Preliminaries, Tenth Preliminary: Division of Practical Principles into Confirmative and Non-Confirmative
Session Thirty-three
Preliminaries – Tenth Preliminary: Division of Practical Principles into Confirmative and Non-Confirmative – Summary of the Difference between Confirmative and Non-Confirmative Principles – The Seven Hypotheses – Fifth Hypothesis – Sixth Hypothesis – Seventh Hypothesis – Analysis of the First Hypothesis – Analysis of the Second Hypothesis – Analysis of the Third Hypothesis – Analysis of the Fourth Hypothesis
October 28, 2025
Continuation of the Discussion on the Seven Hypotheses
We have previously stated that, in general, regarding the meaning of confirmative (muhriz) and non-confirmative (ghayr-i muhriz) principles, and the definition and interpretation of these two categories of principles, several hypotheses exist. Some of these hypotheses are derived from the statements of the founder of this discussion, namely Mirza Na’ini, while others are not found in his words, and his expressions may not even support them. Therefore, regardless of whether the words of Mirza Na’ini can accommodate these hypotheses, several possibilities are raised here. We explained four hypotheses in the previous session, and three other hypotheses remain. We will mention these three hypotheses here and then analyze which of them holds preference.
The Fifth Hypothesis
The fifth hypothesis is that a confirmative principle is one in which the requirement of practical implementation (al-jary al-amali) is legislated. However, in non-confirmative principles, practical implementation or the requirement of practical implementation does not exist. If practical implementation occurs and the action is conformed to the dictate of the principle, it will be a confirmative principle. But if practical implementation is absent and there is no conformity of action to the dictate, but rather it is merely an apparent duty (al-wazifah al-zahariyyah) and a prescriptive obligation to which one must adhere at the time of doubt, this will be a non-confirmative principle.
Naturally, the difference between the Practical Principles according to this hypothesis and Indicative evidences (Amarat) is also clear; because in the latter, the issue of practical implementation is not raised at all, but rather it is based on the reality or is a discoverer of the reality (al-kashifiyyah). However, here, the issue of conformity of action or practical implementation is what is being proposed.
The Sixth Hypothesis
Confirmative principles are those in which both practical implementation and acting upon the reality (al-bina’ ala al-waqi’) exist. That is, in confirmative principles, there is practical implementation and conformity of action to the dictate, but there is also a practical assumption of the reality. This does not mean actual discovery of the reality (al-kashifiyyah), but rather a practical assumption of the reality. This expression appears in the words of the late Na’ini himself:
“And it is the practical implementation and assumption of the reality (wa huwa al-jary wa al-bina’ al-amali ala al-waqi’)”; meaning the practical assumption of the establishment of the reality.
However, in non-confirmative principles, the practical implementation is based on something else:
“The practical implementation and assumption based on one of the two sides of the doubt (al-jary wa al-bina’ al-amali ala ahad tarafay al-shakk)”; meaning we no longer have a practical assumption of the reality, but rather a practical assumption of one of the two sides of the doubt.
This point is explained in the book and is the exact expression of Mirza Na’ini.
What is the difference between these two? When we say practical implementation and assumption of the establishment of the reality, it means that practically, one assumes that it is the reality. This is different from discovery of the reality. However, non-confirmative principles, such as Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), are merely practical implementation and assumption, but based on one of the two sides of doubt. In Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), the practical implementation is carried out on the negation of obligation, which is one of the two sides of doubt; because one side is the obligation and the other side is the non-obligation. Here, the practical assumption is based on non-obligation. Or, for example, in precaution (ihtiyat), the practical assumption is based on the establishment of the obligation, and on the opposite side is non-obligation. In precaution, one side of the doubt is preferred and made the subject of practical assumption, which is the establishment of the obligation, whereas in Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), the practical assumption is based on non-obligation, which is also one side of the doubt.
The Seventh Hypothesis
The seventh hypothesis is that, in general, neither in confirmative nor in non-confirmative principles is practical implementation intended. That is, in confirmative practical principles, just like non-confirmative ones, conformity and practical implementation are not legislated. However, in non-confirmative principles, only the practical assumption of one of the two sides of doubt is intended. It is as if they say: assume practically one of the two sides of doubt. But in confirmative principles, we assume that one of the two sides is the actual reality.
