept does not exist in non-confirmative principles; rather, it merely provides an apparent permission (tarkhis zahiri). It states that you are apparently permitted with respect to this duty.

The Second Hypothesis

The second hypothesis is that in confirmative principles, we are seemingly commanded to apply all the effects of reality, whereas in non-confirmative principles, the command is to apply only some of the effects of reality. The difference between this hypothesis and the previous one is clear: the former was a command to apply the effects of certainty, while this one is a command to apply the effects of reality. The former said “apply the effects of certainty,” meaning a confirmative principle is one through which the effects of certainty are applied, but according to this hypothesis, the effects of reality are applied. Let us provide an example: suppose the Lawgiver states that when ritual ablution (wudu) is not obligatory upon you, dry ablution (tayammum) becomes obligatory. A sick person who cannot perform wudu is naturally obligated to perform tayammum. Now, if we doubt whether wudu is obligatory or not, we apply the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) to the non-obligation of the subject matter, and consequently, all the effects of the non-obligation of wudu are applied. One of these effects is that you do not have to perform wudu and can perform tayammum instead, because the Lawgiver said: if wudu is not obligatory, “tayammum is obligatory upon you.” This constitutes all the effects; meaning both the obligatoriness of tayammum and the non-obligatoriness of wudu are established.

However, in Bara’ah, the matter is not so. Through Bara’ah, only one effect is established. If you negate the obligatoriness of wudu through Bara’ah, only the first part—that wudu is not obligatory upon you—is established. But whether tayammum is obligatory or not cannot be established by this, because Bara’ah is not a confirmative principle; it is merely a principle that excuses us, keeping us away from the doubted duty.

Thus, according to the second hypothesis, the difference between a confirmative principle and a non-confirmative principle is that in a confirmative principle, the duty is to apply all the effects of reality, whereas in a non-confirmative principle, it is to apply some of the effects, not all.

The Third Hypothesis

This hypothesis is found in the words of some scholars, such as the late Ayatollah al-Khoei, or within the words of the late al-Na’ini himself. In confirmative principles, the assumption of equivalence (tanzil) is introduced—treating something as equivalent to knowledge (tanzil manzilat al-ilm), which is submission to something that is not actually knowledge but is treated as such. However, this is not the case in non-confirmative principles.

The Fourth Hypothesis

The fourth hypothesis is that confirmative principles involve two levels of submission (ta’abbud), whereas non-confirmative principles involve only one level of submission. Why do confirmative principles have two levels of submission and non-confirmative principles only one? For example, when we perform Istishab of ritual purity (taharah)—because we previously had certainty of purity, then doubted it, and subsequently applied Istishab of purity—through this Istishab, we submit to an apparent purity, allowing us to perform prayers with it. This is one level of submission. There is also another level of submission, which is that this purity is treated as the actual purity; meaning, just as actual purity had certain effects, this also possesses those effects.

In non-confirmative principles, however, there is only one level of submission, which is the submission to that purity as an apparent ruling. But that the effects of actual purity should be applied to it, or to say we submit to this purity being the actual purity, cannot be understood from it. For instance, if we consider the Principle of Purity (Qaidat al-Taharah) or the Principle of Halalness (Qaidat al-Hilliyyah) as a practical principle, can we apply all the effects of actual purity to it on the basis that it establishes an apparent purity or apparent halalness? No; the only thing obtained through the Principle of Halalness is exemption (bara’ah), and the only thing obtained is submission to halalness—this is the single instance of submission. But submission to the application of the effects of halalness—submitting that the very effects of actual halalness are applied here as well—cannot be derived from it. This is what constitutes a non-confirmative principle. We can do this in confirmative principles, but it is not possible in non-confirmative principles.

Of course, other hypotheses exist here as well. These hypotheses we have mentioned can be considered in themselves, independent of the words of Muhaqqiq al-Na’ini, or by taking them into account. The very fact that practical application and implementation have been stated as the meaning of a confirmative principle—if we analyze this (keeping in mind that application is the action of the duty-bound)—means we cannot intend the physical action of the duty-bound itself; rather, we must say that the obligation and necessity of practical application and implementation are intended. What does this mean? Practical application, meaning aligning one’s action with the dictate of the principle, is obligatory. What does it mean for it to be obligatory to align one’s action with the dictate of the principle? Does it mean applying the effects? Does it mean we must have two levels of submission here? Or does it mean that very path-indicative command we referred to?

In any case, given that various hypotheses exist regarding confirmative and non-confirmative principles, which one is correct? Which of these hypotheses is most aligned with the view of the innovator of this division, or which of these hypotheses is correct and which is incorrect?