Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), Intellectual Exemption, Second Topic
Session Forty
Principle of Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Intellectual Exemption – Second Topic: The Basis of Intellectual Exemption from Obligation (Bara’ah) – Fourth Argument – The Critique of Shahid Sadr – First Objection – Second Objection – Analysis of Shahid Sadr’s Objections to the Four Arguments
November 14, 2025
Summary of the Previous Session
We mentioned that regarding intellectual exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) in the sense popular among modern jurists of recent eras, several bases and proofs have been cited. Three arguments and proofs regarding the rule of the ugliness of punishment without declaration were explained, along with the critiques of Shahid Sadr on them.
The Fourth Argument
The fourth proof, which like the third argument was formulated by Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani, states that a ruling is considered a real ruling and possesses motivational force only when it has reached the duty-bound (Mukallaf). If a ruling is not communicated, it lacks motivational force, and whatever lacks motivational force is not, in reality, considered a ruling.
Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani, according to his terminology in the chapter of ruling, divides it into “promulgated ruling” (Hukm Insha’i) and “real ruling” (Hukm Haqiqi). He states: A promulgated ruling is one that is realized merely by legislation and formulation, without assuming any motive of instigation or stimulation. However, a real ruling is one that is legislated fundamentally with the intention of truly instigating the addressee; that is, the Lawgiver / Legislator establishes the ruling so that the duty-bound is stimulated, motivated, and moves toward performing that action. Therefore, motivational and stimulatory force are the primary, essential, and fundamental motives in the promulgation and legislation of a ruling.
If a ruling possesses motivational and stimulatory force, it is truly a ruling; even in testing or mocking commands, this motive exists. For instance, the speaker’s goal might be to test the addressee, as observed in the command of Allah, the Blessed and Exalted, to Abraham (PBUH) to sacrifice Ishmael (PBUH). God’s goal was not the actual slaughter of Ishmael, but rather a test; yet this very ruling was made with the motive of instigating action; meaning the objective was for Abraham (PBUH) to rise, take the knife, lay his son down, and intend the sacrifice. Thus, whenever this motive is present in a ruling, it is a real ruling; and if such a motive is absent and lacks motivational and stimulatory force, it is not, in reality, a ruling. Hence, Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani termed it “promulgated ruling” in contrast to “real ruling.”
He then states: If it is said that the ugliness of punishment without declaration is established, it is because when a ruling is not communicated—meaning that the absence of declaration is concomitant with the non-arrival of the ruling to the duty-bound—then motivational and stimulatory force are no longer realized. When there is no stimulatory force, in reality, no real ruling exists; and when there is no real ruling, punishing someone for abandoning it is meaningless, because punishment presupposes the existence of a ruling, whereas here no ruling exists. If they wish to punish someone for abandoning an action toward which no ruling was directed, it is ugly.
The Critique of Shahid Sadr
The late Shahid Sadr (RA) has raised objections to this proof as well, following the same pattern as the previous three arguments, stating:
The First Objection
The mere promulgation of a ruling can, in itself, possess a stimulatory effect under the assumption of probable communication. This means that if the duty-bound deems a duty probable—here, Shahid Sadr himself does not believe in the necessity of caution (Ihtiyat), but where there is a probability of duty, or in his terms, “probable communication” is realized—the Right of Obedience (Haqq al-Ta’ah) and the Right of Mastership (Haqq al-Mawlawiyyah) demand that the duty-bound perform that probable duty.
He states that this argument is, in reality, a petitio principii (begging the question); because the primary dispute is over the breadth or narrowness of the “Right of Obedience” and “Right of Mastership.” The proponent of the argument has, in fact, assumed the Right of Obedience to be narrow, limiting its scope to communicated or definitely reached duties, while refusing to accept probable duties as falling under the Right of Obedience. However, this very issue is the initial point of contention and constitutes begging the question. We aim to say that the scope of the Right of Obedience is broader than this limit and encompasses probable duties as well.
Therefore, his first objection is that if we consider the scope of the Right of Obedience to be broad, as is correct, then those duties whose declaration is deemed probable must be performed.
The Second Objection
He states that even if we accept that a ruling in the sense described by Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani does not exist (conceding that a real ruling has not been realized), the performance of the probable duty is still intellectually necessary. This is because the criterion of a ruling is the benefit (Maslahah) and harm (Mafsadah) present in the subject matter of the ruling, and indeed, even higher than that, the will (Iradah) and aversion (Karahah) of the Master Himself. These are ontological realities preserved with God, and this suffices for the necessity of performance.
To explain: when we deem a duty probable, even if we assume that no ruling exists, what does the probability of duty mean? It means that I deem it probable that this action contains a benefit or that action contains a harm. Therefore, if I deem the existence of harm probable, my intellect tells me that I must avoid it, even if no ruling is in place. When I deem the existence of benefit probable, my intellect tells me that I must perform it. When I deem it probable that Allah, the Blessed and Exalted, is pleased with an action, I have in fact deemed the attachment of the Divine will probable. Or if I consider an action probably prohibited, even if I am certain that no real ruling has been issued, its criterion still exists, which is the aversion of God. When I deem the prohibition of an action probable, meaning I deem it probable that God Almighty is displeased with this action and has an aversion to it, even if I am certain that no ruling has been issued, performance (or avoidance) is still necessary.
