The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof

Session Sixty-Four

The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, First Part: Lifting, Third Topic: Apparent or Actual Lifting?, The Statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi, The Fifth Evidence and Its Analysis

December 27, 2025

Summary of the Previous Session

We mentioned that regarding the Hadith of Lifting, certain matters must be examined in terms of indicative value (dalalat). The third topic is about the lifting in terms of whether it is apparent or actual; is the “lifting” apparent or actual? This aspect is decisive in the indicative value of the Hadith of Lifting regarding our claim, namely, Exemption.

As was stated, evidences and proofs have been mentioned for the opinion of apparent lifting. Up to this point, four evidences have been examined. Three evidences and proofs were stated by the late Mr. Khoei, which were examined, and we transmitted one evidence from Muhaqqiq Iraqi, which was also examined. An objection had been raised against his evidence, namely, the requirement of the position of imtinan (granting a favor), whose examination has passed.

The Fifth Evidence

The fifth evidence and proof, which is transmitted in the words of Muhaqqiq Iraqi, is a proof consisting of two premises. By joining these two premises, he seeks to prove that “lifting” here is apparent lifting.

The First Premise: The lifting of everything is the contradiction (naqid) of its existence. That is, the lifting of anything is considered the contradiction of the existence of that thing. If something exists, its lifting (its removal) is the contradiction of its existence.

The Second Premise: Two contradictory things (naqidan) exist at the same level (fi martabatin wahidah); two contradictory things are parallel to one another and at the same level.

The Conclusion: The lifting must be at the same level as the lifted object (marfu’); meaning the level of these two must be identical. If we consider the lifting to be actual, its requirement is that the lifting and the lifted object do not stand at the same level, but rather precede and succeed one another. Therefore, we are compelled to say that the lifting here is apparent lifting. This is the conclusion he derives from these two premises.

The first premise is clear; “the lifting of everything is its contradiction” is virtually obvious and is not much subject to debate.

However, the second premise, which says “contradictory things exist at the same level,” means that two contradictories exist at one and the same level. It is impossible for one of the two contradictories to be at one level and the other contradictory to be at another level. Indeed, if they are not at the same level, contradiction has no meaning. One of the conditions for the realization of a contradiction is level-based unity (wahdat rutbiyyah). If they are not at the same level, we cannot refer to two things as contradictories at all. Apparently, this also poses no problem.

The main point is how this matter applies to our discussion. In our subject of discussion (ma nahnufih), what are these two contradictories? He says: The lifting of everything is the contradiction of its existence. We want to see what is the contradiction of “lifting” itself. Since “the lifting of everything is the contradiction of its existence,” the contradiction consists of the lifted object (marfu’). Therefore, we must evaluate “lifting” and “the lifted object” and state that they are at the same level (fi martabatin wahidah).

Now, if we say that the lifted object (that which is lifted) is an apparent ruling and the lifting is also apparent, these will stand at the same level. However, if we say that the lifting is apparent and the lifted object is an actual ruling, their level will no longer be identical.

The reason is that the lifting of a thing is subsequent to the doubt in that thing or the ignorance regarding that thing. Therefore, we must first consider the actual ruling itself, then consider the doubt regarding it [the actual ruling], and then consider its lifting. Consequently, the lifting becomes subsequent to the actual ruling by two stages: first, the existence of the actual ruling; then, the doubt regarding it; and then, its lifting. Because it is stated in the hadith: “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” (lifted is that which they do not know); what does it want to remove? It removes “that which they do not know”. Therefore, the lifted object (that which is lifted) is that which we doubt, but what do we doubt? We doubt its actual ruling.

That is, as if with this explanation, the meaning of the hadith becomes: That regarding whose actual ruling you are in doubt is apparently lifted. Here, the lifting becomes subsequent to the doubt or ignorance regarding the actual ruling by two levels; whereas contradictories must be at the same level (fi martabatin wahidah). If the lifting is at the level of the apparent ruling, this statement is correct: apparent lifting removes the apparent ruling [not the actual ruling]. If it wanted to remove the actual ruling, it would become subsequent by two stages.

Therefore, we cannot say that actual lifting or the lifting of the actual ruling occurs, but rather the lifting of the apparent ruling occurs or it performs apparent lifting. Otherwise, it is not compatible with the second premise, which states: “Contradictory things exist at the same level.” The first premise also remains preserved in its place. This technical and formal proof is from Muhaqqiq Iraqi.

Examination of the Fifth Evidence

An objection has also been raised against this proof and evidence. An important objection raised here is that this evidence and proof is exactly like the matter raised in the issue of incorporating the intention of closeness to Allah (qasd al-qurbah) into the object of the ruling (muta’allaq al-hukm) or incorporating the condition of knowledge (qayd al-‘ilm) into the object of the ruling.