Analysis of the Seven Hypotheses
If we want to take what the scholars have said as the standard, and extract other hypotheses from their expressions from the perspective of conceptual possibility (maqam al-thubut), we can mention even more than these. These are the cases that have been raised in the discussions, or some expressions point toward these hypotheses.
Certainly, some of these hypotheses, as we have said several times, cannot be derived from the expressions of Mirza Na’ini; but other parts of his words can be utilized. In total, these seven hypotheses have been mentioned here. But let us see whether these hypotheses are indeed all independent of one another and cannot be reduced to each other, or if we can say that if we analyze these seven hypotheses carefully, some return to others; the reality and essence of these hypotheses are not separate from each other.
Then, after reducing these hypotheses, let us see which hypothesis we can accept and for which we can find at least some proof in the stage of proof (maqam al-ithbat). This is because some of these hypotheses have no problem regarding conceptual possibility (thubut), but in the stage of proof (ithbat), there is no evidence for them, and they remain merely a hypothesis. We must see whether the proofs have the capacity to indicate this hypothesis or not.
Analysis of the First Hypothesis
According to the first hypothesis, a confirmative principle is a principle according to which the legally responsible person (mukallaf) is commanded to apply the effects of certainty. That is, it is as if the evidence for the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) has a path-bound (tariqi) command to apply the effects of certainty and conviction, saying: just as if you had certainty, a series of effects would be applied to it, now that you doubt, I command you to apply those same effects. However, from a non-confirmative principle, such a path-bound command to apply the effects of certainty is not understood; rather, it is merely an apparent permission (al-tarkhis al-zahari) in Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) and an apparent obligation (al-wujub al-zahari) in precaution (ihtiyat), and that is all; it is an apparent ruling, whether it is permission or obligation.
This hypothesis is indeed derived from the words of Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi. Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi, in the position of explaining the difference between an Indicative evidence (Amarah) and a principle, pointed to this. But we must see if there is any evidence for this hypothesis. Do the proofs indicate such a hypothesis? For example, in “Do not violate certainty with doubt” (la tanqud al-yaqin bi-al-shakk), when it says do not violate certainty with doubt, does this actually mean you are commanded to apply the effects of certainty? Or does it want to say that if you have doubt, consider yourself as having certainty during the state of doubt?
Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi himself, and in some places Mirza Na’ini, pointed out that generally, when the mukallaf implements a principle, they must apply the effects of certainty, and they did not differentiate between confirmative and non-confirmative principles.
Therefore, it seems that the main problem with this hypothesis is that:
- First: From the perspective of the proofs, we cannot deduce this; meaning in the stage of proof (ithbat), there is no evidence for it.
- Second: Even if this hypothesis did not have such a problem, we can at least say it is incompatible with Na’ini’s expressions. Now, others might have had such a meaning in mind, like Muhaqqiq al-Iraqi himself; but even if that is the case, its problem is what we mentioned: ultimately, in the stage of proof, there is no evidence for us to say, for example, “Do not violate certainty with doubt” means apply the effects of certainty to doubt.
Analysis of the Second Hypothesis
The second hypothesis was that the import of confirmative principles is to apply all the effects of reality; whereas the import of non-confirmative principles is to apply some of the effects.
I will explain the meaning of all effects or some effects to you through an explanation mentioned here by Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified). Regarding confirmative principles, Imam says we have two categories of confirmative principles: 1. Absolute confirmative principles, 2. Aspectual (haythi) confirmative principles. For the first, he gives the example of the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab), and for the second, he gives the example of the Rule of Completion (qa’idat al-faragh) and Passing (al-tajawuz). He says: this is an aspectual confirmative principle. For example, one who applies the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) to the continuation of ritual purity (wudu), all of its legal effects are applied (excluding intellectual effects). The legal effects are functional both for the validity of the prayer performed before this and for the subsequent prayer. For instance, someone has performed the Dhuhr prayer and doubts about their wudu between the two prayers—doubting in purity in this sense. When they reflect, they see that they had purity and wudu beforehand, so they apply the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) to the continuation of wudu. The result of this Istishab is that the Dhuhr prayer they performed is valid. It has another result as well, which is that with this same Istishab, they can perform the Asr prayer; they no longer need to go and perform wudu. Thus, all effects are applied.
