The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), Intellectual Exemption, Second Point
Session Thirty-nine
The Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Intellectual Exemption from Obligation – Second Point: The Basis of Intellectual Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Third Argument – The Objection of Shahid Sadr – Exposition of the Treatise on Rights (Risalat al-Huquq) – The Right of Pilgrimage (Hajj) – Second Right: Fleeing from Sin
November 11, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
We stated that before entering the conventional discussions of Exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), which focus on scriptural exemption, a brief explanation regarding intellectual exemption is necessary. We noted that two aspects are raised in this regard: first, the background and history of intellectual exemption, and second, the basis of intellectual exemption. What is meant by intellectual exemption is the rational rule of the “Ugliness of punishment without declaration” (Qubh al-Iqab bila Bayan).
Several arguments have been mentioned as to why punishment without declaration is ugly. Two arguments were stated and analyzed in the previous session, and we referred to the objections of Shahid Sadr against these two arguments. Two other arguments remain, which we will explain along with the objections Shahid Sadr raised against them. Then, we will examine the view of Shahid Sadr himself; because the essence of his objections to the four arguments is a single matter. That is, he has objected to these arguments based on a single foundation and principle, ultimately denying the “Ugliness of punishment without declaration” and believing that the primary principle in cases where we suspect a duty is precaution (Ihtiyat). He completely denies intellectual exemption and believes that wherever a duty is suspected, one must act upon that duty. Of course, he accepts exemption from the scriptural perspective, but intellectually, he states: intellect rules that acting upon suspected duties is necessary. In fact, this view is based on the principle that wherever a duty is suspected, it is obligatory to act upon it based on the “Right of Obedience” (Haqq al-Ta’ah) and the “Inherent Sovereignty” of the Lawgiver / Legislator.
The Third Argument
The third argument mentioned as the basis for the rule of the “Ugliness of punishment without declaration” is put forward by Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani. Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani states: The ugliness of punishment without declaration, as an intellectual ruling, is an instance of the intellect’s judgment regarding the beauty of justice and the ugliness of injustice. (Of course, we will not enter into what Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani’s own view is regarding intellectual beauty and ugliness. He believes that this judgment of practical intellect is among the “praised opinions” [al-Ara’ al-Mahmudah]; meaning matters upon which rational agents in every era and among every nation agree. We will not enter into this dispute.)
He believes that based on this, punishing someone for a suspected duty about which no declaration has arrived is injustice. From the perspective of the intellect, this act is ugly because it is injustice. According to Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani, the Lawgiver / Legislator can punish a servant who has stepped out of the boundary of servitude and has not performed a duty for which the proof was completed, because sovereignty requires that God assigns duties to the servant, and if the servant opposes and abandons the duty, He holds them accountable. However, where there is no declaration, or in other words, the proof is not completed, if He punishes merely based on the suspicion of duty, it is injustice, and the servant’s opposition to such a duty does not warrant blame, punishment, or reproach.
Therefore, according to Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani, the ruling on the “Ugliness of punishment without declaration” is an instance of the intellect’s judgment on the ugliness of injustice. As mentioned, we currently have no concern here with Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani’s interpretation of the intellect’s judgment in these two cases (the beauty of justice and the ugliness of injustice).
This argument is distinctly different from the previous two arguments. Muhaqqiq al-Naini established this ruling on another basis.
The Objection of Shahid Sadr
Shahid Sadr has also objected to this argument. The basis of his objection is also founded on the very point through which he objected to both the first and second arguments.
He states: This argument is, in reality, a petitio principii (begging the question) under one assumption; and under another assumption, it becomes a proposition with the predicate as a condition of the subject (Qadiyyah bi-Shart al-Mahmul).