If you recall, one of the reasons for the non-exclusivity of rulings to the knowledgeable was that if rulings were exclusive to the knowledgeable (conditioned upon knowledge), a vicious circle (dawr) would arise. If the condition of knowledge of the ruling were to be incorporated into the command itself, a vicious circle would arise here. For example, as if it said: “I command you to perform Friday prayer, on the condition that you gain knowledge of the obligatoriness of Friday prayer.” They have stated that this is impossible, because it necessitates a vicious circle. Because on the one hand, the knowledge of the ruling depends on the ruling; meaning the ruling that is to be formulated and legislated itself depends on the duty-bound’s knowledge of that ruling. On the other hand, knowledge of the ruling also depends on the ruling itself and is at a subsequent level to it. Knowledge of the ruling is subsequent, because as long as there is no ruling, knowledge of it has no meaning, and this is a vicious circle: knowledge of the ruling depends on the ruling, and the ruling also depends on knowledge of the ruling. Therefore, they have always stated that incorporating the condition of knowledge of the ruling in any ruling necessitates a vicious circle.

This point mentioned by Muhaqqiq Iraqi is exactly like this circular objection raised elsewhere, through which they wanted to conclude that the lifting of the actual ruling itself cannot occur; the lifting of the actual ruling cannot occur. This is the same and makes no difference. It is exactly like incorporating the intention of complying with the command (qasd al-imtithal) into the object of the command; this is of that very same kind.

Someone who considers the intention of closeness or the intention of complying with the command to be valid in a ruling cannot incorporate this condition into the very ruling he formulates, because the problem of a vicious circle arises. On the one hand, the command depends on the intention of complying with the command (when we say the intention of complying with the command, there must be a command toward which the intention is directed). On the other hand, the command itself depends on the intention of compliance. This becomes a vicious circle: the intention of complying with the command depends on the command, and the command also depends on the intention of complying with the command. And this is a clear and obvious vicious circle.

Here, it is the same. When he says “contradictories exist at the same level,” if the Lawgiver wants to legislate the ruling, He must say: this [ruling] is only for someone who is knowledgeable. Because if He wants to do this, a vicious circle arises; because knowledge of the ruling depends on the ruling itself. Knowledge of the ruling depends on the known object (ma’lum). There must be a known object so that this [person] can gain knowledge of it. Therefore, level-wise, knowledge is subsequent to the known object.

Now, if the Lawgiver wants to restrict His ruling (which is the known object itself) to knowledge, a vicious circle arises; because knowledge of the ruling (meaning the known object itself) depends on the known object itself, and on the other hand, the known object itself and the ruling itself have also been restricted to this condition. Therefore, this is a clear and obvious vicious circle.

Muhaqqiq Iraqi, in fact, through this method, sought to prove his claim that here the lifting cannot be actual; because if the lifting were actual, a vicious circle would arise. Therefore, first, the objector explains the statement of Muhaqqiq Iraqi well as to what the basis of his speech is—which is recorded in the transcripts of the late Na’ini in the book Fawa’id al-Usul—that he wanted to object to the Sheikh; there seems to be no justification for this objection.

He says: According to the apparent meaning of the hadith, since the actual ruling itself is unknown, it itself is lifted. Of course, one of the results of lifting that unknown ruling is the non-obligatoriness of precaution. Otherwise, that this unknown ruling is apparently lifted is definite, meaning the Lawgiver establishes a latitude (sa’ah) for us.

Question: …

Teacher: This dependence of knowledge on the ruling and the ruling on knowledge; the meaning of “ruling” here is different. Knowledge of the ruling depends on the external existence of the ruling. However, on the other hand, when we say the ruling depends on knowledge, what is meant is that the mental existence of the ruling depends on the knowledge of the ruling.

Question: …

Teacher: He who says this [proof] is exactly like that [previous proof], this response also applies here. Why? You may say: what difference does it make? We have dependence. We say: knowledge itself… yes, knowledge of the ruling… [this] is similar to saying that knowledge of this school depends on the external existence of this school. Is this correct or not? Therefore, knowledge of a thing depends on the external existence of that [thing]. However, can we, from the other side, say that this very subject is restricted to a condition in which knowledge is incorporated? … It makes no difference; is this: “prayer” plus the intention, not the mental existence itself? Now, we must examine this to see whether it is possible or not.

This is the response that the late Shahid Sadr gave to him, and through this path, he wanted to conclude that this [lifting] is not apparent lifting; it can also be at one level and there is no problem either.