The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof
Session Seventy-One
The Principle of Exemption (Bara’ah), The Proofs of Exemption, Second Proof: Narrations, First Narration: The Hadith of Lifting, Examination of the Indicative Value of the Hadith of Lifting, 2. The Relative Pronoun “ma”, First Topic: The Literal or Figurative Nature of the Attribution, Examination of the Statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini, Possibilities in Figurative Attribution, The First Possibility and Its Examination, The First Objection
January 13, 2026
Summary of the Previous Session
The discussion was on whether the attribution of lifting to “ma la ya’lamun” (that which they do not know), “ma la yatiqun” (that which they cannot bear), and their likes is a literal or figurative attribution.
Muhaqqiq Na’ini stated: the attribution is literal, and therefore they do not require a legitimizing factor (musahhih). If the attribution were figurative, it would require a legitimizing factor. A legitimizing factor is necessary in one of two scenarios: either we consider the lifting to be ontological, or we say that “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” is introduced in the position of news-conveying (ikhbar). If the lifting is ontological, we require a legitimizing factor because otherwise falsehood (kidhb) is necessitated; the legitimizing factor is the implication of an omitted word; if we do not imply something as omitted, falsehood is necessitated. Likewise, if this sentence is in the position of news-conveying, we must still imply something as omitted because we see that these descriptions exist among the Islamic nation. However, since the lifting in this hadith is not ontological, and since this sentence was introduced by the Prophet as a legislative formulation (insha’), we do not need a legitimizing factor or to imply any omitted word. Therefore, when it is not necessary for us to imply something as omitted, the attribution becomes literal. In the event that the attribution is figurative, that which is lifted is either all effects, or the apparent effect, or the punishment; “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” i.e., “the lifting of the punishment for that which they do not know” and its likes. If this were the case, the attribution would be figurative, but since we do not need to imply an omitted element, that very thing itself is lifted and the attribution becomes literal, similar to “there is no harm and no inflicting of harm” (la darar wa la dirar) or “there is no doubt for the frequent doubter” (la shakka li-kathir al-shakk); there, too, we do not imply anything as omitted. Because they are both in the position of legislative formulation and do not perform ontological negation, but rather it is legislative negation, and legislative negation in “there is no harm and no inflicting of harm in Islam” means the negation of a harmful ruling.
This was the summary of Muhaqqiq Na’ini’s statement.
Examination of the Statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini
Several objections are directed at this statement of Muhaqqiq Na’ini.
The First Objection
This sentence issued by the Prophet (PBUH) is in the position of news-conveying (ikhbar), not legislative formulation (insha’); meaning that the Messenger of Allah reports the divine formulation, as in other cases. In many instances, the Prophet reports the divine ruling, and here is also one of those cases; meaning that Allah has lifted the ruling that is unknown, and what He has lifted is what we must discuss. The purpose is that this is not legislative formulation but rather news-conveying.
Of course, our saying that this is news-conveying is not because the Prophet has no right of legislative formulation or no right of legislation—it is settled that the Prophet has the right of legislative formulation in some cases (apart from those cases that took on a governmental dimension)—a series of rulings such as the third and fourth cycles of prayer (rak’ah), which have been referred to as “the Prophet’s mandate” (fard al-Nabi), were the legislation and formulation of the Prophet; it is not from this gate, but rather the meaning is that this case is not among the cases of the Prophet’s legislation.
And this is supported by the very expression rufi’a (has been lifted) which says “it has been lifted”; had it been the Prophet’s legislative formulation, he would say rafa’tu ma la ya’lamuna (I have lifted that which they do not know); had he wanted to legislate and formulate by this very sentence, he would have stated it in this manner, whereas he stated rufi’a; this is itself a support for this meaning.
Of course, “there is no doubt for the frequent doubter,” or even “there is no harm and no inflicting of harm,” are also, according to the popular opinion, news-conveying, not legislative formulation. If we say “there is no harm and no inflicting of harm” is a governmental and sovereign ruling, then it is the Prophet’s formulation, as some believe, including Shari’at Isfahani and Imam Khomeini, who consider it a governmental and sovereign ruling; however, the popular opinion which states that this means the negation of a harmful ruling, there too the Prophet reports, not formulates. Therefore, even the comparison to “there is no doubt for the frequent doubter” and “there is no harm and no inflicting of harm” is incorrect.
Thus, the conclusion is that he stated: this sentence is legislative, so it does not need a legitimizing factor or an omitted element, and consequently the attribution is literal. But we, in contrast, submit that this is news-conveying and requires a legitimizing factor, and consequently we must imply something as omitted.
The Second Objection
Even if we assume (sallamna) that this sentence is legislative—meaning that, as Muhaqqiq Na’ini stated, the Prophet said “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” in the position of legislative formulation—still it requires a legitimizing factor. His stating that if this is legislative formulation it does not need a legitimizing factor is incorrect, because legislative formulation does not differ from news-conveying in this regard. Let us assume the Prophet legislates with this sentence, but what does he legislate? “ma la ya’lamun” (that which they do not know) itself is not the lifted object, so here too we must imply something as omitted; ultimately, the attribution of an action to other than what it is for (isnad al-fi’l ila ghayri ma huwa lah), even if it occurs in a legislative sentence, requires a legitimizing factor.