He has stated: The duty is not outside of two states: either the proof for the duty is complete, or the proof for the duty is not complete. What does Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani mean by “proof” (Hujjah) and “probative force” (Hujjiyyah)? Two possibilities exist here:
First Possibility: If the meaning of probative force is “that which validates punishment” (Ma Yusahhih al-Iqab). That is, when they say the proof for the duty is complete or not complete, the meaning is something that validates punishment; something that justifies punishment. If this is the meaning, it becomes a “proposition with the predicate as a condition of the subject”; because it is said “punishment without declaration is ugly” or “punishment without proof is ugly.” Its meaning is that punishing for something that is not “that which validates punishment” is ugly. This is a proposition with the predicate as a condition of the subject.
Second Possibility: If the meaning of probative force is “knowledge” (Ilm). That is, punishment for something that does not cause knowledge; punishment for something that has not created knowledge for the duty-bound person. This is the very point of contention (Awwal al-Kalam), which becomes a petitio principii. That is, the proof is identical to the claim. We are fundamentally seeking to see whether knowledge is necessary for performing the duty or not. In this case, the proof becomes identical to the claim, and this is begging the question. Because regarding suspected duties and duties of which we have no knowledge and about which no declaration has reached us, and we merely suspect that the Master has obligated us to perform them, the entire discussion about them is whether abandoning them is injustice or not. If we believe in the inherent sovereignty of God, the Blessed and Exalted, this is no longer injustice. If the Master punishes for abandoning a suspected duty, this is no longer injustice. Therefore, the proof is identical to the claim, and this is a petitio principii.
Question: If he says our intellect says so, how is it a petitio principii?
The Professor: What does injustice mean? Injustice consists of depriving a right-holder of their right. Therefore, in the first place, that right must be recognized so that injustice can find meaning. When we want to recognize the right, we see that God’s right of sovereignty is such that even if a suspicion of duty is held by the servant, yet the servant does not perform the duty, this is stepping out of the state of servitude… We fundamentally have a discussion on this very point. Later we will say whether such a right is established at all or not? Is the “Right of Obedience” (Haqq al-Ta’ah) established or not?
God willing, if there is an opportunity, we will critique and analyze the foundation of Shahid Sadr’s objections to these four arguments in one or two sessions. Because the basis of these objections is established upon his theory of the “Right of Obedience”. The essence of Shahid Sadr’s words in these objections that he has raised against these four arguments is that very theory of the Right of Obedience. This theory has numerous objections, which, God willing, we will address on Saturday if we reach it.
Exposition of the Treatise on Rights (Risalat al-Huquq)
Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) said:
“And the right of Pilgrimage (Hajj) is that you know it is an arrival before your Lord, and a flight to Him from your sins.”
We said that the first right of Hajj is that man knows Hajj is the threshold of entry to the Lord; it is God’s hospitality; it is a mount for man’s movement toward God. We explained this point in brief.
The Second Right: Fleeing from Sin
The second right of Hajj is that you know Hajj is fleeing to Him from your sins:
“and a flight to Him from your sins”
We mentioned in the previous session that Hajj requires certain prior preparations, and at the same time, those very preparations are completed through Hajj itself. Someone who goes to Hajj must certainly strengthen these preparations in themselves at every single moment of the rituals of Hajj. When Imam Sajjad says this (Hajj) is the threshold to God, it means a preparation should be created in him. When he creates these preparations for himself beforehand, his attention will certainly be greater in that place. We referred to some of these cases.
Now the Imam says: Hajj is fleeing to God from your sins. What does this mean? It means we must know Hajj is a set of actions for distancing oneself from sin; fleeing and escaping from sin.
Imam Rida (peace be upon him), according to a narration that Sheikh Saduq narrated in Ilal al-Shara’i, says (the content is almost the same as the words of Imam Sajjad):
“The reason for Hajj is the arrival before God the Almighty…”
He says if someone asks why Hajj has been made obligatory, it will be said that (it is so) that through this order, we enter the threshold of God, the Blessed and Exalted. Hajj is a means for entering the presence of the Almighty.
“…and seeking increase, and exiting from everything the servant has committed, repenting from what has passed, starting anew for what is to come, along with what it contains of spending wealth, exhausting bodies, being occupied away from family and children, restraining the soul from pleasures, traveling in heat and cold, remaining constant upon that always, with humility, submission, and self-abasement.”