Thus, the ultimate point of Muhaqqiq al-Isfahani’s words is that the ruling does not exist; but can it be said that the criterion of the ruling is also absent? That the preliminaries of the ruling are absent? That the Divine will and aversion are absent? This cannot be said. When we deem them probable, their performance is necessary. The Right of Obedience demands that as long as I know something is beloved or detested in the domain of the Master’s soul, it is intellectually incumbent upon me to act accordingly. The Right of Obedience possesses such an implication. The Right of Mastership is undoubtedly the same.
As I mentioned in the previous session, Shahid Sadr states: The conclusion is that none of these four arguments can prove the ugliness of punishment without declaration; meaning that intellectual exemption from obligation (Bara’ah) is refuted. In his view, the intellect rules that the performance of every probable duty is necessary. In other words, the requirement of the intellectual ruling regarding probable duties is caution (Ihtiyat). The primary principle in probable duties, i.e., in cases of doubt (Shubuhat), according to the intellect, is caution; except in cases where the Lawgiver / Legislator Himself has granted permission and license to abandon those duties, which is limited to the extent of license granted by indicative evidences (Amarat) and practical principles to abandon these duties, whether obligatory or prohibitory; beyond this, we cannot negate the duty and rule in favor of exemption from obligation (Bara’ah).
Question:
Professor: They, in fact, believe in caution in cases of doubt; however, their basis for the necessity of caution is scriptural evidence. I do not mean that they have no proof for the ugliness of punishment without declaration. The issue of repelling probable harm has also been raised by them, but their main basis is scriptural evidence, which they say requires caution. In any case, the foundation of that theory is different from this perspective.
Of course, we have previously stated that this theory is famous as the “Theory of the Right of Obedience” (Nazariyyat Haqq al-Ta’ah). About thirteen or fourteen years ago, or perhaps more, we discussed and analyzed this theory in detail in the Usul lessons, the written text of which has also been published. You may refer to it for a detailed study. However, here I will refer to it very briefly, within one or two sessions, so that the foundation of this discourse, which has important implications, becomes clear. Now is not the time for detail; in one or two sessions, I will briefly explain this theory and its critiques.
Analysis of Shahid Sadr’s Objections to the Four Arguments
The discussion concerns intellectual exemption from obligation (Bara’ah), namely the ugliness of punishment without declaration, which has become famous among jurists since the time of Wahid Behbahani and has dominated the atmosphere of the science of Usul. The late Shahid Sadr, who is introduced as the originator of the Theory of the Right of Obedience and recognized as its innovator, proposed it and denied intellectual exemption from obligation (Bara’ah).
Regarding whether this theory is truly his or if its roots were discussed before him, it must be said that some others are also mentioned; for example, it is said that the late Akhund has indications of this matter in the book Kifayah. Also, the late Mr. Damad (in the book Muhadarat, which is the transcripts of his Usul lessons compiled in three volumes by the late Mr. Taheri Isfahani, a student of the late Mr. Damad and the Friday Prayer Leader of Isfahan) addressed the Right of Obedience. This book did not have a suitable print, but it is now available among the collected works of the late Mr. Damad.
The author of Muntaqa al-Usul, although he did not explicitly state this path, denies the ugliness of punishment without declaration and says: Punishment for opposing a probable duty is not ugly.
In any case, the late Shahid Sadr expanded this theory, explained it, and established a framework for it. After him, some of the students of the late Mr. Sadr also accepted this path.
The summary of this theory is that if a duty is definite and certain, the intellect rules in favor of caution; because a certain engagement of duty (Ishtighal Yaqini) demands a certain discharge of duty (Faragh Yaqini). But if the duty is probable, caution is still obligatory, and the intellect rules that caution is necessary.
Therefore, from the intellectual perspective, whether a duty is definite or probable, one must exercise caution. In the case of a probable duty, the reason is the Right of Obedience; and in the case of a certain duty, it is because a certain engagement of duty has occurred, and the intellect says one must act so that certain discharge of duty is achieved.
This issue has an impact on several areas of the science of Usul and is not limited solely to this discussion; rather, it has a significant impact on the reconciliation between real and apparent rulings, the indicator status of cumulative knowledge (Ilm Ijmali), the discussion of audacity in disobedience (Tajarri), the possibility of devotional adherence to speculative evidence (Tabbud bi al-Zann), and the authority of single-narrator reports (Hujjiyyat Khabar al-Wahid).
Discussion of the Next Session
In any case, very briefly, God willing, tomorrow we will try to conclude the discussion, make a brief reference to this theory and its critiques, and pass over it.