Therefore, his stating that if the sentence is legislative we do not need a legitimizing factor is invalidated in two ways, and the result is that this attribution is a figurative, not literal, attribution.
The Third Objection
His stating that if this lifting were ontological lifting we would need a legitimizing factor, but since it is not ontological lifting we do not need a legitimizing factor, is itself perhaps open to reflection. Because legislative lifting, which is also the assumption of Muhaqqiq Na’ini, is problematic in some forms if it is to attach to the ruling itself. The lifting of the ruling itself is meaningless; rather, we must say the lifting of the objects of the ruling. We shall raise this discussion later: whether “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” relates to external subject matters or also encompasses ruling-directed doubts. Some, in objecting to the argumentation based on this narration for Exemption, stated that what is lifted here is particular doubts (shubhat mawdu’iyyah), not ruling-directed doubts (shubhat hukmiyyah). If this is proven, it is clear that the Hadith of Lifting is of no use for the argumentation for Exemption. We want to prove that where the ruling and obligation are doubtful to us, we apply Exemption. Now, if someone says “ma la ya’lamun” does not encompass ruling-directed doubts, we might not be able to argue on the basis of the Hadith of Lifting for Exemption.
Therefore, what Muhaqqiq Na’ini stated in this context—namely that this attribution is literal and does not require a legitimizing factor, and therefore it is not necessary to imply something as omitted—is invalidated.
Possibilities in Figurative Attribution
If we say the attribution is figurative, it inevitably requires a legitimizing factor. Ultimately, if the attribution of lifting to “ma la ya’lamun” is figurative, its requirement is that we imply a word as omitted, and without such implication, the attribution of lifting is not acceptable at all. Regarding what is implied as omitted in this speech and what the lifting is attributed to, there is disagreement. Several views and perspectives exist. Sheikh Ansari referred to these possibilities in Al-Rasa’il, mentioning at least three possibilities there and examining them. We shall now mention these three possibilities, and of course some other possibilities are also open to examination here.
The First Possibility and Its Examination
The First Possibility: That which is implied as omitted is the punishment (al-mu’akhadhah); “rufi’a ma la ya’lamun” meaning “the lifting of the punishment for that which they do not know.” Punishment, chastisement, and holding accountable regarding something that is doubted and unknown (whether it be a ruling or a subject, which we shall examine later) is lifted. Or, for example, if someone does something by error or performs or omits something by forgetfulness, the punishment for the error, the punishment for the forgetfulness, and the punishment for the unknown is removed.
Therefore, according to this possibility, the word “punishment” is implied as omitted, and the lifting is in reality attributed to that omitted element, and in view of it, “ma la ya’lamun”, “ma la yatiqun”, error, and forgetfulness are mentioned. Now, is this possibility acceptable or not?
The First Objection
Several objections are directed at the first possibility:
The First Objection: Punishment is an ontological matter and an action of the Master, and therefore has nothing to do with the duty-bound. Punishment means that the Master, on the Day of Resurrection, holds people accountable and chastises them for omitting or performing some matters, and this is an ontological matter and the result of opposing the legislative command. Therefore, the lifting of the punishment for “ma la ya’lamun” has no connection to the duty-bound for the Prophet to mention it. The lifting of the punishment for a doubted ruling and obligation or a doubted subject has no connection to the duty-bound. The assumption is that the lifting here is not ontological lifting but rather legislative lifting; therefore, it cannot attach to punishment, which is an ontological matter and an action of the Master.
Question: …
Professor: There, everything is within the scope of legislation. The Lawgiver bima huwa Lawgiver is what is intended. We do not look at the aspect of the Necessary Being and absolute power here. A legislator can only remove what he himself has enacted. The Lawgiver cannot perform a miracle bima huwa Lawgiver; we say the Lawgiver bima huwa capable-on-an-absolute-basis can perform a miracle, but the Lawgiver bima huwa Lawgiver can no longer perform a miracle; there, it is a discussion of law and legislation, and therefore we say his path is the path of rational beings, rather the chief of the rational beings, and he acts in the same manner as the rational beings.
Therefore, the Lawgiver can remove things that he himself has enacted, but what about something that fundamentally does not relate to the Lawgiver, such as the desert of punishment—what relation does it have to the Lawgiver? It is reason that says whether the desert of punishment exists here or not; therefore, the Lawgiver cannot say: contrary to the ruling of reason, you have no desert of punishment here. Can the Lawgiver combine two contradictories?
Question: …
Professor: We spoke of the discussion of miracles; we said the Lawgiver bima huwa Lawgiver has fundamentally nothing to do with miracles. The sphere of legislative formulation is different from the sphere of ontological creation by Allah. The Lawgiver cannot say: I declare from today that those who have committed sins have no desert of punishment. Because it has nothing to do with the Lawgiver; it is reason that says the sinner deserves punishment and the obedient deserves reward.
Yes, the Lawgiver can say: O sinners, I have forgiven your sin today; I do not punish you. Meaning: despite your possessing the desert of punishment, I do not punish you; He reports the absence of His own punishment, which falls within the scope of legislation. However, for Him to say: O people, whichever of you is a sinner does not possess the desert of punishment either—this is impossible because it has nothing to do with the Lawgiver. It is reason that, when it sees the Lawgiver has enacted a law, rules that whoever obeys this law deserves reward and whoever opposes this law deserves punishment. This is the ruling of reason, and the Lawgiver has no entry into this domain.