Hajj is in fact: entering the divine presence and the threshold of God. “Seeking increase” means asking for abundance in what? In that we ask God for His limitless grace and blessings. That man exits from everything that chains the servant, the sins that have imprisoned man, the shackles that are tied to man’s hands and feet, he exits from these; meaning he comes out of those shackles and chains while he is repenting; he does not intend to return to those shackles. “Repenting from what has passed” means distancing oneself from what was in the past, and “starting anew for what is to come” means as if he wants to start a new path, a new life, a new direction in which he performs these actions.
Then the Imam (PBUH) said: “along with what it contains of spending wealth”
“Spending wealth”: that he spends his wealth. And “exhausting bodies”: putting his body to trouble. “Being occupied away from family and children”: distancing himself from his family and dependents. “Restraining the soul from pleasures”: warning the soul against pleasures. “Traveling in heat and cold”; “remaining constant upon that always”: the meaning is not that he should only be like this during that Hajj journey; rather, he should be constant upon this character and behavior throughout this journey and these actions. “With humility and submission”: he must have self-abasement along with humility and lowliness (meaning he must distance himself from stinginess and similar vices). These points that I presented to you are about the second right of Hajj.
That we only say the right of Hajj is that we enter the presence of God is not sufficient on its own. Entering the presence and threshold of God is not possible without fleeing from sins. Therefore, it has a positive dimension and a negative dimension.
Its positive dimension is movement toward God; meaning that we know we are going toward God. Its negative dimension is that we say we are distancing ourselves from Satan. These two are concomitant. It is impossible to go toward God, yet at the same time be intimate with Satan and have satanic morals. This is not possible at all.
We very often deceive ourselves. That is, on the one hand we say: Well, thank God we perform our duties; we pray, we fast, we perform the obligations, but on the other hand, we commit sins and intend to continue sinning. These two do not combine. This is like a person who has placed a ladder to go up to the roof, but goes up one step, and when he commits a sin, he goes down one step again. He always goes up one step and down one step. To enter the divine threshold, there is no other way than fleeing from sin. Otherwise, we will stop on these very steps. One day we open our eyes and see we are in the very first place. Even this is optimistic. The pessimistic view is falling into the abyss. Then we do not have the possibility of coming out of the abyss.
Imam Baqir (peace be upon him) says in a narration:
“No care is given to the one who aims for this House if he does not possess three traits: a character with which he behaves gently with those who accompany him, or forbearance by which he controls his anger, or piety (Wara’) that restrains him from the prohibitions of God.”
He says: If someone does not have three traits, Hajj is not useful for him and does not help his state; meaning it is ineffective.
The meaning of this statement is not that he must acquire these qualities before Hajj, certainly before Hajj, preparations are necessary, but paying attention to the fact that we must create these traits in ourselves through (performing) Hajj is very important. That is, the Imam (PBUH) wants to say: If someone does not have these traits during the Hajj journey and during the Hajj rituals, and after that, these traits do not appear in him, it is as if his Hajj is useless.
1. “A character with which he behaves gently with those who accompany him”: the morals and method by which he can face his companions and those who are his friends, fellow travelers, or those with whom he associates, with good character. He should put aside bad temper, bad language, and peevishness. If someone goes to Hajj and returns, or behaves like this with his companions during the Hajj journey, it is clear that this Hajj has made no difference in his state. Ziyarah journeys are also like this. A group gathers and goes to Mashhad or Karbala, but they fight and behave badly with each other from the beginning to the end of the journey. Well, it is clear that this journey only has a form (and appearance).
2. “Forbearance by which he controls his anger”: being forbearing and patient, such that he can control his anger. (If) they break off relations with each other over the smallest matters, malice is created in him, and this (state) continues, it is clear that this Hajj has had no benefit for his state.
3. “Piety (Wara’) that restrains him from the prohibitions of God”: piety and godwariness, such that it distances him from the prohibitions of God.
If these states appear in him, this Hajj will be useful for him. Otherwise, it will not be useful for his state.