However, regarding the Rule of Completion and Passing, if someone doubts about their wudu between two prayers, if they want to act based on the Rule of Completion and Passing, the Rule of Completion and Passing validates the Dhuhr prayer, but they cannot perform the Asr prayer without wudu based on it. Therefore, the Rule of Passing is an aspectual confirmative principle; because it only has an effect from the aspect of the past action. The Postulate of Continuity (Istishab) is effective from all aspects, not from a specific aspect; it validates both the previous prayer and the subsequent one.
Can we accept this hypothesis or not? Regarding the difference between an Indicative evidence (Amarah) and a principle, we can say that in Indicative evidences (Amarat), certainty is legislated and the aspect of discovering the reality exists in them, but in Practical Principles, it is not so. Therefore, this hypothesis, although it has fewer problems than the first hypothesis, still perhaps cannot be viewed as an acceptable hypothesis.
It is true that in the expressions of Mirza Na’ini, in some places, it says “based on the assumption that it is the reality” (bina’an ala annahu huwa al-waqi’) and he says: let us assume that this is the reality, but it is not clear that the effects are meant. Discovery of the reality (al-kashifiyyah) is also definitely not meant; because the aspect of discovery, according to this hypothesis, does not exist in Practical Principles at all. However, we do not reject this absolutely for now, so let this hypothesis remain until we analyze the other hypotheses and see what the truth is in this matter.
Analysis of the Third Hypothesis
The third hypothesis, which is derived from some of the words of the late Mirza Na’ini and the late Al-Khoei, is “treating something as occupying the status of knowledge” (tanzil manzilat al-ilm), which itself can be interpreted in several ways. That is, something that is not knowledge is treated as occupying the status of knowledge. However, non-confirmative principles are not such that they are treated as occupying the status of knowledge.
The problem with this hypothesis is that the language of the proofs is not the language of treating one thing as another (tanzil). Although many believe that this is tanzil—the late Sheikh Ansari considers this to be of the nature of tanzil, but he says it is treating something as occupying the status of the remover (tanzil manzilat al-rafi’), and some like Na’ini himself said it is treating something as occupying the status of reality (tanzil manzilat al-waqi’). These are different from each other. But ultimately, that something is treated as occupying the status of and replacing another thing must be understood from the proofs. We must derive this characteristic and this aspect from the proofs. Therefore, the third hypothesis is also perhaps incomplete.
Analysis of the Fourth Hypothesis
The fourth hypothesis was that in confirmative principles like the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab), we have two instances of legislated submission (ta’abbud), whereas in non-confirmative principles, there is no more than one instance of legislated submission. We explained this; we said those two instances of submission are: first, submission to the principle of purity as an apparent ruling; and second, that this is the very same real purity. Thus, two instances of submission exist in confirmative principles, but in non-confirmative principles, there is one submission, which is the submission to purity as an apparent ruling. The second submission is not raised here.
The problem with this hypothesis is that the proofs of the Principle of Halalness (Asalat al-Hilliya) and the proofs of the Principle of Exemption (Asalat al-Bara’ah) do not support it. For example, “Everything is halal for you until you know that it is haram itself” (kullu shay’in laka halalun hatta ta’lama annahu haramun bi-aynih); it does not want to say that you must submit to this as an apparent ruling without it being really halal. The apparent meaning of the proof of the Principle of Purity (Asalat al-Taharah) and the Principle of Halalness is that, ultimately, you should apply the effects of real halalness and purity here. Beyond this, nothing is understood from these proofs. In the Postulate of Continuity (Istishab), it is not like this, and its reason is clear. So in reality, it wants to say here: apply the effects of that very real halalness. Therefore, this hypothesis is also set aside.
Among the four hypotheses, at least three hypotheses were rejected. Keep the second hypothesis for now, until we analyze the other three hypotheses and, God willing, summarize what the truth is regarding the difference between confirmative and non-confirmative principles.